ML15218A273
| ML15218A273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1997 |
| From: | Birmingham J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Foster W BABCOCK & WILCOX OPERATING PLANTS OWNERS GROUP |
| References | |
| PROJECT-693 NUDOCS 9706020032 | |
| Download: ML15218A273 (4) | |
Text
May 27, 1997 Mr. W. W. Foster, Chairman B&WOG Steering Committee P.O. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION/MAKEUP LINE CRACK FOUND AT OCONEE UNIT-2
Dear Mr. Foster,
On May 3, 1997, two of the three high pressure injection/makeup pumps for Oconee Unit-3 were severely damaged while operators were shutting down the reactor. The damage to the pumps appears to have resulted from inaccurate make/up tank level indication that caused the operators to believe there was sufficient inventory in the tank to run the pumps without damage.
The purpose of this letter is to request information from the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group (B&WOG) on the generic safety implications of the event for B&W designed reactors. The NRC requests that you provide your response to the attached questions by June 6, 1997. Your response should be addressed to the NRC Document Control Desk and should reference B&WOG Project No. 693.
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me by phone, 301/415-829 or by email, jlb4@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Original Signed By:
Joseph L. Birmingham, Project Manager Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See attached page
Attachment:
As stated Project No. 693 DISTRIBUTION:
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- 1EQA, UNITED STATES 0o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20556-O01 May 27, 1997 Mr. W. W. Foster, Chairman B&WOG Steering Committee P.O. Box 10935 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON INACCURATE MAKE/UP TANK LEVEL INDICATION LEADING TO HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP CAVITATION AT OCONEE UNIT-3
Dear Mr. Foster:
On May 3, 1997, two of the three high pressure injection/makeup pumps for Oconee Unit-3 were severely damaged while operators were shutting down the reactor. The damage to the pumps appears to have resulted from inaccurate make/up tank level indication that caused the operators to believe there was sufficient inventory in the tank to run the pumps without damage.
The purpose of this letter is to request information from the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group (B&WOG) on the generic safety implications of the event for B&W designed reactors. The NRC requests that you provide your response to the attached questions by June 6, 1997. Your response should be addressed to the NRC Document Control Desk and should reference B&WOG Project No. 693.
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me by phone, 301/415 2829 or by email, jlb49nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Joseph L. Birmingham, Project Manager Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See attached page
Attachment:
As stated Project No. 693
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION BABCOCK and WILCOX OWNERS GROUP INACCURATE LEVEL INDICATION LEADS TO HPI/NU PUMP FAILURE Regarding the Oconee Unit 3 event on May 3, 1997, in which two of three high pressure injection pumps were damaged, the staff would like the following questions addressed:
- 1.
Are there any single failure vulnerabilities in the make-up tank level instrumentation, pressure instrumentation, or cover gas pressure controller that could cause all high pressure injection (HPI) to be lost during normal operation or following an accident?
- 2.
If vulnerabilities are identified, please describe the following:
- a. consequences,
- b. procedural guidance to handle the situation,
- c. possible recovery actions,
- d. how these single failures are addressed in the design basis of the plant.
- 3.
Describe the extent to which instrumentation associated with the make-up tank is relied on to protect the HPI pumps both during normal operation and following an accident. If instrumentation is relied on to protect the HPI pumps, how many pumps could be damaged by a failure of the instrumentation during normal operation and following an accident?
- 4.
Is the make-up tank instrumentation safety related? Single failure proof? How are the GDC 24 requirements regarding separation of protection and control system met?
- 5.
Describe the role of the make-up tank during a LOCA. How does the HPI system interact with the make-up tank during a LOCA?
- 6.
Where is the system boundary of the HPI system? How is it isolated from other systems?
- 7.
To what extent are these failures modeled in the plant IPEs?
Attachment
cc: B&W Owners Group Project No. 693 Mr. Robert W. Keaten, Chairman Mr. J. J. Kelly, Manager B&WOG Executive Comittee B&W Owners Group Services Vice President & Director of Framatoe Technologies, Inc.
Technical Functions P.O..Box 10935 GPU Nuclear Corporation Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935 One Upper Pond Road Parsippany, NJ 07054 Mr. R. B. Borsum, Manager Mr. J. H. Taylor, Manager Rockville Licensing Operations Licensing Services Framatome Technologies, Inc.
Framatome Technologies, Inc.
1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 P.O. Box 10935 Rockville, MD 20852-1631 Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935