ML16148A512

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Forwards Enforcement Conference Summary Held on 910507 Re Activities Authorized for Facility Concerning DHR Removal Capability & Reactor Coolant Inventory Temporary Loss Noted in Insp Repts 50-269/91-08,270/91-08 & 287/91-08
ML16148A512
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/15/1991
From: Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Tuckman M
DUKE POWER CO.
References
EA-91-049, EA-91-49, NUDOCS 9105210229
Download: ML16148A512 (18)


See also: IR 05000269/1991008

Text

MAY 15 1991

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270,.50-287

License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

EA 91- 049

Duke Power Company

ATTN:

Mr. M. S. Tuckman, Vice President

Nuclear Operations

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/91-08, 50-270/91-08 AND

50-287/91-08

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on May 7,

1991.

This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Oconee facility.

The issues discussed at this conference related to the March 8, 1991, event at

Oconee in which decay heat removal capability and reactor coolant inventory

were temporarily lost for Unit 3 while this unit was in a cold shutdown

condition. A list of attendees, a summary, and a copy of your handouts are

enclosed.

We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the

appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this. letter and its enclosures

will be placed in the'NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Luis A. Reyes

Luis A. Reyes, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. Enforcement Conference Summary

3. Enforcement Conference Handout

cc w/encls:

H. B. Barron

Station Manager

Oconee Nuclear Station

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

(cc w/encls cont'd -

see page 2)

9105210229 910515

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

Q

PDR

Duke Power Company

2

MAY 15 1991

cc w/encls:

(Continued)

A. V. Carr, Esq

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242-0001

County Supervisor of Oconee County

Walhalla, SC 29621

Robert B. Borsum

Babcock and Wilcox Company

Nuclear Power Generation Division

Suite 525, 1700 Rockville Pike

Rockville, MD 20852

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Bishop, Cook, Purcell and. Reynolds

1400 L Street, NW

Washington, D. C. -20005

Office of Intergovernmental Relations

116 West Jones Street

Raleigh, NC 27603

Heyward G. Shealy, Chief

Bureau of Radiological Health

South Carolina Department of Health

and Environmental Control

2600 Bull Street

Columbia, SC 29201

Manager, LIS

NUS Corporation

2650 McCormick Drive

Clearwater, FL

34619-1035

Stephen Benesole

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

R. L. Gill

Nuclear Production Department

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

Karen E. Long

Assistant Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice

P. 0. Box 629

Raleigh, NC

27602

(cc w/encls cont'd -

see page 3)

Duke Power Company

3

MAY 15 1991

cc w/encls:

(Continued)

H. B. Tucker

Senior Vice President-Nuclear

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

bcc w/encls:

L. Wiens, NRR

W. H. Miller, RII

G. A. Belisle, RH

A. R. Herdt, RII

Document Control Desk

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Route 2, Box 610

Seneca, SC 29678

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ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

Duke Power Company

M. S. Tuckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

H. B. Barron, Station Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)

R. L. Swiegart, Superintendent of Operations, ONS

0. C. Kohler, Licensing Coordinator, ONS

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. L. Milhoan, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination

Staff (EICS), RII

B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, EICS, RH

A. R. Herdt, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, DRP, RII

T. A. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Ru

G. A. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DRP, RII

P. H. Skinner, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, DRP, RH

S. Q. Ninh, Project Engineer, DRP, RII

W. H. Miller, .Project Engineer, DRP, RII.

W. M. Troskoski, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement

T. A. Reed, Project Manager, Nuclear Reactor Regulation

F. Jape, Chief, Test Program Section, DRS, RH

ENCLOSURE 2

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

On May 7, 1991, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC

in the Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia to discuss issues associated with

the March 8, 1991, event at Oconee in which decay heat removal capability and

reactor coolant inventory were temporarily lost for Unit 3 while this unit was

in a cold shutdown condition.

Following opening remarks by Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Deputy Regional Administrator,

Region II (RII),

Mr. L. A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects, RH,

and Mr. W. M. Troskoski, NRC Enforcement Coordinator, DPC gave a presentation

(Enclosure 3) on the issues.

An introduction to DPC's presentation was given by Mr. M. S. Tuckman, Vice

President,

Nuclear Production,

with the formal

presentation given by

Mr. H. B. Barron, Oconee Station Manager. The items associated with this event

which were discussed included:

description of the high pressure injection

system; work sequence and operational activities prior to the event; safety

significance; identified deficiencies and corrective actions implemented;

radiation monitor modification program;

and,

shutdown

risk management

practices in effect at Oconee and other DPC nuclear sites.

NRC closed the meeting by thanking DPC for their presentation and stating that

the presentation had served to enhance the NRC's understanding of the issues.

ENCLOSURE 3

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

MARCH 8, 1991

OPENING REMARKS

EVENT REVIEW

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SHUTDOWN RISK MANAGEMENT

EVENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS

CLOSING REMARKS

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To either

LP19 or LP20

(Typical of two Lines)

3LP-19 WORK SEQUENCE

INSTALL FLANGE

REMOVE MOTOR ACTUATOR

  • PM VALVE REPACK (DEFUEL REQUIRED)

REPLACE MOTOR ACTUATOR

ADJUST LIMITS

VALVE ACTUATOR DIAGNOSTICS (MOVATS)

  • VALVE STROKE TIMING

REMOVE FLANGE

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

2/22/91

FLANGE INSTALLED ON PIPING TO 3LP-20

RATHER THAN 3LP-19

2/23/91

LEAK TEST PROCEDURE OF PENETRATION

2/25/91 PERFORMED

2/25/91

3LP-19 REPACKED AND MOTOR

3/5/91

RECONNECTED

3/8/91

3LP-19 RELEASED TO TECHNICIANS TO

07:30

ADJUST LIMITS, VESSEL LEVEL IS 76"

3/8/91

TECHNICIAN BEGINS MANUALLY OPENING

08:48

3LP-19,

LEVEL

ALARMS

RECEIVED

IN

CONTROL ROOM

3/8/91

ABNORMAL PROCEDURE FOR LOSS OF

08:52

SHUTDOWN

COOLING

ENTERED,

OPERATING LPI PUMP STOPPED DUE TO

ABNORMAL MOTOR CURRENT

3/8/91

GRAVITY MAKEUP ATTEMPTED PER

08:56

PROCEDURE

3/8/91

3LP-19 RECLOSED

09:00

3/8/91

GRAVITY MAKEUP REINITIATED

09:02

3/8/91

LEVEL IS RESTORED TO 76"

09:05

3/8/91

3A LPI PUMP IS VENTED

09:09

3/8/91

3A LPI PUMP IS RESTARTED, FORCED

09:11

COOLING IS RE-ESTABLISHED

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

OPERATORS RESPONDED QUICKLY AND

DECISIVELY, EFFECTIVELY UTILIZING

PROCEDURES AND TRAINING TO RECOVER

COOLANT INVENTORY

MULTIPLE OPTIONS FOR CORE COOLING

WITHOUT CORE UNCOVERY WERE AVAILABLE

CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT HATCH AND

PERSONNEL HATCH WERE CLOSED

NO SIGNIFICANT RADIOLOGICAL DOSE RECEIVED

NO RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY OCCURRED

DEFICIENCIES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

FLANGE INSTALLATION PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY

IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE ENHANCED

PROCEDURES/WORK DIRECTION FOR ROUTINE

FLANGE INSTALLATIONS DURING SHUTDOWNS

REVISE TEST PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH

LP-19 AND LP-20 TO SPECIFY AND FACILITATE

INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF FLANGE

LABELING DEFICIENCIES

CLEARLY COMMUNICATE TO ALL PERSONNEL

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN UPON IDENTIFYING A

LABELING DISCREPANCY

COMMUNICATIONS DEFICIENCIES

RE-ENFORCE EXPECTATION FOR THE USE OF

REPEAT BACK PRACTICES DURING ALL

COMMUNICATIONS WITH CONTROL ROOM

PERSONNEL

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

(CONTINUED)

REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY CONTROL

IDENTIFY AND SECURE INTER-SYSTEM

BOUNDRIES TO THE EXTENDED RCS DURING

DRAINDOWN CONDITIONS

IMPLEMENT ENHANCED ADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROLS TO GOVERN ANY CHANGES IN THE

EXTENDED BOUNDRY

RADIATION MONITOR MODIFICATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS

AIR MONITORS (GAS, IODINE, PARTICULATE)

ARE INTERDEPENDENT (COMMON SKID)

AREA MONITORS IN RB ARE INTERDEPENDENT

(COMMON WIRING IN C/R)

AREA MONITORS IN FUEL CANAL AREA WERE

BEING REPLACED DUE TO UNRELIABILITY

0

RADIATION MONITORING

COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN

AIR SAMPLERS AT EACH ELEVATION

AND IN EACH CAVITY

REMOVED AND READ EACH 4-6 HOURS

CONTINUOUS AIR MONITOR

WITH LOCAL ALARM

IN THE FUEL CANAL AREA

CREWS WORKING IN THE CANAL AREA

EQUIPPED WITH ALARMING DOSE METERS

CONTINUOUS RP TECHNICIAN SUPPORT WITH

PORTABLE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS FOR ANY

WORKERS IN THE FUEL CANAL AREA

SHUTDOWN RISK MANAGEMENT

PRACTICES AT OCONEE

ALL REQUIREMENTS FROM GL 88-17 ARE APPLIED

WHEN LEVEL LOWER THAN 3 FEET BELOW VESSEL

FLANGE (REDUCED INVENTORY)

UPPER S/G HANDHOLE COVERS REMOVED FOR

EACH DRAINDOWN TO ASSURE VENT PATH,

GRAVITY MAKEUP ASSURED

TIME IN REDUCED INVENTORY STRICTLY

MINIMIZED (2.5 DAYS LAST OUTAGE)

MULTIPLE POWER SOURCES TO BOTH THE

SAFETY BUSSES AND NON-SAFETY BUSSES DURING

REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATIONS

SHUTDOWN RISK MANAGEMENT

MULTIPLE DHR TRAINS AND SERVICE WATER

SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE

IMPROVED RCS BOUNDARY CONFIGURATION

CONTROL WILL REDUCE RISK OF LOSS OF

INVENTORY

SSF ASSURES SOURCE OF S/G FEEDWATER

INDEPENDENT FROM NORMAL AND EMERGENCY

FEEDWATER SYSTEMS

ONE PERSONNEL AIR LOCK DOOR CLOSED

AT MOST TIMES

PORTABLE GENERATOR, ELECTRIC WRENCHES

AVAILABLE TO CLOSE EQUIPMENT HATCH