ML16154A687
| ML16154A687 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1994 |
| From: | Masnyk O, McGuire NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16154A688 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-94-27, 50-270-94-27, 50-287-94-27, NUDOCS 9411030084 | |
| Download: ML16154A687 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1994027
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report Nos. 50-269/94-27, 50-270/94-27 and 50-287/94-27
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
and DPR-55
Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3
Inspection Conducted:
August 29 - September 1, and September 14 - 15, 1994
Inspector:
0lu
Oryja
,/
asn , Safeguar s Specialist
Date Signed
Approved by:
lell Y /
David R. McGu re, Chief
DfteSi ned
Safeguards Section.
Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of Physical
Security Program for Power Reactors, specifically, Access Control for
Personnel, Packages and Vehicles, and Access Authorization.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations were not identified.
The licensee continues to implement an effective program for access control of
personnel, packages, and vehicles.
Violations 93-32-01, 02, and 03 were closed.
Unresolved Item 94-27-01 was open, dealing with the possible improper denial
of access authorization of a contractor.
ENCLOSURE
9411030084 941014
PDR ADOCK 05000269
G
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. Bailey, Regulatory Compliance, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)
- J. Burchfield, Regulatory Compliance, ONS
- W. Carter, Engineering, ONS
,*S. Kopp, Regulatory Affairs, General Office (GO)
- R. Eller, Regulatory Affairs, GO
- T. Melter, Security, ONS
J a
Peele, Station Manager, ONS
- J Smith, Regulatory Compliance, ONS
- S. Warren, Regulatory Affairs, GO
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative
personnel
- Attended exit interview
SParticipated in exit interview by conference call
A subsequent exit conference call was held on September 21, 1994,
following the records review in Lynchburg, VA.
The following personnel
participated:
Licensee Employees
R. Eller, Regulatory Affairs, General Office (GO)
T. McQuarrie, Site Security Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)
0. Patterson, Licensing Group, Regulatory Compliance, ONS
Me Satterfield, Security, ONS
NRC
B. Carroll, Project Engineer
On October 12, 1994, the licensee was contacted by telephone and advised
that an Unresolved Item was identified and that they would be asked to
respond to several questions to resolve the issue dealing with access
authorization. The participants in this call were as follows:
Licensee Employees
R. Eller, Regulatory Affairs, General Office
0. Nix, Regulatory Compliance, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)
T. McQuarrie, Security Manager, ONS
M. Satterwhite, Security Support Supervisor, ONS
NRC
B. Carroll, Project Engineer.
I
2.
Physical Security Program For Power Reactors (81700)
Access Control -
Personnel, Packages and Vehicles
The licensee's established program for controlling access of personnel,
hand-carried items, materials, and vehicles into the protected area was
reviewed and evaluated to verify compliance with commitments in the
licensee's approved Physical Security Plan (PSP).
Tours of the protected area and observation of access control activities
during the course of the inspection confirmed that positive control of
personnel, materials and vehicles into the protected area was being
accomplished in accordance with commitments contained in the licensee's
approved PSP. The performance capability and efficiency of security
personnel conducting searches of personnel, materials and vehicles; and
providing positive control of access was demonstrated on several
occasions during the period of the inspection. The functional
capability of metal, explosive and x-ray detection equipment utilized in
the personnel access portal was also confirmed.
The licensee has security officers posted at the personnel entrances
into the protected area who double check that personnel are properly
badged before signaling to an individual within a bullet resistant booth
to allow access into the protected area.
The licensee is reorganizing the access control function. This will be
completed in October of 1994.
This section was organized into a five
person group consisting of a supervisor and four administrative
personnel.
The supervisor is now considered a technical specialist,
reporting to the day shift coordinator. The administrative personnel
have been transferred to other work assignments; and the technical
specialist's non-access control duties were reassigned. The technical
specialist will be assisted by security officers. Two officers on each
shift will be trained in this function and will perform it as a post
assignment. When not working in access control they will be assigned
other security duties.
The site access control group badges individuals based on information
contained on the VAX computer system which provides information dealing
with Access Authorization, Fitness For Duty, and training. All access
authorization duties are performed at the Duke Corporate Offices in
Charlotte, North Carolina.
The inspector asked if the access control specialists could recall
occasions where an individual was badged, but then had to have access
revoked based on derogatory information received from the fingerprint
check. The specialists could remember persons whose access had been
revoked due to termination for cause or because of positive drug tests
but not because of fingerprint history information. The only example
that came close was that of a contractor who had worked at the site for
a period of time on a visitor's badge and then was terminated. This
stood out because the badging process usually proceeds quickly; most
3
contractors come to the site with completed background investigations.
The inspector performed a cursory review of the Access.Authorization
program at the Duke Corporate office in Charlotte, N.C. The program is
managed by the Manager, Power Generation Group, Workforce Processing,
Fitness for Duty, Nuclear Screening and
Inprocessing. The licensee has
delineated its program in Nuclear Access Authorization Program, Revision
6, dated November 15, 1993. The licensee's self screening contractors
are provided the program requirements by a memo dated September 11,
1992, containing Revision 3 of the Duke Power Nuclear Access Program for
Approved Non-Licensee Companies.
Corporate staff personnel reiterated that there were no temporary
clearances issued that had to be revoked based on information received
as a result of the fingerprint history check. They attributed this to
the fact that Duke Power Company requires a criminal history records
check for the past five years, which they feel would disclose any
unfavorable information prior to the completion of the fingerprint check
which is usually accomplished after the individual is badged. This five
year criminal history check as part of the background investigation is
not required by the 10 CFR 73.56. The licensee also provides a
document, "Guidelines for Evaluating Adverse Information - Decision
Matrix", to its contractors, but does not require the contractors to use
these guidelines. The contractor performs a background investigation,
adjudicates any adverse information, and submits a request for
unescorted access to the licensee. At the time of this inspection the
licensee was not requiring the contractor to submit adverse information
and adjudication rationale. The licensee performs audits of the
contractors and their methods and records are evaluated during the
audit. The licensee advised the inspector that they were in the process
of changing the process and would require submittal of deragatory
information. It is the responsibility of the licensee to grant, deny,
or revoke access authorization.
A review of the file of the contractor who had worked at Oconee on a
visitor's badge until his employment was terminated disclosed the
following. The file contained a "Record Of Interview" dated May 11,_
1994, from the contract company B&W Nuclear Technologies (BWNT) which
concluded that the contractor's derogatory information had been "fully
addressed and substantiated by objective evidence"; a copy of all
supporting documentation was attached. The contractor's employment was
terminated on May 23, 1994. A letter dated June 14, 1994, from B&W
Nuclear Technologies to Duke Power Company documents a conversation on
June 6, 1994, between respective Access Authorization personnel,
transmitting a formal notification stating that the contractor had
withdrawn his consent for processing of his unescorted access request.
The memo states that the contractor felt his request should be effective
on May 23, 1994, the date he was terminated, but the memo states the
formal request should be as of June 6, 1994. A memo to file from the
Duke Power Access Authorization Coordinator states in response to the
contractor's request for clarification concerning his access
authorization, "I stated to him that technically, he had been "(denied
4
unescorted access) "but officially he had not" and concludes "Based on
the circumstances and the issues involved", (the contractor) "will not
be granted unescorted access to any of the Duke Power company plants at
the present time."
Attached to this memo was a standard form "Denial of
Unescorted Access Authorization" dated May 25, 1994, giving the reason
for denial as "Falsification". Based on discussion with contractor
personnel from another company, it would appear that this was
communicated to a contractor group other than B&W Nuclear Technologies.
The inspector reviewed the contractor's file at the B&W Nuclear
Technologies office in lynchburg, VA, and interviewed several BWNT
personnel.
The inspector found that BWNT is not required,
contractually, to do a five year criminal history check, contrary to the
Duke Power procedure for contractors, instead, BWNT may do such a check.
Their application requires the applicant to list any arrests. The
contract employee in question provided an entire adult history and BWNT
adjudicated his unfavorable information. Originally, the employee had
failed to provide some information, which he subsequently provided with
explanations. The contract company terminated the individual's
employment since he could not get-badged at the site.
Unresolved Item 94-27-01 is opened to determine why and how the
contractor's access authorization was denied.
10 CFR 73.56(e) requires
the licensee to advise the individual of the reason for denial and give
them an opportunity to appeal the denial.
To resolve this, please
provide answers to the following questions:
-
Was the contractor's access authorization denied? Why?
-
Was the reason for denial given to the contractor?
-
Was the contractor given an opportunity to appeal the denial?
-
Was any other licensee or licensee's contract company told that
the contractor's access authorization had been denied?
3.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(CLOSED) Violations 93-32-01, 93-32-02, and 93-32-03.
93-32-01 - Failure to control Safeguards Information (SGI) at the
Computer Center.
The licensee either destroyed or secured all tapes that were previously
uncontrolled. Duke Power completed a self audit conducted by the audit
organization which reviewed all aspects of the Safeguards Information
program. This audit disclosed other problems and included other
corrective action that is discussed at the end of this section.
5
93-32-02 - Unsecured container at the Oconee Station.
The licensee immediately secured the container and conducted an
inventory to ensure that all material was accounted for. Personnel with
access to storage containers were-retrained in the locking process of
containers with internal combinations locks. An access log was
implemented in conjunction with the use of "locked", "unlocked" signs
that are used by personnel to ensure the safe is locked at the end of
the work day.
93-32-03 - Failure to control Safeguards Information on several
occasions at the Oconee Station.
The same measures as discussed in the above violation were implemented
with additional training provided as needed, or attempts to reconcile
the loss of information performed. Additionally, the security section
reviewed procedures maintained by Instrument and Electrical personnel to
make recommendations where Safeguards Information could be removed.
This was reviewed by the responsible Engineer who feels that the
inclusion of Safeguards Information is necessary in these procedures to
make them adequate to provide sufficient technical information to the
users.
The Nuclear Services Division, Safety Assurance Group, Audit Section
conducted a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the Safeguards
Information program. The audit was conducted during the period of
October 11, 1993 through November 30, 1993.
The audit covered the
following activities; identification and location of Safeguards
Information, Safeguards Information access prerequisites,
classification, physical protection of Safeguards Information including
storage, protection of electronic Safeguards Information, and evaluation
of program adequacy. The results of the audit are discussed below.
The following were identified at the Oconee facility:
SC-93-06-11 - The Document Management Group was not providing adequate
control over a Controlled Access Area located within the high rise
office building. The existing requirements for controlling this area
were reaffirmed to the appropriate personnel.
SC-93-06-12 - Oconee craft personnel were improperly using a locking bar
cabinet for long term storage of Safeguards Information at a location
exterior to the protected area. This storage function was moved inside
the protected area.
SC-93-06-13 - Instrumentation and Electronics planners were
inappropriately utilizing LAN connected personal computers to create and
print Safeguards Information. Personnel were advised of the existing
requirements in this area.
SC-93-06-14 - The audit team felt that the Document Management Records
Vault should no longer be used as a Controlled Access Area since it is a
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high traffic area. This area was controlled as a CAA but Class 6
containers were provided for use. At Duke Power CAAs are used with
cabinets that are not considered Class 6 containers.
SC-93-06-15 - Instrumentation and Electronics procedures should be
revised so that they do not contain Safeguards Information. This was
done at the McGuire and Catawba sites. As previously discussed, the
responsible Engineer feels that the procedures require the inclusion of
Safeguards Information.
The following were identified at the Duke General Office:
SC-93-06-16 - Several concerns were identified with the manner in which
Input/Output summary information was processed and stored by Nuclear
Engineering personnel.
The personal computer work station in question
is no longer utilized for the processing of Safeguards Information.
SC-93-06-17 - The controlled Access Area which is managed by Licensing
personnel and located on the 5th floor of the Electronic Center was
found unlocked. The existing requirements for controlling this area
were reaffirmed to the appropriate personnel.
SC-93-06-18 - McGuire security drawings were handled by personnel who
were not on the Safeguards Information access list. The practice of
using the print shop to process security drawings has been discontinued.
SC-93-06-19 - Questionable storage practices were noted at the print
shop. This shop is no longer used for security drawings.
SC-93-06-20 - There was a lack of control of the storage of Safeguards
Information at the Wilkenson Blvd. Corporate Records Facility.
Safeguards Information is no longer stored there.
SC-93-06-21 - Safeguards Information was not properly controlled within
the Main Frame Computers. Safeguards Information has been removed from
the mainframe computer and sent to the sites. This was completed during
the time of this inspection, ahead of schedule.
The following were General Office recommendations:
SC-93-06-22 - The Reprographiacs Group should be provided with a
Safeguards Information container. This has been accomplished.
SC-93-06-23 - Mainframe storage of Safeguards should be discontinued.
This has been accomplished.
SC-93-06-24 - Elimate Print Shop handling of Safeguards Information.
This has been done.
SC-93-06-25 - Improve control of Safeguards Information at Wilkenson
Blvd. Safeguards Information is no longer stored here.
7
The following generic observations were made:
SC-93-06-26 - Site-Administrators and Document Controllers need to be
made aware of Safeguards Information storage container's locations. An
information letter was sent on January 6, 1994 to responsible personnel.
SC-93-06-27 - Personnel need to be trained on the meaning of "need to
know" regarding access to Safeguards Information. This was also
addressed in the January 6, 1994 memo.
SC-93-06-28 - Safeguards Document Controllers require training on how to
access the Safeguards Information access list. Site personnel reviewed
this finding and felt that training was adequate.
SC-93-06-29 - Training was needed on how to mail Safeguards Information.
This was addressed by procedure.
SC-93-06-30 - Updating of the Safeguards Information access list is
inadequate. This was improved so that it is done automatically.
SC-93-06-31 - The Document Controller lists are not updated on a timely
basis. This is now done each time there is a change made to the list.
SC-93-06-32 - There has been limited effort in de-classifying Safeguards
Information. A working group has been formed to evaluate and declassify
appropriate Safeguards Information.
SC-93-06-33 - There is no program to ensure that lock combination are
charged when necessary. This is the responsibility of Document
Controllers no change was made, site security personnel felt current
controls were adequate.
SC-93-06-34 - Safeguards Information should be removed from the staging
computer when it is not in use. Safeguards Information is no longer
maintained on the mainframe.
SC-93-06-35 - Safeguards Information lists need to be updated in a
timely fashion. This is now done on a "real time" basis.
SC-93-06-36 - Safeguards Information should be reviewed and de
classified. A working group is addressing this action.
SC-93-06-37 - CAAs should be well controlled. CAA controls are being
reaffirmed a or clarified as needed.
SC-93-06-38 - The VAX system should be revised to allow Site Safeguards
Administrators to access fingerprint history. This has been done.
SC-93-06-39 - Safeguards Document Controllers need training on the VAX
system. Site security personnel felt the current training was adequate.
8
SC-93-06-40 - All locations and groups should be a requested to develop
safeguards work place procedures. This has been done.
SC-93-06-41 - Restructure the Safeguards Information program.
The licensee has developed Nuclear Policy Manual NSD-206 which was
finalized on August 23, 1994. This contains the restructuring of the
Safeguards Information program and incorporates the suggestions and
corrective measures implemented during the licensee's audit. It will be
implemented as of January 1, 1995.
The licensee was advised during the Enforcement Conference that
violations in this area discovered in the process of completing
corrective and preventative measures would not be cited to allow for an
aggressive and thorough self-assessment.
4.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 1, 1994,
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. Following the review of
records at B&W Nuclear Technologies in Lynchburg, VA, a telephone exit
was held on September 21, 1994. The persons involved are also listed in
Paragraph 1. The licensee was advised that violations 93-32-01, 02, and
03 were closed. The licensee was advised by telephone on October 12,
1994, that an Unresolved Item was identified. The licensee was informed
that it appeared that a contract employee had his access authorization
denied and was asked to provided information to resolve this issue. The
individual's identity was made known to them at this time. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
0II