ML15112B019
| ML15112B019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15112B018 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106180215 | |
| Download: ML15112B019 (3) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMIENT NO. 98.TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO. 98 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-47 AMENDMENT NO.
95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3 DOCKETS NOS.
50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 1.0 Introduction By letter dated March 18, 1981, Duke Power Company (DPC) requested that License Condition 3.E. of Facility Operating Licenses OPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (ONS) respectively, be modified to be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48.
In addition, DPC submitted proposed changes to the common Technical Specifications (TSs) for the ONS by "05000270/LER-1981-009-03, /03L-0:on 810415,during Low Pressure Svc Water Pump Periodic Test,Valves 2LPSW-19 & 2LPSW-21 Were Closed Resulting in RB Rbcu Being Out of Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve [[SSC" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Opened & Personnel Counseled|letter dated May 15, 1981]], in response to an NRC request dated October 7, 1980.
During a telephone conversation, a number of misunderstandings and interpre tation problems related to the August 11, 1978, Fire Protection Safety Evalua tion Report (SER) were discussed with the NRC staff. By letter dated May 15,
2.0 Discussion and Evaluation 2.1 License Condition 3.E.
On February 17, 1981, Paragraph 50.48(c) of 10 CFR Part 50 became effective.
Item (4) of 10 CFR 50.48(c) requires, in part, thqJ fire protection modifica tions related to dedicated shutdown systems be implemented 30 months after.
NRC approval of final design. License Condition 3.E; which was included in the ONS licenses by License Amendments issued on August 11, 1978, requires detailed design information on shutdown systems to be submitted within 15 months from NRC approval of the system concept.
By letter dated March 18, 1981, DPC requested License Condition 3.E. be revised to reflect the requirement of 50.48(c)(4).
The design description of the Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) was sub mitted on March 28, 1980, and is under NRC staff review. The SSF is currently under construction and is expected to be completed within.the time required by 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4).
We have reviewed the DPC request and find that the pro posed revision will clarify NRC requirements and remove any confusion or con tradiction of the regulation requirements. Since this change will ensure compliance with a regulation, we conclude that it is acceptable.
106 18 0_
-2 2.2 Technical Specifications In addition to the License Condition mentioned above, the Amendments issued on August 11, 1978, contained a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) related to the completion of certain fire protection related modifications.
Section 7 of the SER stated that the TSs would require upgrading upon completion of the modifi cations to incorporate limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for newly installed equipment.
(The TSs governing the previously existing fire protection equipment were issued by License Amendments on February 13, 1978.)
By letter dated October 7, 1980, the NRC requested DPC to submit an application for amendment to upgrade the fire protection related TSs to reflect the changes made in this area at the ONS in accordance with our August 11, 1978 SER.
We requested that the applicable model TSs be imple mented by administrative controls as quickly as possible and that the proposed revisions to the TSs be submitted by January 15, 1981.
DPC, by letters dated January 15, March 16, and April 16, 1981, stated that the proposed TSs were being reviewed and presented revised dates for submittal.
By letter dated May 15,
We have reviewed the proposed changes and additions to the TSs related to the fire protection features at the ONS and find that they adequately address the NRC concerns and are in substantial agreement with the Standard TSs for B&W reactors, which were provided as guidance for their preparation.
The DPC application proposes to include,.in the common ONS TSs, the CO2 fire suppression system for the turbine-generators at the Keowee Hydro Station, a number of fire detectors, sprinkler and spray systems and fire hose stations, which were installed in accordance with the NRC staff's fire protection SER issued on August 11, 1978. Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed additions and revisions to the TSs are acceptable.
2.3 Clarification of August 11, 1978 SER Requirements As mentioned above, the Fire Protection SER issued by the NRC on August 11, 1978, required DPC to complete stated modifications to enhance the fire pro tection features at the ONS. As a result of a detailed comparison of the completed fire protection related modifications and the NRC's SER, it was deter mined that some misunderstandings existed on what was actually required.
During a telephone conference between members of the NRC and DPC staffs on May 5, 1981, these misunderstandings were substantially resolved.
The areas of confusion were:
a) HVAC Room Doors, b) Water Flow Alarms, c) Communication Systems, d)
Sprinkler and Spray Systems, and e) Miscellaneous Fire Doors and Hatches. By "05000270/LER-1981-009-03, /03L-0:on 810415,during Low Pressure Svc Water Pump Periodic Test,Valves 2LPSW-19 & 2LPSW-21 Were Closed Resulting in RB Rbcu Being Out of Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve [[SSC" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Opened & Personnel Counseled|letter dated May 15, 1981]], DPC submitted verification of the statements made during the May 5, 1981, telephone conference. We have reviewed this letter and find the clarification provided to be acceptable for the following reasons.
- a. The doors between the cable spreading rooms and their associated HVAC rooms need not function as fire doors since the HVAC rooms can be included in the fire zone of the cable spreading room.
- b.
The water flow alarms need a uniqueness in that an alarm for each system must be provided.
It is not our intent that a unique alarm tone be provided.
Since separate alarms have been provided, this is acceptable.
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- c. The communications systems have been shown to be adequate by installing fixed repeaters for communications inside the containment. It is not a require ment that these repeaters be operable except for those times when the contain ment is accessible.
- d. The sprinkler and spray systems installed in the equipment and cable spreading rooms in accordance with Section 3.1.16 need not meet the NFPA standards as indicated in Section 4.3.1.5. for spray density. The NRC accepted a density of 0.1 GPM per sq. ft. for these systems because of the other fire protection modifications specified in Sections 5.4.6 and 5.7.6.
- e.
The fire doors and hatches have been alarmed to the guard facility instead of the control room as indicated in the SER. This is acceptable since the intent (as indicated in Appendix R to 10 CFR 50) is to have the fire doors alarmed in a continuously manned area.
DPC has also agreed to inspect those fire doors which are normally open with automatic closure mechanisms daily to verify that the doorways are not obstructed from closing.
These inspections will ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Lastly, the combination of a fire door and an alarmed security-pressure door between the turbine and auxiliary buildings is acceptable because the pressure door will also function as a fire door and the installed fire door will-normally be closed.
Since these clarifications are intended to remove any confusion which exists as to the intent of the August 11, 1978 SER and since the clari fied requirements are in accordance with the provisions.of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the staff has concluded that they are acceptable.
3.0 Environmental Consideration.
We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFRI 151.5(d)(4)1 that an environmental impact statement,.or negative declaration and environ mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the Issuance of these amendments.
4.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a signi ficant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: June 9, 1981