ML16138A762
| ML16138A762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16138A763 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309230068 | |
| Download: ML16138A762 (3) | |
Text
-
R REGj4 0
0 o
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.201 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO.201 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47 AND AMENDMENT NO.198 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1. 2. AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated February 23, 1993, as supplemented May 4, 1993, Duke Power Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would delete Table 4.4-1,.List of Penetrations with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Test Requirements, from the TS. The list of penetrations would then be relocated to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual (Chapter 16 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)).
This would permit administrative control of changes to the list of penetrations without having to process a license amendment. The reference to Table 4.4-1 in TS 4.4.1.2.1 has been removed, leaving the scope of local leak rate testing of containment penetrations to be determined "in accordance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50."
These criteria pertain to all containment penetrations and, therefore, include all of the components previously listed in the removed table. Guidance on the proposed TS changes was provided by Generic Letter (GL) 91-08, dated May 6, 1991.
2.0 EVALUATION The Oconee TS relating to containment penetrations (TS 3.6-1 thru 3.6.6 and 4.4.1.2) are written in terms of maintaining "Containment Integrity" rather than in terms of the operability of each penetration component (isolation valve, purge valve, hatch door, etc.) involved in maintaining Containment Integrity. However, the definition of Containment Integrity specifies that all automatic isolation valves are operable, that all non-automatic isolation valves, blind flanges, and hatch doors are closed and that the containment leakage is no greater than specified in TS 4.4.1.
The relocation of the list of containment penetrations with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Test Requirements from Table 4.4-1 of the TS to the SLC Manual does not alter existing TS requirements nor the list of components to which they apply. Generic Letter 91-08 states that the component lists should be incorporated into "plant procedures that are subject to the change control provisions for plant procedures in the Administrative Controls Section of the 9309230068 930916 PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
-2 TS."
As stated in Section 16.1 of the SLC Manual, changes "may be made, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, only after the bases for the requirement have been clearly established and after a multidisciplinary review by Qualified Reviewers, including on-site Operations personnel." Also, "...revisions to the manual are approved by the station manager or his designee." These administrative controls meet the intent of the guidance in GL 91-08.
The relocation of the list of penetrations to the SLC Manual also provides a means to keep the list more up to date than the remainder of the FSAR. The SLC Manual is updated as needed during the year rather than only during the normal annual FSAR update.
Technical Specification 3.6.4 was modified to make clear that the allowable lower limit of reactor building internal pressure was 5 inches of mercury below outside atmospheric pressure. This change is administrative in nature and is acceptable.
The licensee also proposes to add to TS 3.6.3.c a footnote that states, "Penetration flow paths (except for the Reactor Building Purge flow path) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls..." In addition, the Bases section will be changed to state the provisions in GL 91-08 that constitute acceptable administrative controls. These provisions include (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.
The addition of this footnote will allow flexibility in testing and maintenance activities without any significant decrease in safety. The administrative controls, as described in the Bases, will ensure that the penetration could be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation was indicated. Due to the size of the Reactor Building purge line penetrations and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, these valves may not be opened under administrative control.
The Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1430) allow penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
Therefore, this proposed change to the LCO is consistent with the guidance in GL 91-08 and the Standard Technical Specifications, and is, therefore, acceptable.
On the basis of its review, the staff finds that the proposed changes to the TS and their Bases for Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 relating to the relocation of the list of containment penetrations are consistent with the guidance provided in GL 91-08 and the Standard Technical Specifications and are, therefore, acceptable. The changes are primarily administrative and do not alter the requirements set forth in the existing TS. The operability requirements of the TS continue to apply to all containment isolation valves. Overall, these
4W W
-3 changes will allow the licensee to make corrections and updates to the list of components for which these TS requirements apply, under the provisions that control changes to plant procedures as specified in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 34074 dated June 23, 1993).
Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: S. Kirslis Date:
September 16, 1993