ML16154A612
| ML16154A612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16154A611 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-94-10, 50-270-94-10, 50-287-94-10, NUDOCS 9406270246 | |
| Download: ML16154A612 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1994010
Text
s
REGq
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
'JUN 0 2 1994
Report Nos.:
50-269/94-10, 50-270/94-10 and 50-287/94-10
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
and DPR-55
Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2 and 3
Inspection Conducted:
May 9-12, 1994
Ins
pect
r:_
___
W. M. Sartor, Jr., Team Ledef
DAtd Sig'ned
Team Members: K. Barr, RH
D. Barss, PEPB/NRR
A. Gooden, RH
Appr ed by:
____
K. P. Barr, hief
Date igned
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation
and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response
Facilities, including the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center,
Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and Joint
Information Center. The inspection also included a review of the exercise
scenario and observation of the licensee's critique. This announced exercise
was conducted on May 10, 1994, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 12:50 p.m.
The exercise was full participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties and partial
participation by the State of South Carolina. The offsite participation by
the counties and State was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
9406270246 940602
ADOCK 05000269
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. One
Exercise Weakness was identified for the failure to communicate the need for
the fire brigade response in a timely manner. Exercise strengths included the
challenging scenario; the interchange of information between the Emergency
Coordinator, and the Recovery Manager and their respective staffs;
notifications to the offsite agencies; and information provided to the public.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
D. Berkshire, Radiological Assessment Manager
- P. Brandt, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- R. Brown, Senior Technical Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
N. Constance, Unit Supervisor
- L. Crouse, Commodities and Facilities
B. Dolan, Recovery Manager
- D. Durham, Security
- T. Grant, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- M. Greene, Corporate Communications
- J. Hampton, Vice President, ONS
- D. Hubbard, Superintendent, Maintenance
- C. Jennings, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- T. Kelly, Safety Manager
- J. Long, Radiation Protection
- B. Peele, Station Manager, ONS
- T. Pettit, Community Relations, Duke Power
- G. Rothenberger, Superintendent, Operations
- D. Stratton, Business Manager
- R. Sweigart, Work Control Superintendent/EC
- C. Yongue, Radiation Protection
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. Keller, Resident Inspector
- N. Stinson, PEPB/NRR
- Attended exit interview
Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the last
paragraph.
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency
response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the
licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The scenario for this exercise was reviewed in advance of the scheduled
exercise date and discussed with licensee representatives prior to the
exercise. The exercise scenario was well organized and provided
2
sufficient information to the State and local governments for their
participation in the exercise. Some minor inconsistencies became
apparent during the review of the offsite radiological field team data;
however, these inconsistencies did not detract from the overall
performance of the EROs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to
determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented
with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignment of the
onsite ERO.
The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization
was adequately defined and the primary and alternate assignments for the
positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly
designated. During the exercise, the inspector observed that staff was
available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite
emergency organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether
arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the EOF were
adequate, and whether organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated
in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
State staff was accommodated at the EOF. Both State and local staff
were accommodated in the JIC. Arrangements were in place to request
additional resources to support the emergency response. The fire and
medical responses from the offsite agencies were simulated in this
exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E
to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately
implemented.
3
The licensee effectively used their procedure RP/O/B/1000/01, "Emergency
Classification," to classify each emergency condition and to escalate to
more severe classifications as the simulated accident progressed. The
Operations Shift Manager declared an Alert at 8:15 a.m. based on design
basis earthquake, tremor felt, and seismic trigger alarm actuated. Both
the SAE and the GE classifications were declared by the Recovery Manager
in the EOF. The events were declared at 9:44 a.m. and 10:56 a.m.,
respectively.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and
followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume
exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure (RP/O/B/1000/15),
"Offsite Communications," for providing emergency information to
Federal, State, and local response organizations. The inspector noted
that the implementing procedure was adequate to provide guidance to
personnel responsible for initial notification to the State, local, and
Federal authorities. During the exercise, the notifications to the
offsite authorities were well formulated, properly approved, and
provided the information within required time restraints.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that communications among the licensee's ERFs and
emergency organization and between the licensee's ERO and offsite
authorities were good with one noted exception. The exception was when
the TSC was notified at 1059 hours0.0123 days <br />0.294 hours <br />0.00175 weeks <br />4.029495e-4 months <br /> that Warehouse #6 was on fire. A
significant level of concern was apparent due to the Appendix R
equipment stored in the warehouse. The equipment was being considered
as needed to mitigate the current plant situations. The TSC Offsite
Communicator was directed to request offsite assistance to fight the
fire. It was not until 11:21 a.m. that the onsite fire brigade was
directed to respond to the fire at Warehouse #6. This failure to
4
communicate the need for response of the onsite fire brigade to the
scene of the fire in a timely manner was identified as an EW. The
licensee also identified this issue during their critique process.
IFI 50-269, 270, 287/94-10-01:
EW for failure to request in a timely
manner the response of the onsite fire brigade to a simulated fire
within the protected area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)((7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the
exercise. The licensee activated a JIC at the Clemson Operations Center
on Issaqueena Trail in Clemson. The licensee issued a total of three
News Bulletins which were timely and informative. The release
information was described in good layman's terms.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Facility and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the ERFs
to include the SCR, TSC, OSC, and the EOF. In all cases, the facility
and its dedicated equipment facilitated the emergency response.
a.
Simulator Control Room
The SCR was adequately equipped to support the emergency response.
Procedures were effectively used to classify the emergency and
make required notifications.
b.
The TSC was declared operational 20 minutes after the Alert
classification. The facility and its equipment were effectively
used by the EC to receive his turnover briefing, to keep the TSC
staff informed, and to provide emergency information to the OSC
and EOF.
5
c.
Operational Support Center
The OSC was promptly staffed and declared operational 17 minutes
after the Alert. The OSC was equipped and the facility provided
sufficient space for effective damage control activities.
d.
Observations of EOF activities during the exercise reflected a
facility with the necessary equipment to support emergency
response. Communications with the site were effective for making
informed emergency management decisions from the EOF and the
interface with State and local authorities was effective.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment
for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of
a radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment reviewed by the inspector included an
engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological
hazard to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated
accident. The inspector noted that the engineering assessment provided
by the TSC staff was very effective in identifying sources of water to
refill the borated water storage tank.
The primary dose assessment function was in the EOF and was staffed in a
timely manner. The initial dose projection was completed at 9:53 a.m.
approximately nine minutes following the declaration of a SAE.
Projections were periodically made between the SAE and the declaration
of the GE. Those projections indicated that release was initially below
operating limits.
Field monitoring teams established communications with the EOF dose
assessment area and periodically relayed information from the field
concerning the measured dose rates and, in several cases, the
concentration of Iodine-131 from measurements of air samples.
Additionally, the field teams reported on the condition of the bridges
in the plant vicinity that might have been weakened by the scenario
The declaration of the GE occurred at 10:56 a.m. and resulted from the
loss of two fission product barriers and the potential loss of the third
barrier. As part of the scenario, the light indicators for the
personnel hatch into containment showed the hatch was not fully closed.
This provided a release path to the environment but the leak rate was
not known. The Rad Assessment Manager requested support from
6
engineering to obtain an estimate of the leakage rate so that he could
perform offsite dose projections. That leakage rate estimate was not
received from engineering until approximately 12:15 p.m., about an hour
and fifteen minutes following the declaration of the GE. The Rad
Assessment Manager attempted to bound the release by using a field
monitoring measurement of 1-131 equivalent and a leakage rate identified
in the procedure for the 48" hatch being wide open. He considered the
dose projections made at 11:42 a.m. based on field measurement results
being too low because of other plant parameters. Also, he considered
that a release through a 48" hatch would be unrealistically too high.
At about 11:40 a.m., the Rad Assessment Manager made a judgement to use
the leakage rate through a 4" diameter hole for a dose projection. The
engineering estimated leakage rate provided at about 12:15 p.m.,
supported the use of a leakage rate from a 4" diameter hole to do the
earlier offsite dose projections.
In subsequent discussions with the Rad Assessment Manager, he indicated
he was aware that the public was being evacuated from the downwind
sectors. Because of that evacuation, he believed he could take the
necessary time to develop an accurate leakage rate and dose projection.
He indicated he did not want to greatly overestimate the projected
offsite doses because an unrealistic dose projection might cause offsite
officials to take actions that were not warranted.
In this exercise, the delay in performing offsite dose projections did
not impact any PARs. The dose projections did not alter the licensee's
PARs. Also, the State had already made the decision to evacuate the
public from the downwind sectors based on plant conditions. In the
licensee's player critique, the issue of the delay in obtaining leakage
estimates from engineering was identified as an area for action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions
during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed
and in place, and protective action for emergency workers, including
evacuation of non-essential personnel were implemented promptly as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating PARs for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ. The
PARs were quickly formulated and promptly provided to the State and
local authorities with the GE notification message. The EN Form #6 that
provided the PARs for the GE did not include the sheltering of the EPZ
that was not evacuated. The sheltering had been provided verbally and
Follow-up Message #7 was promptly dispatched to include the omission.
7
The inspector also observed that protective actions were instituted for
onsite emergency responders which included periodic radiation surveys in
the ERFs, and continued accountability of emergency response personnel.
The licensee's procedure RP/O/B/1000/10, "Procedure for Emergency
Evacuation/Relocation of Site Personnel," provided guidance and criteria
for initiating and conducting site evacuations. During the exercise,
the inspector observed that licensee personnel followed procedural
guidance and appropriately considered the evacuation of non-essential
personnel.
The decision was made to evacuate the non-essential
personnel from the site at the SAE. Site radiological and
meteorological conditions as well as plant status were evaluated in
making the evacuation plans. The licensee then simulated the actual
evacuation.
No violations or deviations were identified
12.
Medical and Public Health Support
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements were made for
medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.L.
A Medical Emergency Response Team drill was conducted as part of the
exercise but not observed by the NRC. The licensee evaluated the drill
and found it to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Recovery and Re-Entry Planning
This area was observed to determine that general plans are made for
recovery and re-entry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.M.
The licensee conducted recovery planning following accident mitigation.
As a result of this effort, the licensee identified the need to enhance
their Re-Entry Recovery Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee'sscritique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine whether the deficiencies identified as a result of the
exercise, and the weaknesses noted in the licensee's ERO were formally
presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
8
The licensee conducted player critiques on the day following the
exercise. On May 11, 1994, the licensee also conducted
evaluator/controller critiques prior to the formal presentation to
facility management on the following day. The licensee's critique to
their management on May 12 was comprehensive and addressed numerous
issues for further evaluation and corrections as necessary.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed) IFI 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-01:
EW - Manager in the EOF
ERO failed to notify the ED that suspect information would be
provided to the State and offsite agencies in an EN message.
The inspector noted that the licensee's EOF Director Procedure
(RP/O/B/1000/20) was revised to require a group discussion among
managers be held once every hour during an Alert classification
and once every half hour for SAE and GE classifications. During
this exercise, the inspector observed frequent discussions
involving the EOF Director and his various EOF Managers.
Additionally, the offsite radiological data provided to the
offsite agencies was reviewed by the EOF Director prior to its
transmittal.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-02:
Review the licensee's
evaluation of fire response capabilities during Emergency Plan
implementation and any corrective actions to improve
responsiveness in a future inspection.
The inspector noted that the fire brigade's response to the scene
of the reported fire was timely and effective following the
announcement for them to respond. The timely response of the fire
brigade from the OSC corrected the issue. The failure of the TSC
to communicate the need for the fire brigade to respond is a
separate issue being followed as described in Paragraph 7 of this
report.
c.
(Closed) IFI 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-03:
Review the licensee's
evacuation criteria and procedures for non-essential personnel
onsite during a radiological release.
This issue is closed based on the inspector observations made in
Paragraph 11 of this report.
16.
Federal Evaluation Team Report
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and FEMA, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies
during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
9
17.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 12, 1994, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item No.
Status
Description and Reference
50-269, 270, 287/94-10-01
Open
IFI - EW for failure to
communicate the need for the
fire brigade response in a
timely manner (Paragraph 7).
50-269, 270, 287/93-18-01
Closed
IFI - Exercise Weakness for
failure of the EOF staff to
notify the ED of suspect
radiological information prior
to its transmission
(Paragraph 13).
50-269, 270, 287/93-18-02
Closed
IFI - Review the licensee's
evaluation of fire brigade
response (Paragraph 13).
50-269, 270, 287/93-18-03
Closed
IFI - Review the licensee's
evacuation criteria and
procedures for non-essential
personnel onsite during a
radiological release
(Paragraph 13).
18.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
EC
Emergency Coordinator
Emergency Director
EN
Emergency Notification
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Response Facility
Emergency Response Organization
EW
Exercise Weakness
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Emergency
IFI
Inspection Follow-up Item
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Oconee Nuclear Station
Operations Support Center
Protective Action Recommendations
10
PEPB Emergency Preparedness Branch
Radiological Protection
Site Area Emergency
Simulator Control Room
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and
Objectives
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
SCOPE
A.
SCOPE
The 1994 Oconee exercise scheduled to be conducted on May 10th is designed to
meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The 1994
exercise will involve full participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties and partial
participation by the State of South Carolina. This participation will also include
activation of the Alert and Notification System for Oconee. This exercise will involve
full participation of Oconee Nuclear Site's emergency response organization and will
require activation of the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and
Emergency Operations Facility.
A critique involving exercise participants and controllers will be conducted prior to
the formal critique involving Oconee Nuclear Site management and the NRC. These
critiques will be held at Oconee Nuclear Site.
A public critique will be held at the Duke Power Operations Center on May 11, 1994
at 1200.
1.1
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
A.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION
a.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff (TSC, OSC, EOF, JIC) and activate facilities as required
by Figure B-8 in ONS Emergency Plan after declaring an Alert or higher emergency
classification.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
c.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the
Control Rooml TSC to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC.
d.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator
in the TSC to the EOF Director in the EOF.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and determine/ implement mitigation
strategies.
B.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
a.
Demonstrate the ability to properly classify emergency situations in accordance with plant
procedures.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to notify counties and state within 15 minutes after declaring an
emergency or after changing classification.
c.
Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages
transmitted to state and counties.
C.
COMMUNICATIONS
a.
Test onsite and offsite communications equipment:
-
Selective Signaling
-
Duke Offsite Radio System (FMTs and TSC/ EOF)
-
Duke Onsite Radio System
-
FTS-2000 System:
-
Intercom Systems
b.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and
field personnel.
1.2
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
C.
COMMUNICATIONS (continued)
c.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the
emergency classes.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide current plant data to appropriate locations, organizations,
and field personnel.
e.
Test adequacy and operability of emergency equipment/ supplies.
D.
ACCESS AND CONTROL
a.
Demonstrate the ability to account for onsite personnel within 30 minutes.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to locate unaccounted personnel determined by site assembly.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of non-essential personnel (planning
process will occur, evacuation of personnel will be simulated).
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide controlled access to the plant and EOF.
E.
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
a.
Onsite*
-
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient
radiation levels.
-
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne
radioiodine concentrations.
-
Demonstrate the ability to provide offsite dose projection in accordance with site
procedures.
-
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker
exposure.
-
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision (based on predetermined criteria)
whether to issue KI to emergency workers and then to issue same.
1.3
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
E.
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING (continued)
b.
Offsite:
-
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize teams in the 10 mile EPZ to locate and track the
plume for noble gases and radiolodine concentrations in a timely manner.
-
Demonstrate the ability to transmit field measurement data to TSC/ EOF.
c.
Dose Calculations and Protective Action Recommendations:
-
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action
recommendations in accordance with site procedures.
F.
OFFSITE AGENCY ASSISTANCE
d.
Demonstrate county and state participation in exercises/ drills.
Full (Counties)
Partial (State)
G.
a.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
H.
RECOVERY AND REENTRY
a.
Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled
recovery and reentry.
d.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of workers,
equipment, etc.
1.4
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
I.
EXERCISE/ DRILL MANAGEMENT
b.
The Annual Exercise will be scheduled during different seasons of the year.
d.
Drills/ exercises will be under the control of a Drill/ Exercise Director. Controllers/ Evaluators
will be utilized to keep the scenario on track and to allow for "free play".
e.
Critiques will be held after all drillst exercises to determine any corrective actions that may
need to be made.
MISCELLANEOUS
a.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedure revision to RP/0/8/1000/20, Emergency
Operations Facility Director Procedure requiring round-table discussions between EOF
Director and managers for information exchange. This will ensure that EOF Director is
aware of information that could be provided to offsite agencies. (Corrective action for
Exercise Weakness 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-01).
1.5
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
INITIAL CONDITIONS
Uniti
100% Power
Core is at 410 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) with a continuous run of 185 days.
End Of Cycle (EOC) - 15 refueling outage is scheduled to begin on May 19th.
At 0700 the control room received an alarm indicating low oil level in 1A2 Reactor
Coolant Pump (RCP).
Maintenance personnel are in the Reactor Building
investigating the alarm.
KI Inverter is bypassed.
Unit 2
Shutdown with the reactor defueled. Unit was shutdown based on B&W analysis
and NRC recommendation to investigate potential of core barrel cracking. Cracks
were found earlier in April in another B&W unit.
Condensate System is being maintained in recirdl cleanup mode. Condenser and
Upper Surge Tank are full. Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System is in operation
with A, B, and D CCW pumps in service.
Main Transformer is backcharged to provide power to unit's auxiliary electrical
loads.
Unit 3
Shutdown with the reactor defueled. Unit was shutdown based on B&W analysis
and NRC recommendation to investigate potential of core barrel cracking. Cracks
were found earlier in April in another B&W unit.
Condensate System is being maintained in recirc cleanup mode. Condenser and
Upper Surge Tank are full. Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System is in operation
with A, B, and C CCW pumps in service.
Main Transformer is backcharged to provide power to unit's auxiliary electrical
loads.
Keowee Hydro Units 1&2 are operable.
The Aux Service Water Pump Switchgear is energized from CT-5 for performance test of the Aux
Service Water Pump.
Testing of the Aux Service Water Pump is scheduled to begin at
approximately 0800.
4.1
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
INITIAL CONDITIONS
Weather Forecast
A slow moving Low Pressure Front has moved into South Carolina with a
stationary Low Pressure Area located near Columbia. Thunderstorms are
expected later in the afternoon. Winds from South - South-SouthEast
(160 - 230) and from 0 - 15 mph are expected. The low temperature for
May 10 is expected to be 55OF with a high of 800F.
4.2
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
0745
Two Maintenance Technicians enter Unit 1's RxB to determine the oil level in 1A2
RCP Lower Oil Pot.
While closing the personnel hatch from inside the reactor building, the keyway key
on the door's hand wheel drops out and falls between the personnel hatch and the
reactor building floor. The maintenance technician's are unable to retrieve this key.
0800
Design Basis Earthquake (>0.05g,
.08g actual) occurs:
4
Control Room/ Site personnel feel tremor
Seismic Trigger Alarm, 1SA-9, E-1, actuates
MC SEISMIC RECORDER (10201) is recorded on alarm typer
Strong Motion Accelerometer (SMA3) event indicator changed from
black to white
1A Feedwater (FDW) Pump Recirc piping shears at condenser
Condenser looses vacuum
1A and 1B FDW Pumps trip
Reactor (Rx) trips
All Emergency FDW pumps start
Aux Service Water pump suction piping fails at pump -Aux Building begins
to flood = 800-1000 gpm.
Unit 1 & 3 Low Activity Waste Tank levels start to slowly increase
Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank levels start to slowly increase
LPI Pump Rooms start to flood
Maintenance Technicians exit the RxB through the Emergency Personnel
Hatch
While exiting the hatch, the Inner Hatch Door fails to secure and latch;
Outer Hatch Door is secured. Control room does not receive Inner Hatch
Door Open light due to an electrical fault.
4.3
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE
OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
0805
Control Room personnel initiate AP/ 1/A/ 1700/05, Earthquake
Shift Supervisor initiates Emergency Plan using RP/O/B/1000/01, Emergency
Classification
Conditions for an Alert classification exist
0805 - 0815
Shift Supervisor initiates RP/0/B/1000/02,
Control
Room Emergency
Coordinator Procedure
TSC, OSC, EOF activation initiated
Site Assembly initiated per RP/0/B/1000/09, Procedure For Site
Assembly
Control Room Offsite Communicator prepares Emergency Notification
Form per RP/ 0/ B/1000/15, Offsite Communications
Control Room personnel request l&E to analyze data from Tendon Gallery
Peak Acceleration Recorder (PAR400) and the Strong Motion
Accelerometer (SMA-3)
Control Room personnel notified of flooding in Aux Building and of damage
to the World Of Energy
0825 - 0830
Alert declared based on Design Basis Earthquake, Tremor Felt and Seismic
Trigger Alarm Actuates (0.05g).
Offsite
agencies
notified
as
per
RP/0/B/1000/15,
Offalte
Communications
0835 - 0845
Site Assembly Completed (30 minutes after initiation of Site Assembly)
TSC/ OSC Staffed and operational, turnover completed between Shift Supervisor
and TSC Emergency Coordinator
Operations personnel secure Aux Service Water leakage by securing Unit 2
Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) pumps and closing their respective discharge
valves. Even with the discharge valves close = 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of water remains in the
CCW piping.
4.4
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
0845 - 0900
OSC teams assess plant damage - damage is observed at the Oconee Office
Building and Administration Building
Efforts in progress to recover from Aux Building Flood
Emergency Coordinator may relocate personnel from the Oconee Office Building
and Administration Building based on observed damage and personnel safety
concerns.
If personnel are relocated, RP/O/B/1000/10,
Procedure For
Emergency Evacuation/ Relocation Of Site Personnel and Site Directive 4.4.1,
Site Evacuation/ Relocation Plan would be utilized to determine appropriate
actions. Actual relocation of personnel will be simulated.
0855
OSC notified of potential Hazardous Material Spill by damage assessment team
Spill is a SCDHEC reportable hazardous material spill (not an EPA
Reportable Quantity) involving = 110 gallons of lubricating oil (R&O-68)
Spill is located in the Drum Storage inside the PAP and covers an area of
!0x20'. The spill is contained within this area with no threat of reaching
any storm drains/ or wet land areas.
OSC reports information to the TSC; the Environmental Management (EM)
Group is requested to provide support.
0856- 0090
TSCIEM enters RP/0/B/1000/17, Hazardous Substance Release
Environmental Management should determine if a Reportable Quantity (RQ)
is involved and to determine reportability of spill.
Environmental Management should advise TSC that release is reportable.
Spill involves a hazardous material that is less than the RQ.
Counties and SC State Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management
should be contacted. Control Room should document on Hazardous
Substance Release form.
TSC personnel recognize that a four hour NRC ENS call is required
pursuant to 1 0CFR50.72(b)(2)(vi), Fourhowr reports and then provide this
information to NRC.
4.5
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
0900
NRC notified over ENS; ERDS started and providing data to NRC
EOF Director notifies TSC Emergency Coordinator that the EOF is Operational and
ready for turnover
Field Monitoring Team(s) report damage to Highway 183( 130 approaches to bridge
over intake canal
0915 - 0925
Turnover completed between TSC and EOF; EOF declared activated
0920
1A2 RCP motor seizes due to loss of oil
Control room receives indications of severe vibration
1A2 RCP breaker trips open
=0925
1% Fuel Clad damage occurs as a result of metal fragments generated by damage
to 1A2 RCP Impeller
0930
Small break LOCA (=400 gpm) occurs inside Reactor Building (RxB) on 111 RCP
discharge line
RxB pressure increases
Full High Pressure Injection is unable to maintain Sub Cooling Margin
> 0' F
18 LPI pump starts on ES Signal
1
1A LPI pump will not start on ES Signal; if Control Room operators attempt
to manually start 1C LPI pump it will not start either (Both pum ps are In Uhe
same room and have been affected by flooding)
Conditions exist for Site Area Emergency classification
0945
Site Area Emergency declared based on RCS Leakage Greater Than Available
Makeup Pump Capacity, Full HPI Unable To Maintain Subcooling > 00 F
EOF Director notifies State( County Emergency Preparedness Director(s) of
classification upgrade
TSC notifies NRC of classification upgrade
4.6
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Emergency Coordinator may relocate/ evacuate non-essential personnel.
Site
Evacuation/ Relocation would be conducted using RP/0/B/1000/10, Procedure
For Emergency Evacuation/ Relocation Of Site Personnel and Site Directive
4.4.1, Site Evacuation/ Relocation Plan.
Actl evacuaton/telocatron of
personnel wrl be simulated.
0945 - 1000
Alert and Notification System activated by Counties (Sirens and EBS Message)
0900 - 1000
A craft person supporting OSC team in Auxiliary Building slips on the floor and
sustains a compound fracture to their arm. Victim is contaminated.
MERT is dispatched from the OSC to respond
1045
1 B LPI pump trips (if In service) due to flooding in the B LPI Pump room
if not in service, 1B LPI pump will not start on ES Signal
After 1045
Aftershock with a magnitude of = 0.05 g occurs
Aftershock enables Emergency Personnel Outer Hatch door to fail
Control Room receives open indication lights for both the Inner and Outer
Emergency Personnel Hatch doors
Due to other control room activities, operators may not notice open
indication lights (red)
Smoke observed in #6 Warehouse, reported to Control Room Emergency
Number and OSC
1045 - 1100
Steam is observed leaking from the RxB around RxB Emergency Personnel Hatch
Field Monitoring Teams begin to detect activity at Site Boundary
Conditions exist for General Emergency Classification
1A and 1B BS Pumps unavailable due to flooding conditions
Fire Brigade dispatched to respond to report of smoke/ fire at #6 Warehouse
4.7
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE
1994 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
1115
General Emergency declared based on:
Loss Of 2 Of 3 Fission Product Barriers With A Potential For Loss Of Yd
Barrier - Loss Of Containment, RxB Penetrations Are Not Isolated AND LOCA
650 gpm (non-isolable fault).
Small And Large LOCAs With Failure Of ECCS - Leads To Core Melt, LOCA
Site Area Emergency # 1 Emergency Action Level Satisfied and Loss Of All
Injection Or Imminent Loss Of Injection Capability
1120- 1130
EOF Director notifies State/ Counties
The following Protective Action Recommendations are provided to
State/ Counties:
Evacuate sectors In a two mile radius and five miles downwind.
Shelter any sectors not evacuated.
Additional Protection Action Recommendations may be made, depending upon
Field Monitoring Team readings/ Dose Assessment recommendations.
1115- 1400
Exercise continues until State/ County objectives are completed.
TSCl OSC/ EOF develop Recovery/ Re-entry plan
4.8