ML15112A932

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 84,84 & 81 to Licenses DPR-38,DPR-47 & DPR-55,respectively
ML15112A932
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/1980
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML15112A931 List:
References
NUDOCS 8008140213
Download: ML15112A932 (2)


Text

a ne oUN ITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 84 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO. 84 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 AMENDMENT NO. 81 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3 DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 Introduction By telecopied letter dated July 16, 1980, the Duke Power Company (licensee) requested an expedited temporary Technical Specification (TS) change for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 (Oconee-2). The proposed change would revise TS 3.3.1, High Pressure Injection (HPI) System, Section c.(2)(b).

This request was authorized on July 16, 1980. The licensee confirmed their July 16, 1980, telecopied request with a formal submittal dated July 16, 1980. This Safety Evaluation documents our review.

Background

The.HPI motor 2B failed a bearing at 10:22 PM on July 13, 1980. The TS section referenced above would require the motor and pump to be restored to service by 10:22 PM July 16, 1980, or Oconee-2 reduced to 60% full power within an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Due to the subsequent failure of the replacement motor, the original motor had to be repaired. These procedures used up most of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by the TS before power reduction would commence. Due to the severe hot weather in the Oconee service area and the marginal ability of the electrical utilities in the area to meet their power demands, the licensee requested an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, commencing at 10:22 PM on July 16, 1980, before power reduction would be started.

Evaluation Of the remaining two HPI pumps, the "A" pump was in operation for system make-up and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow. The "C" pump was in standby; this pump was verified operable on June 14, 1980, pursuant to an oral report from the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee stated all power supplies, instrumentation and controls, and auxiliary support systems for the HPI system were operable.

Three HPI pumps are required to be operable only for the assumed occurrence of (1) a limiting single failure in the HPI system, and (2) a postulated break in the primary cold leg piping of between 0.04 and 0.10 sq. ft. in the vicinity of-the HPI nozzle for which the HPI flow is assumed lost and failure of one of the pumps.

8008140213

Oconee 1/2/3

-2 Otherwise, only one HPI pump, assuming single failure of the remaining pump, would be required. With.Pump "A" operating and Pump "C" on standby, it is required. that valve HP-26 which is normally closed, open on receipt of an engineered safeguards (ES) signal. To reduce the probability of this valve faling to open onsignal, an operator would be stationed to ensure the valve does open on receipt of an ES signal.

As the request is only for a duration of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of additional time, the low probability of the most limiting small break (0.04 to 0.10 sq. ft.), and the compensating factor of stationing an operator to verify the opening of valve HP-26, we conclude that this temporary TS change is acceptable.

Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is.insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 151.5(d)(4).

that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above,.that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a signi ficant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will, not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:

August 1, 1980