ML15224A615
| ML15224A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1990 |
| From: | Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A614 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-89-36, 50-270-89-36, 50-287-89-36, NUDOCS 9001190198 | |
| Download: ML15224A615 (3) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Power Company Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 During the Nuclear-Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted November 12 December 16, 1989, three violations-of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1989),
the violations are listed below:
A. Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.1.a requires that written procedures with appropriate check-off lists and instructions shall be provided for the operation of all systems and components involving nuclear safety of the facility. TS 6.4.1.e requires that written procedures with appropriate check-off lists and instructions shall be provided for preventive or corrective maintenance which could affect nuclear safety or radiation exposure to personnel.
TS 6.4.1.j requires approved procedures for nuclear safety related periodic test procedures.
Implicit in these specifications is the requirement that the procedures contain adequate guidance to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the components.
Contrary to these requirements, certain procedures for operation and maintenance were inadequate in that:
The procedural guidance for operation of 3BS-1 in accordance with certain procedures such as, Performance Test (PT)/3/A/0150/22A, Operational/Refueling Valve Functional Test, dated February 23, 1989, did not ensure that the valve was fully closed when expected to be completely shut.
This inadequacy resulted in a spill of approximately 2000 gallons of reactor coolant on November 9, 1989 through the reactor building spray nozzles into the Unit 3 reactor building. This inadequacy is applicable to other similar throttle valves.
The procedural guidance provided by PT/0/A/0610/05B, Electro-Mechanical Breaker Trip Test, dated August 25,
- 1989, was inadequate in that the required plant conditions existing at the time the test was conducted were not incorporated into the procedure.
This contributed to a loss of power for approximately 21 seconds on Unit 3, on December 3, 1989.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1).
Duke Power Company 2 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 License Nos. DPR-38, -47, -55 B..
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station shall be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
Contrary to the above, the station was not operated in accordance with approved procedures in that:
On Unit 3 the portion of OP/3/A/1102/10, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown, associated with crud burst operations requires temperature to be maintained at greater than 160 degrees F when two reactor coolant pumps are operating.
On November 10, Unit 3 was observed to be operating at a temperature of 155 degrees F.
During the cooldown of Unit 2 on November 11, 1989 per OP/2/A/1102/10, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown, a change in the sequence of the above procedure resulted in the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) watchstander having inadequate LTOP written procedures.
On November 14, 1989, an operator failed to follow OP/3/A/1107/04, Operation of the Vital Bus,
- Computer, ICS, and Auxiliary Inverters, resulting in a loss of power to inverter 3KVIA, which caused an Emergency Safeguards actuation signal.
This resulted in an unrecognized loss of fire protection to the Reactor Building for approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
On November 17,
- 1989, the performance of procedural steps out of sequence, during Performance Test/3/A/0150/06, Mechanical Penetration Leak Rate Test, resulted in a spill of contaminated liquid in the High Pressure Injection Pump room.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
C. Technical Specification (TS) 3.12.1 states that the reactor building polar crane shall not be operated over the fuel transfer canal when any fuel assembly is being moved. TS 3.12.4 states that when the reactor vessel head is removed and the polar crane is being operated in areas away from the fuel transfer canal, the flagman shall be located on top of the secondary shield wall when the polar crane hook is above the elevation of the fuel transfer canal.
Contrary to the above, on November 27, 1989, at approximately 3:00 p.m.,
the polar crane was in operation over the fuel transfer canal during the period that a fuel assembly was being moved. In addition the polar crane was being operated in areas away from the fuel transfer canal with the flagman not located on the secondary-shield wall and the polar crane hook was above the elevation of the fuel transfer canal.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
This violation is applicable to Unit 3 only.
Duke Power Company 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 License Nos. DPR-38, -47, -55 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector within thirty (30) days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation : (1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date. when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Alan R. Herdt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 8th day of Jan.
1990