ML15112B052
| ML15112B052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1982 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15112B050 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204210625 | |
| Download: ML15112B052 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00 tooWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO.10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-47 AMENDMENT NO. 107 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3.
DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 1.0 Introduction By letter dated June 3,.1981, the NRC approved the design of the Emergency Feed water System (EFWS) Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication systems for the Oconee Nuclear Station (0NS) with the provision that acceptable Technical Speci fications (TSs) be submitted which would require periodic testing of the initia tion circuitry. By letter dated December 7, 1981, Duke Power Company (Duke or the licensee) applied for these requested additions to the ONS TSs.
By letter dated October 30, 1981, Duke responded to our August 25, 1981, Safety Evaluation (SE) concerning NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation". We have reviewed this information and have included our findings in this SE.
2.0 EFWS Automatic Initiation By letter dated May 22, 1981, Duke informed the NRC of the proposed testing to be performed on the EFWS automatic initiation circuitry after its installation.
We found the proposed testing to be acceptable provided the tests were performed during each hot shutdown instead of cold shutdown for the Main Feedwater (MFW) discharge pressure switches. In the December-7, 1981 application, Duke provided for monthly testing of both EFWS initiation circuits and the MFj discharge pressure anticipatory reactor trip circuitry. However, in order to perform these tests during reactor operation, modification needed to be made to the dis charge pressure test circuitry. These modifications will be implemented as follows:
Oconee Unit 1:
Duke will implement this modification during the first available outage of sufficient length prior to or during the Oconee 1, Cycle 8 refueling outage.
Oconee Unit 2:
This modification will be implemented during the Oconee 2, Cycle 6 refueling outage.
Oconee Unit 3:
This modification will be implemented during the 1982 Oconee 3, Cycle 7 refueling outage.
8204210625 820408
. PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
Duke Power Company
-2 The proposed TS indicates that the testing requirements will become effective on a schedule consistent with the modification installation described above, and require, in the interim, that the MFW discharge pressure switches be tested during each cold shutdown period if not tested within the previous month. We have reviewed this proposal and find that it is in accordance with our request and presents an acceptable means of providing assurance of con tinued system operability. Therefore, we conclude that these changes to the TSs are acceptable and that NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.2, has been satisfactorily resolved.
3.0 EFWS Evaluation By letter dated August 25, 1981, the NRC provided an SE for the Emergency Feedwater System in accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1.
This SE con cluded that all but the following issues, involved in the resolution of Item II.E.1.1, had been acceptably addressed. The remaining issues are:
- 1. Flow tests from the EFW pumps to the steam generators,
- 2.
Endurance testing of EFW pumps,
- 3. Tornado protection,
- 4. TSs requiring periodic initiation circuitry testing, and
- 5. Completion of NRC review of the EFWS flow requirement.
Duke responded to the request contained in our August 25, 1981, letter asking for additional information related to Items 1, 2 and 3 above by letter dated October 30, 1981; the approval of Duke's December 7, 1981 appli cation, discussed in the preceding section of this SE, resolves Item 4 above; and our evaluation of Item 5 follows.
Duke provided information related to the EFWS flowrate design bases and criteria, requested by Item II.E.1.1, by letters dated March 3, April 3,andi April 17, 1981.
Duke's response evaluated various transient and accident conditions involving the use of the EFWS. The results of these evaluations showed that any one EFW pump (two electric motor driven and one steam turbine driven pumps are provided in each unit) could provide sufficient EFW flow to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System. We have reviewed this information and have concluded that the flowrate design bases are acceptable.
at the ONS.
Duke's October 30, 1981, letter responded to the remaining open issues for Item II.E.1.1.
Duke objected to the TS requiring a flow test to the steam generators (SGs) following a cold shutdown because: 1) the injection of cold water into the SGs may cause unnecessary stressing, and 2) similar testing is not required for other systems presently required to be operable by the TSs.
We have reviewed this response and agree that this testing is not needed following each cold shutdown at the ONS since the ASME Section XI pump and valve testing in addition to the doub1e verification of correct valve positioning following a cold shutdown provide reasonable assurance of system operability. However, we maintain that it is advisable'periodi cally, and following any maintenance or repairs which could degrade the
.Duke Power Company
-3 flow path, to perform a system flow test. This position was discussed with Duke representatives and they agreed that such testing would be accomplished, Therefore, with the agreement of Duke, an additional requirement (Specifica tion 4.9.3) was incorporated into the ONS TSs which requires a system flow test. We find this change to be acceptable and that this issue has been acceptably resolved.
Duke also objected to the necessity of performing a 48-hour endurance test on each EFW pump. Duke provided the test data from endurance tests per formed on one motor driven and one turbine driven EFW pump, This data indicates that the tests were accomplished without significant problems.
We have reviewed this information and find that this issue has been adequately resolved because: 1) the EFW pumps which were acceptably tested are identical to the other comparable EFW pumps, and 21 all EFW pumps will continue to be tested in accordance with procedures whitch are at least as restrictive as ASME Section XI requirements, The last item involved providing assurance, in the event of a tornado with complete loss of both the MFMS and the normal EFWS, that cooling water could still be provided to the SGs.
Duke stated that the Auxiliary Service Water System (ASWS) could be used to provide the cooling water under these circumstances. In addition, although an analysis has not as yet been per formed, Duke states that the Standby Shutdown Facility CSSF), which is presently being installed, will also be available to provide the necessary cooling water flow.
We have reviewed the information provided by Duke and question the adequacy of the ASWS in removing decay heat since this system is a low pressure system which would require considerable steam generatQr blowdown to lower the pressure to the point where the ASWS could provide cooling water flow, Additional concerns involve overpressurization of the ASWS and possible cold shocking effects of injecting cold water into a relatively dry SG, Since verification that the SSF system is tornado protected has not been accomplished, we, likewise, question its acceptability for this service, We have discussed these concerns with Duke and an agreement has been reached that this subject will be handled as a separate issue, Duke has agreed to provide supporting information within 120 days of this evaluation on the availability of a source of SG cooling water and/or an evaluation which demonstrates that the probability of a tornado damaging both the normal EFWS and the SSF system is acceptably low, We find this to be an acceptable approach to this concern.
On the basis of the above, we find that all concerns of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1, have been acceptably resolved. Therefore, we conclude that this Item is satisfactory for continued plant operation.
Duke Power Company
-4 4.0 Enyironlenta. Contideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4),
that an.environmental impact statement,.or negative declaration and environ mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
5.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a signi ficant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission s regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: April 8,1982 The following NRC staff personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:
P. C. Wagner, T. Chan.
7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 DUKE POWER COMPANY NOTICE OF ISSUANCE DF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments Nos. 110,110 and 107to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, issued to Duke Power Company, which revised the Tech nical Specifications (TSs) for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3, located in Oconee County, South Carolina. The amend ments are effective as of the date of issuance.
These amendments revise the TSs to include the Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS) automatic intiation circuitry testing requirements, clarify the testing requirements for the Anticipatory Reactor Trip from Loss of Main Feedwater, and require an EFWS flow test.
The application for the amendments complies with the standards and require ments of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required" by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consid eration.
The Commission has determined that the icuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
7590-01 For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated December 7, 1981, (2) Amendments Nos.
110, 110, and 107 to Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, and.(3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. and at the Oconee County Library, 501 West Southbroad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 8th day of April 1982.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (OohnIF. Stolz, Chief Opey ting Reactors Branch'#4 Vision of Licensing