ML15239A064

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Forwards Requalification Exam Rept 50-269/92-302 During Wks of 920720 & 0727
ML15239A064
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/15/1992
From: Peebles T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Hampton J
DUKE POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML15239A065 List:
References
NUDOCS 9209250222
Download: ML15239A064 (6)


See also: IR 05000269/1992302

Text

September 15, 1992

Duke Power Company

ATTN:

Mr. J. W. Hampton

Vice President

Oconee Site

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION REPORT

NO. 50-269/92-302

This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered

requalification examinations led by Richard S. Baldwin during the weeks of

July 20 and July 27, 1992. These examinations were administered to employees

of your company who currently hold licenses to operate the Oconee Nuclear

Station. At the conclusion of these examinations, the examination questions

and preliminary findings were discussed with those members of your staff

identified in the Examination Report, Enclosure 1. The examiners found that

.the

Oconee Requalification Program was satisfactory. A Simulator Fidelity

Report is provided as Enclosure 2. A copy of the written examination

questions and answer key, as noted in Enclosure 3, was provided to members of

your training staff at the conclusion of the examination.

We are concerned that, while your Requalification Program continues to be

satisfactory, it shows weaknesses which are a concern in both number and

severity. Specifically, it shows weaknesses in the Training Department's

ability to construct comprehensive written examinations. The facility stated

they understand this concern and committed to improve the examination develop

ment process.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this examination, please contact me.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by T. A. Peebles)

9209250222 920915

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

Thomas A. Peebles, Chief

V

PDR

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

.

Enclosures:

1. Examination Report 50-269/92-302

2. Simulator Fidelity Report

3. Examination and Answer Key (RO & SRO)

(Document Control Desk Only)

cc w/encls 1 and 2:

(See page 2)

.

Duke Power Company

2

September 15, 199.

H. B. Barron, Station Manager

Duke Power Company

Oconee Nuclear Station

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

L. Wikie, Training Manager

Duke Power Company

Oconee Nuclear Station

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC

29679

M. E. Patrick

Compliance

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

A. V. Carr, Esq.

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

.

Charlotte, NC 28242-0001

County Supervisor of

Oconee County

Walhalla, SC 29621

Robert B. Borsum

Babcock and Wilcox Company

Nuclear Power Generation Division

1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525

Rockville, MD 20852

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Winston and Strawn

1400 L Street, NW

Washington, D. C. 20005

Office of Intergovernmental Relations

116 West Jones Street

Raleigh, NC 27603

Heyward G. Shealy, Chief

Bureau of Radiological Health

South Carolina Department of Health

and Environmental Control

2600 Bull Street

.

Columbia, SC 29201

(cc w/encls cont'd -

See page 3)

Duke Power Company

3

September 15, 1992

cc w/encls cont'd:

Manager, LIS

NUS Corporation

2650 McCormick Drive

Clearwater, FL 34619-1035

R. L. Gill

Nuclear Production Department

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

Karen E. Long

Assistant Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice

P. 0. Box 629

Raleigh, NC

27602

bcc w/encls: 1 and 2:

L. Wiens, NRR

A. F. Gibson, DRS

W. Miller, DRP

G. A.

Belisle, DRP

A. R. Herdt, DRP

L. L. Lawyer, DRS

G. T. Hopper, DRS

R. S. Baldwin, DRS

Operator Licensing Branch, DLPQ:NRR

R. Miller, Sonalysts

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN:

Mr. P. Harmon, Oconee Senior

Resident Inspector

Route 2, Box 610

Seneca, SC 29678

bcc w/encls 1, 2, and 3:

Document Control Desk

bcc w/o encs:

IMS, Region II

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

  • B. Barron, Station Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station
  • D. Covar, Nuclear Instructor, Oconee Nuclear Station
  • P. Stovall, Director of Operator Training, Oconee Nuclear Station
  • D. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
  • L. Wilkie, Training Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, instructors,

operators, and office personnel.

2.

Examiners

  • R. Baldwin, Chief Examiner, Region II
  • J. Bartley, Region II
  • R. Miller, Sonalysts
  • Attended exit interview

3.

Other NRC Personnel Attending Exit

None

4.

Discussion

a.

Examination Results/Program Evaluation

Based on the examination results, the examination team found that

the Oconee Requalification Program met the criteria established in

NUREG-1021, ES 601 C.2.b (Revision 6), and thus was determined to

be satisfactory. The facility is permitted to administer the re

examinations for returning those individuals that failed this

examination to licensed duties. However, these individuals must

still pass a subsequent NRC administered examination for license

renewal.

b.

Reference Material

(1) The examiners reviewed the reference material supplied by

the licensee and determined it to be adequate to support the

examination.

(2) The licensee supplied a sampling plan describing the

requalification cycle topics and the selection process used

for the topics to be included in the examination. This

sampling plan was very difficult to use. The design of the

sampling plan allowed the skewing of the examinations

.

Report Details

2

towards specific topic areas. As an example, 35 percent of

the questions on two of the proposed Part A, static

examinations, and two of the proposed Job Performance

Measures dealt with the Reactor Protection System. Also,

five of the seven proposed dynamic simulator scenarios had

Small Break Loss of Coolant Accidents (SBLOCA) as the major

transient.

(3) The examiners found that many of the questions in the

question bank lacked time validation. This required the

facility to delete almost 30 percent of the questions from

the proposed examinations to meet time limits based on

actual crew validation of the examination.

(4) The facility does not have the complete EOP basis documents

on site and must call the main office in Charlotte,

North Carolina to resolve questions concerning EOP bases.

This hampers the effectiveness of the instructors when

researching EOP issues.

c.

Proposed Examination

(1) The examiners expended a significant amount of time and

effort to raise the written examinations up to the level

required by NUREG 1021.

This required replacing 20 percent

-and modifying 25 percent of the questions for the proposed

Part A Static sections, and modifying 30 percent of the

questions for the Part B Limits and Controls section.

Almost 60 percent of the questions on the proposed Part A

could be answered without the use of the associated static

simulator setup. Many of the questions on the Part A and

Part B examinations were memory level or direct lookup. The

examiners required other changes be made to the stems and

distractors of questions to make them test at the synthesis

and analysis level.

During the prep week, after the

proposed written examinations had been revised, another 25

percent of the questions had to be modified so the

examinations would meet the requirements of NUREG 1021.

(2) The examiners determined the proposed simulator scenarios

met the requirements of NUREG 1021 in complexity and depth

of EOP usage. However, none of the scenarios contained

instrument failures, several did not have failures requiring

the Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) to reference Technical

Specifications as specified in NUREG-1021 (Revision 6)

ES-604-1, Simulator Scenario Review Checklist, and several

Individual Simulator Critical Tasks did not have clear

evaluation standards for the evaluators. These problems

were corrected during the preparation week.

Report Details

3

(3) The JPMs were well organized and their content was good.

Eight of the thirty-nine proposed JPMs were faulted. The

examiners faulted four additional JPMs. The facility JPM

bank had only one JPM written for calculating an Estimated

Critical Position and one for calculating Shutdown Margin.

These were rewritten to change the numbers and graphs used

to obtain the data for the calculations in order to provide

test variety.

d.

Examination Administration

(1) Administration of the exams went smoothly and according to

the facility's schedule with a few exceptions.

(a) There were three last minute changes to the written

examinations which delayed their start times about 20

minutes.

(b) During the second week of the examinations, the

facility left two operators unescorted with operators

who had already completed two JPMs which the

unescorted operators were scheduled to perform later

that day. This security lapse required rescheduling

these operators to perform two different JPMs the

following day.

(2) Part of the reference materials for the Part B examination

included extracts of the facility's Technical

Specifications. The facility had included only those

sections covered in the requalification cycle. This was

inappropriate cueing and the facility was informed the

reference materials should include the complete Technical

Specifications.

(3) One question on the Part A examination was re-evaluated

post-exam and was determined to have two correct answers.

This change resulted in the change of a pass or fail

determination.

e.

Operator Performance

The examiners noted several operator and crew weaknesses during

the dynamic simulator portions of the examination. Two of these

weaknesses, communications and EOP usage, affect the crews'

ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

(1) Communication weaknesses were noted in the areas of

repeatbacks and the interaction and coordination between the

Unit Supervisor (US), Control Room Senior Reactor Operator

(CRSRO), and the Reactor Operators (RO).