ML15068A458

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Petition to Intervene and for a Public Adjudication Hearing of Entergy License Amendment Request for Approval of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G Equivalent Margins Analysis
ML15068A458
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/2015
From: Lodge T
Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter (MSEF), Nuclear Energy Information Service
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
SECY RAS
Shared Package
ML15068A455 List:
References
50-255-LA2, Pending, RAS 27348
Download: ML15068A458 (35)
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Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of: ) Docket No. 50-255-LA2 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. )

(Palisades Nuclear Plant)

) March 9, 2015 Operating License Amendment Request

)

PETITION TO INTERVENE AND FOR A PUBLIC ADJUDICATION HEARING OF ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX G EQUIVALENT MARGINS ANALYSIS Now come Beyond Nuclear (BN), Dont Waste Michigan (DWM), Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter (MSEF), and the Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS) (hereafter collectively called Petitioners), all of which hereby move to intervene in this proceeding on behalf of their respective members in opposition to Entergys license amendment request. Entergy seeks approval of an Equivalent Margins Analysis for Palisades Nuclear Power Plant (Palisades) which was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2013. The request is alleged to have been submitted to the NRC at least three years before any reactor vessel beltline material Charpy upper-shelf energy (USE) in steel plating or welds decreases to less than 50 ft-lb, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G, Section IV, Fracture Toughness Requirements.

Petitioners request admission of their below-enumerated contention and for the NRC to convene a public adjudication hearing on this matter, which would amend the current operating license of Palisades. Their contention is:

The methods of prediction used by Entergy concerning whether steel plate and weld materials within the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant possess Charpy upper shelf energy (USE) values of less than 50 ft.-lbs. of ductility stress do not provide adequate assurance of margins of safety against fracture or rupture which are equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

This Petition is brought pursuant to the Federal Register notice of January 6, 2015, found at Vol. 80, No. 3, p. 520, 523, entitled Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations. In it, the NRC gave notice of Entergys amendment request, to amend the operating license of Palisades by approval of the licensee's equivalent margin analysis (EMA),

performed in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix G), which demonstrates that materials within the Palisades reactor pressure vessel (RPV) which are predicted to possess Charpy upper shelf energy (USE) values less than 50 ft-lbs will provide margins of safety against fracture, equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Id. at 523. Petitioners position is that the continued safe operation of Palisades is not assured by mere calculated predictions, which are predicated in some instances on inaccurate or mistaken assumptions, but that a genuine estimate of safety further requires consideration of physical ductile strength testing of coupon material which reposes within the Palisades RPV.

Petitioners bring their petition pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.309, and in support thereof, address the component requirements for such a pleading as follows.

I. Standing A. Legal Basis Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must address (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983) (citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976)). Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), etc.); (2) the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29 (1999). An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity, by demonstrating harm to its members.

See Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Road, Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261, 271 (1998).

All of the petitioning organizations here wish to participate in a representational capacity.

To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142, 168, affd on other grounds, CLI 13, 48 NRC 26 (1998). Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413, 426 (2002).

Standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the declarations of the organizations and individuals appended to this Petition. All of the petitioning individuals live within 50 miles of PNP, and each one has designated his or her organizational Petitioners to represent his or her interests in this proceeding.

Because they live near the Palisades site, i.e., within 50 miles, the individually-named members of Petitioners have presumptive standing by virtue of their proximity to the nuclear power plant. Diablo Canyon, supra, 56 NRC at 426-427, citing Florida Power & Light Co.

(Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 146, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3 (2001). In Diablo Canyon, the Licensing Board noted that petitioners who live within 50 miles of a proposed nuclear power plant are presumed to have standing in reactor operating license cases, because there is an obvious potential for offsite consequences within that distance. Id. Here, Entergy seeks an operating license amendment for the Palisades nuclear reactor, near South Haven, Michigan, which is a controversy involving the very real question of whether the 44-year increasing embrittlement of the Palisades RPV can sustain an emergency feedwater accident without rupturing through 60 total years of operation. That would be a possibly cataclysmic event that could result in widespread radiological material across large areas of land and water - and the same standing concepts apply.

The organizational Petitioners members seek to protect their lives, health and property by opposing the license amendment to allow Entergy to rely merely on a calculated EMA which contains some defective or improper assumptions, and further permitting Entergy to use the EMA without destructive testing of metal coupons which have been aging for many years inside the RPV. Petitioners members are concerned with the chronic and increasing risk of a serious nuclear reactor accident involving loss of coolant within the severely-embrittled Palisades reactor vessel in the event of a thermal event, i.e., a serious mishap, called pressurized thermal shock (PTS). PTS could cause or allow the RPV to fracture even if the reactor were under control. If that happens, a loss-of-coolant accident, or LOCA, ensues. Then meltdown becomes a distinct possibility; if the containment fails, what could follow then would be a catastrophic release of hazardous radioactivity to the living environment.

Petitioners oppose reliance upon the EMA because there are deficiencies in its factual basis and assumptions. There has been a dangerously-long passage of time since actual physical testing of the degree of embrittlement in the RPV coupons was performed at Palisades, while the risks of a severe through-wall fracture have grown to unknown levels. Intervenors assert that the license amendment cannot be allowed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission because Entergy cannot demonstrate compliance with the Atomic Energy Act.

Locus standi is based on three requirements: injury, causation and redressability. The petitioning organizations hereby request to be made parties to the proceeding because (1) continued operation of the PNP poses a tangible and particular risk of harm to the health, well-being and property of members living within 50 miles of the site, (2) the NRC has initiated proceedings for a license amendment, the granting of which could result in malfunctioning of the reactor in ways that could directly, negatively, affect the named members and others, and (3) the Commission is the sole agency with the power to approve, to deny or to modify an operating license of a commercial nuclear power plant. A license amendment is authorization from the NRC to continue operation of a nuclear power plant at a specific site under altered conditions.

Before issuing the license amendment, the NRC staff must complete safety and environmental reviews of the request. The license amendment must comply with provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, federal laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act, NRC regulations and all other applicable laws.

The Petitioners representationally seek leave to intervene because the interests of their members will not be adequately represented absent this course of action and intervention, and without the opportunity to participate as full parties in this proceeding. The proposed amendment claims that there is adequate assurance of safe operation of the RPV despite the admitted fact that several areas of its metal plating fall below the 50 ft.-lb. minimum ductility stress requirement, and additional areas could well fall below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria during the remaining operating license term, through 2031. Reliance on Entergys EMA, alone could - and according to Petitioners evidence, may unacceptably - cause failure of a critical safety component, namely the RPV. If the RPV were to fail, so would safety margins for operation of the nuclear reactor core within it. Without a public adjudication hearing and determination of the propriety of allowing continued reactor operation in reliance on the EMA, Palisades may operate dangerously and pose an undue and unacceptable risk to the environment, and jeopardize the health, safety and welfare of the Petitioners members who live, recreate, own property and conduct their business in the vicinity of PNP.

Attached to this Petition are declarations of persons with individual standing to intervene, along with declarations from the four (4) petitioning organizations which are prepared to represent those persons, their members. Representational standing of the Petitioners is thus proven via declarations from Beyond Nuclear, Dont Waste Michigan, Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter, and the Nuclear Energy Information Service, by their respective leaders or officers, who formally express their intentions of protecting the interests of their members who reside within 50 miles of Palisades.

Notably, the same organizations, and the same individual members, have intervened in a related, open NRC license amendment proceeding about the Palisades RPV and its presumed ability to withstand pressurized thermal shock (PTS). See Amended Petition to Intervene and for a Public Adjudication Hearing of Entergy License Amendment Request for Authorization to Implement 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, Alternative Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events, Docket No. 50-255-LA, filed December 10, 2014.

Petitioners in the instant matter incorporate by reference and reallege herein as though rewritten the entirety of contents and averments of that December 10, 2014 petition.

B. The Named Intervenors Beyond Nuclear (BN) is a not-for-profit organization located at 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 400, Takoma Park, Maryland, 20912, phone (301) 270-2209, www.beyondnuclear.org. BN has over 20,000 members, of whom a number reside, work and recreate within the fifty (50) mile Emergency Planning Zone for Palisades. Beyond Nuclear provides the declaration of Bette Pierman, a member, who lives in Benton Harbor, Michigan, within about a 15-mile radius of Palisades. Beyond Nuclear seeks to intervene to protect the interests of Pierman, who has safety and environmental concerns about Palisades operations surrounding its severely-embrittled RPV as well as loss of Upper-Shelf Energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria. Pierman believes, based on evidence she has seen, that the possibility of through-wall cracking of the Palisades RPV is greater than Entergy predicts; that the request for license amendment is inadequate as written; and that her interests will not be adequately represented absent participation in this action by BN to intervene and participate as a full party in this proceeding on her behalf. Kevin Kamps, radioactive waste specialist at Beyond Nuclear, represents BN in this proceeding and has submitted a declaration in support of BNs representation of Pierman as its member.

Dont Waste Michigan (DWM) is a federation of environmental organizations with a board of directors and a membership of some 40 researchers, educators, concerned citizens, and others. DWM was founded in 1987 to oppose the designation of the State of Michigan as a repository for what was misleadingly called low-level radioactive waste from eight states.

Dont Waste Michigans work was ultimately successful; Michigan was eliminated from consideration as a repository for the wastes. DWM also resisted, unsuccessfully, the 1993 plan at Palisades to load high-level nuclear waste in casks on the shore of Lake Michigan at the plant site. DWM has several members who reside, work, and/or recreate within fifty (50) miles of Palisades and maintains a website, http://dwmi.homestead.com. DWM seeks to intervene on behalf of its member, Alice Hirt, who lives about 35 miles from Palisades in Holland, Michigan.

According to her declaration, Hirt has safety and environmental concerns about Palisades operations with a severely-embrittled RPV, as well as loss of Upper-Shelf Energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria. She believes, based on evidence she has reviewed, that the possibility of through-wall cracking of the Palisades nuclear reactor vessel is greater than Entergy predicts; that the request for license amendment is inadequate as written; and her interests will not be adequately represented absent participation in this action by DWM to intervene as a full party in this proceeding on her behalf. Michael Keegan, co-convenor of DWM, represents the group in this proceeding and has submitted a declaration to assure DWMs responsibility to act to protect its members.

Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter (MSEF) is a group of sustainable energy advocates, nearly all of whom live, work or recreate within 50 miles of PNP. Maynard Kaufman, a member, lives about 10 miles from Palisades. Kaufman has safety and environmental concerns about Palisades operations with a severely-embrittled RPV, as well as loss of Upper-Shelf Energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria. He believes, based upon evidence he has reviewed, that the possibility of through-wall cracking of the Palisades nuclear reactor vessel is greater than Entergy predicts; that the request for license amendment is inadequate as written; and that his interests will not be adequately represented absent participation in this action by MSEF to intervene and participate as a full party in this proceeding on his behalf. Vikke Andersen, co-convenor of MSEF, represents the group in this proceeding and has submitted a declaration assuming MSEFs responsibility to act to protect its members.

Nuclear Energy Information Service, located at 3411 W Diversey Avenue, #16, Chicago IL 60647 (NEIS) is a nonprofit organization which has opposed continued operation of Illinois and Great Lakes region nuclear power plants for over 30 years, while supporting greater reliance on sustainable energy technologies. NEIS opposes Entergys request to allow a change to the Palisades Operating License for purposes of implementation of 10 CFR § 50.61a, and also opposes Entergy's proposed EMA regarding loss of 50 ft.-lb. upper shelf energy. Gail Snyder, a member of NEIS, owns vacation property within 15 miles of Palisades, where she and her family occasionally travel to camp and picnic. Snyder has safety and environmental concerns about Palisades operation using a severely-embrittled RPV, as well as loss of Upper-Shelf Energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria. She believes, based on evidence she has seen, that the possibility of through-wall cracking of the Palisades nuclear reactor vessel is greater than Entergy predicts; that the request for license amendment is inadequate as written; and that her interests will not be adequately represented absent participation in this action by NEIS to intervene and participate as a full party in this proceeding on her behalf. David Kraft, executive director of NEIS, represents the group in this proceeding and has submitted a declaration in support of NEIS commitment to act to protect its members.

II. Background On January 6, 2015, notice was published in the Federal Register1 of Entergys intentions to seek amendment of the operating license of Palisades to authorize reliance on Entergys equivalent margin analysis (EMA), performed in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix G, which supposedly demonstrates that materials within the Palisades reactor pressure vessel (RPV) which are predicted to possess Charpy upper shelf energy (USE) values less than 50 ft-lbs will provide margins of safety against fracture.

Petitioners maintain that implementation of the EMA as a means of estimating the degree of embrittlement and loss of Upper-Shelf energy of the Palisades RPV, and its susceptibility to rupture, rest upon flawed or weak assumptions. Reliance upon Entergys EMA will justify a troublesome and safety-inadequate consideration of the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel.

1 80 Fed. Reg. Vol. 3, pp. 520, 523http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-06/html/2014-30966.htm.

According to the NRC Staff:

The EMA does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, and does not result in physical alteration of a plant structure, system or component (SSC) or installation of new or different types of equipment. The EMA does not affect plant operation or any design function. The EMA verifies the capability of a [SSC] to perform a design function. Further, the EMA does not significantly affect the probability of accidents previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), or cause a change to any of the dose analyses associated with the UFSAR accidents because accident mitigation functions would remain unchanged.2 Consequently, the Staff concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.3 Petitioners detail below their position that the analysis provided to the NRC by Entergy is inadequate and relies upon unsupported assumptions. Petitioners urge that there is a consequent-ial possibility that reliance upon Entergys equivalent margins analysis, especially absent the scientific information that would be provided by physical destruction testing of one or more metal coupons from within the RPV, comprises a material overestimate of the ability of metal plating and the welds of the RPV to withstand a severe PTS incident, as well as to fulfill safety requirements despite the loss of upper-shelf energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria. They submit that the resulting PTS incident and/or RPV fracture could lead to a loss-of-coolant accident involving the Palisades RPV, and consequent core meltdown and catastrophic radioactivity release to the environment. Therefore, Petitioners argue that the standards of 10 CFR § 50.92 have not been satisfied.

2 Id. at 524.

3 Id.

III. Legal Standards Governing License Amendments Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations at 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.90 to 50.92 provide the applicable process when a licensee wishes to request a license amendment. Specifically, § 50.90 authorizes applications to amend existing operating licenses; § 50.91 provides for notice and comment regarding license amendment applications, as well as consultation with the State in which the facility is located; and § 50.92 provides the standard considered by the NRC when determining whether to issue an amendment.

IV. Factual Basis for Petition A. Statement of the Contention The methods of prediction used by Entergy concerning whether steel plate and weld materials within the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant possess Charpy upper shelf energy (USE) values of less than 50 ft.-lbs. of ductility stress do not provide adequate assurance of margins of safety against fracture or rupture which are equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

B. Brief Explanation of the Basis for the Contention NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 provide fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events at pressurized water reactors such as Palisades. A PTS can occur when water considerably cooler than the water normally used in operation of a nuclear power reactor is injected into the reactor pressure vessel; severe cracking of the metal RPV can follow, which in turn can cause a serious nuclear power accident. Entergy is pursuing an alternative analysis of RPV fracture toughness under 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, by which the NRC affords operating license holders for a pressurized water nuclear power reactor whose construction permit was issued before February 3, 2010 and whose reactor vessel was designed and fabricated to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1998 Edition or earlier - a category which includes Palisades - a chance to invoke an alternative to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.61. Entergy is attempting by this LAR to use an equivalent margin analysis (EMA),

performed in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix G, to demonstrate that materials within the Palisades reactor pressure vessel (RPV) -

metal plates and welds - which are predicted to possess Charpy upper shelf energy (USE) values less than 50 ft-lbs., will nonetheless provide margins of safety against fracture. This is because 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a allows Entergy to substitute various estimates of the status of the RPV for actual data investigation and analysis.

Petitioners maintain that Palisades has a little-acknowledged problem of worsening reactor vessel embrittlement commencing from the start of operations in the early 1970's as well as a problem of worsening loss of upper-shelf energy below the 50 ft.-lb. screening criteria in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix G regulations. Palisades owners have repeatedly - a half dozen times or more - invoked 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 or predecessor procedures to push back the metallurgical toughness parameters which would otherwise have caused a shutdown of Palisades and forced expensive reactor vessel annealing to try to fix the embrittlement problem.

In December 2014, the instant Petitioners formally challenged a proposed license amendment for Palisades on the ground that there is not apples-to-apples validity of data drawn from other power reactors en route to questioning the implementation of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a.

They further questioned whether Entergy should be allowed to resort to § 50.61a at all.

Petitioners assert that a critical, scientifically-verifiable means of assessing the current status of embrittlement of the Palisades RPV is being ignored. It involves examination of metal surveillance samples, called capsules or coupons. These are pieces of metal which are alike in composition and age to the RPV metal and/or its welds, which have been aging and exposed to neutron irradiation inside the RPV throughout the period of Palisades operations. Entergy has not removed or examined any coupons since a 2003 refueling outage, and does not intend to study a coupon until at least 2019. Entergy plans to substitute the estimate procedure of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a for the scientific rigor implicated by 10 C.F.R. § 50.61, despite the availability of scientifically-measurable coupons. Entergy further has submitted its EMA to buttress its position that although some portions of the metal plating and welds that make up the RPV have fallen below the 50 ft.-lb. upper-shelf energy ductility stress standard imposed by the NRC, there is no compromise in the RPVs ability to withstand fracture or rupture in the event of a sudden, emergency injection of water significantly cooler than that normally within the RPV.

The fact that sixteen (16) years will have passed between coupon examinations to gain an accurate view of the RPV calls into question Entergys motivation for switching to § 50.61a and concomitant use of a revised EMA. Petitioners believe that such a course is potentially dangerous and scientifically suspect. Palisades' neutron embrittlement dilemma and loss of upper-shelf energy continues to worsen as the plant ages. Repeated amendments to the fracture toughness requirements for the plant have trivialized embrittlement characteristics in the past, and now, the loss of upper-shelf energy of parts of the RPV.

Nor would this be the first time that scientific data of became problematic in Palisades embrittlement turmoil. In the 1980's, Palisades was allowed to ignore the scientifically acceptable 1ó variation identified by Westinghouse. On February 28, 1984, the NRC authorized deletion of sample SA-60-1 from consideration because its measured neutron value exceeded this 1ó variation:

As of October 31, 1982, the licensee indicates that Capsule A-60 had accumulated approximately 8.7x 10(18) n/cm2 (E>1MeV) neutron fluence. Since the neutron fluence accumulated by the Capsule is significantly greater than the predicted EOL fluence for the Palisades reactor vessel and Capsule A-240 has provided material properties that can be utilized to predict the EOL material properties of the Palisades reactor vessel, Capsule A-60 will provide no useful fracture toughness data and may be deleted from the surveillance program.

Declaration of Arnold Gundersen, hereafter Gundersen Declaration (attached to this Petition, along with Gundersens curriculum vitae) at p. 16, ¶ 41. From this evidence, Arnold Gundersen deduced that this particular sample was discarded precisely because it gave an answer that would have required Palisades to be shut down. It follows, he opined, that the analytical basis for continuing operation is distorted, and since specific sample data has been disregarded, Entergy may be putting the public at risk by operating Palisades under unsafe conditions. Id. at

p. 16, ¶ 42.

Entergys planned deviation from the regulatory requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 to § 50.61a would introduce further non-conservative analytical assumptions into the mix, and the proposed equivalent margins analysis is an untried methodological approach to measure neutron bombardment-induced reactor vessel embrittlement, combined with the risks inherent in the loss of upper-shelf energy. Allowing Palisades to continue operations under such relaxed measurement conditions exposes the public to increased danger and is not acceptable, and reliance on the proposed EMA must be denied.

C. Concise Statement of Alleged Facts and Expert Opinion Upon Which Petitioners Intend to Rely

1. Three Areas Of The Palisades RPV Are Predicted To Fall Below The 50 ft.-lb Ductility Stress Limit Petitioners initial concerns focus on the following admissions by Entergy:

As documented in the PNP license amendment request for primary coolant system pressure-temperature limits (Reference 2), a plate material and a weld material in the PNP reactor vessel traditional beltline region are predicted to drop below the Appendix G 50 ft-lb screening criterion prior to the PNP end-of-license-extension (EOLE). The lower shell (LS) plate material, D-3804-1, is predicted to drop below the screening criterion in December 2016 and the intermediate shell (IS) to LS circumferential weld material, 9-112 (heat no. 27204), is predicted to drop below the criterion in November 2027.

As documented in WCAP-17403-NP (Attachment 1), the Charpy USE of an upper shell (US) plate material, D-3802-3, in the reactor vessel extended beltline region is predicted to remain above the 50 ft-lb Appendix G screening criterion at EOLE when considering an initial Charpy USE value based on a curve-fit of the available Charpy V-Notch data. However, this material is predicted to drop below the Appendix G screening criterion, to 47.5 ft-lb at EOLE, when considering an initial Charpy USE value based only on the available 95% shear Charpy V-Notch data for this material.

The remaining beltline and extended beltline materials in the reactor vessel are projected to maintain above the Charpy USE screening criterion of 50 ft-lb at EOLE. The results of the fluence calculations for the extended beltline region materials of the PNP reactor vessel are provided in Table E-2 of WCAP-1 5353 - Supplement 2 - NP (Attachment 2). Supplement 2 was generated to address the neutron fluence experienced by materials located in the extended beltline regions above and below the reactor core that were not included in either Revision 0 of WCAP-1 5353 or in Supplement 1 of that report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix G, this letter transmits for NRC review and approval the EMA report WCAP-1 7651-NP (Attachment 3) for the two traditional beltline and one extended beltline reactor vessel materials discussed above. Extended beltline US plate material D-3802-3 was analyzed due to the possibility that it may fall below the 50 ft-lb limit if future operation includes higher flux levels, longer operating cycles, or changes to the reactor internals. The analysis of the three materials used the equivalent margins methodology specified in ASME Code Section Xl, Division 1, Appendix K, "Assessment of Reactor Vessels with Low Upper Shelf Charpy Impact Energy Levels," and concluded that all three of the reactor vessel materials are acceptable.

Letter, Entergy to NRC, October 21, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13295A448, pp. 1-2.

There are several reasons why, in light of the admitted facts that parts of the RPV plating and welds fall below allowable ductile stress limits, that Entergys subsequent equivalent margins analysis assurances cannot be accepted. These are discussed below.

2. Expert Opinion Petitioners expert on Palisades embrittlement issues in the December 2014 petition, Arnold Gundersen, Chief Engineer of Fairewinds Associates, Inc., expressed this opinion in December 2014 concerning the EMA:
45. Now, juxtaposed against this industry unique background of deteriorating embrittlement conditions within the Palisades reactor, the aged plant requests two more license amendments:

45.4 Disturbingly, one of these amendments proposes a significant analytical deviation from the regulatory requirements of 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.61 to 50.61a (Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements). This newest amendment request once again introduces further non-conservative analytical assumptions into the troubled calculational history of Palisades.

45.5 On top of the aforementioned analytical deviation is an even more alarming License Amendment Request (LAR) containing an equivalent margins evaluation that was only recently released from the public document room, even though the document was filed more than four months ago in July 2014. Once again, Entergys Palisades NPP is seeking NRC approval for another untried methodological approach to measure the neutron bombardment induced reactor vessel embrittlement in such a manner, that the Palisades NPP could continue to operate under additional relaxed measurement conditions.

46. A License Amendment Request (LAR) is a serious request for any operating nuclear power plant because it seeks to assure the public that if these changes are made the plant will still retain and operate within its safety margins and be as safe as it was before the changes were implemented. From the evidence reviewed, it appears that this specific LAR is required because prior evaluations suggest that three portions of the nuclear reactor vessel will not meet the NRC required 50 ft-lb. ductility stress limit. It also appears, from the five documents attached to the LAR, that Westinghouse has reanalyzed and manipulated the Palisades data so that the final calculations keep the reactor vessel within the regulatory acceptable range above the minimum 50 ft-lb ductility stress limit.
47. Finally, the evidence I reviewed in the five attachments to the LAR,4 suggests that Entergy may have chosen not to apply the Westinghouse reanalysis because that analysis would not allow Entergy to operate the Palisades NPP in the manner it wished.

As a result, Entergy submitted what it calls an equivalent margin analysis to show that even in the portions of the nuclear reactor that did not meet the NRC minimum required 50 ft-lb ductility stress limit, the reactor will still provide sufficient safety margins for continued operation of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.

48. The latest equivalent margins evaluation is a red flag indicating that the reactor vessel at Palisades is operating in more uncharted territory than imagined.

4 License Amendment Request for Approval of Palisades Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50 Appendix G Equivalent Margins Analysis, ADAMS No. ML14316A370, November 20, 2014. :

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1431/ML14316A370.html Basically, Entergy is proposing to operate its Palisades NPP well outside the norm by proposing to reanalyze the deteriorating metallurgical conditions without using the readily available physical samples that are designed specifically for this purpose.

(Emphases supplied). Gundersen Declaration, pp. 19-20. Petitioners hereby incorporate fully herein by reference as though rewritten herein the entirety of the Gundersen Declaration.

Gundersen also opined his declaration that Almost half of the initial capsules [coupon samples] installed 43 years ago still remain inside the embrittled nuclear reactor and that if the NRC allows Entergy to postpone the next Palisades coupon sampling until 2019, then no accurate current assessment of Palisades severe embrittlement condition exists. Id. p. 8, ¶ 21.

Moreover, he observed (id. at p. 3, ¶ 8) that Continued operation of the Palisades nuclear power plant without analyzing the coupon designated to be sampled more than seven years ago means that Entergy may be operating Palisades as a test according to 10 C.F.R. § 50.59.5 (Emphasis in original).

5 10 CFR § 50.59(c)(2) criteria require a licensee to seek a license amendment if the proposed change, test, or experiment would:

(I) Result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of any accident previously evaluated in the [UFSAR];

(ii) Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the [UFSAR];

(iii) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the [UFSAR];

(iv) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the [UFSAR];

(v) Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the

[UFSAR];

(vi) Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the [UFSAR];

(vii) Result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the [UFSAR] being exceeded or altered; or (viii) Result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the [UFSAR] used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.

Southern California Edison Co, (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-13-07, pp.

18-20 (May 13, 2013).

The problems identified by the need for an equivalent margins analysis in conjunction with Palisades long history of metallurgical concerns, Gunderson concluded, prove that continued operation in the future will be on an experimental basis. Clearly the special condition of the Palisades reactor and its ranking as one of the most embrittled reactors in the United States qualify its continued operation as a test. Id. at pp. 20-21, ¶ 50. Gundersen further advised that extrapolation beyond 2014 is problematic and potentially dangerous because of the 16 year period that will have passed between 2003 and 2019 since an actual sample was removed from inside the RPV, so there is no physical data to benchmark the analysis described in 10 CFR 50.61 and in 10 CFR 50.61(a). Gundersen Declaration at p. 21. Even the NRC, he notes, has acknowledged that its 50.61(a) models require validation in order to provide assurance of safe operation at Palisades. Id. Because abundant capsule coupon samples remain inside the reactor, he counsels, they should be removed and tested rather than the Entergy proposal of a license change based only upon an extrapolated analysis. Id. at ¶ 51.

3. Palisades RPV Has Above-Normal Sulfur Content In Plating, So Lower Fracture Toughness The following passage appears in Attachment 5 to Entergys License Amendment Request, Westinghouse WCAP-17651-NP, Revision 0, Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Vessel Equivalent Margins Analysis, 2/28/2013), ML14316A208, p. 24/45 of .pdf:

Per P-PENG-ER-006, the sulfur content of US plate D-3802-3 is 0.029 wt. %.

Similarly, for LS plate D-3804-1, the sulfur content is 0.024 wt. %. The Palisades plates have a sulfur content greater than the high-toughness model limit of 0.018 wt. %

specified in RG 1.161. The J-R model in RG 1.161 has an upper limit in sulfur because J-R data for plates with high sulfur content are scarce and the available data showed low toughness, flat J-R curves, and a size effect. The most data available for a high-sulfur A-302 B plate are for the V-50 plate in NUREG/CR-5265 (Reference 15). This plate has a reported sulfur content of 0.021 and 0.025 wt. % with USE values of 44 to 51 ft-lb, averaging around 48 ft-lb at the 1/4T locations in the T-L (weak) orientation. This USE is comparable to the EOLE projection for the Palisades high-sulfur plates.

The V-50 plate was unusual in that it had a test specimen size effect that has not been observed in other RV material J-R curves and is unique to the V-50 plate. A high content of manganese-sulfide (MnS) inclusions and banded regions of microstructure, are believed to be the causes of the unusual specimen size effect observed. Conservatively, the lowest J-R curve test data from this testing program is plotted in Figure 5-5, which is from a 6T size specimen and is considerably lower than test data for the 1T J-R, which is the standard size specimen typically used. In addition, the manufacturing practices used to produce this extremely low-toughness V-50 plate are not representative of those used in the Palisades RV.

The V-50 plate is A-302 B plate with a nickel content of 0.23 wt. % while the Palisades plates are SA-302B Modified, which means that they have at least 0.4 wt. %

nickel. Nickel was added to increase toughness. Therefore, the J-R curve test data from the V-50 plate data can be conservatively viewed as the worst possible case and can be compared to the J-applied values from this evaluation. Adjusting the 180°F 6T plate V-50 J-R curve data to 600°F using the ratio of the RG 1.161 correlation, the 600°F data can be approximated as shown in Figure 5-5.

High-sulfur A-302 B Modified plate J-R data are available in NUREG/CR-6426 (Reference 16). However, the weak-direction Charpy USE value is 64 ft-lb, which is above the 10 CFR 50, Appendix G limit of 50 ft-lb. This further validates that the V-50 plate was an anomaly and can be considered a very conservative lower bound of the available high-sulfur A-302 B plate J-R data. The J-applied in the Palisades SA-302 B Modified plate remains below the measured very conservative lower-bound V-50 A-302 B plate J-R data.

The higher sulfur content of the plates means lower fracture toughness. Palisades takes credit for the nickel content of the RPV on the one hand (for increasing the toughness against Upper Shelf Energy loss in RPV upper shell), while failing to mention or account for in the EMA that nickel impurities worsen RPV neutron embrittlement and PTS risk. See generally H. B.

Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity, July 23, 1998, ML14178B146, pp. 13-14 of .pdf.

This is neither explored nor accounted for in the EMA.

4. Ductile Tearing In Low Charpy USE Materials Is Not Well Understood The NRC admits that it has poor information about the ductile tearing propensities of steel plating with low Charpy upper-shelf energy:

Ductile tearing is the dominant fracture process in the upper-shelf region of the Charpy impact energy versus temperature curve for RPV materials. The conditions governing cleavage mode-conversion of the ductile tearing process in materials with low Charpy upper-shelf energy are still not well understood and are not considered in this regulatory guide.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.161, Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessels with Charpy Upper-Shelf Energy Less than 50 ft.-lb. ADAMS No. ML003740038 (p. 3/40 of .pdf). Petitioners have seen no later regulatory guidance which demonstrates any greater understanding of ductile tearing.

5. A Recent Report Documents Discovery Of Micro-cracking In Beltline Ring Forgings of PWRs On February 13, 2015, the Director-General of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) responsible for nuclear power safety in Belgium revealed that the problems found in two nuclear reactors had implications for nuclear safety worldwide. In a statement posted to its website, FANC announced that thousands of flaw indications were discovered during investigations inside the Doel 3 and Tinhange nuclear reactor pressure vessels. The flaw indications are actually microscopic cracks, caused by stresses from the pressure inside the RPVs. Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessel Crisis: Greenpeace Briefing, February 15, 2015 (copy attached to this petition).

The thousands of microcracks appear to result from small ruptures in the RPV steel produced by the release of high-pressure hydrogen gas, which was trapped in the metal during the steel making process. Id. at p. 4/10 of .pdf. Regulators in Belgium and other countries have recommended, in particular, that the steel used in making beltline ring forgings be closely examined. Id.

This is significant information because world-recognized nuclear engineers have advised close attention to this phenomenon in older reactor RPVs. Also, the cracks occur inside the vessel, the plates of which are under stress from the pressure inside the vessel. Metal coupons, while exposed to the same thermal events as RPV walls as well as neutron irradiation, are not under pressure, and so any evidence gleaned from the coupons would not represent the worst case. That is, the coupons would likely provide non-conservative data regarding embrittlement.

A mere projected equivalent margins analysis should not be allowed to stand against serious physical investigation into the status of the uniquely-embrittled Palisades RPV. Palisades should be made a priority for destructive coupon testing and, as well, for examination of actual RPV plating and welds for the micro-cracking uncovered in the Belgium reactor inquiry.

6. The LAR Guidance For 10 C.F.R. §50.61a Alternative Calculations Is Only In Draft Form As of November 2014, official NRC interpretative guidance for 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a was not finalized, and the Palisades EMA, being predicated upon non-final guidance, should not be accepted. NUREG-2163, which provides the technical basis for the alternate PTS rule, was just publicly released on March 2, 2015. Of the guidance documents, these 2014 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards minutes state the following:

The Committee met with representatives of the NRC staff to discuss Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1299, Regulatory Guidance on the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule (PTS), and the supporting Technical Basis Draft NUREG-2163, Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on the Alternative PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61a). The Alternate PTS Rule provides revised PTS screening criteria in the form of an embrittlement reference temperature, RTMAX-X, which characterizes the reactor pressure vessel materials resistance to fracture from initiated flaws.

Summary of 619th ACRS Meeting November 4-7, 2014, ADAMS No. ML14328A634.

7. Although The NRC Admits The Scarcity of Embrittlement Data, It Declines to Order Destructive Testing Despite the availability of metal coupons in the Palisades RPV for destructive testing, the NRC so far has refused to require that. Yet the NRC, itself, admits the paucity of scientific data on embrittlement and the unfortunate use of proxies:

Unfortunately, the specific material of interest (i.e., the material from the beltline region of the reactor vessel under operation) is seldom available for testing. Thus, testing programs have used generic materials that are expected to represent the range of actual materials used in fabricating reactor pressure vessels in the United States.

Regulatory Guide 1.161, "Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessels with Charpy Upper-Shelf Energy Less Than 50 Ft.-Lb.," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, June 1995, ADAMS No. ML003740038.pdf (p. 4/40 of .pdf). Palisades has very negative stature as the worst-embrittled U.S. reactor. To allow 16 years to pass without actual physical destructive testing, as Entergy proposes to do, is explained only by Entergys and the NRC Staffs denial of the likely state of the RPV which would be revealed by physical science.

8. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix H Requires Substantial Advantage If Coupons Are Not Evaluated NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix H, entitled Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements, require the following in an integrated surveillance program:
1. In an integrated surveillance program, the representative materials chosen for surveillance for a reactor are irradiated in one or more other reactors that have similar design and operating features. Integrated surveillance programs must be approved by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or the Director, Office of New Reactors, as appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. Criteria for approval include the following:
a. ***;
b. ***;
c. ***;
d. ***;
e. There must be substantial advantages to be gained, such as reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct result of not requiring surveillance capsules in all reactors in the set.

(Emphasis added). 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appx. H, III C.1.e.

Entergy has made no showing of any substantial advantage to be gained from a 16-year hiatus from destructive testing, during which time regularly-scheduled refueling outages (and of late, many unscheduled maintenance outages, as for unexpected leaking) will have occurred.

Entergy was recently cited by the NRC with a "White Finding" for exposing 192 workers to, on average, a 2.8 Rem dose of hazardous radioactivity in the short, month-long Control Rod Drive Mechanism replacement project in February-March 2014. Thus, avoidance of worker radiation dose as a supposed reason for avoiding metal surveillance coupon testing at Palisades should not be deemed an acceptable excuse by NRC. For, as Intervenors' expert Gundersen testified at the NRC-Entergy regulatory conference on Jan. 13, 2015 held at NRC Region 3 HQ in Lisle, IL, Entergy's rush to return Palisades to a profitable restart was the very reason the 192 workers were so unnecessarily dosed with excessive hazardous radioactivity, in violation of Entergy's own commitment to ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) dose limits of 2 Rem/year.6 V. Conclusion The evidence articulated in support of this Petition warrants a hearing before the Atomic 6

See: Michigan Radio coverage of the 2.8 Rem per worker figure at http://michiganradio.org/po st/regulators-palisades-odds-over-how-much-radiation-workers-were-exposed-last-year; see Gundersen's prepared statement at http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/kk-links/1%2013%2015%20Fairewin ds%20Arnie%20Gundersen%20NRC%20Conference%20Call%202015-1-13.pdf; see the NRC Final Significance of White Finding at https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/view?Access ionNumber=ML15056A072 Safety and Licensing Board. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act states that a reactor operating license must include technical specifications that include, inter alia, the specific characteristics of the facility, and such other information as the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to find that the utilization . . . of special nuclear material . . . will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a).

The Commission is empowered to issue an order amending any license as it deems necessary to effectuate the provisions of [the AEA] (42 U.S.C. § 2233) - that is, to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.

Id. § 2201; see also id.§ 2237. Additionally, the Commission may at any time . . . before the expiration of the license, require further written statements [from the licensee] to determine whether . . . a license should be modified. Id. § 2232(a).

Finally, section 189a of the AEA states that [i]n any proceeding under [the AEA], for the

. . . amending of any license . . ., the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A).

Petitioners have demonstrated their particularized interest in the outcome of Entergys license amendment request to allow reliance on an equivalent margins analysis which is shown by Petitioners to be of dubious quality. Petitioners pray the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant them leave to intervene in the license amendment proceeding, and to schedule discovery and an adjudicatory hearing.

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (OH #0029271) 316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604¶5627 (419) 255-7552 Fax (419) 255-7552 Tjlodge50@yahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of: ) Docket No. 50-255-LA2 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. )

(Palisades Nuclear Plant)

) March 9, 2015 Operating License Amendment Request

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing PETITION TO INTERVENE AND FOR A PUBLIC ADJUDICATION HEARING OF ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX G EQUIVALENT MARGINS ANALYSIS was served by me upon the parties to this proceeding via the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange system this 9th day of March, 2015.

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (OH #0029271) 316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 255-7552 Fax (419) 255-7552 Tjlodge50@yahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of: ) Docket No. 50-255 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. )

(Palisades Nuclear Plant)

) March 9, 2015 Operating License Amendment Request

)

DECLARATION OF AUTHORIZED OFFICER OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO INTERVENE IN DOCKET NO. 50-255 Under penalty of perjury, I, David Kraft, declare as follows:

1. I am authorized by Nuclear Energy Information Service, 3411 W Diversey Avenue, #16, Chicago IL 60647 (NEIS) to sign this Declaration. NEIS is formally and officially opposed to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.s formal request to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to allow a change to the Palisades Operating License to approve the licensee's equivalent margin analysis, performed in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix G, which demonstrates that materials predicted to possess Charpy upper shelf energy values less than 50 ft-lbs will provide margins of safety against fracture, equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
2. NEIS has 902 active members, several of whom live, recreate or conduct business within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear power plant site, including Gail Snyder. NEIS is concerned that if the NRC grants the Entergy license amendment request, the operation of Palisades could adversely affect the health and safety of NEIS members and the Chicago metropolitan area (even though Chicago itself is outside a 50-mile radius from Palisades, Lake Michigan lies between the plant and Chicago), and the integrity of the environment in which they live.
3. In order to ensure that the operating license amendment decision for Palisades protects the interests of NEIS members in a safe and healthy environment, the group formally seeks to intervene on behalf of its member, Gail Snyder, who has provided a declaration of her standing to pursue the pending Pressurized Thermal Shock license amendment proceeding. NEIS intends, on behalf of its members, to take any legal actions necessary to ensure the license amendment proceeding is conducted fairly, effectively, efficiently and in a manner that provides the full consideration of all issues that could affect the safety and health of NEIS members and their living environment and property.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts are true and correct and that any expressions of opinion are based on my judgment.

For Nuclear Energy Information Service

___ March 9, 2015_________________ By________________________________________

[date] David Kraft, Executive Director

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