ML15244A297
| ML15244A297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1987 |
| From: | Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8708280066 | |
| Download: ML15244A297 (3) | |
Text
REGULA*6Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIdBYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8708280066 DOC.DATE: 87/08/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
05000269 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
05000270 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.
05000287 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HERDT,A.R.
Region 2, Office of Director RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION TUCKER,H.B.
Duke Power Co.
SUBJECT:
Forwards request for add1 info re review of responses to IE Bulletin 85-003, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant 'Transient Due to Improper Switch Settings."
Request should be submitted within 30 days of ltr date.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE11D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL a6SIZE:
TITLE: Bulletin Response (50 DKT)
NOTES:AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000269 AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000270 AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000287 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 LA 1
0 PD2-3 PD 1
1 PASTISH 1
1 INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA 1
1 AEOD/DSP 1
1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1
1 NRR/DEST/ADE 1
1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1
1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1
1 NRR/DOEA/GCB 1
1
/EPB 1
1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1
1 EGFILE 02 1
1 RES/DE/EIB 1
1 FILE 01 1
1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1
1 NRC PDR 1
1 NSIC 1
1 NOTES:
1 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REGUIRED: LTTR 19 ENCL 18
AUG 118 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING OCONEE'S RESPONSES TO IEB 85-03 (DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is continuing its review of responses to IEB 85-03, "Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transient Due to Improper Switch Settings."
The review indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved for your facility.
Please provide the additional information as stated in the enclosure. It is requested that you submit the additional information within 30 days of the-date, of this letter.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Alan R. Herdt, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl:
M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager bcc w/encl:
NRC Resident Inspector H. Pastis, NRR State of South Carolina A. Gibson A. Herdt F. Jape R. Kiessel, NRR Document Control Desk T. Peebles GS~hn ~i :ls N~ape7' TP~ebeVx OZ/~ /8'7 08/
/87 08//7/87 870820066 870818 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR
ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) RE:
Review of Responses to Action Item e of IE Bulletin 85-03 Licensee:
Unit(s): Oconee 1,2,3 Duke Power Company Date of Response: 05-16-86 P. 0. Box 33189 11-20-86 Charlotte, N. C. 28242 02-18-87 Respondent:
Hal B. Tucker Vice President Nuclear Production The information provided in your response to Action Item e of IE Bulletin 85-03 was found to be deficient in some-areas. Please provide the additional information necessary to resolve the following comments and questions:
- 1. Unlisted MOVs CF-1 and CF-2 in discharge lines of the core flooding tank safety injection system are shown normally open on FSAR Figure 6.0-2, Revision D2.
The possible problem that the system would be inoperable if the MOVs were left closed inadvertently should be addressed.
Based on the assumption of inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, revise pages 4 and 5 of the response of May 16, 1986 to include these valves.
- 2. Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials?
If not, please explain.
- 3. Please explain on an individual basis why the 12 MOVs shown in discharge lines of the EFW pumps on FSAR Figure 10.4-13 for Oconee 1 are not listed in the response of 05-16-86. Assume inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, and consider the separation of EFW and normal FW systems. As appropriate, revise the response of 05-16-86 to include these valves.
This comment applies also to units 2 and
- 3.
- 4. We have been unable.to locate MOV 1-FDW-347, which is identified in the response of 05-16-86. However, we were able to find MOV 1-FDW-47 on FSAR Figure 10.4-13, in a discharge line to Steam Generator IB.
Is this valve meant? This question applies in essence to units 2 and 3 also.