ML16127A269
| ML16127A269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1988 |
| From: | Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16127A270 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-26, REF-GTECI-RV, TASK-A-26, TASK-OR 50-269-88-34, 50-270-88-34, 50-287-88-34, NUDOCS 8901130131 | |
| Download: ML16127A269 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1988034
Text
REGUI
UNITED STATES
03
oNUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION il
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos: 50-269/88-34, 50-270/88-34 and 50-287/88-34
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
.Charlotte, N.C.
28242
Docket Nos.:. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55
Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted: N vember 16 - December 16, 1988
Inspectors:
Skinner, Senio>7'esident Inspector
D6te 4igned
L.DWert, ResideX Inspector
Dhte/$igned
Approved by: (7]
1>
tl
nspector
T. A.'Peebles, Section Chief
DAte Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced inspection involved resident inspection
on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance
activities, Unresolved safety issue A-26,
and inspection of open
items.
Results: A weakness was noted in the licensees program associated with
communications between Operations and Instrument and Electrical
Technicians during troubleshooting, paragraph 4.d.
Within the areas inspected, the following violations and unresolved
items were identified:
-
Lee Station
100KV transmission
system inadequate design
resulting in a violation of TS 3.7.6, paragraph 6.c.
-
An unresolved item associated with the performance of work on
circuit breakers without performing a retest, paragraph 4.c.
-
An
unresolved
item associated with potentially
serious
weaknesses exhibited during a station modification that resulted
in the cutting of a pipe in a wrong line, paragraph 4.b.
- 0
1: :.
1 8
1 :
PDR i
ADOCK 05000269~
2
-
An unresolved item associated with Safety Issue A-26, concerned
with the resolution of an apparently incorrect Low Temperature
Overpressure Protection setpoint, paragraph 5.
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager
- C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative
J. Brackett, Senior QA Manager
M. Carter, Site Design Engineer Representative
- J. Davis, Technical Services'Superintendent
R. Dobson, Electrical Engineering
W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer
D. Havice, Instrument & Electrical Engineer
- C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer
- E. Leggette, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group
J. McIntosh, Administrative Services Superintendent
G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians,
operators,
mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors:
- P.H. Skinner
- L.D.,Wert
- Attended exit interview.
2. Plant Operations (71707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical
specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records
were reviewed routinely.
Discussions were conducted with plant
operations, maintenance,
chemistry,
health physics, instrument &
electrical (I&E), and performance personnel.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily
basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during
week days and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift
change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance.
Actions
observed were conducted as required by the Licensees Administrative
2
Procedures.
The complement of licensed. personnel on each shift
inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS.
Operators were
responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant
conditions.
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors
included review of portions of the licensee's physical
security
activities. The performance of various shifts of the security force
was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included;
protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel,
packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval,
escorting of
visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
The inspectors observed
protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier
integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization
and operations or maintenance.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine
basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building
Auxiliary Building
Units 1,2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms
Units 1,2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area
Standby Shutdown Facility
Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Room
During the plant. tours, ongoing act.ivities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
Lando W. Zech,
Jr.,
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
visited the plant on December 8. During the visit the licensee made
a short presentation to brief the chairman about the plant, the major
design features of Oconee,
plant statistics, and areas where the
plant has put increased emphasis to achieve a more reliable and safe
operating facility. A copy of the slides used in the presentation is
provided as Enclosure 2. Also attending this presentation was Mr. W.
S. Lee, Chairman of the Board, for Duke Power company. The chairman
then toured the plant speaking to various groups and conducted an
exit briefing upon conclusion of the tour.
b. Followup On Unit 3 Reactor Trip (93702)
On November 14, 1988, Unit 3 tripped from 100% power due to a turbine
trip. Later the same day,
the unit again tripped due to a turbine
trip, this time from 39% power. These trips are discussed in
Inspection Report 269,270,287/88-33.
The inspectors attended the
licensee's post trip review meeting and have been following the
associated corrective actions. While the fault which initiated the
3
turbine trip has been identified and corrected,
the inspectors
expressed a concern during their review of the transient. The Oconee
units should be capable of sustaining a main turbine trip from 39%
power. In fact calculations performed in preparation for the recent
increase in the Anticipatory Reactor Trip on turbine trip (ART)
setpoint indicate that the Oconee units should be able to survive a
turbine trip from as high as 50% without tripping the reactor.
The
ARTS setpoint has been increased to 45% recently after the Technical
Specification (TS)
high RCS pressure trip setpoint was increased to
2355 psig. These modifications were intended to reduce the number of
unnecessary.reactor trips from low power operation.
The inspectors
noted that OSC-2699 indicates that the peak RCS pressure during the
transient following a main turbine trip from 50% power will be about
2350 psig or just below the RCS high pressure trip setpoint. A review
of the transient monitor graphs indicates that in the transient from
39%,
the peak RCS pressure would have exceeded this value (the
pressure increase was terminated by the reactor trip at 2345 psig).
Other graphs show that feedwater flow decreased much faster than
reactor power and may not have been adequately controlled by the
Integrated Control System
(ICS)
cross limits.
The inspector's
understanding is that if
the ICS had functioned as expected, the
cross limits should have limited the. mismatch between reactor power
and feedwater demand to approximately 5%. The inspectors concern is
that either the ICS on Unit 3 was not functioning as expected or
perhaps an error was made in the analysis of this transient and in
fact the Oconee units cannot sustain a turbine trip from this power
level.
Discussions with Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
personnel
indicate thatsome possible causes for the observed ICS response are
being investigated. While the ICS is not directly safety related,
the ability of the system to perform as expected during plant
transients is important to overall plant safety.
This issue is
identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
287/88-34-02:
Performance During Main Turbine Trip Runback.
c. All three Oconee units operated at 100% power for the entire report
period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural
and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for
necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical
content, authorization to
begin
work,
data collection, independent
verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of
completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected
to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was
calibrated, prerequisites were met,
tests were conducted according to
procedure,
test results were acceptable and systems restoration was
completed.
4
Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
IP/0/A/0310/014B Engineered Safeguards Analog Channel B On
Line Calibration (Unit 2)
PT/0/A/600/21
Safe Shutdown Facility Diesel Generator
Operation
Maintenance
Inspection of Condenser Circulating Water
Procedure
Pump Flange Equalization Tubes
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Maintenance Activities (62703)
a. Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the
reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified
personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described
work that was
not within the skill of the trade.
Activities,
procedures
and work requests
were
examined to verify proper
authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and
exposure control,
proper return of equipment to service, and that
limiting conditions for operation were met-.
Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 050780 Investigate and Repair Problem with 1LPSW-18
b. On
November
21,
1988,
during installation of a Nuclear Station
Modification
(NSM)
Construction and Maintenance
(CMD)
personnel
removed
a section of pipe from the wrong line.
The workers
mistakenly-cut a demineralizer relief valve tailpipe instead of a
backwash supply.header. The work involved NSM 1794 which was being
installed
to
provide
resin
sluicing .capability
from
the
demineralizers
to
the
Radwaste
Facility.
The
licensee's
investigation is still in progress but discussions with involved
management indicate that several potentially serious personnel errors
combined to cause this event. The pipe that was supposed to be cut
was a 2 1/2 inch schedule 10 line while a 2 inch schedule 40 pipe was
actually cut. The mistake occurred in.
the Unit 1/2 High Pressure
Injection (HPI)
Pump room.
It
was fortuitous that no personnel
injury or release of radioactive material occurred as a result of
this event.
Indications are that the most significant errors
occurred in the process of component and independent verification.
The inspectors are concerned that differences may exist in the
training and qualification of CMD personnel (in comparison to Nuclear
Production Department personnel) in regards to the process of correct
component verification. While the full details of this incident are
still being developed and indications are that the workers involved
were mislead to some degree by related circumstances, the inspectors
5
feel that correct component verification by all onsite personnel is
essential to safe plant operation.
This item is identified as an
Unresolved
item
269,270,
287/88-34-05:.
Potentially
Serious
Weaknesses Exhibited During Modification
1794 Resulting In The
Cutting Of A Pipe In The Wrong Line, pending review by the inspectors
of CMD personnel. training, qualifications and administrative controls
when performing activities on site.
c. Adjustment of Magnetic Overloads on Various Safety Related Breakers
On December 9, while testing the 3A Reactor Building Cooling Unit
(RBCU) during Emergency Safeguards Channel testing, the RBCU tripped
on overcurrent. An investigation by the licensee determined that the
breaker magnetic overloads had been adjusted at the request of Design
Engineering in accordance with work request
(WR)
53486 H.
When
questioned by the inspectors, the licensee stated that the WR did not
contain any retest requirements
as a result of the work.
The
inspectors are concerned that work was performed on equipment that
could affect operation of the component
and
no testing was
accomplished to assure that the components would function correctly
following the work. Since this event occurred late in the inspection
period, the inspectors did not have sufficient time to review this
item.
This is being identified as an Unresolved Item 269,270,
287/88-34-03:
Performance
of
Work
With
Inadequate
Retest
Requirements Specified, pending review and evaluation by the
inspectors.
d. Troubleshooting 1DID Inverter
On November 18,
1988,
during troubleshooting and repairs to Unit
One's inverter (1DID), the inverter's output breaker was incorrectly
opened which resulted in a second loss of power to panelboard 1KVID.
Earlier inverter
1DID
had
blown
some fuses, causing Reactor
Protection System (RPS) Channel 'D' to lose power, RPS breakers CB-3
and CB-4 to trip and also the turbine driven emergency feedwater
(TDEFW) pump to start (the steam supply valve was deenergized and
opened as designed).
During repair actions,
an Instrument
and
Electrical (I&E) technician opened the output breaker of the inverter
and caused a second loss of 1KVID.
All systems functioned as
expected and no RPS actuation occurred as a result of this activity.
Discussions with the licensee indicate that less than adequate
communications between I&E personnel played a significant role in
this issue. Contributing factors include a misunderstanding on the
part of the I&E technician of how the system functioned. The output
breaker was labeled with a caution which warned of consequences of
opening the breaker.
The inspectors have
on several
previous
occasions noted less than adequate communications between operations
personnel and I&E technicians which resulted in undesirable events or
plant transients.
This area has been addressed as a weakness. in
6
previous resident inspector reports. The inspectors will follow the
licensees investigation into this matter and actions to prevent
recurrences.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Unresolved Safety Issue A-26 (25019)
The inspectors commenced review of NRC
Manual
Temporary Instruction
2500/19, Inspection of Licensee's Actions Taken To Implement Unresolved
Safety Issue A-26:
Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection. For
Pressurized Water Reactors. NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
for the licensee in correspondence dated August 8, 1983. The licensee
made plant changes and proposed TS revisions in correspondence dated
August 15, 1984. The TS proposed by the licensees correspondence was
approved and issued by NRC correspondence dated March 30,
1987.
During
the review of this documentation, the inspectors identified what appears
to be an area of conflict.between the requirements as set forth in the SER
and the technical specifications (TS)
proposed by the licensee (and
approved
by the. NRC).
The
SER states on page 5 that the worst
overpressurization event (at Oconee) with a failed closed Power Operated
Relief Valve (PORV)
is an inadvertent actuation of the High Pressure
Injection (HPI)
system and that DPC had agreed to incorporate TS which
would require that the four HPI motor operated valves to be locked out in
the closed position prior to cooling down below 325 degrees F.
The
proposed TS and subsequently approved TS identifies this as an option and.
not as a requirement.
The inspectors concluded from the information
presently available that if the option to close the HPI valves is not used
with the plant at less than 325 degrees F, then the plant is not protected.
for the most serious overpressurization event as discussed in the SER.
This concern has been discussed with NRR and with the licensee personnel.
This is identified as an Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-34-04: Resolution
of Apparently Incorrect LTOP Protection TS, pending obtaining and review
of additional information from NRR and the licensee addressing this area.
This is not considered a significant safety issue at this time since all
units are operating and operating procedures address operation of the LTOP
protection. However, since an option does exist in the TS and it has been
used in the past, the resolution of this finding will be expedited.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspection of Open Items (92700)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee
reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with
licensee
personnel, as appropriate:
a. (Closed) P 2188-01:
10 CFR Part 21 Report Associated With Limitorque
H3BC Worm Gears. This Part 21 report was issued by Limitorque in a
letter to the NRC dated March 18, 1988.
It described a potential
7
defect in the worm gear component of type H3BC valve actuators. In
DPC internal correspondence dated October 17, 1988, this potential
defect was addressed by Design Engineering (DE). -DE identified that
only one safety related valve (CCW-9,
Emergency CCW Discharge to
Intake Canal) utilizes a H3BC gearbox at the site.
DE stated that
they did not consider this to be a problem since the actuator has
been operated under load which indicated that porosity would probably
not be present.
Limitorque indicated that failure would be
instantaneous upon gear loading at the time of actuation.
The DE
group recommended that CCW-9 actuator gearbox be disassembled and
inspected for defects during the next refueling outage. This is not
necessarily an outage effort so the licensee intends to perform this
inspection within the next two months but if not done at that time it
will be inspected during the upcoming Unit 1 outage.
Based on this
action, this item is closed.
b. (Closed) IFI .269,270,287/88-20-01:
Safe Shutdown Facility HVAC
Condenser Low Service Water Flow. In early March, 1988, the licensee
had identified that service water flow through the HVAC condensers
was significantly lower than expected. The details of this issue and
efforts to resolve it
have been closely followed by the resident
inspectors and are set forth in Inspection Report 269,270,287/88-20.
During
review of the
DE analysis of this issue the inspector
identified several concerns.. While the central question of what is
causing a lower than expected condenser flowrate has not yet been
resolved, the inspectors concerns have been addressed;
-
In response to the inspectors observation that the condenser
control valve
(CV)
may
have
been
nonconservative,
Design
Engineering determined that the most conservative data would
shift the CV value for the condensers. by a very small quantity
which is within the overall conservatisms of the analysis.
-
The
inspector noted that the
3-way valves which isolate
condenser bypass flow in high load situations failed to fully
shut off bypass flow.
had
assumed
the
valves would
automatically fully close on high HVAC service water demand. A
DE review of the test data showed that a maximum of 1.3. gpm
would be lost through the bypass path which left 24.6 gpm
calculated flow through the condensers,
more than the 24 gpm
required.
-
The
licensee readjusted the stroke of these 3-way valves.
Subsequent testing determined that this adjustment stopped
leakage through the bypass path when
the valves are fully
closed. All flow will now be directed through the condensers.
8
The licensee also began installation of a third, higher capacity
service water pump in. addition to the two existing pumps.
This
modification would
assure operability if
lakewater temperature
exceeded 85 degrees F.
The modification was partially completed
(piping installed,
pump
mount installed) and then placed in an
inactive state when
lakewater temperature
stopped increasing at
approximately 82.5 degrees F. The licensee has also continued other
efforts to discover the cause of the low condenser flow.
The specific concern of the inspectors have, been addressed and IFI
269,270,287/88-20-01 is considered closed.
LER 269/88-08 addresses
this issue and contains the licensees planned corrective actions to
restore more margin to the SSF HVAC system through modifications to
both the service water system and the HVAC system.
The inspectors
will continue to follow the resolution of this issue during followup
of LER 269/88-08.
c. (Closed)
Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-33-01:
Lee Station 100 KV
Transmission System Inadequate Design. During this report period the
inspectors continued to examine both the circumstances involved in.
the discovery of this issue and the licensee' s. corrective actions.
As discussed in Inspection Report 269,270,287/88-33, the method of
discovery of this event was a Duke initiated review of nuclear
station design calculations. The inspectors noted that LER 269/88-13
which addresses this issue lists LER 269/87-05 (Potential Tripping of
High Pressure Injection (HPI)
Pumps During Starting)
as a similar
incident with the same root cause. The root cause as stated in both
,of these LERs is that Design Engineering (DE).failed to adequately
analyze the effect of the addition of the Motor Driven Emergency
Pumps
(MDEFWP)
to the emergency
power
system.
LER 269/87-05 states that as of June 1987 it was known that the HPI pump
motors might have tripped when powered via the standby busses from
CT-4 and the Keowee Hydrostation.
The inspectors concluded it was
reasonable to expect an electrical design engineer to then question
if the same problem exists when the loads were supplied from the Lee
Station. Since the Standby Bus voltage transient profile was not
adequate when supplied from one emergency power source, the profile
when supplied from the other emergency power source should have also
been examined. Recent discussions with licensee DE disclosed several
factors concerning this issue:
-
Since August 1986 DE had as an item on their action list to
resolve design calculation problems.
One of these problems was
identified as an analysis of the Lee Combustion Turbine System
to station transformer CT-5.
Even as the issue of potential
tripping of HPI motors was being resolved, this item was planned
to be analyzed.
9
-
The analysis concerning the Lee Station could not have been completed
previous to October 1988 since an adequate design engineering model
of the Lee Combustion Turbines did not exist. This engineering model
was not developed and tested until September 1988.
The fact that the voltage supplied by Lee would have been adequate
prior to the
1979 addition of the MDEFWP's
may have been
coincidental, an adequate analysis of how the MDEFWP's affected the
voltage at the time these motors were being added might have
prevented this situation. The root cause of this problem is that no
original Lee Station voltage transient profile analysis could be
found. This item is being closed as an Unresolved issue and being
upgraded to a violation. As a result of the inability of the Lee
Station to supply sufficient capacity and capability to assure vital
functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents, each.
time Lee Station has been used in the past as the source of emergency
power a violation of TS's has occurred.
Discussions with the
licensee indicate that both Keowee units are removed from service for
planned activities: 1) once per year for approximately 30 minutes to
perform flow test,.2) once every three years for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
for turbine inspections, and 3) have been removed two times since
1979 for re-wedge of. the generators which required less than 72
hours. The licensee has also identified that at no time has Keowee
hydro station been unavailable for unplanned reasons (i.e. due to
failures). Since TS 3.7.6 requires the Lee gas turbines to provide
emergency power whenever the Keowee units are removed from service,
each time in the past that these units were removed resulted in.a
violation of TS 3.7.6. This is being identified as Violation
269,270,287/88-34-01: Violation of TS 3.7.6 Due To Inadequate Design
Review Of Modifications.
d. (Closed) Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-33-02:
Potential Inadequate
Configuration Control Associated With Sliding Links.
This item was
open pending completion of the licensees inspection and evaluation of
their findings. A memo to file was written on November 18, 1988,
which documented the licensees findings.
These findings indicated
that no safety significant circuits were found with improperly opened
links.
Final corrective actions for all open links will be to either
close the links back in or tag them as to why they are open. This is
presently scheduled for February. 1,
1989 for all units.
This
unresolved item is being closed and the correction for the root cause
of this problem will be tracked with the activities associated with
Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-13-06: Failure To Maintain Electrical
Configuration Control In The ES and RPS Cabinets.
e.
LER 287/88-03:
Potential Degraded Performance of Reactor Building
Cooling Units (RBCUs)
Due to Service Induced Fouling.
During this
report period the licensee continued efforts to resolve this issue.
Inspection Reports 269,270,287/88-28,32, and 33 contain additional
details.
The exact mechanism of fouling and the rate of fouling
accumulation remain unresolved.
Differences between the cooler
performance of Unit 3 and the other units have not yet been
explained.
The licensee recently revised the methodology used to determine
operability of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
coolers and RBCUs.
The revised criteria are based on safety function requirements.
The
previous criteria utilized (Inspection Report 269,270,287/88-28) were
largely performance requirements rather than required safety
functions.
The licensee's revised operability calculation states
that the safety. functions of the coolers are to provide longterm
cooling to the core following an accident and to maintain containment
temperature and pressure below required limits following an accident
(Environmental Qualification, Building Pressure Limits).
While
satisfaction of the original operability criteria did ensure that
these safety functions were met, the unit cooldown and LOCA criteria
were judged by the licensee to.be overly restrictive and not required
to determine operability of the coolers.
Calculations OSC-3319 and
OSC-3318 (50.59 evaluation of revised operability criteria) contain
the details of the criteria revisions.
On
November
23,
1988,
the
licensee
completed operability
determinations on the LPI and RBCU coolers of all three units.
Results are:
-
Unit 1:
Tested on November 8, 1988 and determined operable
through May 22, 1989 (beyond EOC). This evaluation was based on
a lakewater temperature of 90 degrees F and a conservative .
fouling factor., Unit 1 coolers will be tested again on January
11-13, 1989 (one week before refueling shutdown).
-
Unit 2:
Tested on October 4, 1988 and determined operable
through June 11, 1989. This evaluation is based on 90 degrees F
lakewater temperature and a conservative fouling rate of .25
percent per day. Unit 2 coolers will again be tested on January
16-17, 1989.
-
Unit 3:
Tested most recently on November 1, 1988 and determined
operable through January 16,
1989.
This evaluation is also
based -on 90 degrees F lakewater temperature and a .25 percent
per day fouling rate. Unit 3 coolers will be tested on January
10-12, 1989.
The inspectors continue to closely follow this issue.
While the
revised operability criteria have lengthened the required testing
intervals the licensee continues to test the coolers as necessary to
further resolve this issue as well
as ensure operability of the
coolers. Recent indications are .that the .25 percent per day fouling
rate is very conservative.
It
also appears that the elevated
lakewater temperature does not affect the analysis as was originally
postulated. (Due to low relative humidity in containment, dew point
is not yet being reached throughout the entire tube bundle but the
licensee feels sufficient data has been obtained to discount that the
suspected heat transfer modeling errors).
Data has been obtained
with lakewater temperature 10 degrees cooler than previous testing
and degradation rates have not improved.
Additionally the cause of
Unit 3's RBCUs lower capacity has not yet been determined. Possible
causes and plans for continued investigation have been discussed at
length with the residents. The inspectors will continue to monitor
the licensee's actions on this matter.
7.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 15, 1988,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following items
were discussed in detail:
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
269,270,287/88-33-01
Closed
Lee Station Transmission System
Inadequate Design, Paragraph 6..c.
269,270,287/88-33-02
Closed
Potential Inadequate
Configuration Control Associated
with Sliding Links, Paragraph 6.d.
269,270,287/88-20-01
Closed
Safe Shutdown Facility HVAC
Condenser Low Service Water Flow,
Paragraph 6.b.
P 2188-01
Closed
Worm Shaft Gear Failures In
Limitorque Operators,
Paragraph 6.a.
269,270,287/88-34-01
Open
Violation of TS-3.7.6 Due To
Inadequate
Design
rev.iew
of
Modifications, Paragraph 6.c.
287/88-34-02
Open
ICS Performance During Main
Turbine Trip Runback,
Paragraph 2.b.
269,270,287/88-34-03
Open
Performance Of Work On Circuit
Breakers Without Testing,
Paragraph 4.c.
12
269,270,287/88-34-04
Open
Resolution of Apparently
Incorrect LTOP Protection TS,
Paragraph 5.
269,270,287/88-34-05
Open
Potentially Serious Weaknesses
Exhibited During Modification 1794
Resulting In Cutting A Pipe In The
Wrong Line, Paragraph 4.b.
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did
they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors
during the course of their .inspection.
ENCLOSURE 2
Attachment A
Page 1 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
COMMISSIONER ZECH VISIT
DECEMBER 8, 1988
AGENDA
0830 0900
BRIEFING BY PLANT MANAGEMENT
0900 1130
PLANT TOUR
1130 1200
EXIT BRIEFING
Page 2 or 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
COMMISSIONER ZECH VISIT
DECEMBER 8, 1988
PLANT BRIEFING
.
ORGANIZATION
-
MAJOR PLANT DESIGN FEATURES
-
SELECTED PLANT STATISTICS
-
AREAS OF INCREASED EMPHASIS
- -g
I'
W. S. LEE
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
D.
W. BOOTH
PRESIDENT
W. H.
OWEN
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
POWER GROUP
II
I
R.
L.
DICK
G. W. GRIER
H. B. TUCKER
R. B. PRIORY
Vice President
Manager
Vice President
Sr. Vice President
Const. & Maint.
Corporate Q.A.
Nuclear Production
J.
E. GROGAN
T. MCMEEKIN
J.
C. LEATHERS
General Manager
Vice President
Vice President
Const. & Maint.
Design
Prod. Support
B., L. PEELE
R. M. KOEHLER
ONS Design
Gen. Manager
OFF SITE
(300)
Training
ON SITE
V
D. L. FREEZE
R. J. BRACKETT
M. S.
TUCKMAN
C. W. BOYD
T. S. BARR
Manager
Senior Q.A. Mgr.
Station Manager
Station Trng. Mgr.
CMD-South
Oconee Nuclear
(950)
(80)
(1022 -
Staff)
(7)
(50)
(200 -
Contractors)
W. W. FOSTER
R..L. SWEIGART
J. M. DAVIS
G. E. ROTHENBERGER
1J. T. MCINTOSH o
Superintendent
Superintendent
Superintendent
Superintendent
Superintendent a
Maintenance
Operations
Tech. Services
Integrated Schldg.
Station Svcs.
(519)
(177)
(235)
(19)
(50)
+
(200 Contractors)
Page 4 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
ORGANIZATION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
DO IT OURSELVES-MINIMAL VENDORS
ADEQUATE RESOURCES-ONSITE AND OFFSITE
LOW TURNOVER-HIGH EXPERIENCE
NON UNION STATUS
SHIFT RESOURCES-12 HOUR SCHEDULE
TRAINING COMMITMENT
USE OF ENGINEERS/TECHNICAL STAFF
Page 5 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
MAJOR PLANT DESIGN FEATURES
3 VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL UNITS
EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE-KEOWEE HYDRO STATION
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM-FLEXIBILITY/RELIABILITY
SAFE SHUTDOWN FACILITY
EMERGENCY CONDENSER CIRCULATION WATER SYSTEM
Page 6 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
PLANT STATISTICS
HISTORICAL CAPACITY FACTORS
UNIT 1
66.5%
UNIT 2
66.6%
UNIT 3
67.6%
RECENT CAPACITY FACTORS
1983
79.0%
1984
83.0%
1985
75.0%
1986
73.6%
1987
72.3%
1988
(PROJECTED) --------
83-84%
SIX YEAR AVERAGE ---------- 77.6%
SIGNIFICANT RECORDS
OCONEE HAS PRODUCED MORE ELECTRICITY THAN ANY OTHER NUCLEAR PLANT IN U.S.
1983
UNIT 3 HIGHEST U.S. CAPACITY FACTOR ------- 94.7%
1984
UNIT 2 HIGHEST U.S. CAPACITY FACTOR ------- 96.6%
1985
UNIT 2 SETS WORLD RECORD
-
439 CONTINUOUS DAYS
1987
5 RUNS IN EXCESS OF 100 DAYS
1988
BEST EVER UNIT 3 RUN
- 351 DAYS
BEST EVER UNIT 1 RUN
- 235 DAYS
UNIT 1 WILL BE AMONG HIGHEST U.S. CAPACITY FACTORS 1988
STATION WILL BE AMONG HIGHEST U.S. CAPACITY FACTOR FOR MULTI-UNIT
STATIONS IN 1988
HEAT RATE HISTORICALLY AMONG LOWEST IN U.S.
1983
12
1984
7
1985
10
1986
8
1987
3
1988
4
INPO EVALUATIONS -- CATEGORY 1 -- EXCELLENT PLANT LAST FOUR YEARS
NRC VIOLATIONS -- 5 PER YEAR PER UNIT---------------LAST
6 YEARS
LER'S
-- 8.8 PER YEAR PER UNIT
--
LAST 6 YEARS
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
-
3 MILLION
3 MILLION
6 MILLION
1 MILLION
Page 7 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
RECENT EMPHASIS
(CONTINUED)
SIMULATOR TRAINING
- SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE TIME FOR SIMULATOR TRAINING
SYSTEM/COMPONENT OWNERSHIP
-
ENHANCING THE OWNERSHIP OF COMPONENTS/SYSTEMS BY ENGINEERS/STAFF
EXPOSURE CONTROL
- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN TOTAL EXPOSURE --1988 LOWEST YEAR IN 14 YEARS
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
- OUTAGE MANAGEMENT HAS IMPROVED-LAST OUTAGE 43 DAYS
- UNIT 2 REFUELING IN 66 DAYS INCLUDED REBUILDING 4 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS
-
STRONG EMPHASIS WITH 5 FULL SCALE DRILLS PER YEAR--MANY USING SIMULATOR
Page 8 of 8
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
RECENT EMPHASIS
- CHEMICALLY CLEANED SECONDARY
--
UNITS 1 AND 2
- TUBE SLEEVING TO REDUCE PROBABILITY OF LEAKS
--
UNITS 1 AND 3
- INSTALLED COLD LEG DAMS (MINIMIZE TIME IN DRAINED CONDITION)
- DECON OF CHANNEL HEADS TO REDUCE DOSE
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
- OVERHAUL APPROXIMATELY 100 LIMITORQUES PER REFUELING
EXTENSIVE USE OF MOTOR OPERATED VALVE ANALYSIS TEST SYSTEM (MOVATS)
VALVE OUALITY
- EXTENSIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT OF VALVE PERFORMANCE
BINGHAM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP UPGRADE
- REBUILT 8 BINGHAM REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS DUE TO FAILURE OF 1
AREA DECONTAMINATION
- RECOVERED MANY SQ. FT. OF CONTAMINATED AREA IN AUXILIARY BUILDING
HOUSEKEEPING/MATERIAL CONDITION
- UPGRADING PAINTING, INSULATION, HOUSEKEEPING STANDARDS
- A LONG WAY TO GO