ML16161A812
| ML16161A812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A811 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-02, 50-269-87-2, 50-270-87-02, 50-270-87-2, 50-287-87-02, 50-287-87-2, EA-87-043, EA-87-43, NUDOCS 8705190320 | |
| Download: ML16161A812 (2) | |
Text
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Power Company Docket Nos. 50-269, 270, 287 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3 License Nos. DPR-38, 47, 55 EA 87-43 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on January 26-30, 1987, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), the violation is listed below:
A.
10 CFR 50.48(b) requires, in part, that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 shall satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, including specifically,Section III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability.
Section III.G.2 specifies that, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, a means to ensure that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided.
Section III.G.3 requires an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of cables, systems or components in the specified fire area under consideration where the protection of systems does not satisfy the requirements of Paragraph G.2.
Contrary to the above, as of January 26, 1987, cabling to the motor operator for the letdown cooler B outlet valve (HP-4), for each Oconee unit, which is required to satisfy the alternative shutdown capability of Section III.G.3 above, was not independent of the specific design basis fire area. The cabling was routed through the east penetration room, the design basis fire area. A fire in this area could result in the loss of reactor coolant inventory in excess of the makeup capacity of the specified safe shutdown equipment.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the violation if admitted, (2) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified 870 519032 0 870505
~0,CK 05000269 pDR A O 70 0
- 2 in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ORIGINAL SIGNED BY A.F. Gibson J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this54-day of May 1987