ML16161A333
| ML16161A333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  (DPR-38-A-303, DPR-47-A-303, DPR-55-A-303) |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1999 |
| From: | Emch R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A334 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905040260 | |
| Download: ML16161A333 (10) | |
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e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-270 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 303 License No. DPR-47
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility)
Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated March 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9905040260 990428 PDR ADOCK 05000269 p
-2 B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.
303, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Richard L. Emch, Jr., Section Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:
April 28, 1999
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 303 License No. DPR-55
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility)
Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated March 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical.
Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:
-2 B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 303
, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Richard L. Emch, Jr., Section Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:
April 28, 1999
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 DOCKET NO. 50-269 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 DOCKET NO. 50-270 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DOCKET NO. 50-287 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.9.3-1 3.9.3-1 B3.9.3-2 B3.9.3-2 B3.9.3-3 B3.9.3-3 B3.9.3-4 B3.9.3-4 B3.9.3-5 B3.9.3-5
0 0
Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
- a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts;
- b. One door in each air lock closed; and
---NOTE-------------
An emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed.
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
- 1. closed by a manual, non-automatic power operated or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or
- 2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Reactor Building Purge supply and exhaust isolation signal.
APPLICABILITY:
During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately containment ALTERATIONS penetrations not in required status.
AND A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.9.3-1 Amendment Nos. 303, 303, & 303
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES BACKGROUND OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown (continued) when containment OPERABILITY is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment ingress and egress is necessary.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.
Placement of a temporary cover plate in the emergency air lock is an acceptable means for providing containment closure.
The temporary cover plate is installed and sealed against the inner emergency air lock door flange gasket. The temporary cover plate is visually inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. All cables, hoses and service air piping run through the sleeves on the temporary cover plate will also be installed and sealed. The sleeves will also be inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. Leak testing is not required prior to beginning fuel handling operations. Therefore, visual inspection of the temporary cover plate over the emergency air lock satisfies the requirement that the air lock be closed, which constitutes operability for this requirement.
The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling.
The Reactor Building Purge System includes a supply penetration and exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,.two valves in each of the supply and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The system is not subject to a Specification in MODE 5.
In MODE 6, large air exchanges are necessary to support refueling operations. The purge system is used for this purpose, and two valves in each penetration flow path may be closed on a unit vent high radiation signal.
(continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.9.3-2 Amendment Nos. 303, 303, &303
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES BACKGROUND Other containment penetrations that provide direct access (continued) from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by a closed automatic isolation valve, non-automatic power operated valve, manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the containment penetration(s) during fuel movements.
APPLICABLE During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel SAFETY ANALYSES assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). A minimum fuel transfer canal water level and the minimum decay time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity subsequent to a fuel handling accident results in doses that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The design basis for fuel handling accidents has historically separated the radiological consequences from the containment capability. The NRC staff has treated the containment capability for fuel handling conditions as a logical part of the "primary success path" to mitigate fuel handling accidents, irrespective of the assumptions used to calculate the radiological consequences of such accidents (Ref. 2).
Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36.
LCO This LCO reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity from containment.
The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the RB purge isolation signal.
(continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.9.3-3 Amendment Nos. 303,303, &303
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES (continued)
LCO This LCO is modified by a note indicating that an emergency (continued) air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed.
APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Performance of these actions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. Also the Surveillance will demonstrate that each open penetration's valve operator has motive power, which will ensure each valve is capable of being closed.
The Surveillance is performed every 7 days during the CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within (continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.9.3-4 Amendment Nos. 303, 303, &303
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE the containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to REQUIREMENTS be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete (continued) fuel handling operations.
As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment.
SR 3.9.3.2 This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the isolation position actuates to its isolation position on an actual or simulated high radiation signal.
The frequency requires the isolation capability of the reactor building purge valves to be verified functional once each refueling outage prior to CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. This ensures that this function is verified prior to CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
This Surveillance will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.
REFERENCES
- 1.
UFSAR, Section 15.11.
- 2.
NRC letter to RG & E dated December 7, 1995, R.E.
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Conversion to Improved Standard Technical Specifications - Resolutions of Ginna Design Basis for Refueling Accidents.
(continued)
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.9.3-5 Amendment Nos. 303, 303, & 303