ML15222A043

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Summary of 900716 Meeting W/Util in Charlotte,Nc Re Licensing & Regulatory Issues.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl
ML15222A043
Person / Time
Site: Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  
Issue date: 08/23/1990
From: Wiens L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9009040048
Download: ML15222A043 (71)
v • d • e


Text

0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Z0 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 23, 1990 Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 50-369, 50-370, 50-413, 50-414 LICENSEE:

Duke Power Company FACILITIES: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2 SUbJECT:

SUMMARY

OF JULY 16, 1990 INTERFACE MEETING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY On July 16, 1990, the NRC staff met at the general office of the Duke Power Company (Duke) in Charlotte, NC to discuss licensing and regulatory issues.

This meeting was part of a continuing series of meetings held three times annually. Representatives of the Duke corporate office, the three Duke nuclear stations, NRC Resident Inspection staff and NRR participated in the meeting.

An agenda of the meeting is included as Enclosure 1.

After opening remarks, Duke made a presentation on initiatives undertaken in the Duke Quality Assurance (QA) Programs. The presentation covered QA per formance assessment, training initiatives, Self Initiated Technical Audit program process and status, and enhancements to the QA verification process.

The next presentation discussed the Transmission Department (TD) organization relationship to station management and TD training, procedures and work control system.

Following those presentations, a representative from the NRC Office of Enforcement made a presentation on the enforcement policy in the area of maintenance violations.

He indicated that escalated enforcement could be taken for severity level I, II, or III violations that were caused by maintenance program deficiencies which could have been prevented by proper implementation of the Commission's Revised Policy Statement on the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants. Such enforcement actions would be submitted to the Commission for review. The process by which the region recommends severity levels and civil penalties remains unchanged.

During the presentation, Duke requested that the NRC allow licensees an opportunity to make an additional presentation after the initial enforcement conference, if changes to the original severity level or civil penalty are made.

The Catawba Station Manager then presented an analysis of the unavailability rate for the Catawba Auxiliary Feedwater system. Following a presentation on the status of the Duke Design Basis Documentation program, the NRC made a pre sentation on the background and status of revisions to the approved source term.

9009040C)48 90823 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDC August 23, 1990 Future revisions are not expected to significantly affect currently licensed plants and are not expected to result in changes in the size of Emergency Planning Zones.

At the conclusion of the meeting, a tour was taken of the Duke System Dispatchers center and the Catawba/McGuire Crisis Management Center. The participants then briefly met in three groups to discuss plant-specific issues relating to Oconee, McGuire and Catawba.

Meeting participants are listed in Enclosure 2. Handouts used during the presentation are provided in Enclosure 3.

Leonard A. Wiens, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosures:

As stated cc/w enclosures:

See next page Db Docket File OGC NRC PDR E. Jordan Local PDR NRC Participants (See Enclosure 2)

F. Maraglia ACRS (10)

J. Partlow R. Borchardt PDII-3 R/F D. Matthews L. Wiens OFC

. :PDII-3 PM:PDII-3 D:P&

NAME EIngram LWiens DMat hews DATE 1 /

90 f/9i/90

/go/0 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name:

DUKE INTERFACE MEETING

SUMMARY

Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station McGuire Nuclear Station Oconee Nuclear Station cc:

A.V. Carr, Esq.

North Carolina Electric Membership Duke Power Company 3400 Sumner Boulevard 422 South Church Street P.O. Box 27306 Charlotte, North Carolina Raleigh, North Caroline 27611 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Saluda River Electric Cooperative, Bishop, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds Inc.

1400 L Street, N.W.

P.O. Box 929 Washington, D.C. 20005 Laurens, South Carolina 29360 North Carolina MPA-1 Senior Resident Inspector Suite 600 Route 2, Box 179N 3100 Smoketree Ct.

York, South Carolina 29745 P.O. Box 29513 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0513 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. S. S. Kilborn 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Area Manager, Mid-South Area Atlanta, Georgia 30323 ESSD Projects Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief MNC West Tower - Bay 239 Bureau of Radiological health P.O. Box 355 South Carolina Department of Health Pittsburgh, Pennsylvaria 15230 and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street County Manager of York County Columbia, South Carolina 29201 York County Courthouse York, South Carolina 29745 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General Richard P. Wilson N.C. Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 692 S.C. Attorney General's Office Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Mr. Robert G. Morgan Nuclear Production Department Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Duke Power Company 121 Village Drive P.O. Box 33189 Greer, South Caroline 29651 Charlotte, North Carolina 28241 Mr. Alan R. Herdt, Chief Dr. John M. Barry Project Branch #3 Department of Environmental Health U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pecklenburg County 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 1200 Blythe Boulevard Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203

Duke Power Company

-2 cc:

County Manager of Mecklenburg County Honorable James M. Phinney 720 East Fourth Street County Supervisor of Oconee County Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Walhalla, South Carolina 29621 Mr. J. S. Warren Mr.- Paul Guill Duke Power Company Duke Power Company Nuclear Production Department P.O. box 33189 P.O. Box 33189 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Charlotte, North Carolina 29621 Senior Resident Inspector Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Production Department 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Duke Power Company Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 P.O. Box 1007 Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1007 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2, Box 610 Seneca, South Carolina 27611-7687 Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Director Department of Environmental, Health and Natural Resources Division of Radiation Protection P.O. Box 27687 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-7687 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Division Suite 525 1700 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2536 Countryside Boulevard Clearwater, Florida Office of Intergovernmental Relations 116 West Jones Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 Duke/NRC Interface Meeting July 16, 1990 Wachovia Center/WC-2669 Charlotte, N.C.

8:30 Coffee 9:00 Introductions/Opening Remarks Mike Tuckman 9:15 Quality Assurance John Frye Program Initiatives Doug Franks 10:15 Break 10:30 Transmission Department Roy Holmes Interface Jeff Ashe 11:30 Design Basis Documentation Jack Peele Program Status 12:00 Catawba Emergency Feedwater Pump Tony Owen 12:15 Lunch 1:15 NRC Presentation Dave Matthews 2:15 Corporate Office Tour Mike Tuckman o NPD o erisis Management Center o Dispatch Center 3:15 Adjourn ATTENDEES NAME ORGANIZATION L. Wiens NRC/NRR/PDII-3 T. Cooper NRC/RI/McGuire W. Orders NRC/SRI/Catawba D. Hood NRC/NRR/PDI1-3 D. Matthews NRC/NRR J. Frye Duke/QA/Audit L. Davison Duke/QA/General Office B. Dolin Duke/Design Eng./Catawba D. Murdock Duke/DE/McGuire R. Wilkinson Duke/NPD/Planning & Consulting D. Franks Duke/QA/McGuire G. Grier Duke/QA/G.O.

J. Peele Duke/Design Eng./Oconee B. Futrell Duke/NPD/Nuc Safety Assurance B. Gill Duke/NPD/Regulatory Compliance R. Morgan Duke/NPU/Regulatory Compliance S. Ninh NRC/RI/McGuire F. Rinaldi NRC/NRR/PD1l-3 O K.

Jabbour NRC/NRR P. Skinner NRC/SRI/Oconee M. Tuckman Duke/NPD/Nuclear Support B. Miller NRC/RII/Project Engineer H. Tucker Duke/NPD/G.O.

P. Nardoci Duke/NPD/Regulatory Compliance P. Guill Duke/NPD/NSA W. Scott NRC/NRR/Performance Evaluation Branch J. Ashe Duke/Trans/EM&C L. Tatum Duke/Trans/EM&C R. Holmes Duke/Trans/EM&C J. Hicks Duke/Trans/VP E. LeGette Duke/Oconee/Compliance W. Troskoski NRC/Office of Enforcement

AGENDA Opening ReMarks Jim Hicks, Uice President Transmission Transmission Department Organization Roy Holmes, Manager Transmission EMC Training, Procedures, & Work Control Systems Jeff Ashe, Manager Plant Support Closing ReMarks Jim Hicks, Uice President Transmission Open The Floor For Questions

Why Is There A Transmission Organization How Is Transmission Organized What Transmission Does In Nuclear Plants Plans To Strengthen Transmission Service To Nuclear Plants

Transmission Department U P Trasmission Transmission mmmm Departm Review Committee Employee Relations Administration Line

& Safety

& Services Maintenance &

Construction

.o Electrical Operations Maintenance &

Engineer Construction

Transmission Department EMC Division Manager EMC Division District Manager District Manager District Manager Manager Manager EMC EMC EMC EMC EMC Charlotte Greenville Greensboro Electrical Supt.

Plant Maint.

Manager Plant Support

Transmission Department EMC Division Charlotte District Greensboro District Greenville District District Manager EMC Supervisor Planning District District EngieerEngne.

Superintendent Superintendent Superintendent Relaying Nhr Meter Test Steel Breakers Batteries Controls Meter & Instr.

Foundation Cable Transformers Computer Control House Aux. Systems Capacitors Maintenance Doble Testing Switchgear Paint

Transmission Department EMC Division Plant Maintenance Section Manager EMC Plant Maintenance Engineer Superintendent Superintendent Manager Plant Support Generator Motor Nuclear Station Generator Testing Bus Support Engineers Excitation Systems

Maintenance Services For Nuclear Plants Breakers -

600 volt to 500,000 volt a Motors -

4160 and 6900 volt

  • Protective Relaying -

600 to 500,000 volt Systems

  • Transformers - 600 volt to 500,000 volt Power Transformers
  • Metering and Instrumentation -

Electrical Systems

  • Generators -

Turbine and Diesels

  • Phase Bus -

600 volt and above

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION TRANSMISSION DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT Station Manager Manager Plant Maintenance Superintendent of Maintenance Transmission Superintendent Manager Maintenance Engineering Services Supervisor Supervisor Technical Station support Support Assistant

I. TRANSMISSION DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PROGRAM

  • Approach Used

" Program Revisions

" ETQS Program Layout I

I. PROCEDURE

S

  • Upgrade

- Non Class iE III. WORX CONTROL SYSTEMS

TRAINING SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT MODEL ANALYSIS DESIGN DEVELOPMENT IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION

0 JOB ANALYSIS

  • DEVELOP.TASK LISTING
  • PERFORM JOB SURVEY
  • DETERMINE TASK RATINGS (FREQUENCY, DIFFICULTY EMPLOYEE TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION AND IMPORTANCE)

SYSTEM (ETQS)

PROGRAM REVISIONS T

  • VERIFY TASK LISTINGS
  • IDENTI FY SKILLS

&, KNOWLEDGES I_

TRAINING ANALYSIS

  • IDENTIFY SETTINGS FOR TRAINING
  • REVIEW WITH PRODUCTION GENERAL EMPLOYEE SUPPORT DEPARTMENT TRAINING (GET)

COMMON SKILLS I

& KNOWLEDGES INITIALTRANSMISSION PROGRAM DEVELOPED T & Q GUIDES TASKS DETERMINED TO REQUIRE CLASSROOM PRODUCTION SUPPORT TASKS DETERMINED OR LAB TRAINING DEPARTMENT DEVELOPED TO REQUIRE ON-THE-JOB CLASSROOM TRAINING TRAINING EXISTING EMPLOYEES ARE ASSESSED AND PLACED INTO THE PROGRAM AT THE CORRECT LEVEL

TRANSMISSION DEPARTMENT ETQS PROGRAM Pftimental Technician

  • wat uni Math Modfle For:

Relay and Meter Of Technician On-%

Funamental Electuiclan Introduction Duty Area For Specific 1kailng For all employees Bus Motor or Includes Admln.,

Breaker Switchgear Safety, General Knowledge aDo T1 Tools and Equipment Generator Electronics FUniamental Mechangc I

iy Area Pr specem wralning Or For Crane, Ro0Wi0 aIR And Steel Crews IOl13~l~l

XEY POINTS Organization Changes

  • Matrix to Superintendent of Maintenance and Maintenace Engineering Services Onsite
  • Locate Field Crews Onsite
  • Onsite Procedure Writing Enhance Information Flow
  • UP Improved Focus On Transmission Activities ETQS Program
  • Fully Accredited
  • Production Support Department Guidance and Support

" Classroom Training Starting 7-16-90 DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION PROGRAM STATUS NRC/DUKE INTERFACE MEETING JULY 16, 1990 B L PEELE DIVISION PROJECT MANAGER DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION PROGRAM STATUS AGENDA

1)

NEED FOR PROGRAM

2) SCOPE AND SCHEDULE
3)

CURRENT STATUS

4)

DB DOCUMENTS

5)

INVOLVEMENT WITH INDUSTRY

6)

NUMARC DB GUIDELINES

7)

WORKSHOP

8)

QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS

Duke Power/Design Engineering Dept.

Transition:

New Construction Station Support Catawba 2 C. 0.

8/86 TOPFORM 3/87 (The Overall Plan for Organizational Review of Mods)

TOPFORM Refined 2/88 DE Site Offices 4/88 DE Project Organization 11/88 Design Basis Documentation Report 5/89

eEngineered Solutions to Problems a50.59 Evals. of Mods.

  • Operability Evals.

DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTATION

  • Design Requirements
  • Required Operating Modes
  • System Descriptions
  • NRC Commitments DUKE SITA
  • More productive audits/responses
  • Better system design basis understandirg Better able to identify generic issues

DBD Pilots Oconee - Emergency Feedwater System (EFW)

McGuire - Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System (VG)

Catawba - Nuclear Service Water Pump Structure

DBD Project Management Quality Design Nuclear Assurance Engineering Production Lead Dept.

G oon Technical Engineering Oconee General Nclea ce Nuclear Services Support Project Office Nuclear Station Division Division Station Mechanical Electrical Civil

  • Review DBD Specs.
  • Prepare & Transmit DBD Specs.
  • Normal Document Audit 1989 Scope Identified
  • Initiate and Resolve PIRs

- Coordinate Remaining Initiate LERs Scope Annually

  • Revise Procedures
  • Prepare & Transmit Test Acceptance Criteria Drawings
  • Initiate and Resolve PIRs Same For McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations

Estimate of DBD Systems and Structures Scope Criteria - Nuclear Safety Related, Technical Specification, or other selected systems Mech Systems Elect Systems Civil Structures Oconee 45 26 6

McGuire 61 34 3

Catawba 60 34 3

Total DBD 166 94 12 Total Plant 291 167

DBD Prioritization

  • Risk Significance / Recent Experience
  • Plant Testing Trends (performance degradation, wear, fouling, etc.)
  • NRC Generic Issues

DBD Schedule Oconee Systems & Structures 13/year McGuire Systems & Structures 16/year Catawba Systems & Structures 16/year Total 45/year Project Completion - 1995

DBD CURRENT STATUS (JUNE 1990)

CATAWBA MCGUIRE OCONEE COMPLETED 2

4 2

NDERWAY 10 8

10 STILL TO START 5

4 4

TOTAL SCHEDULED 17 16 16

Relationship of DBD to Other Documents 10CFR Tech.

FSAR Codes Duke Gds Specs SAR SER Caics Corres.

Stands LL I

Plant, Systems &

Structures Dwgs Smry Specifications Dwgs Design Design Vendor Computei NPD Dwgs Specs Docs Lists Proced 0i

4Typical Documentation Reviewed for DBD 10CFR Duke Drawings FSAR PIR / LERs SER Valve / Equipment Lists Standard Review Plan I & C List Branch Technical Positions System Descriptions Tech. Specs.

Current NSM Packages Duke Nuclear Guides Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Licensing Correspondence Review Manual ANS Standards Fire Protection Review Manual ANSI Standards Response to TMI Concerns t E Standards Response to NUREG-0588 IEE Standards Plant Environmental Parameters SITA Audit Findings Manual INPO SOERs EQRI Manual NSSS Correspondence Testing Correspondence Files

- Station Task Force(testing)

Specifications

- IWP/IWV Code (ASME Section XI)

Calculations IWP/IWV Manual Manufacturer Drawings and NPD Directives on Retest Manuals Station Procedures and Retest List Design Studies on Testing

DESIGN BASES HIERARCHY PLANT DB SYSTEM DB SYSTEM DC EQUIPMENT DC DB = DESIGN BASES DC = DESIGN CRITERIA

Page 4 SECTION

10.0 INTRODUCTION

  • Boundary and Scope
  • System Purpose
  • Format and Use SECTION 20.0 DESIGN BASES AND CRITERIA
  • ONLY safety-related and regulatory required system and equipment design bases.

PIP PROCESS INVOKED IF VIOLATED SECTION 30.0 SYSTEM/STRUCTURE DESCRIPTIONS

  • Description of safety and nonsafety functions
  • Nonsafety-related and nonregulatory required design bases FIGURE 1. OUTLINE OF SPECIFICATION SECTIONS

corm 45O69 (R 10-98)

System Design Bases/Objectives Design Basis:

The VG system shall supply control air at sufficient pressure to keep the emergency diesel generator running (Reference section 20.1.2 of specification no. MCS-1609.VG-00-0001).

Objective: Verify that a control air pressure of no less than 90 psig and no greater than 135 psig is maintained, after the diesel starts, while the emergency diesel generator is running for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Tech. Spec. 4.8.1.1.2e(8)). The starting air compressors shall be available to start during this test.

Test Frequency:

The control air test shall be performed with the same frequency as the emergency diesel start test.

Operability: If a diesel fails this test, then it shall be declared inoperable.

Test Acceptance Criteria Test/Measurement Reference Document Acceptable Value Including Tolerance ontrol air pressure TT/OB/9100/300 90 < P < 135 psig Tech. Spec. 4.8.1.1.2e (8) 2/15/89 letter from JR Hilley to F Schubert DUKE POWER COMPANY QA COND 1

McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Design Basis/Test Acceptance Criteria Emergency Diesel Generator Control Air OSN/DTE &AdL INS/TE._.A C /f CHK/DTEt~

i;I-qN/T4D~d-.C CUK/DTE____

4,. INS/DTE s

C

I REVISIONS DSN R DE CD NO -

REVISIONS DSN CHKIAPR OTE C/E ELE M/N DWG NO MCDB-1609-VG.S002-O1 TREV 0

WEja(m tcs!W.VG-0l F33/35 R

21/23 P~

LINE PURIFIER l/BATMOSPHERE 61/65 115/117 7Yn1 AIR [NLET HIR RN FILTER AS/BI STARTING AIR DRYER Al81 AFTERCOOLER AIR 62/66 TANK Al/

RlI/Bl COMPRESSOR Al/BI 83/84 VOLUME TANK A/B DIESEL VI BLACKOUT CONTROL AIR ENGINE HEAD3ER HEADER A/B 939 91034NOTE Z

CONTROL AIR FILTER A/B 79/80 77/78 90/92 n18/20 34/36 "41 RN 63/67 ZZ/Z4 vATMOSPHERE 64/68 LINE 116/118 1I1 PUIIRA2/82 AIR INLET PURIFAIER AZ/BZ IR RN FILTER AZ/BZ STARTING AIR DRYER R2/82 AFTERCOOLER AIR TANK A2/B2 R2/B2 COMPRESSOR AZ/BZ NOTES u

1. EACH UNIT HAS TWO DIESEL ENGINES (A AND B).

EACH ENGINE HAS TWO STARTING AIR SUBSYSTEMS (AS SHOWN ABOVE). BOTH R AND B SUBSYSTEMS EQUIPMENT TAG NUMBERS ARE DISPLAYED.

Z. SOLENOID VALVES VGSVSI6/5170.5161/5171.5162/5172 AND 5163/5173 ARE LOCATED ON THE CONTROL AIR HEADER. SEE IC DETAILS MC-1499-VG3 AND MC-2499-VG3.

TYPICAL FOR UNITS I AND 2 LE=

ooty 1o1 Colme IS AI 911 FLOW ODViKA.

DUK

-ME Ll lEVI 0puLe L t

So-w P_

_CGUIRE PDSaAR STATION I--

SUM"FIRT VALt

-E I

wo

-e DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE mJK IUOIE

-9200"M HC-1609-4.0 VG SYSTEM CUNIT I)O (IHC-69-4.0 VG SYSTEM UNIT 21SRN R

SYSTE ve)

RELIEF VALVE assIRE(661 v19 ETWE i s

_e_____

SFLOV DIC ORMNOL

.1 REVISIONm Mg o

nDGN C

F 1

1

Figure 1.

Terminology Relationships 0 & M Procedures Configuration Instructions Management Other Other Controlled Physical Plant Documents Design Control Design Bases Calculatlions Specs.

Reg. Req'mis Analyses Drawings Other Dsgn Re Evaluations 1_Usts DsignDesign Design Design Design Input Process Output Documents

Discrepancy FIGURE 2.

Design Basis Discrepancy Safety N

Resolution Process Concern?

Operability Y

Reportability Evaluation Evaluation Oper.

N N

Rep.

Issue?

Issue?

Y Y

Take Tech Spec Complete Report NRC or other action DB3 Activity to NRC Enforcement Policy Final Evaluation Closeout

KEY POLICY PROPOSALS OPERABILITY Evaluate at deliberate pace Presumption of operability REPORTABILITY Presumption of conformity Combine related items in single LER ENFORCEMENT No violations

USE OF SOURCE TERM IN REGULATION CURRENT SITING REQUIREMENTS SITING REGULATION IS 10 CFR 100.

PART 100 REQUIRES THAT EVERY REACTOR SITE DEFINE:

1)

AN EXCLUSION AREA - NO RESIDENTS, CONTROLLED BY APPLICANT

2)

LOW POPULATION ZONE (LPZ)

- "LOW" DENSITY OF RESIDENTS PERMITTED

- NEAREST DENSELY POPULATED CENTER AT LEAST 1 1/3 TIMES LPZ OUTER RADIUS.

PART 100 ASSUMES EXISTENCE OF LOW-LEAKAGE CONTAINMENT.

CALCULATED DOSES AT EAB AND LPZ MUST MEET PART 100 GUIDELINES (25 REM WHOLE BODY AND 300 REM THYROID) FOR 2 HOUR AND 30 DAY PERIODS, RESPECTIVELY.

1

USE OF SOURCE TERM IN REGULATION CURRENT SITING PRACTICE FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE IS DERIVED FROM TID-14844 (1962), AND PRESENTLY GIVEN IN REG. GUIDES 1.3 AND 1.4 100 PERCENT OF NOBLE GASES 50 PERCENT OF IODINE (HALF OF THIS IS THEN ASSUMED TO PLATE OUT IN CONTAINMENT)

INSTANTANEOUS APPEARANCE IODINE CHEMISTRY GIVEN (LARGELY 12)

CONTAINMENT IS ASSUMED TO LEAK AT MAXIMUM LEAK RATE ALLOWED IN TECH. SPECS.

FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEMS (SPRAYS, FILTERS)

EVALUATED CONSERVATIVELY.

DOSES CALCULATED USING CONSERVATIVE SITE METEOROLOGY.

2

WHAT CAN WE DO WITH WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHY?

CURRENT SET OF REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE HAS SERVED WELL TO SET CERTAIN PLANT DESIGN AND SITE PARAMETERS.

TID-14844 DID NOT ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATE CREDIT FOR THE USE OF FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEMS.

AS THE SIZE OF PLANTS INCREASED, HOWEVER, FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEMS BECAME NECESSARY TO KEEP EXCLUSION AREAS FROM BECOMING VERY LARGE AND RELIANCE ON SUCH SYSTEMS INCREASED.

AS CURRENTLY APPLIED, PART 100 AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY GUIDES PRIMARILY INFLUENCE PLANT DESIGN AND INFLUENCE SITING TO A MUCH LESS EXTENT (SITING GOVERNED BY REG. GUIDE 4.7).

FURTHER, PART 100 DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF CONTAINMENT FAILURE WHICH IS THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTOR TO RISK.

3

WHAT CAN WE DO WITH WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHY?

(CONTINUED)

HOWEVER, CURRENT PRACTICE DOESN'T INCLUDE UPDATED UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE TERM FORM, CONTENT, AND BEHAVIOR AND RESULTS IN DESIGNERS INCLUDING DESIGN FEATURES THAT MAY NOT BE IN THE DIRECTION OF ENHANCED SAFETY.

NEW DESIGNS UNDER REVIEW.

THEREFORE, THE STAFF IS CONSIDERING CHANGES TO CURRENT PRACTICE FOR FUTURE LWRs THAT WOULD:

GIVE DESIGNERS MORE FLEXIBILITY TO DEVELOP DESIGNS WITH SAFETY FEATURES THAT ENHANCE SAFETY BY UTILIZING REALISTIC SOURCE TERM ASSUMPTIONS, AND MORE DIRECTLY ADDRESS ACCEPTABLE SITE PARAMETERS.

4

OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT TO CURRENT PRACTICE CONTINUE CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW (E.G., PER SECY-90-16 FOR ABWR):

DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

TECHNICAL UPDATE:

UPDATE TID, R.G.s, SRP TO REFLECT LATEST UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE TERM AND ASSOCIATED METHODOLOGY, BUT NO RULE CHANGE.

DECOUPLING:

UPDATE REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE TO STATE SEVERE ACCIDENT DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND SITE PARAMETERS.

5

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

- STEP 1 TECHNICAL UPDATE UPDATE TID, REG. GUIDES 1.3 AND 1.4 AND CORRESPONDING SRP SECTIONS TO RECOGNIZE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF SOURCE TERM:

TIMING OF RELEASE FORM AND CONTENT OF FPs.

RETAIN 10 CFR 100 DOSE GUIDELINES AND SITING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REG. GUIDE 4.7.

RETAIN CURRENT CONTAINMENT DESIGN BASIS (LOCA)

AND ASSUMPTIONS, BUT EVALUATE CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE UNDER LIKELY SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.

CHANGES WOULD BE MADE TO SUPPORT EVOLUTIONARY LWR REVIEW.

APPLICATION OF THESE CHANGES TO EXISTING PLANTS NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED.

6

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS - STEP 2 DECOUPLING EVALUATE FURTHER THE BENEFITS, DISADVANTAGES, AND SCOPE OF DECOUPLING PLANT DESIGN AND SITING FOR FUTURE LWRs.

SPECIFICALLY LOOK AT:

MODIFYING 10 CFR 100 TO SPECIFY ACCEPTABLE SITE PARAMETERS AND TO REMOVE REQUIREMENT FOR CALCULATION OF DOSE, AND MODIFYING 10 CFR 50 TO SPECIFY ACCEPTABLE PLANT DESIGN PERFORMANCE AND FEATURES (SUCH AS CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE AND FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEMS)

CONSIDERING SEVERE ACCIDENTS.

7

QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION Quality Assurance Performance Assessment Training Initiatives Self Initiated Technical Audits Verification Process Improvements

Quality Assurance Performance Assessment QA Department Testing Resource Operations Alelorc Modifications Allocation M0, aintenance

\\Rad Protection

UALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION Recent Enhancements Location based Management comment SALP "influence" Verification Managers' responsibility

QUALITY ASSURANCE.

VERIFICATION FUNCTION QAPA Strengths

  • Large data base
  • In-house information
  • Management input
  • Objectivity/subjectivity
  • Sensitive to significance
  • UALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTIO Verification Specialist Training
  • Basic Nuclear Operator [30 weeks]
  • Introduction to System Specifics

[8 weeks]

  • Specialized Technical Training
  • Performance Based Auditing
  • Other Available Training
  • Simulator demonstrations
  • Continuing management
  • Continuing special ization\\

traininag

  • UALITY.ASSURANCE VERIFICAT FUNCT Self-Initiated Technical Audits (SITA)
  • Background
  • Process
  • Participants
  • UALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION SITA Low Pressure Service Water (Oconee)

Diesel Generator Starting Air (McGuire)

Shared Essential 600 Volt Motor Control Centers of Essential Auxiliary Power Systems (Catawba)

Emergency Power Distribution System and Emergency Switching Logic

  • /

/ (conee)

Control Area Ventilation and Chilled Water Systems (McGuire)

SSURANCE VERIFICATION SITA Some of the Results...

  • UALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION SITA-The Future June 18, 1990-High Pressure Injection System (Oconee)

December 10, 1990-Auxiliary Feedwater System (Catawba)

Enhancements to the Verification Process Technical Improvements Partnerships Performance based approach

QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION Technical Experts as Audit Team Members through Other Departments Design Engineers Analytical Chemists Senior Reactor Operators Fire Protection Engineers RadWaste Engineers Nvuclear Engineers

,-Health Physici~sts Environmental Enaineers

ALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTIO Technical Expertise Within QA

  • SRO assigned to Surveillance at Oconee
  • Superintendent of Maintenance assigned to Audits
  • Security specialist assigned to Audits
  • Extensive training program
  • UALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICAT F

Audit Partnership

  • Why SUCCESS g
  • How Results Surveillance

QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FUNCTION Performance-Based Approach

  • Training by John Johnson of JETS

Performance-Based Approach

  • Audits and Surveillances

DUKE/NRC INTERFACE MEETING JULY 16, 1990 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER UNAVAILABILITY INTRODUCTION DUKE / NRC MEETING JUNE 18, 1990 HIGH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY INPO GUIDANCE CAN BE LOOSELY INTERPRETED DETAILED AND CONSCIENTIOUS TRACKING PLANNED VS UNPLANNED

SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (1/89 - 12/89) 14 14 MEDIAN 14-0.013 12

_10 8-8 CNS-1 =.082 5

CNS-2 =.074 4-3 2

2-1 1

1 0

0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 sum of components unavailability/number of trains UNAVALABIU1Y sum of unavailable hours for the sstem (hours system required) x (number of trains)

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE HOURS FOR 1989 PLANNED UNPLANNED 2,000 1,790.6 O

'1,500 1,174.9 1,000 LaJ 610.9 569.1 500 261.1 103.5 57.6 74.5 2.2 18.4 34.8 87.1 38.3 60.4 I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I II c

(fo cn Cn cn c

cn on n

0n cn c

. cn V

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE HOURS FOR 1989 PLANNED UNPLANNED 2,ooo 1,790.6 C Ei 1,500 1,174.9 2 1,000 500 261.1 60.4 D

I C1J c I C.3 C-3 C-lC,

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE HOURS THIRD QUARTER 1989 - FIRST QUARTER 1990 PLANNED UNPLANNED 1,400 1,203.7 1,200 1,101.0 a 1,000 n800 00 400 261.1 200 11.0 0--y I

I w

Ln an cnn

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TOTAL UNAVAILABLE HOURS THIRD QUARTER 1989 -

FIRST QUARTER 1990 6% OTHER 12% FLUSH 11% PULL TST 6% TESTING 20% MNT 45% SUPPORT

CLAM FLUSHING (12% UNAVAILABILITY)

NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PROBLEM TRACKED SEPARATELY FROM SUPPORT SYSTEM SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MODIFICATIONS RAW WATER TASK FORCE

CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (20% UNAVAILABILITY)

USUALLY LARGEST CONTRIBUTOR To UNPLANNED UNAVAILABILITY INCLUDES ESTIMATED UNAVAILABILITY HOURS GOVERNOR VALVE STEM CORROSION SA-2 AND SA-5 STROKE TIME GOVERNOR OIL PRESSURE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE TORQUE SWITCH

SUPPORT SYSTEMS (45% UNAVAILABILITY)

NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER (RN) AND COMPONENT COOLING (KC)

RN PUMP LUBE STRAINER MODIFICATIONS CHEMICAL FLUSH AND 'B' TRAIN PUMP PACKING KC HEAT EXCHANGER CLEANING RN PUMP 2A INOP DURING UNIT 1 OUTAGE NUMEROUS INOPERABILITIES OF LESS THAN 50 HOURS

VARIOUS TESTING (17% TOTAL UNAVAILABILITY)

PERIODIC TS TESTS (6%)

OPERATIONS MONTHLY PERFORMANCE QUARTERLY (IWP)

INCREASED FREQUENCY DUE To OPERABILITY CONCERNS GOVERNOR VALVE STEM PULL TEST (11%)

VALVE STEM CORROSION INITIALLY PERFORMED WEEKLY CURRENTLY MONTHLY

OTHER CATEGORY (6% UNAVAILABILITY)

ONLINE MODIFICATIONS (2%)

GOVERNOR VALVE DRAIN LINE SA-2 AND SA-5 STROKE TIME AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP BEARING COOLDOWN (2%)

SA-2 AND SA-5 LEAKAGE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE (2%)

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TOTAL UNAVAILABLE HOURS THIRD QUARTER 1989 -

FIRST QUARTER 1990

,1,400 O

O1.200 1,000 39 0

800 0

D 2400 200 0I-I CL OM in) z z

(nl z

p 0

CL 0

7)1

D m

in-a

SUMMARY

CATAWBA'S AUXILIARY FEEDWATER UNAVAILABILITY WAS POOR IMPROVEMENTS ALREADY APPARENT BASED UPON STATION EFFORTS FUTURE UNAVAILABILITY PROJECTIONS CLAM FLUSH PUMP TESTING CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT SYSTEMS GOVERNOR VALVE STEM PULL TEST BEARING COOLDOWN MODIFICATIONS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PROJECTED UNAVAILABLE HOURS THIRD QUARTER 1989 -

FIRST QUARTER 1990

,1,400 U1,200 C

-r 1,000 800-PROJECTED 600-CURRENT z

400 200 0

p:0 0

H-m

SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (1/89 - 12/89) 14 14 MEDiN 14 12-CNS-1 =.026 CNS-2 =.023 10 8

8-gPROJECE CURR 6

5 5

4 4

4 2

2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 sum of components unavailabilify/number of trains UNAVAlIABILTY =

sum of unavailable hours for the system (hours system required) x (number of trains)

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