ML16161A867

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Insp Repts 50-269/87-30,50-270/87-30 & 50-287/87-30 on 870721-24.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Questions Concerning Operation W/Low Pressure Svc Water Sys Inlet Temp Greater than Design Basis Value Given in FSARs
ML16161A867
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  
Issue date: 08/07/1987
From: Jape F, Matt Thomas
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML16161A866 List:
References
50-269-87-30, 50-270-87-30, 50-287-87-30, NUDOCS 8708270297
Download: ML16161A867 (6)


See also: IR 05000269/1987030

Text

SREGo

UNITED STATES

0

oNUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.:

50-269/87-30, 50-270/87-30, and 50-287/87-30

Licensee:

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270,

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and

and 50-287

DPR-55

Facility Name:

Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection Con ucted:

July 21-24, 1987

Inspector: ___

-

jIrazkz8187

M. Thodas

Date Signed

Approved by::__

F. Jape, Chief

Odte Signed

Test Programs Section

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of followup on

questions concerning operation with low pressure service water (LPSW)

system

inlet temperature greater than the design basis value given in the FSARs and

followup on previous open items.

Results:

One violation was identified.

Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59

evaluation for operation with LPSW inlet temperature above 75F, paragraph 5.

8708270297 870814

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

0

PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  1. P. M. Abraham, Design Engineer, Safety Analysis Section
  1. R. C. Bucy, Design Engineer, Safety Analysis Section
  1. P. F. Guill, Licensing Engineer
  1. D. M. Hubbard, Performance Engineer
    • M. D. McIntosh, Acting General Manager for Nuclear Stations
    • J. F. Norris, Design Engineer, M&N Division
    1. F. E. Owens, Regulatory Compliance
  1. R. L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
    1. M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager
    • E. M. Weaver, Design Engineer, Station Support

Other licensee employees contacted included test coordinators, engineers,

operators,

and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

    1. J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector
    1. P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
    1. L. D. Wert, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview.
  1. Attended NRR/Region II meeting on July 21, 1987.
    • Attended NRR/Region II meeting by phone on July 21, 1987.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 24, 1987, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The following new

item was identified during this inspection.

Violation 50-269, 270, 287/87-30-01, Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59

Evaluation for Operation with LPSW Inlet Temperature Above 750 F,

paragraph 5.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

2

4.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. LPSW Inlet Temperature in Excess of FSAR Value

The inspector followed .up on the Unresolved Item

(UNR)

269,

270,

287/87-23-01,

concerning plant operation with LPSW inlet temperature

greater than the design basis value as specified in the FSAR.

Because the lake water temperature is expected to exceed the FSAR value

of 750 F by August 1, 1987,

a meeting was held at the Oconee site on

July 21, 1987, to discuss this issue.

The meeting was attended by NRC

representatives from NRR and Region II,

and Duke Power Company (DPC)

representatives from the site and the General Office.

At the meeting, the

licensee stated that the following actions are being considered due to the

combination of high lake water temperatures and the degraded capabilities

of the Units 1 and 2 low pressure injection (LPI)

and reactor building

cooling units (RBCUs)

coolers (which have not-been fully cleaned and

tested):

(a) A modification to the Confirmatory Order (issued by NRC on April 10,

1987 for Unit 1) will be issued to DPC.

(b) The licensee will submit a Technical Specification (TS)

change for

Unit 2 for NRC approval prior to the lake water temperature exceeding

800F.

(c) Unit 3 can operate at 100% power,

based on the results of the

licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

(d) The licensee will submit the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to the NRC

prior to the lake water temperature exceeding 750 F.

During the meeting, the licensee stated that the lake water temperature

had exceeded 750F for various lengths of time during nine of the past 11

years.

It was further stated that, prior to the question being raised by

the inspector (NRC

Inspection Report 269,

270,

287/87-17),

lake water

temperature above 750 F had not been evaluated for impact on plant

operation nor on the design bases accident analyses.

The inspector

questioned licensee personnel

as to why the elevated lake water

temperature had not been previously evaluated, and whether there was a

mechanism for ascertaining when FSAR values that are used in procedures

or accident analyses have been exceeded.

The licensee stated that FSAR

values used in design calculations, procedures,

etc., are constantly

being reviewed as a result of the emergency condenser circulating water

(ECCW)

problem; NRC Appendix R inspections; and safety system functional

inspections performed by both NRC and DPC.

However, the licensee stated

that the higher lake water temperature had not been previously evaluated

prior to the question being raised by the inspector, because of an

apparent oversight.

The inspector informed the licensee that failure to

3

perform a safety evaluation to determine if operation with higher lake

water temperature constituted an unreviewed safety question or not, is a

violation of NRC requirement 10 CFR 50.59.

Therefore, unresolved item

50-269,

270,

287/87-23-01 will be closed and a violation will be

identified.

The violation will be tracked as

item 50-269,

270,

287/87-30-01, Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Operation

with LPSW Inlet Temperature Above 750F.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Followup on Open Items (92701)

a.

(Closed)

IFI 269/85-40-01,

Concerning Followup on Licensee Actions

to Resolve the Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV)

Blowdown Problems.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's post trip review reports for

Unit 1 reactor trips which occurred on January 21, 1986 and May 10,

1986.

Per the trip report of January 21,

1986, work requests (WR

20653D/53688D) were written for MSRV IMS-8 because the valve did not

reseat properly (approximately 975 psig).

This did not appear to be

a problem in that the blowdown pressure setpoint for valve IMS-8 to

reseat is 977 psig.

There were not reported problems with any of

the other MSRVs.

This indicates that the licensee's program for

rebuilding the MSRVs appears to have solved the problem.

This item is considered closed.

b. (Closed) UNR 269/85-40-02, Concerning a Determination by the Licensee

as to the Reportability of the Pressurizer Code Safety Valves Lifting

Outside of their Setpoint Tolerances During Testing.

The licensee

evaluated the valves with high lift

setpoints and concluded that the

valves did not represent a safety concern nor a technical

inoperability.

Per intrastation letters, dated June 9, 1986,

and

May 6, 1987, and with the implementation of the Problem Investigation

Report Station Directive, the licensee has more clearly defined and

documented guidelines and criteria to evaluate for reportability

pressurizer code safety valves that have been tested with high lift

setpoints.

This item is considered closed.

c.

(Closed)

IFI 287/85-31-01,

Concerning Repairs to Unit 3 Reactor

Building Grating.

The licensee replaced all the missing tie-down

clips and secured the grating per work request WR 53478D. This was

done prior to Unit 3 restarting from the refueling which it was in

at the time the concern was identified.

The licensee stated during

this inspection that a program for securing reactor building grating

during refueling has been implemented for all three units.

This item is considered closed.

~r,.

4

d.

(Closed)

IFI 269,

270,

287/86-06-01,

Concerning Review of Final

Resolution to Discrepancy Identified During Performance of Periodic

Test PT/0/A/0610/02.

The inspector reviewed the periodic test in

question, which was approved March 3, 1986.

All test discrepancies

were resolved and test acceptance criteria met.

This item is considered closed.

e.

(Closed)

TI 2500/16, Concerning Licensee Handling of IE Information

Notice 85-45,

Determine If a Seismic Interaction Exists Between

Movable Incore Flux Mapping Systems and Seal Table at Westinghouse

Designed Facilities or Facilities with a Similar Design.

The

licensee evaluated Information Notice 85-45 and concluded in a

memorandum, dated August 19, 1985, that the notice was not applicable

to Oconee since Oconee is a Babcock & Wilcox (B&W)

designed plant.

It

was also stated that no seismic interactions or installation

deficiencies were found that would hinder proper functioning of the

Unit 1 incore detector system (which is similar to the flux mapping

system used in Westinghouse designed plants).

This item is considered closed.

AUG 0 7 1987

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287

License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Duke Power Company

LATTN:

Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President

Nuclear Production Department

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC

28242

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/87-28, 50-270/87-28 AND 50-287/87-28

This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

inspection conducted by

N. Economos on July 13-16,

1987.

The inspection included a review of

activities authorized for your Oconee facility.

At the conclusion of the

inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff

identified in the enclosed inspection report.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.

Within

these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures

and, representative records,

interviews with personnel,

and observation of

activities in progress.

Within the scope of the inspection,

no violations or deviations were

identified.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10,

Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

8708170297 670807

Alan R. Herdt, Chief

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

Engineering Branch

0

PDR

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report

cc w/encl:

LM

S. Tuckman, Station Manager

8

bcc w/encl:

Resident Inspector

W. Pastis,

NRR

State of South Ca olina

N conomos:gb

iake

Peebles

08/3 /87

8/4 /87

08/ /87