ML15239A049
| ML15239A049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1991 |
| From: | Kwiatkowski D Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15239A050 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9108190154 | |
| Download: ML15239A049 (58) | |
Text
Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 JN 2 6 1991 Mr. Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Congel:
Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the October 9-10, 1990, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Oconee Nuclear Station.
The State of South Carolina and Anderson, Greenville, Oconee, and Pickens Counties, South Carolina, participated in the exercise.
The final exercise report was prepared by the Region IV staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
A copy of this report will be provided to the State of South Carolina by the FEMA Region IV staff.
There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise.
There were,
- however, five Areas Requiring Corrective Action identified during this exercise.
FEMA Region IV staff will monitor the status of the corrective actions.
Based on the results of the October 9-10, 1990, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the Oconee Nuclear Station are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Oconee Nuclear Station, granted on February 23,
- 1983, will remain in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S.
Wingo, Chief, Radiological Preparedness Division, at (202) 646-3026.
- incerely, Dennis H. Kwiatkowski Assistant Associate Director Office of Technological Hazards Enclosure F:
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EXERCISE Conducted on October 9-10, 1990 Exercise Report December 10, 1990 Utility:
Duke Power Company Plant Location:
Near Seneca, South Carolina Participating State and Local Governments:
State of South Carolina Oconee County Pickens County Anderson County Greenville County
Oconee Nuclear Station Protective Action Zones Miles 4
creee DA-2 1309 es F-2 11 F-1 A-1 24 LMte Rw ef "7
222 178 183oAe0 Six Mile B-2 E*
Nucler 188 Station 188 Liberty E-2 93 Ila
~ateachee 9
lia West Union D1C1nr 2
2 130 291 28 183 iery3 Central C-2 135 Seneca D-2 1330 Clem ao e-Pendleton 21 (3) 65
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pacte I. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
1 EXERCISE TIME LINE 2
II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION 3
State of South Carolina 3
Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) 3 Media Center 4
Oconee County 6
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 6 Other Activities 7
Medical Drill 10 Pickens County 11 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 11 Other Activities 12 Anderson County 16 Relocation/Congregate Care Center 16 Decontamination 16 Greenville County 17 Relocation/Congregate Care Center 17 III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 19 IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 20 V.
APPENDICES 22 A.
Evaluator List and Assignments 23 B.
Status of Objectives 24 C.
Exercise Objectives and Scenario 25
1 I. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The Oconee Nuclear Station partial participation exercise was conducted on October 9-10, 1990. The entire exercise was focused on response operations related to conditions in the plume exposure pathway of a radiological accident at the.Oconee Nuclear Station. The exercise was observed and evaluated by 18 Federal evaluators. Some non-scenario related events were evaluated on October 10, 1990.
The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
The Oconee Nuclear Station is owned and operated by the Duke Power Company.
It is located approximately eight miles northeast of Seneca in eastern Oconee County. Portions of Oconee and Pickens Counties are located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The exercise included the following major participants:
Governor's Division of Public Safety Programs South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division (EPD)
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC)/Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH)
Oconee County (Risk)
Pickens County (Risk)
Anderson County (Hc Greenville County '
st)
Duke Power Company/Oconee Nuclear Station Twenty-three exercise objectives were demonstrated, and no NUREG 0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 Deficiencies were identified.
Five Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were identified, as well as several Areas Recommended foi Improvement; these are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.
2 I
LEEI11RCMEDTO1 EVN I I NA I I NAII NIANI II NA I
NEMERGENCYIITM IPOECIE I
A I
SIE I
ESO I~ ~
~
~~11Eaut ACIN IDCAE CTO IDCSO1IATIAINIISRCIN LEVEL II
~
etor IIEOMNATINH TME I
TME I
MSAG B-1, C-(1,R D-1, 9:5 TIM 9:5p:8p IE~uuuEUE~uUEEEEEEuEEu
&EuEEF-1EUEEUEEUEUEEE IIIA 2 B 2 C-2 1I I
GNERUALI 11 II-2
&I F-2
~~~~~~~9 4 E0N II NA IINAH
/
I
/
I
/
IE E G N Y
-- - -- - H -- - -- - -
I I.....................2)..mEacuae.Eu m
E u
u m
m m
m m
I I~~.
NoneH I
I Il~etorsC-2 11:9 PMi 1109 P I
II II ct(vateivation I
IT I I
irnsad 910p H 9:8 mD-:22p ARE 118:5 pmH EOSti onal)
3 II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION State of South Carolina Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC)
No formal evaluation of State-level response operations was required in this partial participation exercise; however, the FEOC was activated to provide realism and support for county participants. Also, the E.reau of Radiological Health activated its dose assessment functions at the FEOC to assist all participants in protective action play.
The State National Guard Armory at Clemson provided adequate operating space for all State-level participants. Operations were well coordinated and adequately supported by communications.
Cooperation between BRH and EPD staffs was particularly noteworthy. Protective action recommendations (PARs) were thoroughly discussed ana t-:imined. The emergency notification form information was telephoned to the FEOC. Decisions were promptly developed and co-=.unicated.
The primary purposes of t1:e BRH operations at the FEOC were to coordinate dose projections with Duke Power Company; to control State field monitoring te2-.j (which did not play in this exercise); and to develor PARs for the areas affected by the release. Numerous dose projections were developed by the BRH staff using a pre-programmed computer system identical to the one used by Duke Power Company.
The BRH uses the EPA's protective action guides (PAGs) as the technical basis for their PARs. The utility's recommendations were used in developing State recommendations for the off-site areas.
As plant status changed, new projections were made and additional PARs were prepared.
At 10:50 p.m., the decision was made by the State Health Officer to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers within five miles of the plant. The projections indicated a thyroid dose greater than five REM.
4 Superior Items:
- 1.
Cooperation between EPD and BRH staffs.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
The emergency notification form should be faxed to the FEOC to eliminate transmission errors.
Media Center The Media Center on Issaqueena Trail was declared operational at 10:40 p.m. State, county, and utility staff were present to inform the media of the nature and extent of the incident at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
Before the activation of the Issaqueena Trail Media Center, information was issued at the Duke Power Company media facility at the World of Energy Visitors' Center adjacent to the plant.
At 9:40 p.m., the decision makers recommended the evacuation of the 5-mile area around the plant, which included the World of Energy facility. Twenty-five minutes later, the Media Center at the plant began relocation to the Issaqueena Trail location. The delay in making this move was excessive, since at the time evacuation was ordered, all traffic movement to the World of Energy building would have been stopped and media representatives would have been denied access. Further, the evacuation route to the new location traversed the plume.
At about 11:00 p.m., the State of South Carolina issued a press release which added two areas to the list of previously evacuated areas.
The wording of the news release did not clearly state that the listed areas were additions to the original list and could have caused some uncertainty. Also, the State news releases were not numbered, and only one contained a time of release.
Pickens and Oconee Counties' representatives at the Media Center immediately established contact with their EOCs and began to exchange information. The county representatives also released appropriate information in the media briefing. Telephones, facsimile machines, and radios were used to communicate with the various EOCs.
The exercise terminated at 11:30 p.m.
5 The area designated for use by media representatives was inadequate to handle the number of,media representatives who could be expected in the event of an actual incident. In addition, many of the services, materials, and equipment normally provided for the media were not available; i.e., news releases, telephones, interview areas, technical assistance, recordings of previous media briefings, and media kits. Much of this problem can be attributed to the partial participation nature of this exercise.
The county PIOs were knowledgeable and conducted an adequate demonstration; however, since the State does not fully participate in a partial participation exercise, many of the services and functions normally provided in a full participation exercise were not present, i.e., rumor control, background information for the media, and monitoring of TV and radio. The ability to brief the media at the Media Center was demonstrated.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
The Issaqueena facility should be used throughout future exercises.
If that is not done, the move from the plant area should be made immediately after the evacuation order.
- 2.
Check news releases to see that messages are clearly stated and that all are numbered.
- 3.
Provide a larger working area for media representatives.
- 4.
Provide more equipment and materials for media representatives.
6 Oconee County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Oconee County EOC is located in the basement of the Oconee County Law Enforcement Complex. The EOC was sufficient to support extended operations. During the exercise it became noisy and crowded because of the double staffing of some positions.
The status boards were kept current but were difficult to read from the back of the operations room. A large Emergency Classification Level (ECL) board was placed above the status boards in the center of the front wall, thereby implementing an Area Recommended for Improvement from the previous exercise.
Communications systems functioned well during the exercise.
Notification of changes in the ECLs and updates were received over the Selective Signaling System, which is a dedicated ring down telephone system. Later in the exercise these notifications were also faxed to the EOC.
Some confusion was caused when two of the messages from the plant stated that there were no protective actions recommended while, previously, protective actions had been recommended and implemented by the State and the counties. The Administrative Decision-Line was used by Oconee County to coordinate protective action decisions with the FEOC and Pickens County.
The EOC was well managed by the county Emergency Management Director. Periodic briefings were conducted, and all changes in the ECLs were announced promptly. A representative from Duke Power Company explained the situation at the plant. The Chairman of the County Commission and several commissioners were present throughout the exercise.
They were involved in thorough discussions in all protective action decisions.
At 9:10 p.m., Oconee County, in coordination with Pickens County and the FEOC, decided to activate the public alert and notification system to alert the public to the potential for protective action recommendations. The sirens were activated and the EBS message was broadcast at 9:22 p.m. The sirens were again activated (simulated) at 9:55 p.m., after a decision was reached at 9:53 p.m. to evacuate certain areas of the EPZ.
The EBS message was broadcast (simulated) at 9:58 p.m.
Shortly after the Alert declaration was received, Oconee County dispatched two public information officers (PIOs) to the World of Energy building at the plant, where Duke Power Company was setting up the initial Joint Information Center.
PIOs were also
7 stationed in the operations room and kept in constant contact with the PIOs at the Media Center. They worked diligently to keep the public informed of the accident and the situation in Oconee County, thereby correcting the Area Requiring Corrective Action identified in the previous exercise.
Oconee County has identified mobility-impaired people and their special needs during an evacuation and have the resources to evacuate them. The transportation coordinator knows the resources available in Oconee County to assist those people in need of transportation; however, he was not sure of the specific procedures for helping them.
A TLD and two direct-reading dosimeters (0-20 R and 0-200 R) were issued to emergency workers going into the field from the EOC.
They were told to call their readings into the EOC where they would be recorded.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
Revise procedures for the special needs of the mobility-impaired to insure the best use of transportation resources.
Other Activities Traffic Control PoJ s (TCPs) -
The exercise scenario called for Oconee County to estanlish two traffic control points. TCP #1 at the junction of SR 130 and Route 1 and TCP #2 at the intersection of Routes 76/123 and SR 130.
The functions of these TCPs were effectively demonstrated by well-trained personnel of the State Highway Patrol.
The officers at each TCP had sufficient knowledge of their emergency response roles relative to protective actions, planning areas, evacuation routes, relocation center sites, access control, and reentry for essential services. Both TCPs had excellent radio communications with the EOC. Both officers also knew what to do when protective actions were in effect, or when changed. Each officer had a permanent-record TLD, two zeroed pocket dosimeters (0-20 R, 0-200 R), a charger, an exposure-record card, and instructions on dosimetry record keeping, and the exposure authorized. They also had KI and related instructions, including authorization procedures.
8 The foregoing demonstrations at each TCP indicated that excellent dosimetry equipment and procedures for emergency worker exposure control were in place and that TCP officers were well trained and knowledgeable of their duties. This resolves an Area Requiring Corrective Action from a previous exercise.
Superior Items:
- 1.
The knowledge of traffic control and exposure control procedures demonstrated by the State Highway Patrol officers.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
It is recommended that the checklist used by the TCP officers be formalized into a Standard Operating Procedure for the various TCPs in Oconee County's portion of the EPZ.
School Evacuation -
The evaluator met with the Oconee County School District Superintendent and the Director of Transportation at the Oconee County EOC.
Six school principals or their representatives were also interviewed by the evaluator. The county school evacuation procedures and related data-were thoroughly examined. The school personnel were knowledgeable and enthusiastic about improving their school preparedness programs.
The schools are notified by commercial telephones with back-up, unlisted telephone numbers in the event of an overloaded system.
Transportation resources were adequate for the emergency although the school system could not demonstrate the ability to notify the bus drivers during non-duty hours.
(E.2.)
The six schools that were interviewed each had a site-specific evacuation plan. These plans lacked continuity and were not coordinated with the Oconee County School System. Although most of the plans were exemplary, some of the high schools relied heavily on student-driven vehicles but lacked an accountability of the student drivers and their potential passengers.
(J.1o.d.)
The school bus drivers had no dosimetry and lacked formal evacuation and radiation training.
(0.1.b.)
A law enforcement vehicle will accompany the buses to satisfy this need, but this procedure must be placed in the plan.
9 Superior Items:
- 1.
The Oconee County Emergency Management Agency along with.the school system and the utility have developed a video about county school evacuation procedures that is shown to faculty, staff, and at some schools, the pupils.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
- 1.
E.2. -
A detailed and updated telephone list and notification method for bus drivers should be developed.
- 2.
J.10.d. -
An effort must be made to account for student drivers with pernission slips or waivers during an evacuation.
- 3.
0.1.b. -
A rigc-'is training schedule, including dosimetry instruction, should be developed by Oconee County.
Areas Recommended for improvement:
- 1.
The Oconee County School District should provide better instruction to parents who live outside the 10-mile EPZ about evacuaticn policies and the function of reception centers.
- 2.
School plans should be coordinated system-wide.
Reception Center - Reception Centers in Oconee County serve as actual Reception Centers for school children but serve as Shelter Information Points for the general population. The Reception Center, or "Shelter Information Point", was located at West Oak High School, outside the 10-mile EPZ. The personnel at the Reception Center were enthusiastic Red Cross volunteers.
However, they were not aware of having any function other than handing out a map with directions to the New Prospect Elementary School Reception Center. The evaluation took place at 8:30 p.m.
The building was locked and no representative from the school was present. In a conversation with the EMA Director it was revealed that the West Oak School Principal is aware of the dual emergency use of the building and the procedures for receiving the evacuated school children.
10 Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions: Rone Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
The role of the West Oak High School should be clearly stated in the Emergency Planning Information brochure and in the county plan.
Medical Drill The participants in the medical drill involved the Oconee County Emergency Medical Services (EMS), which is a part of the Oconee Memorial Hospital.
Other participants included the Oconee Memorial Hospital and the Oconee County Emergency Management Office. The hospital is located within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Station.
The medical drill was initiated by a telephone call from the Oconee County Emergency Management Coordinator to the Oconee County EMS. Within thirteen minutes the EMS team arrived at the Corinth-Shiloh Fire Department, the accident site. Immediately one of the EMS persons medically evaluated the patient. The second EMS person was prepared to monitor the patient and the area.
The EMS personnel properly examined the patient and covered him with a sheet. The vehicle was excellently prepared to transport the patient. The walls and floors of the ambulance were covered with plastic. The two team members who cared for the patient carried 0-20 R and permanent-record dosimetry and were dressed in protective clothing. The EMS did not have plastic bags handy to place the patient's personal items in and placed them on the ground.
Later, these items were placed in plastic bags.
En route to the hospital, the EMS made adequate calls to the Oconee Memorial Hospital staff on the medical condition and contamination level of the patient. EMS personnel also kept the hospital staff informed about the patient while still at the accident area.
The EMS left the accident site and arrived at the Oconee Memorial Hospital in 15 minutes. The hospital had prepared for the patient's arrival.
Protective covering had been placed on the hallway and Emergency Room (ER) floors and at the outside entrance to the ER. A control line and security had been established. The hospital staff wore protective clothing and appropriate film badges but wore improper dosimetry (0-200 R).
(K.3.a.)
11 In the ER the patient was thoroughly monitored and decontaminated. There was adequate contamination control by the supervising physician and nurse. The health physicist from the hospital's nuclear medicine department was professional and gave excellent directions to the hospital staff. Nose, ear, and saliva samples were taken. The monitors used the Eberline 120 and CDV-700 survey meters.
Exit procedures were adequate but not posted. The EMS personnel and vehicle were properly monitored and released.
Superior Items:
- 1.
Professionalism and cooperation of EMS and hospital personnel.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
- 1.
K.3.a. -
The hospital needs to acquire 0-20 R dosimeters since it is located within the 10-mile EPZ.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
EMS personnel could improve contamination control by initially placing the patient's personal items in a plastic bag.
- 2.
Exit procedures for ER staff should be clearly posted.
Pickens County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Pickens County EOC was activated and staffed at 7:52 p.m.
Notification of the EOC staff started at 7:26 p.m. and was completed at 7:40 p.m. This process was effectively accomplished by using an up-to-date call list.
The EOC was staffed according to the county plan and all personnel were knowledgeable and well trained. All maps, displays, and status boards were kept current and were easily viewed throughout the EOC.
Direction and control of the Pickens County response to the simulated emergency was excellent. The Director of Emergency Preparedness and the newly appointed County Administrator worked extremely well together as a team. All decisions regarding protective actions for the citizens of Pickens County were discussed among the proper response agencies and then fully coordinated with Oconee County and the FEOC.
Siren and EBS
12 activations at the Site Area and General Emergency classifications were well within the FEMA 15-minute time requirement. Discussions concerning mobility-impaired and institutionalized individuals resulted in Pickens County decision makers evacuating a retirement center and issuing early notification of the handicapped within the 10-mile EPZ.
The Radiological Officer was well trained and very knowledgeable of his duties regarding county emergency workers. Proper dosimetry (0-20 R) and TLDs were issued, and all survey instruments were recently calibrated (September 1990).
Although emergency workers were well trained, instructions should be issued along with the dosimetry, TLDs, and instruments that convey dose limitations and procedures for notification of the proper individual when limits are exceeded.
Superior Items:
- 1.
Leadership provided by the County Administrator.
- 2.
Team concept used in EOC management.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
Provide emergency workers with instructions regarding exposure limits.
Other Activities Traffic Control Points (TCPs) -
Traffic Control Points (TCPs) were established at the intersection of Shady Grove Road and Route 49 (TCP #1) and the intersection of Shady Grove Road and Route 133 (TCP #2).
Both TCPs are within the 10-mile EPZ of the Oconee Nuclear Station. TCP #1 was established by two deputies of the Pickens County Sheriff's Department and TCP #2 was established by one deputy of the Pickens County Sheriff's Department and one South Carolina State Highway Patrolman.
Communications equipment was adequate and fully demonstrated.
The deputies had car-mounted radios, portable radios, and cellular telephones. The State Patrolman was similarly equipped but did not have a cellular telephone.
13 Each person assigned to TCP duties was equipped with a 0-20 R self-reading dosimeter and a simulated TLD. TLDs are available but were not issued during this exercise. The three deputies interviewed had received radiological training within the past month. The State Patrolman has not received radiological training in several years. All radiological equipment observed had current calibrations.
The four people interviewed were cognizant of their responsibilities concerning protective actions, planning areas, evacuation routes, location of relocation centers, access control, and reentry for essential services.
The state controller injected a message which simulated an impediment to evacuation and the TCP personnel responded satisfactorily.
All of the TCP personnel observed demonstrated the capability to carry out their assigned duties in a manner that is consistent with the plan.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
Provide refresher radiological training for State Patrol peisonnel assigned TCP duties.
Reception Centers -
teception Centers in Pickens County serve as actual Reception Cerners for school children but serve as Shelter Information Points for the general population. This Reception Center (Shelter Information Point) was established at the Pickens High School parking lot. The local Department of Social Services provided personnel to distribute directional maps for designated shelters. The number of maps provided for each shelter corresponded to the capacity of that specific shelter. When the map supply was depleted, shelter capacity for that specific shelter was assumed to be filled. Additional maps would be provided for the next shelter, etc. Traffic control for this activity was provided by deputies from the Sheriff's Department.
Communication was provided by the mobile command/communication van of the local Office of Emergency Preparedness. Additional training for this activity would improve the knowledge and coordination of those involved.
14 Deficiencies:
None
.Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
The plan and Emergency Planning Information brochure should clearly state the dual purpose function of the Reception Centers.
School Evacuation - The Director of General Services for the County School District was the designated school district representative in the Emergency Operations Center. He was extremely knowledgeable in all phases of school evacuation procedures as outlined in the Emergency Plan. Two elementary schools of the seven in the 10-mile EPZ were selected to demonstrate the evacuation knowledge and capabilities of the principals and staff. Written evacuation procedures specific to the school were provided by each principal visited. Both principals were impressively knowledgeable and well organized.
The principals knew the number of buses needed at each school as well as the host school to which the students would be transported. Each principal described loading procedures for the buses. Parents are informed of evacuation procedures by the school news letter, a brochure mailed to each parent by Duke Power Company, and an open-house PTA meeting.
Beginning the next school year, all parents will be provided an information brochure on the registration of students.
Specific information on the number of buses needed at each school has been included in the overall plan and in the specific plan of each school, correcting an Area Requiring Corrective Action from the previous exercise. School evacuation information is also included in EBS messages. This also corrects an Area Requiring Corrective Action from the previous exercise.
Bus drivers are part-time employees of the school district and will be contacted by telephone using a call-down alerting list.
If a regular driver cannot be reached, each school has personnel licensed as drivers for emergency situations. Bus drivers have not been provided dosimetry or trained in the use of dosimetry.
(K.3.a.)
Drivers will be provided route maps and directions to the host school by each principal as the driver reports to the evacuating school.
The county plan has no information concerning day care centers in the 10-mile EPZ.
The plan has no means of contacting day care p
centers other than EBS messages.
15 Deficiencies: None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
- 1.
K.3.a. -
Provide dosimetry and training to school bus drivers.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
List day care centers in the emergency plan.
- 2.
Develop procedures for contacting day care centers in addition to EES.
Decontamination -
The Emer-ency Worker/Vehicle Decontamination Station is at the County Prison Farm. The county representative in charge was quite knowlegeable of requirements and explained procedures in detail. Personnel present appeared well trained.
Vehicles are monitored in a large open field with excellent drainage and provisions tor containment, if required. Clean vehicles would be relocated to an area with exits away from decontamination operation:.
Personnel will pass through a "hot line" and, if required, mo-ve to a building with showers.
Procedures allow for male,female separation, as appropriate.
Vehicle monitoring was demonstrated by a member of the county fire department. Procedures were executed rapidly but thoroughly.
Dosimeters of proper ran;e and TLDs were worn. Equipment had been recently calibrated. Previous Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were resolved.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None
16 Anderson County (Host)
Relocation/Congregate Care Center The New Prospect Elementary School in Anderson County was used as the Relocation/Congregate Care Center. The school has the capability to accommodate 850 evacuees. It is well designed for use as a care center and has ample restrooms, showers, kitchen facilities, a 10-day meal supply, telephones (9), and handicap access ramps.
The monitors were very well trained and equipped to monitor and decontaminate the evacuees. They had not been issued film badges or TLDs. TLDs were available at the county emergency director's office.
The shelter was well marked with American Red Cross banners which provided directions. Upon monitoring vehicles and personnel, those found clean were directed to a registration desk for processing into the shelter. Those found contaminated were directed along paper-covered walkways to showers. Upon showering, they were re-monitored, issued new clothing, and directed into the shelter for registration. A suitable area for vehicle decontamination and parking is available on school property.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None Decontamination The decontamination station used in this exercise was located on the Old Clemson Highway at the Corinth-Shiloh Fire Station. The fire station was manned by volunteers trained in radiological defense. Present were two members of the fire department, the Oconee County Fire Marshall, and the Oconee County Director of' Emergency Management.
Equipment on hand for use in monitoring and decontamination were two self-reading dosimeters (0-20 R, 0 200 R) per person. Also available were CDV-700s and CDV-715s, Scott air packs, acid suits, ample water supply, and fire vehicles. The monitoring and decontamination team was knowledgeable in the use of their equipment and procedures.
Ample parking was available to separate the clean and decontaminated vehicles.
17 Superior Items:
- 1.
Cooperation and attitude of Red Cross and Anderson County emergency workers.
- 2.
Ability of the Corinth-Shiloh Volunteer Fire Department.
Deficiencies: None Areas Reauiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None Greenville County (Host)
Relocation/Congregate Care Center Greenville County demonstrated relocation and congregate care capabilities at the Carolina High School. The center was well staffed by county representatives from the emergency management organization, School District, Department of Social Services (DSS), Sheriff's Department, Gant Fire Department, American Red Cross, and The Salvation Army.
The facility is large, modern, and adequate to handle evacuees.
During the exercise, approximately 20 high school students were processed through monitoring, decontamination (as appropriate),
and registration into the shelter.
Monitoring activity took place outside the gymnasium and was accomplished by personnel from the Gant Fire Department. These well-trained personnel were members of a 50-member county hazardous materials team. Team members used recently calibrated CDV-700's with headsets and had self-reading dosimeters with a range of 0-200 R. Three monitors performed the monitoring of the students.
If found to be contaminated, evacuees were directed into a large, pre-fabricated tent that contained a shower facility with a 150 gallon holding tank. In this tent, evacuees would be showered and re-monitored to insure decontamination before being directed to the shelter.
The pre-fabricated inflatable tent is an innovative and versatile piece of equipment that the county has been utilizing for six months. Additional supplies were on hand such as plastic bags for clothing and valuables, radiation record
18 exposure forms, and paper coveralls.
Following the monitoring process, if found to be "clean", the evacuees were directed into the shelter where they were registered by DSS and Red Cross personnel, a process that seemed redundant. Approximately 12 members of the DSS staff were on hand for this exercise.
The school principal served as shelter manager, and demonstrated excellent control of the situation. He has undergone appropriate shelter management training and was enthusiastic and well versed in his responsibilities. All personnel interviewed knew their roles and appeared to be working well together.
It was apparent that much planning had taken place for this exercise. Red Cross had an excellently equipped nursing station set up. There were back-up rosters and written SOPs on hand from participating agencies.
Weaknesses were identified and discussed with the Emergency Management Director. He indicated he would like to develop additional trained monitors in the county, including females.
It was pointed out to him that a plan needs to be developed to identify to the registrars in the shelter those evacuees who have completed the monitoring process. There was confusion concerning the form utilized by the DSS personnel.
Overall, this was an excellent demonstration.
Superior Items:
- 1.
Planning and participation by all agencies.
- 2.
Red Cross nursing station.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
- 1.
Develop a method to identify evacuees who have completed the monitoring process.
- 2.
Train more monitors, especially females.
- 3.
Use only one shelter registration form and register only those persons actually entering the shelter.
19 III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of Completion Deficiencies None Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Oconee E.2.
A detailed and updated County telephone list and notifi cation method for bus drivers should be developed.
J.10.d.
An effort must be made to account for student drivers with permission slips or waivers during an evacuation.
0.1.1.
A rigorous training schedule, including dosimetry instruc tion, should be developed by Oconee County.
Medical K.3.a.
The hospital needs to acquire Drill 0-20 R dosimeters since it is located within the 10-mile EPZ.
Pickens K.3.a.
Provide dosimetry and train County ing to school bus drivers.
01
20 IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement FEOC
- 1.
The emergency notification form should be faxed to the FEOC to eliminate transmission errors.
Media Center
- 1.
The Issaqueena facility should be used throughout future exercises.
If that is not done, the move from the plant area should be made immediately after the evacuation order.
- 2.
Check news releases to see that messages are clearly stated and that all are numbered.
- 3.
Provide a larger working area for media representatives.
- 4.
Provide more equipment and materials for media representatives.
Oconee County
- 1.
Revise procedures for the special needs of the mobility-impaired to insure the best use of transportation resources.
- 2.
It is recommended that the checklist used by the TCP officers be formalized into a Standard Operating Procedure for the various TCPs in Oconee County's portion of the EPZ.
- 3.
The Oconee County School District should provide better instruction to parents who live outside the 10-mile EPZ about evacuation policies and the function of reception centers.
- 4.
School plans should be coordinated system-wide.
- 5.
The role of the West Oak High School 0
should be clearly stated in the Emergency Planning Information brochure and in the county plan.
Facility or 21 Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Medical Drill
- 1.
EMS personnel could improve contamination control by initially placing the patient's personal items in a plastic bag.
- 2.
Exit procedures for ER staff should be clearly posted.
Pickens County
- 1.
Provide emergency workers with instructions regarding exposure limits.
- 2.
Provide refresher radiological training foyr State Patrol personnel assigned TCP ruties.
- 3.
The plan and Emergency Planning
- formation brochure should clearly state the dual purpose function of the Peception Centers.
- 4.
LIst day care centers in the emergency plan.
- 5.
Develop procedures for contacting day care centers in addition to EBS.
Greenville County
- 1.
jevelop a method to identify evacuees who have completed the monitoring process.
- 2.
Train more monitors, especially females.
- 3.
Use only one shelter registration form and register only those persons actually entering the shelter.
22 S
V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Status of Objectives C. Exercise Objectives and Scenario I
23 FEDERAL EV ALTUATOR AS S I GN4MENT S IOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EXERCISE (PT)
October 9 & 10, 1990 CHIEF EALUATOR AND RAC CHAIRMAN John Heard (FEMA) 1.
S.C. FEOC (CLEMSON)
Don Hammonds (FEMA)
Frank Wilson (FEMA)
MEDIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)
Jim Sutch (FEMA)
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
Bob Trojanowski (NRC)
MEDICAL ACTIVITIES Robert Perdue (FEMA)
OCONEE COUNTY (WALHALLA)
Larry Robertson (FEMA)
Becky Heizer (FEMA)
Tim Dowd (FEMA)
Josh Moore (FEMA)
PICKENS COUNTY (PICKENS)
Bill McSwain (FEMA)
Al Lookabaugh (FEMA)
Tom Carroll (FEMA)
Wayne Waddell (FEMA)
GREENVILLE COUNTY (Shelter)
ANDERSON COUNTY (Shelter)
Josh Moore (FEMA)
MOBILE EVALUATORS Ed Hakala (DOT)
Al Hall (FEMA)
24 WCON EE E)XERC (A
4
)
STANDARD 36 OBJECTIVES (GM EX-3) TRACKING FORM STATE COUNTIES
=mm P
A am =G I
1 0
I N
R G
C C
D E0 SITE: OCONEE STATE STATE O
K E
E STATE: S. CAROLINA E
RAD N
E' R
N R
EX DATE: OCT 9, 1990 M
HEALTH N
S V
A TYPE:
PARTIAL E
S AB.C m
m s ma*mss asEs as assmm
- 1. EMERG. CLASS. LEVI I----
90(0 I.
- 2. MOB. EMERG. PERS.I
-I-90-1 90 90 90
- 3. DIRECT & CONTROL
-I --------
E
- 4. COMMUNICATIONS 90I VE 90 I 90 R
- 5. FACIL/EQUIP/DISP I I--9019-1-------
- 6. EMERG. WORK. EXP.
90 90 I I-----
- 7. FIELD MONT-AM.
I--------------E I
I I
- 8. FIELD MONT-IODINE II-----
E I
- 9. FIELD MONT-PART. II--
I--
C
- 10. PLUME DOSE PROJ. I-I--
-I
- I E
90 I 90 I-I--
- 11. PLUME PROT. ACT. I90 I
90---9--I
-I
- 12. ALERT/NOTI-15 MINI 90 90------
90-- - -------
9-- I 0I
- 13. ALERT/NOTI/INSTR. I-90 90I I
- 14.
ALERT/NOTI/MEDIA I-
-990-
- 16.
KI-EMERG.
WORKERI 90
-I
- 17.
KI-GENERAL POP.
I I-IS 90
-c
- 18. PROT.ACT-PLUME I
I 190-0--
C 90 190 E N E
- 19. SCHOOLS N E 20.
TRAFFIC CONTROL 90
-90
-A P
- 21.
RELO/CTR-REG.MON.I 90---
90 9
E
- 22. RELO/CTR-CONGCARE I
I 90
-90 T
90----I--
N
- 23. MEDICAL-TRANS I
1 90 1 I I ---
I 1 90I
- 24. MEDICAL-FACILITY
- 26. SUP/ASSIST-FED 90---90-I-----I C
- 27.
IP-SAMPLE I
- I I
I I
I I
I 0
- 28. IP-LAB N
- 29.
IP-DOSE ASSESS
__I
- 30.
IP-PROT.ACT.RECOMI E
E
- 31.
REC/REENTRY-TOTALI V
E
- 32.
REC/ENENTRY-APPROI I-R I
- 33.
REC/REENTRY-IMPLEI I-Y
- 34.
SHIFT CHANGE II---
A
- 35.
EVAC ON-SITE PERSI 90
_RS
25 Ghe tate of B*outly (!arolina filitart lpartmient OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL T. ESTON MARCHANT MAJOR GENERAL THE ADJUTANT GENERAL June 28, 1990 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural & Technical Hazards Division FEMA, Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309
Dear Mr. Woodard:
In accordance with Section N, NUREG-0654, the purpose, scope and objectives for the Oconee Nuclear Station partial participation exercise to be conducted the week of 8-12 October, 1990 are attached.
Sincerely, Paul R. Lunsford Director RGC:1vs Attachments Emergency Preparedness Division Rutledge Building 1429 Senate Street Columbia. South Carolina 29201 (803) 734-8020
PURPOSE AND SCOPE A.
The purpose of this partial participation exercise is to demonstrate the state and local W
emer~ency or~anizatiofls' ability to protect the lives and property of the citizens residing, workin Or travellin within the "Plume Exposure Pathway" Emergency Planning Zone (P
) in case o a radiological mishap at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
Oconee, Pickens, Anderson, and Greenville Counties will accomplish the objectives listed in the enclosure. Some objectives ma be demonstrated out-of-sequence with the scenario/events sequence due to schedlig and volunteer worker considerations.
A complete list of such events will be she to all controllers and evaluators prior to the exercise.
The exercise will demonstrate the affected counties' ability to work efficient with the utility and the State under emergency conditions. Federal Evaluators will observe the strengths and weaknesses of the emergency response forces. Such observations will form a basis for improvement of resources, plans and performance of the participating agencies.
The State of South Carolina will activate the Forward Emergency Operation Center (EEOC) at the Clemson ANG Armory with sufficient staff for direction and control and all necessary assistance for the counties to achieve their objectives. Controllers, Evaluators, laison Officers and the EEOC staff will be pre-positioned.
B.
Participants will include:
- 1.
Designated State Agency Players - Emergency Preparedness Division (EPD),
Governor's Division of Public Safety Programs (DPSP), Department of Health
& Environimental Control (DI{EC)/Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) and Emergency Medical Service (EMS), Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG), South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCP), Department of Social Services (DSS), and Department of Wildlife and Marine Resources. All other RER agencies will be on standby.
- 2.
The counties of Oconee and Pickens, which have portions of their territory within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 3.
The counties of Anderson and Greenville which will demonstrate sheltering for the citizens of Oconee and Pickens Counties.
- 4.
The Oconee Nuclear Station and the Duke Power Company.
- 5.
Voluntary Organizations - Red Cross, Amateur Radio.
- 6.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
C.
The exercise will be initiated unannounced and after-hours during the week of 8-12 October 1990.
D.
The Oconee Nuclear Station is located near the eastern border of Oconee County, just north of Bridge 183 on the Keowee River. In operation since 1973, the Oconee FNF has three nuclear reactors with a total production capacity of 2,658,000 kilowatts of power.
STATE AND LOCAL REP
-on~
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES I
=
11 464 STATZ_
2..
cmrq.
CLwas.
La.11 O
- 2.
m4ob.
M-ry. Pars.
_o F 3. virect and Control e....
- 4. C-amicattofl so rarcil. Equip. Oimp.
J.
Emarq.
Work~ Up. Caz-
-o
-~-
x 7..
riel ma t.
A =c t+/- S a.~
-il ot ixldim 9.~~~~
-i abt -a=At
- b L.5. P=
P..rt.cti ons~
Ile.
2.6.
~-EmergenCy Workers 00 1.7.
i-General Population r-~~
-s rt c-P-P 2,~.
Relo Camniur-Coflq Cre (U~
za_-
-airl rm ov 24.-
-ei~-FCitisW
- 25.
oscn taunclar-urn
714 state of ouuth Garolina Military Department OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL T. ESTON MARCHANT August 28, 1990 MAJOR GENERAL THE ADJUTANT GENERAL Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural & Technological Hazards Division FEMA, Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Dear In accordance with Section N,
NUREG-0654, the scenario, sequence of events, and radiological data for the Oconee Nuclear Station partial participation exercise to be conducted 9-10 October 1990 are attached.
Sincerely, Paul R. Lunsford Director PRL:cme Attachments Emergency Preparedness Division Rutleoge Buiiding 1429 Senate Street
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION -PARTIAL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE (For Controllers and Evaluators Only)
On the evening of Tuesday, 9 October 1990, Oconee NS Units 1 and 3 are operating at 100%1 of power. Unit 2 is shut down for refueling. Unit 1 is running abnormally hip activity levels, but is within tech specs. It is 410 days into the fuel cycle which is normaly 540 days.
The weather is overcast with temperature of 80 F. Winds are from 3500 (NNW) at 3 mph, class "G" (stable).
At 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />, Unit 3 loses 50% or more of its statalarms (annunciators). At 1910, Unit 1 develops component cooling pump problems.
At 1915 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.286575e-4 months <br />, control room operators declare an ALERT on Unit 3 due to loss of statalarms greater than 15 minutes. The TSC and OSC are activated and offsite authorities notified...SCHP and County Warning Points.
Duty Officers at EPD and BRH receive, relay, coordinate and confirm the ALERT message in accord with their procedures. County Directors place their EOCs on standby and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) is activated. The Governor declares a State of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station and the SEOC assumes direction and control of the emergency.
The Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) team is deployed to the Clemson Armory, State PIOs go to the ONS Media Center and EPD Liaison Officers go to the County EOCs (Simulated - all are pre-positioned). At 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />, the EEOC assumes direction and control of the emergency. County EGGS are fully activated.
Conditions on Unit 1 continue to deteriorate due to multiple electrical and mechanical coolant failures. At 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />, the reactor trips and is shut down. At 2040 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.7622e-4 months <br />, a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal fails causing a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with leakage of 900 gpm. A direct flow path from the reactor building to the penetration room is created.
By 2050 hours0.0237 days <br />0.569 hours <br />0.00339 weeks <br />7.80025e-4 months <br />, loss of sub-cooling in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) causes declaration ofa Site Area Emergency (SAE). TSC, EEOC and County EGGS; are notified.
At the FEOC, EPD, BURAD, and Governor's Office (DPSP) reps confer and decide on protective actions for the EPZ populations. Siren time/and EBS messages are coordinated with the counties and activated (Sirens and EBS simulated). Traffic Control Points are established, reception centers and shelters opened, and BURAD Field Teams deployed (Simulated).
At 2055 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.819275e-4 months <br />, a radiological release to atmosphere commences due to penetration room ventilation failure. Between 2055 and 2150, emergency coolant probleis increase with emergency feedwater from Unit 3 unavailable, valve and fan blade failures, and a high vibration alarmn on the Reactor Building Coolant Unit (RBCU).
A General Emergency (GE) is declared at 2150 when the High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump fails.
The EOC team once again confers on protective action recommendations (PARS) and coordinates siren time and EBS message content. Affected sectors in the plume pathway (EPZ) will be sheltered or evacuated as necessary. Transit dependent citizens in the EPZ may be evacuated. Emergency workers will receive dosimeters, TLDs and KI. Evacuees will be registered and sheltered.
Vehicles and evacuees will be decontamnated as necessary, schools will be evacuated, and an injured/decontaminated victim will be transported and treated at Oconee Hospital. Federal Radiological Emergency Response Teams will begin to arrive (Simulated).
By 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />, plant operators have managed to shut down Unit 1 completely and seal off the radiological release. The plant commences recovery operations.
Exercise termination will be coordinated by the FEOC when all county objectives have been demonstrated.
Note: Some field events will be demonstrated on 10 October 1990. See separate schedule.
Ito 0
S 4j C2 0 m UX
- r.
~0 0
4 E-4 to0
.0 14 0)r.tor z
~0 m
OUIOd 000~a go 0I u
CO4 rY*4 4
- 0) 14 ZU-0 0
41O*'*
1%0> 4 0.dH "4~
- ~
~
0 0>)Ja
=)H )0 W
w E-0 wqE-0 0
~
0~
go or) 0 0 O 4.3 z 0-u 0
C o4 a,0 2o4E r43r 0
U 1% 0
4>
0~
0a 0o CO a.V 0
4 4
- 4.
)
- r.
U 41 0
WI to 4
c 0 w
0 t o 0 4
0 41Ur A t 1
to 00 I) r_
>d E-4 0 '-
- 44)
-0 0is 4
94 r-0 3$
-r-4 V
$4 to
> to 41a
- 4)
XI 0
0 j
0 0 0
0 0 to
.)
0 t
H U
~aO.~
- U.
V0 O
OU L)
C z
OO 0
q0 00e4 1
S 0
$4 0
0 pa 1
4 4
-r-w 0-4 C
0 o
E4O ro
)
rO W O0>
p O
$0 0
- 1>>
C)
U-
- 4) 0 a) 14 0 0t 0H O
0 to w00&
O 40 0
OC1 V)o oo a) 4),
a)
Q.a)
- o.
o efl o
z
>)
Ce
- o.
HW u
0 0
- 04) 050 a
0O 0H>
o o
0 go v 0 W 0Ir 4
0W0
-n C
zU to0 U V
$ 4
- U m 0)
H~~0 0
4)U OC
~
1e
~~z~.&JO 0
In0 W
~I 4C 0U 4 )
4 H
W 0
4
)
U Z Z
tao 0
U 0C 4
od rA
- v.
0
- 4) 00 00 Z
a) 0 EA~
Fo
- 4) 0 Si W E--4=.
-'4 CL 04 4 to-Z W0 V0 a) u. ~
-4' L )
in 0.W F4 0z mz.4 wV U r 1 E-4 ti)*1 -
0 a) r~
)
E-4 C-a)t4n 0
W 01 a) 44 0 0' m
to ) O.Oi
>W 0zE4O E-4 to ---
go w
0 0 z
n C ~
ur 0
Tn R Wo 0W
~&-
0 e
~
0W' 0 W0 0 4 0.
0 IV 41 4
U 0
'1.
u) 41
- r.
4 4 W r4 to0 W 4 )
U~~
WV 00 j ua ~W1 V
- 4)
W)4 4 1 ~410 H.a w
44W W 0 a~T 0
024 C 4-4 P 0M
>p4 MU~
~
U44
).
44 Ii V
4 WOW
~
~n W 4
n4-W~4) 40 45 0 c~0 0
00 0-0 0 14401~
0It 0
WO.
HW u o CL 0 0
um0
' 4 Va)4 O
- 4) 41 r O
z
>0 0
)
4)I Cfl u
V 0
U
%0 0,
1%~
0 II 0
41 to
- 4)
-4 to 0 0 0
rg
- r.
to0 0
0 0 V U
0 0
0
- r.
ty, 0 "4 4
>z E-t 0
0 r 0 4)444
- '4 0
to4 O0 E 4-I 0 0 V) 0t 0 0 E-4 04 W
0 r-4 1
z 0'
0-V 44 w'
00 0i U
0~14 St 0
4 Z
H W 0
U4 =I)t 0
w o o CFO>0 41 to0 E-4 W
0
.c0
'-4)"
0 u
V 4
go U~
pi 0-1S 0
44 v00 4
W0 0:
0 04 to 0
0 Wi~i E- --
)
u40.
w4 C)D
-0 4
) 0 w u r
0W 0 0 0
-ri W
0n
- r.
$4 4 w rP w
~z 4 ))
V~
c to M0 0 4 )
4 Id w
t 0 WU W -4 V 4 > 4 >
z f) 40 inO 0 u iz 0 )
- 0)
- u. 0 0
0 4 "
E4 0 ) Z 04 4 W.u4
- go 0
c U 04 43 E-.4 0~
0 Q
r 4j
-4 CD4.d
" 4
$4 004 4.
to 1
O044 4
0000 U
0L r-r 0
0
-V4 0)~
r 0
(a"4 (n1:
rV
,4 "4 0 Sz )4 j
0,-
4)4 f0 I4
$.i 4 3W to4
)
0 O va jt tiC
$4S. U m c 0 0 4 1
- V 414)4
- 4) 0 ~
W QII.OW w u0
- 4) cc E-4 0r I a)
- 4. o0 pA 0
0 0
0 to 0
E-4
0 4a) w "4t r-4
- 0. 1d C
0 11>
0" 4 "4
k r4 qr-r 4 ~
W
- r. In U>,
0>,~.
0 00)4 er.41A
>> 4)W 0
0 F. 0) r-'~
0O4' r-4 r
0 :3U t
U g 4 zz tvfn O a 00 4)UW 01
-4$
UM 0
0t
>4"
>44
>J5
- 0)
>1 l0ta 04 4.
$ 4 r00 u
0)~4~
"4x
- 0) gi 04 1
4.0
.1 040 r4 0
0 I0
~4) 0)14 0~~~~~~.
0
'-5 9
tV 41.4-4 0t 4'
4 1
09w00r4 M4 0 0 0o4 MJ 4 4 r
ZH
- 0) 4)0C 4
e OC-w Vw 4J 0
"qr4 900 0
H~0 V0
.W
- 0) 00 0
41
-.r0
)0 H
Z.-
- 0)
C) 00 U
W.
0
)
t r
x0 to
'0-
$4
>)
w) 0 F-40
-4 $4 W0U 0 r.I U
to0
~z--.
to w
-40 0
to 0 0 0
0 C
it a
- 4)
Ca V)d "4
41 wH
)
LV
)
0 Q) w
- r.
U $4 M
- 0.
w -4 0.
1 r-4 F.'
0 0
0 )"
0 4400(
040 (1) -4.'0 Q
04' W44 V 0
- 0)
-)4 C)0 0
4Ug 0
- 0)
- r. u4 7
z u
0 L )
- 0) 4 1 H)>
F--
E 4 0r W
H 0
0 r-4 0
r-4.U "4
0 W
0
~
U 4
U Z0 e-44 to-m
, vUL M. I ) 44 z0 4~
-W4j4)r E
4
)t
)t II PO r.
U) u a)
CLq UI4-CI C d
CL0 Iz(
0 W0 w ~~
0
)
t 4
4 wI I
I I~0 Lo U)1 T
L
- 1) 04 I04
)
- 4) 0 rz E E) it 03 Q,0 40 I..I
- 00)
-4
>4'0 4
0).
U)U4 r
U) 0-
- 4) r-) 4U C
4.4 0
ol 0 r-"
-I4 4 0 r40 Q)r-
"4
%4 0 i
PC' "40 E-4
- 30I U) u
()
z 0-a 0
U
V P
C gI 0
0 i n 4
- c
- 1.
w3 0#
0 C
4 V 0
$4 goem H p -P4 o.14 I o
V 0
"0 0 0
0
- 4)
V)
.4.
0 E-4W 0
0 0
0 0
0a 4j
-k41 l
V 01r.
w 4
m~~~
0 4
0 0
0 0 V".4~
00 a 0 0
S-n r 0
4 o4 ad o ao
-n4 4)0 ID e
0 O
O O
p 3C a
> 4) r -4 0
- GW0 >W C~-.
0 O~
UW EC I
W S4
,)
V O 0
N0 0
00 w0 V
0Q.
r-4O 0
V
- 4) 00 4.4 644 0"4 m0 0
0 14 it.
Ct50 O O >
I DO H
- 06.
is r.04.
0.L 0
>4 4
0.4 0
03 M 4 W L O--q) 4) c 0 e-i. $4.
V Vo4 D Ok CCOM
~
00 0W00 m~ m~O w4
- w.
o e-0 r-4 i0 0
O 0
0 0
Iw U
O~W COp O0)
O o
00 LO w'.
004r.0COCr.
E-4 W V0 0
tP. k0
%4 0'
DOc V
to0A41wV F
0O >4 0-4 0
0 o4) 0 E-W0 00*0 w
_ t
-4U0r.-v $4W-4 V)
V-0O4V-4d 4
go >W 0
V
~
0 in 00 e-"40 00-4 4.44' H
)
4 U4>0~
~o 4~
0 om 43-
.'.4.'4.W4 004) 0 U0-0-
[0 v
0 CD 0in 2; 4) 0 c
t r4-0
% 4' 410 03 ~41~-
to 0
$4>40 46 041300 0
"4 2
- 0)
V C
r-~~1 Z0
.s v4~
04 tr ta 0
ilZ0 C0~
4)0 0
0 M E--
0 s,
> > >.0 Or
- 4) 4j
$4
$4
'#4 V
0m$
)-'
=0 to C
4460 430 CDf
- 43) 4 4J4 04),40 0
04'
)
0 F
~~
UUx 0
4-(4 43 r30 E3)UO4' 4~0 030030 4O 0
014>0
- 04.
) H -
0 04) 0 0.4 4ci' ol o i i 00 E -4 r-4 4 '
3 t o4 04 0
0 0
0 4 3 0-1d*
to.
0 U 4 'r 0.
4 14
=~, -
4'0 03 to) to~e 4'
4'V10 41
-0 Md-~
u a~
0 CL1.
- 4) 4 )
0
-~.
t o f
w 0 1 ~ '
0 4 ).
4 )0 0
0
~.4 d
> 4) Vt~
t'0-4 0
ca 0
44 U,
PO M
1 0
t ZH 00
~-~0 IL 0
1% 00 41 0 E-14 0N 3 0q'
,9 00 to W
E-.9-20303 zU 0
1 0
E-4 0 M-4.
0 W~
- 4)
E-4C 00 03 0,"-4
-M F-Z-0 0
o 0 t-4 r4 -4V 08 0 ".
-4 4
- 4) 0 z
- '-4 0>
-4 0~
-t-4~V4
430 4
01 41 10 1
4 41 1
goJ-
- 1.
to v S0 Ln 4)Lin 411 64u
- 9.
eI-4 9-.
1
- 4) 4)0 04 4 j 0a 4
d041
.0r In
- 4) 0- 41 Z C4 o p r0 to 1>
4 0 ad4 0
E I)
W'. 4) 00 rH ON V
a)~
r4 "4 0 0
4V 14 I
V~
0 V1r 0
o 4)w oi
> > ~ -
E4 4)0 43 r.4~U CDV w
>4A-1 4z c
4
-r4 go4 0 to 4m 40> S-A 0
-W$4P oa 041 0
41 a x 145-41 44 U >1 0 4
, 4 )0 U
JU 4j U~
5-43
=
0 >'.
C~0>
r;: W 41 W
U 41 0
'.4
.4 i
"40 u I
.c o0E- 0 00w.)toL r
.40 r4 0
43 0C 1~ 44 A3 w
43 014
, 0 44 C1
- 4) wC)I 4 U 4 04
- 4-4
$ 4 1 o~ C L)
ON 4 1. 0)
V~ 4.0 0 HS.0 4.)
- '4' 0~ u1 01 4
0-4 C~
r.I 10 N3 04 CU 0Z o
)
043uro4)9 0 a
- 0) e 0Ct 00 r0' (L
0 Lc)
PQ r 4 0
w0 MI I1 41 494 w1 00'
[-4 0-0 4
U4 41 1
S.4) o 43 1%0 004-VI 41 4
o 4
U0
$4~
4341
- ).0 41)
H r-4
~~4.)
4 49O E-41 0
0C
- 4.
C,0 0z 0
0I9r.4
to 0
w 4
0
$4 I..i to~
q~d 4
V go:
0 0.~ rQ 0
w
- tP 4-4 54-)
- 0) 0 00
- w.
4)4)0 ao a1
)
S:>9 4 )
M 0 u
in 0 40
>4 410U
- 4) r-4 o-w w
"-4 14 C-4 04)0
-0 t
14 u000) 0 0
%4
---1 4.)
- 0 04 4 1c
)
V a) 4))."
4)>I 0
00~~
0 MU~44
~
- r. 4) )
000)4
- 40)
- 4) m41V 0
0Oi
%1 0o>
E-4 0
~
U ~0
- 3 to
_V
- 4) 0U U
Q40 0'
4 j
4414
-'4 U) 00 04-
>.(
0 w
to4) 0 00u X
0 V
-S40W flS4 0)-
Vw a)
IW
- 4)
- 04)
- 4)
(1) W
)
v0 0
~
~
0 044) go" N.~I
.Iz
$0E 0 000).0 E 0 4
.V0
)
0 -r0
-4 0
- 4) $4 A
~ff~E
~04U it 0A 4-E4 0
M C0 0
o 0 E-4 L) c t 0
r-
)
0 U W 4
to>9
).4 )
CL L
) it L)- 4-. )
- 4) to E -4.) 0 V)
V) t00o) to--4 0~
X 4.J4 U4 Uw 0
0V H
o O to
-P U r.
F.
o U 0 0 41 ) 4.
to 0 Ou>
0 to 0
0 4
$4 U Z
H 1%1 00 c
w %
-.4 to
- 4) 0.' 4j
-4 44~
0W g~>
- 0)
> r-4 0x
>,-40 0
to.H00 fa
- 4) ( r 4 >
1.4
~H 0 r-4 0- o r-o $
0U.4
> W11-r4).
- 4) L)4)
E-0 0
44>
U) 4' W. w-tQ0 P-4 4 w r&)
wl E-4 00 N E-to~.
41 0 0 z~
4 ) ' -
4 j-0 0.
4 )
...40 0 m
-0 U--f 4)4W 000 0 ~~~ *t4i 4-4 4~~4 0O 144 ) 4 )
(04 0x a
04-
'00.
to4 r-4 U
4-j (a
u0 -H 1w 0
LO r-0 U
"- 4 01
)
0 m c o M =
V4 rz U)4)r=t C)
- 0) u C
-~
c 0
n 0
-n m
-7 CO T
0, a4c,.
z0 C1 C
0!r
,ccC4 r, nL ni No 0 1C 0
1 C4%
11-4
-D l>J4 cc C
~ li&~ ~
c 0 C
-I
-. N0 0 -
0
.0
~0 7%-0
.0 7%-7%-0 r4 r4
- m. ( (N m (N 4%
0 N
W Of-I~ f n fn I rn I ff 5Ln MA C -
r, fn
-7 LA 7 c-
"N r
.7
-0 0
r -
i
-.7c
-cC
-zc
-7 (N
N -7 (N
IN (N -T c,
~*-(
(N N
(N (N
N (N
(N
(
(N (N
(
(N N
(
0 ci rJ-r4 C~
00 21 E
4
-C LM Li I ~
~-
,n r14 r-4
I.n
- nJ 0
0 ZO=N z
0 C14L&C-4 s-C t
r 9 N el cc~
c.-
-l (14 N
E
-7 0
UC T C 0
Ln
'0 C14
'0
'0
'0
'7C 7C4% NL 0 f" V) C 'M 0 '0 N 0 CNC4 7m r -0=%
w c -
%C w -
w r-w-
wr-
-o= 7 m0 C0 m
- c. q C14 r%
-7 (N
(
U C~~J r4 (N (NC~( N (
N (
N (N Z
I-Z Z 4ZNZN N Z N C (4M (N4 (N4
-4
-CE 04-C C:
1 C
-'14 I
00 cc --------------------------
z~~~~~~L zN(
2 IN~IN(~N~N(~NrIJ(
C
- 00 0
EO t
0 C
0%
-z z0%
'fN C"C,C1 N -7 0
-7 0
)
r L
C7, %0 UN E-I U ~ Z. (N C)'
1;t C LA A
NM
'C
-n N
i' 7~L~C zo 0
E
% - f C
Lil
'C C-0%)
c 0%
&i
@ 10 CC4 CC (14 0 0 0 C 4 C 1 C4
Icc C
C4 C
ca C
M2
~C 4
ON u
0
-c 1-1 1z en c C
%-C nL T
(a4
-n
-M r
-M Lm C
-z c L/n Ltn LM, U
l)
Ln MI Ln P
LM ULA E~C-M'-7 i
-7 Ln 0C-4 N N4 N4 NCN N
- 74 N
1 N 1 N 1 N1 N%
N1 NCNN4 N
N
cc ;I W01 I=
0 ~
C1 C
0 4_
-7
-l
-- V 0.r nM T 4%
64 aj W
4U 0
co Ur In C
EIZ
-7r 7 n c n0r n
r 74 U 4
C4 C
4I r
q L
0
.~I AJ L; Z CC93 cm 0
N 4
c I l
w 3WwwIWQc a
WI= M,M 17 n V
-C n%
n-W T
,Tz 4 C rO, nM--w C(4C%(4CC4C 1 z
0
.I en'.
3c, L;.C z
~ =z-,zv
,=
E 0
C(4 M
-7
-n C
t%-
CN (1N r4 r1 C4 E-C N
C4 r
14 C4C4 r
1
C3 W
0
-C E zW t4 0
4:
z C14 c
1-4 1 r
Do C zn 04 LI C
E5;-
N-r-,
7 U)
C1 M
C14 C C
C4 C0 01 C4 C0
ICI
-CE
- 0) 0 L)>
c ca 10 z
0 0
cm w
0 aw
=
u0 C
C% L-.
%C %C
-C SP nC m " N-Ctn I
n%
C-Cj rn r'J I I f'n DO 1=
o 0
LI, C%
'0)
%C s
M~
CN ?
M 1
-7 Ln C1 l
C1~4 rCN en P
r14 C14 C1 1
C14 C4
E 0
9
-Iw z
00 W
U 0
0 u
0 Q
0 1
cc 0
C4 1
~~+-1 Z:
C14 U,
=CC en
-7cfl N
0C (N 7 (14 r
~
~--E
~(
C1 C1 1
rn r"
C14r CN C
C C
C1
C 0 L
.C L sw 4)*
I ZZa-1
=0U uv EIX L C' L 0
- ~0 C1 V C1
Coaxi SITE AREA MAPSN z
1 t
-F zONE A
is 1
'SA
Page 1 of 2 FIGURE I-1 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ACCIDENT ASSUMPTIONS DBA assumes TID-1484A release of fission products to the containment atmosphere:
(1) 100% of all care noble gas activity.
(2) 50% of all core iodine activity with plate out of half of that released.
Therefore, 25% of the iodine activity will be in the containment atmosphere.
Loss of reactor coolant assumes the release of one reactor coolant volume with noble gas and Iodine activity associated with operation at 100% power with 1%
fuel failure before the release.
Gap activity release assumes t-hat there is cladding failure sufficient to re lease all fission products in the gas gap of the fuel pins to the containment atmosphere.
Assumed is loss of 10% of all core noble gas activity and 5% of all core iodine activity to the containment atmosphere.
The containment leak rate following the accident is expressed in volume percent per day.
Regulatory Ged, 1.4 requires that we assume the design leak rate (Technical Specification 4.4.1.1) the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and half the design leak rate for the rest of the accident.
For Oconee these values are:
(a) 0.25%/day for 0-24 hours (b) 0.125%/day for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - 30 days The 0.25%/day is the Tech. Spec. leak rate associated with the design pressure, 59 psig.
Assumptions used in determining the contribution to the total dose from ECCS leakage are:
(a) 7520 cc/hr leakage from the pump seals and valves of the ECCS in the auxiliary building.
(b)
An iodine partition factor of 0. 1 is used to determine the amount of iodine released to the auxiliary building atmosphere.
(c)
All activity released to the auxiliary building is released to the atmosphere with no filtering.
Most Oconee penetrations through the containment are located in the penetration room.
This room has its own ventilation system which draws a negative pressure on the room.
The air drawn from the penetration room passes through charcoal filters and is exhausted through the unit vent.
Bypass leakage is the fraction of the total containment that bypasses the penetration room and escapes to the atmosphere unfiltered.
I-6 Revision 89-3 December, 1989
Page 2 of 2 FIGURE I-1 (Continued)
Some examples of potential bypass leakage paths are:
(1)
Leakage around the equipment hatch seals.
(2)
Leakage through isolation valves that do not seal properly.
(3)
Leakage through microscopic holes or cracks in the containment wall.
At Oconee the containment bypass leakage is 50% of the total containment leakage.
Tech. Spec. 4.4.1.1.5b requires that during the containment leak rate test, if the containment leakage is greater that 50% of the design leakage rate, local leak rate tests must be performed.
These tests must verify that any leakage greater than 50% of the design leakage is going into the penetration room.
This only verifies that the maximum leakage bypassing the penetration room is 50%
of the containment leakage.
It does not give the actual bypass leakage.
Dose contributions are as follows:
(a)
Bypass leakage contributes approximately 84% of the total thyroid dose.
(b) ECCS leakage contributes approximately 1% of the total thyroid dose.
(c)
Penetration room exhaust contributes approximately 15% of the total thyroid dose.
1-7 Revision 89-3 December, 1989
FITGURE J-I PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMIMENDATIONS PROTCTITE ACTAOC FUEL DAMAGE CONTAINMENT RE(1)%%IEDATI' Tn BE CONDITION SYMPTOMS (NOTE 2)
STATLS iNOTE J CONSIDERED CONDITION ASECRS I
AO. Al. BI1. Cl. DI.
GENERAL N/A N/A El Fl.
EMERGENCY EVACUATENON DECLAREDESSENTIAL PERSONNEL DECLARED_____
IONDITION B
- 1) RIA 57 OR 58
- 1) KNOWN CONTAIN DOSE CALLTIONS ON SALEME.NT BREACH REUIRED TO DETER ONOR MINE EVACUATION RE FUEL DAMAGE RB PRESSURE QUIREMENTS.
DETECTED BY GREATER THAN SEENOTE I BELOW.
MONITORS I PSIG AND NSEE ENCLOSURE 4. TO RELEASE INDFTERMFSECTORS.
PROGRESS
)NTAPIBL
- 2) RIA 46
-SHELTER REMAINDER.
ON SCALE CONDITION C
- 1) CONDITION 2
- 1) CONTAINMENT EVACUATE 2-MILE FAILED FUEL Is ISOLATED RADIUS AND
- 1) APPROXIMATELY (CP/BAND 5-MILES 20% FUEL GAP RB PRESSURE IS DOWNIND.
ACTIVITY IN CON-
LESS THAN 59 SHELTER TAINMENT (ACTUAL IN PROGRAss OR PROJECTED)
- H, rN RB I\\CRILLSING
2)LOSS OF PHYSICAL
- 2) N/A
- 2) N/A SEE ENCLOSURE 4.2 TO CONTROL OF PLANT DETERMINE SECTORS.
CONDITION D NDIONEVACUATE 5-MILE FAILED FUEL RADIUS AND 10 ACTIVITY GREATER (CP/0/B/2005/09)
MILE DOWNWIND.
THAN FUEL GAP IN
NO CREDIT IS REMAINDER.
CONTAINMENT (ACTUAL OR
- H 2IRB INCR.EASING TAKENFOR RELOCATE AS PROJECTED) 2RCONTAINMENT NEEDED.
e RR ROIGTI RAD AECTI SEE ENCLOSURE 4.2 TO DETERMINE SECTORS.
'NOTE 1:
EVACI.ATE THOSE SECTORS THAT GAN E EN*ACUATED PRIOR TO 'LLME ARIVAL SHELTER THOSE SECTORS THAT CANNOT BE EVACUATED PRIORTO 'LLMEARRI AL AND THEN EVACAE AFTER PLLME PAS-SS IF RELEASE IS EXPEMTED TO LAST LONGER THA I
HOES EVACATIONR MAY RLT INOLOWER DOSQU.IRE NOTE 2:
FEL DAMAGE RELEASE OF FISSIOE PRODUCTS INTO NOTE 3:
CONA INI ENT STATUS-DETER M1E IF CONTAINENT IS ISOLATED OR WHETHER A EEASE MI OCCDRORING.
J-5 Revision 90-2 SI.
- June, 990
"~
CLZ 17)P4F.S/G MILE
-43
-1 CR so ER PLAN T
0-4)
C )
B-4 85
-4 29 'O.4UMENT MVile TVw A
d'
- c.
0-2A-2 921
-z CI-329' 0-2 V,
OWEP 6
'cm.
~~~~.
I 61
(~i4~
~ 2>
~
V
- ~a.~aoK.J 1300 401 N -
-2,
£R '
17 AI291
'601 PD.
E -Z
-2S
-0 D -1c 4A' C'
©F-2 4
IN 0
A 19-"LLC 130~L o
WO9IE Ot' EV N zC'DR.
30 DFF