ML15342A249
| ML15342A249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 12/15/2015 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | NRC/OCM |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| Mandatory Hearing 2, RAS 28628, 50-608-CP | |
| Download: ML15342A249 (5) | |
Text
Exhibit SHN-028 Commission Mandatory Hearing SHINE Construction Permit Application S f P
l 2 Safety - Panel 2 Accident Analysis December 15, 2015
Accident Initiating Events and Scenarios Bases for identification of accidents:
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
List of events from NUREG-1537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
List of events from NUREG 1537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) augmenting NUREG-1537 Experience of the hazards analysis team Current preliminary design information Current preliminary design information Qualitative evaluations within categories Quantitative evaluations to determine consequences P
t l t d i
di ti f
ilit (IF) d di i t
d ti Postulated an irradiation facility (IF) and radioisotope production facility (RPF) Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA)
Establishes an outer limit consequence, bounds other accidents Most limiting MHA was in the RPF (Facility MHA) 2
IF Postulated Maximum Hypothetical Accident Target solution vessel (TSV) and b
iti l
bl t
subcritical assembly support structure (SASS) integrity lost, target solution spills into irradiation unit (IU) cell Subcritical Assembly Support Structure (SASS)
Maximum inventories assumed in TSV Pool presence ignored High radiation detected initiates TSV (Internal to SASS)
High radiation detected, initiates alarms and confinement High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal d
b dit d adsorbers credited Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.1 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE:
TSV Dump Tank 3
Public (site boundary) TEDE:
0.017 rem
RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)
(Facility MHA)
The five noble gas TSV Off Gas g
storage tanks rupture simultaneously With the maximum inventory NGRS Compressors Purge y
Contents are instantly released High radiation levels initiate Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Noble Gas Storage Tanks g
alarm and cell isolation Redundant isolation dampers close Al RAD dampers close 10% of the activity bypasses the isolation dampers 10% of the activity leaks Condensate Knock Out Tank Radioactive Process Vessel Vent System 10% of the activity leaks through penetrations 4
Radioactive Liquid Waste
RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)
Dose consequences (Facility MHA)
Worker TEDE: 3.6 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE: 0.082 rem The MHA consequences are conservative Simultaneous, instantaneous rupture Entirety of noble gas is transferred and released The five tanks are filled to capacity Additional ventilation isolation dampers would close, but are not credited Actual doses would be lower Radiological consequences to workers and the public are within the limits of 10 CFR 20.1101, 20.1201, and 20.1301 5
Exhibit SHN-028 Commission Mandatory Hearing SHINE Construction Permit Application S f P
l 2 Safety - Panel 2 Accident Analysis December 15, 2015
Accident Initiating Events and Scenarios Bases for identification of accidents:
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
List of events from NUREG-1537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
List of events from NUREG 1537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) augmenting NUREG-1537 Experience of the hazards analysis team Current preliminary design information Current preliminary design information Qualitative evaluations within categories Quantitative evaluations to determine consequences P
t l t d i
di ti f
ilit (IF) d di i t
d ti Postulated an irradiation facility (IF) and radioisotope production facility (RPF) Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA)
Establishes an outer limit consequence, bounds other accidents Most limiting MHA was in the RPF (Facility MHA) 2
IF Postulated Maximum Hypothetical Accident Target solution vessel (TSV) and b
iti l
bl t
subcritical assembly support structure (SASS) integrity lost, target solution spills into irradiation unit (IU) cell Subcritical Assembly Support Structure (SASS)
Maximum inventories assumed in TSV Pool presence ignored High radiation detected initiates TSV (Internal to SASS)
High radiation detected, initiates alarms and confinement High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal d
b dit d adsorbers credited Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.1 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE:
TSV Dump Tank 3
Public (site boundary) TEDE:
0.017 rem
RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)
(Facility MHA)
The five noble gas TSV Off Gas g
storage tanks rupture simultaneously With the maximum inventory NGRS Compressors Purge y
Contents are instantly released High radiation levels initiate Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Noble Gas Storage Tanks g
alarm and cell isolation Redundant isolation dampers close Al RAD dampers close 10% of the activity bypasses the isolation dampers 10% of the activity leaks Condensate Knock Out Tank Radioactive Process Vessel Vent System 10% of the activity leaks through penetrations 4
Radioactive Liquid Waste
RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)
Dose consequences (Facility MHA)
Worker TEDE: 3.6 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE: 0.082 rem The MHA consequences are conservative Simultaneous, instantaneous rupture Entirety of noble gas is transferred and released The five tanks are filled to capacity Additional ventilation isolation dampers would close, but are not credited Actual doses would be lower Radiological consequences to workers and the public are within the limits of 10 CFR 20.1101, 20.1201, and 20.1301 5