ML16148A728
| ML16148A728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1993 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A725 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-92-29, 50-270-92-29, 50-287-92-29, NUDOCS 9301200043 | |
| Download: ML16148A728 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1992029
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
JA.NI
Report Nos.:
50-269/92-29, 50-270/92-29 and 50-287/92-29
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
P.O. Box 1007
Charlotte, N.C. 28201-1007
Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270
License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR- 47,
and 50-287
and DPR-55
Facility Name:
Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3
Inspection Conduc
-18,
1992
Inspector:
/
.1
insorge P.
gate'Signed
ac or Inspector
Inspector:
Q
R. C. Chou
bate Signed
Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
. Blake, Chief
Date Signed
M erials and Processes Section
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted onsite in the area of
Inservice Inspection (ISI), snubber inspection and functional testing, and
licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
Results:
In each of the areas examined the inspectors discovered that nondestructive
test (NDE) examiners were conducting conservative examinations in accordance
with the appropriate test procedure, except as noted below. NDE procedures
were also noted to be very detailed, well organized and technically effective
in implementing the applicable code requirements. Supervisors, engineers, and
9301200043 930111
PDR ADOCK 05000269
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- H. Barron, Oconee Station Manager
- G. Bibb, UT Examiner
- T. Coleman, ISI Coordinator/Compliance Engineer
- W. Foster, Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance
- F. Linsley, Component Engineering
- B. Peele, ONS Engineering
- S Perry, Regulatory Compliance
- R. Pettit, ISI Outage Support
- T. Royal, Component Engineering
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
B. Desai, Resident Inspector
- P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2. Inservice Inspection (ISI)
The inspectors reviewed documents and records, and observed activities,
as indicated below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in
accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and
licensee commitments. The applicable code for ISI, for Unit 1, Unit 2,
and Unit 3, is the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition with Addenda
through Winter 1980 (80W80). Unit 1 has completed the fourteenth cycle,
and is in the second outage of the third 40 month period, of the second
ten year ISI interval (02,P3,I2). Unit 1 received its operating license
on February 6, 1973 and commenced commercial operations on July 15, 1973.
Unit 2 is operating, in the thirteenth fuel cycle, of the third 40 month
period, of the second ten year ISI interval (P3,12).
Unit 2 received its
operating license October 6, 1973 and commenced commercial operations on
September 9, 1974. Unit 3 is operating, in the fourteenth fuel cycle, of
the third 40 month period, of the second ten year ISI interval (P3,I2).
Unit 3 received its operating license July 19, 1974 and commenced
commercial operations on December 16, 1974. The licensee's
nondestructive examination personnel are performing the liquid penetrant
(PT), magnetic particle (MT), and ultrasonic (UT) examinations under the
umbrella of the Duke Power Company (DPC) Quality Assurance (QA) program.
2
a. ISI Program Review, Units 1, 2 and 3 (73051)
The inspectors reviewed the following documents, relating to the ISI
program to determine whether the plan had been approved by the
licensee and to assure that procedures and plan's had been
established for the applicable activities. Documents were reviewed
for technical content.
Documents Reviewed
ID
Revision
Title
Unit 1 ISI Plan for Outage 2 Period 3,
Interval 2
(R7)
Second Interval Inservice Plan Oconee
Nuclear Station
The licensee is in the process of replacing a number of check valves
on the Feedwater systems. The style of the replacement valves will
facilitate valve maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the
licensee's program for valve replacement. Documents were reviewed
for technical content.
Documents Reviewed
ID
Revision
Title
MP/O/A/1810/014
(Chl8)
Valves and Piping -Weld Removal and
Replacement- Class A through F
MP/O/A/1800/086
(Ch2)
Pipe Cold Spring
(R91-01)
Oconee Nuclear Station Mechanical
Maintenance Welding Program
OS-0243.00-00-0001
(R16)
Piping Installation Specification
(R14)
Welding Program
(R39)
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
(R37)
Shield Metal Arc:Welding
(R3)
Gas Tungsten Arc.Welding of Carbon
Steel Piping (Large Diameter Pipe Open
Root) Impact Procedure
L103 2
(Rl)
Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW)
Carbon Steel
te
OpenButt
3
Documents Reviewed (Cant.)
ID
Revision
Title
(R2)
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
(R7)
Shielded Metal Arc Welding
(R17)
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
(R16)
Shielded Metal Arc Welding
1
Procedure Qualification Record (PQR) supporting Welding
Procedure Specification (WPS) Field Weld Data Sheet (FWDS)
L-250 and Performance Qualification (PQ) L-185
2
PQR supporting WPS FWDS L-350 and
PQ [-154
The licensee's program documents appear adequate for their intended
applications.
b. Review of NDE Procedures, Units 1, 2 and 3 (73052)
The inspectors reviewed the procedures listed below to determine
whether these procedures were consistent with regulatory
requirements and licensee commitments. The procedures were also
reviewed for technical content.
Procedures Reviewed
ID
Revision
Title
NDE-25
(R14)
Magnetic Particle Examination
Procedure and Techniques
NDE-35
(R13)
Liquid Penetrant Examination
All procedures reviewed appeared to contain the necessary elements
for conducting the specific examination.
c. Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 1 (73753)
The inspectors observed work activities, reviewed certification
records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel
qualifications for personnel who had been utilized in the ISI
4
examinations during this outage. The observations and reviews
conducted by the inspectors are documented below.
Activities Observed
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT)
The inspectors observed PT examinations of piping welds listed
below. The inspectors performed an independent evaluation of the
indications obtained to confirm the NDE examiner's evaluation.
Liquid Penetrant Examinations Observed
Item No
Weld No.
Size
Component
E010.001.007
1"x1.187"
Pressurizer Nozzle to
The inspectors noted the following relative to the PT examinations
observed:
o
With the documentation provided the PT examiner to perform the
examination of weld 1PRZ-WP63-7 (Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundary (RCPB) pressurizer nozzle to safe end butt weld), the
inspectors could not determine the exact location of the weld.
The PT examiner indicated he would PT examine the entire area
which he perceived to have been prepared by the cleaning crew
(the bright shiny area), to assure coverage of the weld and the
one half inch of adjacent base material on each side of the
weld, as required by procedure NDE-35, "Liquid Penetrant
Testing" Revision 13, Figure 3, for RCPB butt welds.
Subsequently the licensee obtained a drawing from off site,
that indicated the upstream weld fusion line was the boundary
dividing the bright shiny area (inconel weld metal) from the
oxidized area (carbon steel nozzle) on the nozzle-weld-safe end
assembly. Therefore the PT examiner examined the weld and
approximately six inches of adjacent base material downstream
of the weld, but failed to examine any adjacent base material
upstream of the weld.
An inadequate document package caused the PT examiner to fail
to comply with the extent of examination requirements
delineated in Figure 3, of procedure NDE-35, in that he did not
examine one half inch of adjacent base material upstream of
weld 1PRZ-WP63-7. Failure to follow procedure requirements for
activities affecting quality is a violation of Title Ten, Code
of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This
violation will be identified as 50-269,270,287/92-29-01:
"Failure To Follow PT Procedure".
0
5
Inspection by otrvec
12'
ALctual Inrume+oa
711
1 PRZ-HPS3-7
Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe End Assembly
0
The inspectors discussed the above with another PT examiner,
who indicated that when he examined similar pressurizer
nozzles, due to lack of specific knowledge of the exact weld
location, he examined the entire nozzle assembly from the
pressurizer face to the end of the nozzle-weld-safe end
assembly (approximately 12-inches).
The inspectors indicated
that the licensee has a weakness related to ISI weld drawings
which has caused unnecessary PT examination coverage, and
resulted in unnecessarily longer stay times in high radiation
areas.
The inspectors reviewed the certification documentation for
penetrant Batch No.87KO43, developer Batch No. 91C17P and cleaner
Batch No 92K051.
The inspectors reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual
acuity documentation for PT-II examiners EDC and ADG.
With the exception of the issues discussed above the examinations
were satisfactorily performed.
Magnetic Particle (MT) Examination
The inspectors observed the MT examination of the welds listed
below. The inspectors performed an independent evaluation of the
indications obtained to confirm the NDE examiner's evaluation.
6
Magnetic Particle Examinations Observed
Item No
Weld No.
Size
System
C05.021.118A
1-03-10-WG91C 14"XO.750"
C05.021.115A
1-03-10-WG91B 14"XO.750"
The licensee attempted to MT examine several other welds while the
inspectors were present however the licensee determined the surface
preparation was not acceptable for MT examination.
The inspectors reviewed the certification documentation for 8A Red
MT powder Batch No.89DO81, yoke OCQUA-183, and ten Lbs. test weight
S/N SYNT 11016.
The inspectors reviewed the certification, qualification, and visual
acuity documentation for MT-II examiners DLC and JWR.
The examinations were performed satisfactorily.
Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
The inspectors observed the UT examination of the welds listed
below. The inspectors observed examiners perform equipment
calibrations and ultrasonic examinations for the welds listed below.
Ultrasonic Examinations Observed
Weld Number
Item Number
Component
C01.020.001
Core Flood Tank Head To
Shell Weld
ICFTB-LH-SLH
C01.020.005
Core Flood Tank Head To
Shell Weld
- Observed calibration activities only, because the licensee
determined that the surface preparation was not acceptable for
examination at the time the inspectors were present.
The examination and calibrations were performed satisfactorily.
Radiographic Film Storage
On a previous inspection conducted on site, August 10-14, 1991, the
inspectors examined the film storage facilities at the Oconee
Station for compliance with DPC procedure QA-102 and identified some
discrepancies with both the procedure and the implementation of that
procedure. The inspectors conducted a followup inspection in that
area, noting the following:
7
o
The licensee is in the process of reorganizing the film storage
facility. At this writing the majority of the film is storied
consistent with the film manufacturers recommendations. The
licensee has conducted more frequent temperature and humidity
checks, since the last inspection in thisi area.
o
The licensee is in the process of revising the procedure to
correct the short comings noted in the August inspection.
d. Visual Examination of ISI Pipe Supports
The inspectors randomly selected 20 pipe supports for walkdown
reinspection. The 20 pipe supports, in various systems, are located
in the Reactor Building and Turbine Building. The inspection
results were compared with the applicable procedure, QAL-14,
Revision 13, "ISI Visual Examination, VT-3 and VT-4," dated November
2, 1992. The visual inspection included a check on configuration;
defects such as distortion, cracks, bent members, weld failures
induced by operations; condition of connections to supporting
structures; and/or component settings. The inspectors' observations
generally agreed with the information reported by the licensee's ISI
examiners except for the discrepancies as noted below:
Table 1
Pipe Support Walkdown Reinspection
Support No.
Rev. Discrepancies/Remedies
D3
None
01
None
D1
None
Dl
None
D1
None
D1
None
D1
None
1-01A-0-550-HlO
1
The load indicator plate for the
spring can was painted over. The
licensee will reinstruct the painters
again not to paint over load plates
and support tags.
1-01A-1-1-0-401A-H7 2
None
1-01A-0-550-H5
1
None
1-01A-0-550-R3
11
None
0
8
Table 1(Cont.)
Pipe Support Walkdown Reinspection
Support No.
Rev. Discrepancies/Remedies
1-01A-0-550-R4
2
A rod support around column lines L-16
near this support was loose.
A trapeze support located 5' north of
column 16 and 6' west of column L at
EL. 806' the west rod had hit the
insulation on an adjacent pipe and the
east rod was bent and had hit
insulation on another pipe.
The licensee will review and correct
these problems.
1-O1A-1-1-O-401A-H43 3 A 1/4" gap was found between the
washer and the spherical bearing on
the eye rod at the end attachment,
even with spacers installed. The
licensee will review and resolve this
problem
1-53B-4-0-435B-H30 3
None
1-53B-0-435B-R35
8
None
1-53B-4-0-435B-H13
10
None
1-53B-0-435B-DE066 4
The snubber was in contact
with other pipe insulation. The
licensee issued Work Request No.
92054547 to correct it.
1-53B-0-435B-DE067 3
The sway strut was skewed
excessively. The licensee issued Work
Request No. 92054351 to correct it.
1-53B-435B-DE079
2
None
1-03A-1-0-400B-SR56 0
One bent anchor bolt and one anchor
bolt with grout chipped off were found
and recorded by the licensee ISI
examiners. The licensee's actions
regarding this finding are discussed
below.
During this refueling outage, the licensee's QC inspectors
identified that Support No. 1-03A-1-0-400B-SR56 had a bent anchor
bolt with a loose nut and another anchor bolt with grout chipped
off. The licensee's engineers reviewed the base plate calculations
and found that if they considered the bent bolt as an abandoned
anchor, the factor of safety would be approximately 3;
which fails
9
to meet the requirement of greater than 5 for long term design of
self drilled expansion anchor bolts, per paragraph 1-8.2.1.10 of
Design Specification No. OS-0027.00-00-0001. A factor of safety of
3 will meet the temporary operability requirement of greater than 2,
per IE Bulletin 79-02.
The inspectors reviewed the support calculation, rev. 0, dated
November 21, 1981.
Page 6 of this calculation, initiated and
checked on August 9, 1979, used the allowable loads for four 1/2
inch diameter, self-drilling anchor bolts got a factor of safety of
2.51.
Page 7 of this calculation was initiated on October 19, 1979,
used a combination of the 1/2-inch diameter anchor bolt allowable
loads and increased concrete strength due to aging to get a factor
of safety of 3.63. Page 8 of this calcuation was initiated and
checked on December 15, 1979, to record the ISI deficiencies of
chipped grout and a bent anchor bolt. This part of the calculation
clearly indicated the following conditions: a bent anchor bolt and
an anchor bolt with the grout chipped off;
the factor of safety of
3.63 was calculated assuming no deficiencies;
and a recommendation
to modify the support using four 7/8-inch diameter wedge anchor
bolts to replace the bent and other self drilling anchor bolts to
achieve a factor of safety of 5.1 to meet the requirement of factor
of safety of greater than 5.0. The calculation concluded that a
repair was required.
Subsequently, on May 20, 1980, page 8 of the calculation was
revised, and rechecked, using allowable loads for 3/4-inch diameter
anchor bolts to get a factor of safety of 6.38, without considering
the effect of the bent anchor bolt.
Page 5 was added to the
calculation and contained reviews of a final factor of safety 6.38
for IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 dated September 3, 1980 and
September 30, 1981 by two different checkers respectively. From the
above review processes, it appears that at least four persons missed
the bent anchor bolt deficiency during their reviews. Pending the
licensee's investigation of the root cause and correction, this
matter is identified as Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/92-29-02,
Failure to Identify Pipe Support Design Deficiencies.
Support No. 1-O1A-1-1-0-401A-H43 was found to have a 1/4" gap
between the washer and spherical bearing on the eye rod at the end
attachment for the snubber. The licensee agreed to review and
establish inspection and acceptance criteria for the gap between the
washer and spherical bearing for snubbers and sway struts.
During the support walkdown reinspection, the inspectors noticed
that insulation on some of the supports was not removed for the ISI
inspections. The licensee's understanding of the conditions which
exempt the requirement for removal of insulation, (Paragraph IWF
1300.e of ASME Section XI,) were different between the ISI QC
examiners and engineers. The licensee agreed to review the ASME
code exemptions, and their explanation, with the ISI QC examiners
and engineers.
The inspectors initially reviewed personnel qualification
documentation for eight of the ISI QC examiner's who performed the
inspections of the pipe supports listed in Table 1 above. These
qualifications were reviewed for conformance to requirements in the
areas of activity qualified to perform, expiration date, annual
visual acuity, and color vision examination.
The certification records were found to be generally acceptable,
however, the inspectors found a gap of five months for the visual
accuity examination for one examiner. The Form QA-140B for vision
examination was not in the qualication package for a period of five
months. The examiner had eye examinations for near vision, far
vision, and color perception on July 17, 1991 and December 16, 1992;
this indicated a lapse of five months on the eye examination.
When the inspectors questioned the QC supervisor about the problem,
the supervisor stated that they had found this problem two days
before, and had issued Problem Identification Serial No. 0-092-0693.
The QC supervisor also stated that the examiner in question had a
complete eye examination during a physical examination performed on
February 26, 1992, for respirator qualification and a company
drivers license. He passed the eye examination again on December
16, 1992, two days before this review. Therefore, the QC supervisor
stated that DLC was a qualified QC examiner.
However, thru review of the medical record, the inspectors found
that the examiner was not a qualified QC examiner during the lapse
of five months on the eye examination because he did not have a near
vision or Jaeger examination performed on February 26 1992, since
the Department of Transportation.does not require a near vision
examination to Duke trucks.
The inspectors expanded the review to include all 14 ISI QC
examiners and found another QC examiner, to have an eye examination
lapse of one month between January 4, 1990 and February 4, 1991.
Per Paragraph 7.1.4 of Procedure NDE-B, Training, Qualication, and
Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel, the near
vision, distance acuity, and color perception examination shall be
conducted at least once annually and shall be documented on Form QA
140B or an equivalent form. Both of the examiners failed to meet
the above requirements, but in both cases, when the examiners were
tested after the lapse their vision was acceptable. Pending the
licensee investigation of the root cause(s) and corrective actions
on the problem, this matter is identified as Unresolved Item
50-269,270,287/92-29-03, Failure to Conduct Annual Vision Acuity
Examination.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified,
except as noted in paragraph 2.c. above.
3. Snubber Inspection and Functional Testing, Unit 1 (70370)
All snubbers in safety-related systems, and non-safety related systems
required to protect safety-related systems, are required to be operable,
and 100 percent visual inspected and ten percent functionally tested
during each refueling outage, per Technical Specification (TS) 3.14 and
4.18. TS 4.18.1 states that snubbers located in the accessible areas can
be inspected during normal operation, while those located in the
inaccessible areas, are to be inspected during refueling outages.
Procedure Nos. MP/1/A/3018/010 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/1/A/3018/019
for mechanical snubbers are used in the inaccessible areas.
Procedure
Nos. MP/1/A/3018/011 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/1/A/3018/020 for
mechanical snubbers are used in the accessible areas. Procedure No.
MP/0/A/3018/009A is used for hydraulic and mechanical snubber functional
testing.
The licensee performed functional tests on more than the 10 percent
required by TS and simultaneously, included all snubber supports, which
were required by ISI inspections, in the functional test during each
refueling outage. The licensee had completed visual inspection on all
the snubbers during or before this refueling outage. The licensee found
all snubbers inspected to be acceptable.
The NRC inspectors conducted independent visual examination verification
on 18 snubbers selected at random. Three hydraulic and three mechanical
snubbers were located in inaccessible areas. Six hydraulic and six
mechanical snubbers were located in accessible areas. These examinations
were conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the examination
procedures being used by the licensee and to assess the validity of the
information reported by the examiners. These verification examinations
generally agreed with the findings of the visual examiners except as
noted below:
Table 2
Snubber Inspection
Discrepancies/
Support No.
Bldg.
Type
Remedies
1-53A-0-481A-H41C
Reactor
Hydrau.
None
1-53A-0-481A-H40C
Reactor
Hydrau.
The extension piece of this
snubber contacts the nearby pipe
insulation. The licensee will
issue Work Request to correct
it.
1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S5 Reactor
Hydrau.
None
12
Table 2 (continued)
Snubber Inspection
Discrepancies/
Support No.
Bldg.
Type
Remedies
1-51-478A-H6142
Reactor
Mechan.
None
1-51-478A-H6140
Reactor
Mechan.
None
1-03-480A-H6071
Reactor
Mechan.
None
1-03A-1-0-400B-SR56 Turbine
Hydrau.
See discrepancy found in Table 1
for this support.
1-03A-1-0-400B-SR54 Turbine
Hydrau.
None
1-03A-1-0-400A-SR53 Turbine
Hydrau.
None
1-03A-1-0-400A-SR52 Turbine
Hydrau.
None
1-O1A-3-0-401A-R9
Turbine
Hydrau.
None
1-01A-3-0-401A-R8
Turbine
Hydrau.
None
1-03A-0-551-R13
Turbine
Mechan.
None
1-01A-1-1-401A-H43 Turbine
Mechan.
See discrepancy found in Table 1
for this support.
1-01A-403C-DE072
Turbine
Mechan.
A portion of the tag was painted
over and it was dfficult to read
the support I.D.
The licensee
will reinstruct painters not to
paint over them.
1-O1A-0-401A-DE071 Turbine
Mechan.
None
1-O1A-0-550-R15
Turbine
Mechan.
None
1-01A-0-550-R16
Turbine
Mechan.
None
The licensee is still in the process of establishing inspection and
acceptance criteria for inspection of the gap between the washers and
spherical bearings at the rod end near the rear bracket or the piston rod
eye near the pipe clamps. This problem was already identified as
Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/91-05-01 which remains open.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
4. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Bulletin 50-270,287/88-BU-10, Nonconforming Molded Case Circuit
Breakers. The licensee responded to Bulletin 88-10 by letters dated
April 4, 1989, and April 24, 1989. The licensee's evaluation determined
that none of the nonconforming molded case circuit breakers discussed in
Bulletin 88-10 were installed or used in Unit 2 and Unit 3.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview
13
The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 18, 1992,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the findings listed below.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not
contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the
licensee. The licensee was informed by telephone on December 22, 1992,
of the unresolved item related to pipe support design deficiencies.
Violation 50-269,270,287/92-29-01:
"Failure To Follow PT
Procedure".
Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/92-29-02:
"Failure To Identify Pipe
Support Design Deficiencies"
Unresolved Item 50-269,270,287/92-29-03:
"Failure To Conduct Annual
Vision Acuity Examination"
6. Acronyms and Initialisms
-
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
-
Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Ch
-
Change
-
Duke Power Company
-
Dimension Power Reactor
FWDS
-
Field Weld Data Sheet
ID
-
Identification
-
Inservice Inspection
-
Magnetic Particle
-
No.
-
Number
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.E.
-
Professional Engineer .
PQ
-
Performance Qualification
-
Procedure Qualification Record
-
-
Quality Assurance
R
-
Revision
-
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
-
Ultrasonic
WPS
-
Welding Procedure Specification