ML14357A059
| ML14357A059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2014 |
| From: | Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| References | |
| 14-565 | |
| Download: ML14357A059 (70) | |
Text
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 December 17, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.14-565 Attention: Document Control Desk NL&OSANVDC R3 Washington, DC 20555 Docket Nos.
50-338/339 License Nos.
NPF-4/7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 RESPONSE TO MARCH 12. 2012 INFORMATION REQUEST EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 2.1
References:
- 1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012
- 2. Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to NRC, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1," dated March 31, 2014
- 3. EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic"
- 4. NRC Letter, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, 'Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,' as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," dated May 7, 2013 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.
In Reference 2, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) provided the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for North Anna Power Station in response to the Reference 1 request. In that submittal, Dominion committed to perform, as an interim measure, an Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) in accordance with Reference 3 and to provide the results of the evaluation to NRC by December 31, 2014.
Reference 3 contains industry guidance and detailed information to be included in the ESEP Report submittal. NRC endorsed this industry guidance in Reference 4.
The attached ESEP Report for North Anna Power Station provides the information described in Section 7 of Reference 3.
I Cl
Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 2 of 3 If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact Mr. Thomas Shaub at (804) 273-2763.
Sincerely, David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Commitments made in this letter:
None
Attachment:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Vicid L. M11l
'NOTARY,M.IC j
- i commonwealth of Virgini~a COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA m n-eg. # LoVi542 lia
)mýýommrission Expires May 31, 2018 COUNTY OF HENRICO
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The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by David A. Heacock, who is President and Chief Nuclear Officer of Virginia Electric and Power Company. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Acknowledged before me this /7
--7 day of Ile C',)-" &
,/
2014.
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
4f Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 3 of 3 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Regional Administrator Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Dr. V. Sreenivas Project Manager - North Anna U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08 G-9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. K. Cotton-Gross Project Manager - Surry U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08 G-9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station J. E. Reasor, Jr.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Innsbrook Corporate Center, Suite 300 4201 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 50.54fSeismic. Resource@nrc.gov
Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 ATTACHMENT EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT December 2014 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS I AND 2
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Executive Summary In response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter of March 12, 2012 on Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, a seismic evaluation program, entitled the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), was conducted for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 (NAPS) as an interim measure until the long-term seismic risk evaluation is completed. The ESEP evaluated the impact of higher than design basis earthquakes on select equipment associated with FLEX strategies that are being implemented for mitigation of beyond design basis events to protect the reactor core. The ESEP was completed for NAPS because the recently developed Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS), which was prepared using probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, exceeds the plant's Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The ESEP was performed in accordance with the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic.
This report provides summary information resulting from the ESEP performed for NAPS. The report includes a description of the Review Level Ground Motion Spectra (RLGM), the equipment selection process, the seismic capacity walkdown approach, the screening of components, the methodology used to perform the seismic margin assessment, and the results.
The results include seismic factors of safety or high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacities for the selected structures, systems and components (SSCs) for both structural integrity and functional failure modes, and, for some SSCs, the basis for screening out from further evaluation.
The report concludes that the SSCs have seismic factors of safety greater than unity and/or HCLPF capacities that are greater than the selected RLGM.
Therefore, no upgrades to the plant or modifications to any SSC are required as a result of the ESEP.
i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table of Contents Executive Summary.............................................................................................................. i 1.0 Purpose and Objective........................................................................................................
1 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies..........................................
2 2.1 Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal.................................................................
2 2.2 RCS Inventory Control / Long-Term Subcriticality.....................................................
3 2.3 Containment Function................................................................................................
3 2.4 Core Cooling and Heat Removal during Modes 5 & 6..............................................
3 2.5 Powering Key Parameter Instrumentation................................................................
4 3.0 Equipment Selection and ESEL..............................................................................................
5 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL...................................................................
5 3.1.1 FLEX Equipment List...................................................................................
5 3.1.2 ESEL Development.....................................................................................
7 3.1.3 ESEL........................................................................................................
8 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)........................................................................
9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee.................................................................
9 4.2 Comparison to SSE...................................................................................................
10 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion..................................................................................................
12 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected...................................................................................
12 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra.................................................
15 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach......................................................................................
15 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used..............................................................................
15 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process.......................................................................................
17 6.3 Seismic W alkdown Approach......................................................................................
18 6.3.1 W alkdown Approach.....................................................................................
18 6.3.2 Application of Previous W alkdown Information............................................
19 6.3.3 W alkdown of Block W alls..............................................................................
19 6.3.4 Significant W alkdown Findings......................................................................
20 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process.....................................................................................
20 6.5 Functional Evaluations of Relays..............................................................................
20 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)...............................
21 7.0 Inaccessible Items.......................................................................................................................
22 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for W alkdowns........................................
22 7.2 Planned W alkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.............................................
22 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results..............................................................................................
22 8.1 Supporting Information..............................................................................................
22 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications......................................................................
24 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule.....................................................................
24 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments.....................................................................
24 9.0 R e fe re n ce s..................................................................................................................................
2 4 Appendix A - Unit 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results..... A-i Appendix B - Unit 2 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results..... B-i ii
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system.
The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 (Reference 9.1), which requested information to assure that these recommendations were addressed by all U.S.
nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff included a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA).
Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff would determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for North Anna Power Station (NAPS) Units 1 and 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 9.1) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (Reference 9.2).
The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to provide the NRC a clear understanding of the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 2.0 BRIEF
SUMMARY
OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES Diverse and flexible (FLEX) strategies have been developed for NAPS in accordance with NEI 12-06 (Reference 9.3) to respond to NRC Order EA-12-049 (Reference 9.4). The NAPS submittal to NRC dated February 28, 2013 (Reference 9.5) and subsequent updates (References 9.6 through 9.8), hereafter collectively referred to as the Overall Integrated Plan (OIP), provide a description of the strategies developed to mitigate a Beyond Design Basis (BDB) event.
FLEX strategies relevant to the ESEP are listed in Table 3-2 of Reference 9.2 and include reactor core cooling and heat removal, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory control and long-term subcriticality, containment function, and core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5 & 6. These strategies, as described in the NAPS OIP, are summarized below.
2.1 REACTOR CORE COOLING AND HEAT REMOVAL PHASE 1 Reactor core cooling and heat removal is achieved through steam release from the Steam Generators (S/Gs) via remote or local manual operation of the S/G Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). S/G makeup is provided from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) during FLEX Phase 1 with suction from the Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST). Upon depletion of the ECST, the suction of the TDAFWP is aligned to the Fire Protection (FP) System, with water flow supplied from the Service Water (SW) reservoir via the diesel-driven FP pump.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy includes deployment of the portable BDB high capacity pump taking suction from Lake Anna or the SW reservoir and providing flow to the suction of the TDAFWP or a deployed portable BDB Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump (while simultaneously refilling the ECST via the permanently installed BDB ECST refill connection.)
The portable BDB AFW pump discharges to the S/Gs via the permanent tie-in connection to the AFW system. This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 3 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategy is required for core cooling and heat removal, since the TDAFWP and/or the portable BDB AFW pump can provide S/G makeup indefinitely.
However, additional pumps, acquired from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC), provide backup capability should multiple failures occur during extended operation. These pumps will utilize the same flowpaths described above.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 2.2 RCS INVENTORY CONTROL / LONG-TERM SUBCRITICALITY PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for ensuring adequate RCS inventory and reactivity control consists of monitoring pressurizer level and RCS pressure, and controlling RCS cooldown by S/G depressurization to a steam pressure of 290 psig.
PHASE 2 RCS inventory control and long-term subcriticality is maintained by injecting borated water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the RCS via the permanently installed BDB RCS pump discharge connection in the Safety Injection (SI) system using the portable BDB RCS injection pump. The BDB RCS injection pump draws the contents of the RWST through the BDB RCS pump suction connection installed in the Quench Spray (QS) pump suction piping.
This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 4 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategy is required as the portable BDB RCS injection pump can provide RCS makeup indefinitely. However, additional pumps acquired from the NSRC provide backup capability should multiple failures occur during extended operation. The NSRC pumps will utilize the same flowpaths described above.
2.3 CONTAINMENT FUNCTION PHASE 1 The Phase 1 strategy for containment function is to monitor containment temperature and pressure using installed instrumentation.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy for containment function is to continue to monitor containment pressure and temperature.
PHASE 3 The Phase 3 strategy for containment function is to continue to monitor containment pressure and temperature.
No primary or alternate strategies are required to be defined to maintain the containment function (Reference 9.8).
2.4 CORE COOLING AND HEAT REMOVAL DURING MODES 5 & 6 PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6 involves the initiation of 3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the gravity feed and spill method of removing decay heat.
Several different flowpaths can be utilized for gravity feed and spill depending on plant conditions.
Valves are aligned in the SI system to allow borated water from the RWST to flow into the cold leg piping of the RCS using the installed plant piping flowpath. A spill path is established through the pressurizer PORVs or a removed pressurizer safety valve.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 response for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6 includes utilization of the portable BDB AFW pump to provide RCS boration and makeup water flow.
Temporary suction hoses for the pump are routed to the permanent FLEX connection in the QS pump suction piping to provide a borated water source from the RWST. Temporary discharge hoses are routed and connected to the permanent FLEX connection in the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) piping. Flow can be directed to either unit's RCS by aligning the manual cross-tie valves in the Unit 1 "C" and Unit 2 "A" CVCS charging pump cubicles.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategies or equipment are required for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6.
The continued implementation of the Phase 2 strategy ensures adequate decay heat removal indefinitely.
2.5 POWERING KEY PARAMETER INSTRUMENTATION PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for powering key parameter monitoring instrumentation includes relying on the installed Class 1 E 125 VDC station batteries to power 120 VAC vital bus panels through the installed Class 1 E inverters, and includes stripping non-critical loads to extend battery life.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy for re-powering key instrumentation upon depletion of the 125 VDC station batteries involves the deployment of portable 120/240 VAC diesel generators that will be connected to 120 VAC vital buses through installed FLEX cabling, connections and distribution panels. This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 10 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 Although the Phase 3 electrical re-powering strategy includes deployment of a 4160 VAC diesel generator, this strategy is established to provide redundancy and is not the primary strategy. Therefore, it is not included in the scope of the ESEP since the primary strategy described under Phase 2 above is capable of powering the required instrumentation for the duration of the event.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION AND ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 9.2).
3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The selection of equipment was based on installed plant equipment credited in selected FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as described in the NAPS OIP and summarized in Section 2.
Equipment was selected following the guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3 for reactor core cooling and heat removal, RCS inventory control and long-term subcriticality, containment function, and core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5
& 6 FLEX strategies, including the key parameter monitoring instrumentation that is required to implement the response strategies.
Station drawings and the Equipment Data System (EDS) were reviewed to populate the list and to provide supporting information.
The initial plant conditions that define the starting point for identification of FLEX strategy-credited equipment and development of the ESEL is consistent with the boundary conditions identified in NEI 12-06, i.e., the BDBEE impacts all units at the site concurrently, all units are initially operating at power, and each unit successfully shuts down when required. For the core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5 &
6 FLEX strategy, the reactor initial condition is shutdown in either Mode 5 or 6.
3.1.1 FLEX EQUIPMENT LIST Initially, a FLEX Equipment List was determined for each Unit through the evaluation of the FLEX strategies supporting the core cooling and containment functions to determine the mechanical and electrical flowpaths, installed FLEX connections that support the use of portable FLEX equipment, and key parameter monitoring instrumentation that supports strategy implementation.
The following mechanical and electrical flowpaths support the FLEX strategies and key parameter monitoring instrumentation and were evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
AFW System from the ECST to the suction of the TDAFWP SW reservoir to the suction of the TDAFWP via the diesel-driven FP system pump AFW from the discharge of the TDAFWP to the S/Gs
" Steam flow from the S/Gs to the atmosphere via the S/G PORVs Steam flow from the S/Gs to the TDAFWP turbine RCS injection flowpath to the RCS from the RWST via the portable RCS injection pump Gravity feed flowpath to the RCS from the RWST 5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Vital instrument power from the station batteries through the inverters or from the portable electrical generators via BDB receptacles and distribution panels, to the vital bus distribution panels and to the instrumentation on instrument racks, Main Control Room (MCR) boards, etc.
The following installed FLEX connections support the FLEX strategies and key parameter monitoring instrumentation and were evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
BDB AFW pump discharge connection (flow to the S/Gs)
BDB ECST refill connection (suction supply source for AFW pump)
BDB RCS Pump discharge connection (RCS inventory makeup)
BDB RCS Pump suction connection (borated water source)
Charging pump discharge header connection (Modes 5&6 RCS inventory makeup) 120/240V portable generator connection receptacle (supply to 120VAC vital buses)
The following Key Parameter Instrumentation supports the FLEX strategies and was evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
S/G level indication and pressure indication located in the MCR RCS temperature indication and pressure indication located in the MCR ECST level indication located in the MCR AFW flowrate indication located in the MCR Pressurizer level indication in the MCR Core Exit Thermocouples indication in the MCR Excore Nuclear Instrumentation indication in the MCR Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) indication in the MCR Containment pressure and temperature indication located in the MCR The FLEX Equipment List was developed through detailed review of the mechanical and electrical flowpaths, FLEX connections, and key parameter instrumentation to identify specific supporting equipment.
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components, and applicable P&IDs were annotated to define flowpaths and major branch isolation points as part of the review. Components within the flowpath, and associated branch lines to an isolation device, were identified from this review.
Instrumentation loop diagrams and electrical schematic drawings were used to identify electrical and instrumentation components, cabinets, panels, etc., that are required to support operation of the key parameter instruments.
Mechanical and electrical components were tabulated to produce the FLEX Equipment List. The EDS database and station physical piping drawings were utilized to identify the installed location for each component.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Structures; piping; conduit; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct; and nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components were not included in the FLEX Equipment List tabulation consistent with the guidance provided in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3.2.
3.1.2 ESEL DEVELOPMENT The guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3.2 was applied to the FLEX Equipment List in order to develop the ESEL by removing components from the list that met the exclusion criteria. The following guidance from EPRI 3002000704 was applied to ESEL component selection:
- 1. The scope of components was limited to those required to support the Primary FLEX strategy success path. For the Core Cooling and Heat Removal during Modes 5 & 6 strategy, several different flowpaths can be utilized for gravity feed to the RCS depending on plant conditions. The flowpath chosen through the Charging pumps represents one of the flowpaths that are available to operators.
- 2. The following types of components were not included on the ESEL:
Manual valves, check valves, and rupture disks Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.
- 3. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, only one train component is included in the ESEL.
The following additional considerations were applied when generating the ESEL for NAPS.
Multiple Trains/Channels Supporting a Strategy For cases in which multiple trains or channels supported the primary strategy, only components associated with a single train/channel are included in the ESEL.
Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Implementation of FLEX strategies at NAPS includes manual operation of certain power operated valves.
The power operated valves that are manually manipulated to change position are included in the ESEL to ensure their ability to be actuated during FLEX implementation.
Flow Orifices and Flow Venturis Flow orifices and venturis are located within the pressure boundary of the piping and provide no active function. These components were considered piping components and were excluded from the ESEL.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Electrical Junction Boxes Junction boxes provide completely passive locations for pulling, installing, or joining cables.
These boxes were considered to be equivalent to conduit and were excluded from the ESEL.
Electrical Panels and Cabinets Electrical panels and cabinets provide consolidated locations for connecting multiple cables and mounting instrumentation.
The cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
Cabinets and panels are also included if the routing of instrumentation or power cable was found to pass through a cabinet without termination.
Key Parameter Instrumentation Key parameter instrumentation (indicators and recorders) are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included in the ESEL as separate components.
3.1.3 ESEL The list of components that comprise the ESEL for NAPS Units 1 and 2 are provided in Appendices A and B, respectively.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 4.0 4.1 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)
PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE The North Anna control point elevation and GMRS are unchanged from the March 2014 submittal (Reference 9.11).
The Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) control point elevation was identified following the guidance in EPRI Report 1025287 (SPID)
(Reference 9.16) as the highest rock-founded, safety-related structure, which is the Casing Cooling Tank and Pump House structure at elevation 268 ft, or 3 ft below plant grade. A plot of the GMRS at the control point elevation is provided in Figure 1; tabular data are provided in Table 1.
North Anna Unit 1 & 2 GMRS at Contol Point Elevation Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 1.20 01I -
-GMI 1.00 i
r-0.80 J
0.60i i
0.40
/
i 0.20 100.0 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz]
Figure 1 - Control Point GMRS 9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table I - Control Point GMRS Tabular Data at 5% Damping Freg [Hz]
Accel [g]
Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
100.0 0.5721 5.000 0.4847 90.00 0.6149 4.000 0.3702 80.00 0.6965 3.000 0.2667 70.00 0.8132 2.500 0.2159 60.00 0.9601 2.000 0.1770 50.00 1.1145 1.500 0.1317 45.00 1.1652 1.250 0.1065 40.00 1.2155 1.000 0.0806 35.00 1.2617 0.900 0.0745 30.00 1.2226 0.800 0.0677 25.00 1.1889 0.700 0.0602 20.00 1.1670 0.600 0.0522 15.00 1.1707 0.500 0.0435 12.50 1.1525 0.400 0.0347 10.00 1.0508 0.300 0.0260 9.000 0.9622 0.200 0.0174 8.000 0.8562 0.167 0.0145 7.000 0.7346 0.125 0.0109 6.000 0.6068 0.100 0.0087 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The North Anna SSE response spectrum at 5% damping for structures founded on rock is taken at 0.12g for horizontal ground motion. For structures founded on soil, the design basis earthquake is 0.18g for horizontal ground motion. North Anna SSE response spectra are plotted in Figure 2. Tabular data are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for rock and soil-founded structures, respectively.
The North Anna control point GMRS exceeds the site SSE (both at rock) in the 1 to 10 Hz range; therefore, North Anna screens in for ESEP.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Safe Shutdown Earthquake Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 0.60 -
0.50
.2 0.30 -
-0.20 0.10 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz]
SSE (Rock-Founded Structures)
SSE (Sol-Founded Structures)
Figure 2 - North Anna Safe Shutdown Earthquake Table 2 - North Anna SSE Data for Rock-Founded Structures at 5% Damping Freq [Hz]
0.125 0.173 0.201 0.252 0.307 0.357 0.415 0.470 0.532 0.603 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 1.183 1.308 1.500 1.720 1.901 Accel [g]
0.0030 0.0050 0.0070 0.0110 0.0170 0.0230 0.0300 0.0360 0.0440 0.0530 0.0670 0.0820 0.0980 0.1160 0.1490 0.1740 0.2140 0.2650 0.3090 Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
2.000 0.3330 10.00 0.3330 10.64 0.3180 11.18 0.3070 11.47 0.3010 12.05 0.2910 13.00 0.2750 15.09 0.2460 18.43 0.2120 20.36 0.1970 22.50 0.1830 25.49 0.1670 28.16 0.1550 30.35 0.1470 35.26 0.1320 38.00 0.1250 40.00 0.1200 50.00 0.1200 100.0 0.1200 11
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table 3 - North Anna SSE Data for Soil-Founded Structures at 5% Damping Freq [Hz]
0.125 0.173 0.201 0.252 0.307 0.357 0.415 0.470 0.532 0.603 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 1.183 1.308 1.519 1.720 1.901 Accel [g]
0.0060 0.0110 0.0150 0.0230 0.0340 0.0460 0.0620 0.0800 0.0970 0.1140 0.1370 0.1610 0.1860 0.2130 0.2610 0.2960 0.3560 0.4150 0.4700 Freq [Hz]
2.000 7.000 7.502 8.085 8.499 9.160 9.629 10.122 10.640 11.184 11.467 12.054 13.000 15.090 Accel [g]
0.5000 0.5000 0.4670 0.4350 0.4140 0.3850 0.3670 0.3490 0.3330 0.3170 0.3090 0.2950 0.2740 0.2370 18.425 0.1950 20.359 0.1800 22.496 0.1800 50.000 0.1800 62.784 0.1800 100.0 0.1800 5.0 5.1 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION DESCRIPTION OF RLGM SELECTED The review level ground motion spectra (RLGM) selected for the ESEP are in accordance with the two criteria described in Section 4, page 4-1 of EPRI 3002000704, as follows:
Case 1 The RLGM is a scaled version of the SSE. For NAPS, the SSE is defined separately for rock-founded structures (with a PGA of 0.12g) and soil-founded structures (with a PGA of 0.18g).
The maximum ratio of the GMRS-to-SSE (both rock-based) in the 1 to 10 Hz range occurs at a frequency of 10 Hz and is greater than 2. Thus, in accordance with EPRI 3002000704, Section 4, criterion 1, the RLGM is taken as two times the SSE. Since there are two SSEs for NAPS, there are two RLGMs defined for the ESEP evaluations - one for rock-founded structures and one for soil-founded structures. Each SSE spectrum is scaled up by a factor of 2 to produce the associated RLGM.
Figure 3 shows the plots of the Case 1 horizontal direction RLGMs used for ESEP for rock-founded structures and 12
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report soil-founded structures at 5% spectral damping.
Table 4 and Table 5 provide the corresponding digitized values of frequencies and accelerations for these two RLGMs. In the vertical direction, the rock and soil SSEs are 2/3 of the horizontal SSEs; thus, the RLGM in the vertical direction are taken as 2/3 of the horizontal direction, respectively.
Case 2 The RLGM for this case is taken directly as the control point GMRS consistent with EPRI 3002000704, Section 4, criterion 2. This RLGM was applied for the evaluation of two tanks (i.e., the Refueling Water Storage Tanks, one per unit), which are located outside in the yard area. The tank foundations are located on rock surface at approximately the same elevation as the control point GMRS. The Case 2 RLGM (GMRS) is plotted in Figure 1 of Section 4.1 at 5% spectral damping and the digitized values of frequencies and accelerations are provided in Table 1 of Section 4.1.
Vertical GMRS at the control point elevation was developed using V/H ratios consistent with the guidance in NUREG/CR-6728 (Reference 9.14).
North Anna ESEP RLGM Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 1.20 1.00 IlI 0.80
.2_o 2 0.60 -
-7 0.40 I
0.20 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz)
ESEP RLGM (Rock-Founded Structures)
ESEP RLGM (Soil-Founded Structures)
Figure 3 - North Anna ESEP RLGM (2xSSE) 13
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table 4 - North Anna 2 x SSE RLGM Data for Rock-Founded Structures at 5%
Damping Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
0.125 0.0060 0.173 0.0100 0.201 0.0140 0.252 0.0220 0.307 0.0340 0.357 0.0460 0.415 0.0600 0.470 0.0720 0.532 0.0880 0.603 0.1060 0.700 0.1340 0.800 0.1640 0.900 0.1960 1.000 0.2320 1.183 0.2980 1.308 0.3480 1.500 0.4280 1.720 0.5300 1.901 0.6180 Table 5 - North Anna 2 Damping Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
0.125 0.0120 0.173 0.0220 0.201 0.0300 0.252 0.0460 0.307 0.0680 0.357 0.0920 0.415 0.1240 0.470 0.1600 0.532 0.1940 0.603 0.2280 0.700 0.2740 0.800 0.3220 0.900 0.3720 1.000 0.4260 Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
2.000 0.6660 10.00 0.6660 10.64 0.6360 11.18 0.6140 11.47 0.6020 12.05 0.5820 13.00 0.5500 15.09 0.4920 18.43 0.4240 20.36 0.3940 22.50 0.3660 25.49 0.3340 28.16 0.3100 30.35 0.2940 35.26 0.2640 38.00 0.2500 40.00 0.2400 50.00 0.2400 100.0 0.2400 x SSE RLGM Data for Soil-Founded Structures at 5%
Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
1.183 0.5220 1.308 0.5920 1.519 0.7120 1.720 0.8300 1.901 0.9400 2.000 1.0000 7.000 1.0000 7.502 0.9340 8.085 0.8700 8.499 0.8280 9.160 0.7700 9.629 0.7340 10.122 0.6980 10.640 0.6660 Freq [Hz]
11.184 11.467 12.054 13.000 15.090 18.425 20.359 22.496 50.000 62.784 100.0 Accel [g]
0.6340 0.6180 0.5900 0.5480 0.4740 0.3900 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA The in-structure response spectra (ISRS) corresponding to the Case 1 RLGMs were derived by scaling the existing design basis (SSE) ISRS for North Anna structures.
The spectral ordinates of the SSE-based ISRS were multiplied by a factor of 2 at each frequency to obtain ISRS corresponding to the RLGM.
No estimate of ISRS is required for the Case 2 RLGM because this RLGM (GMRS) is directly used in the analysis of the RWST.
6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH The seismic margin evaluation approach for ESEP consisted of the following steps:
- 1. Development of the components list (ESEL - described in Section 3 of this report)
- 3. Seismic capability walkdowns of equipment on the ESEL (described in Section 6.3)
- 4. Screening of components for which explicit margin calculations were not performed because of previously evaluated large margins or other applicable screening (described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2)
- 5. Calculation of high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacity or factor of safety for ESEL components (described in Sections 6.1 and 6.4) 6.1
SUMMARY
OF METHODOLOGIES USED The seismic margin calculations for the ESEL components were performed using the EPRI seismic margin assessment methodology described in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Revision 1 (Reference 9.15).
In some cases, explicit seismic margin calculations were not performed, such as for components that are part of a larger assembly (rule-of-the-box) or for selected seismically-rugged components that were determined to be acceptable based on Seismic Capability Engineer inspections and judgment during the seismic capacity walkdowns. Additionally, where the factor of safety to the RLGM-based ISRS, as determined by review of previous seismic margin calculations performed for the Individual Plant Examination of External Event (IPEEE) program or component design basis calculations, were determined to be large, explicit calculations to quantify the seismic margin were not required or performed.
15
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Seismic Margin Calculations The seismic margin to the RLGM was calculated for ESEP as either a HCLPF capacity or a factor of safety. Based on EPRI NP-6041, a simplified expression to calculate the HCLPF capacity of a component can be stated as:
HCLPF = ((C-DNs)/Ds) x RLE Where C represents the capacity, DNS represents the concurrent non-seismic demand (typically deadweight), Ds is the seismic demand, and RLE is the review level earthquake, which is the RLGM for ESEP (typically, peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the RLE is used).
For some ESEL components, the HCLPF capacities were calculated and reported using the above approach.
For other ESEL components, a factor of safety to the RLGM-based ISRS was calculated and reported. The factor of safety is simply a ratio of the component's load carrying capacity to the demand or load placed on the component. The factor of safety to the RLGM-based seismic demand provides the assessment of acceptable seismic margin when the factor is greater than unity. The calculated factor of safety, when multiplied with the PGA of the applicable RLGM, will yield an estimate of a component's HCLPF capacity. For the purposes of the ESEP, if the factor of safety was greater than unity, the HCLPF was concluded to be greater than the RLGM and acceptable seismic margin was shown.
Failure Modes Both structural (anchorage or other load path) and functional failure modes were considered in performing screening evaluations or calculations to determine factors of safety or HCLPF capacities. The governing failure modes were determined and reported.
Seismic Interactions Seismic interactions, including nearby block walls and piping attached to tanks, were evaluated as part of the seismic margin assessment.
The seismic evaluation of the equipment included evaluating the capacity of nearby masonry block walls whose failure could impact the functionality of the equipment.
Block walls whose failure could affect safety related equipment were previously evaluated in response to NRC IE Bulletin 80-11.
During the IEB 80-11 effort, for some block walls, steel supports were installed to provide additional support to the walls and increase their ability to withstand earthquakes. The masonry block walls were also later evaluated as a part of the IPEEE program. For the IPEEE, block wall capacities were calculated for the bounding walls of interest following the approach in EPRI NP-6041. A similar approach was followed for the ESEP. Bounding walls in 16
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the proximity of ESEL equipment were selected for further evaluation based on wall configuration as discussed in Section 6.6. below.
Piping attached to tanks was reviewed as part of the seismic capacity walkdown of tanks on the ESEL to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements.
6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS EPRI NP-6041 contains a set of screening criteria tables that can be used to "screen out" components from further review because of their generically good performance in earthquakes or seismic simulation tests at or above certain levels. EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4, Summary of Equipment and Subsystems Screening Criteria for Seismic Margin Evaluations, was used for screening ESEL components. The table provides screening bins based on ground peak spectral accelerations of <0.8g and 0.8 - 1.2g.
For rock-founded structures, the RLGM peak spectral acceleration is less than 0.8g.
Therefore, the lower screening bin of <0.8g was used to screen equipment located in rock-founded structures.
For soil-supported structures, the RLGM peak spectral acceleration is greater than 0.8g, but less than 1.2g. Therefore, the higher screening bin of 0.8 - 1.2g was used to screen equipment located in soil-founded structures.
The use of screening Table 2-4 included the following considerations:
Caveats and restrictions associated with each specific system or component type are required to be met, as indicated in the table notes.
The table is applicable to equipment up to 40 ft above grade.
For equipment that did not satisfy the corresponding component caveats or restrictions from Table 2-4 or were located above 40 ft above grade, alternate methods, such as the use of component specific seismic test data, were used to evaluate component functionality.
The screening values given in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 are for the functional capacity of the component and do not include consideration of anchorage or other load paths. Thus, equipment anchorage was addressed in addition to the guidance given in the screening tables.
The anchorage capacity calculations used the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) approach from EPRI NP-6041.
Alternatively, the anchorage conditions for some equipment items were found to be acceptable based on either large available margins demonstrated by a previous calculation, or a determination by inspection that the anchorage was very robust compared to the seismic demand (i.e., weight of component small and component robustly anchored). In such cases, an explicit HCLPF calculation was not performed.
17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 WALKDOWN APPROACH Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704, which refers to EPRI NP-6041 for the Seismic Margin Assessment process.
Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041 describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:
"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.
If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component of each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical.
This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, 18
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report potential SI [Seismic Interaction1] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection."
6.3.2 APPLICATION OF PREVIOUS WALKDOWN INFORMATION Previous seismic walkdowns performed for the USI A-46 program, IPEEE program, and in response to the 10CFR 50.54(f) information request related to Fukushima NTTF 2.3: Seismic (Reference 9.1) were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Seismic capacity walkdowns were performed for several ESEL components during the USI A-46 I Seismic IPEEE program in the 1990's. Those walkdown results were reviewed and the following steps were taken to confirm that the previous walkdown conclusions remained valid.
A walk by was performed to confirm that the equipment material condition and configuration is consistent with the walkdown conclusions and that no new significant interactions related to block walls or piping attached to tanks exist1.
If the ESEL item was screened out based on the previous walkdown, that screening evaluation was reviewed and reconfirmed for the ESEP.
An exception to the first bulleted item was taken for the components on the ESEL that were included in the seismic walkdowns recently conducted (2012) for the Fukushima NTTF 2.3: Seismic effort. These walkdowns confirmed the equipment material condition and configuration and the potential for seismic interaction were consistent with the IPEEE/USI A-46 programs walkdown information, such that additional confirmatory walkdown or walk-by inspections were not required for these components.
6.3.3 WALKDOWN OF BLOCK WALLS Plant layout drawings were reviewed to determine locations which may have masonry block walls near equipment on the ESEL. Walkdowns were performed in 1 EPRI 3002000704 page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287."
19
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the areas that included block walls and equipment on the ESEL. Block walls in close proximity to ESEL equipment were identified for further evaluation. Block walls that could not impact ESEL equipment because of the distance from the equipment, or because the wall was blocked from impacting the equipment, were screened from further evaluation.
6.3.4 SIGNIFICANT WALKDOWN FINDINGS Consistent with the guidance from NP-6041, no significant outliers or anchorage concerns were identified during the seismic walkdowns. The following findings were noted during the walkdowns and subsequently resolved.
In all cases, the ESEL items had capacities greater than the RLGM.
Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM.
During walkdown of the ECST, it was noted that for each tank, there was one piping penetration through the missile shield that was identified to be grouted, which limits flexibility of the piping to accommodate any tank displacement. This walkdown observation was reviewed against the ESEP analysis for the ECSTs and the tanks were demonstrated to have adequate capacity for the RLGM.
There were walkdown observations relating to anchorage that required further review. These observations included gaps between the bottom of base plate or cabinet and the concrete surface and bolt spacing or edge distances that reduced the capacity of the anchor bolts.
After reviewing the anchorage capacity for these items, it was determined that the anchor bolts had adequate capacity for the RLGM.
6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041. The evaluations included the following steps:
Performing seismic capability walkdowns as described in Section 6.3.
Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041 or other approach, as described in Section 6.2.
Performing HCLPF or factor of safety calculations, as necessary, considering various failure modes that include both structural failure (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure.
Section 6.1 describes the method / approach used to perform these calculations.
6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATIONS OF RELAYS Not applicable since no relays were identified for inclusion in the ESEL.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES)
The results of the seismic margin assessment for each component on the ESEL are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the tabulated information in these appendices.
The tabulated results are annotated to clarify the reported HCLPF / Factor of Safety and Failure Modes. Notes (1) through (9) are applicable to the tables in Appendices A and B and are defined below:
RLGM used for evaluation:
(1) 2 x SSE Rock-Founded Structure (PGA anchored to 0.24g)
(2) 2 x SSE Soil-Founded Structure (PGA anchored to 0.36g)
HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported:
(4) HCLPF Capacity (g)
(5) Factor of Safety to RLGM Methods for evaluating anchorage or structural integrity (if no explicit HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported):
(6) HCLPF > RLGM based on large margins in previous analysis (7) HCLPF > RLGM based on walkdown inspection (rugged design)
Methods for evaluating equipment function (if no explicit HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported):
(8) HCLPF > RLGM based on NP-6041 screening tables (9) HCLPF > RLGM based on review of additional data (e.g., test reports, experience data, etc.)
The evaluation of masonry block walls located near ESEL equipment determined that the capacity of the walls exceeded the applicable ESEP RLGM of 2 x SSE. Of the eight masonry walls identified for evaluation based on review of drawings and plant walkdowns, two limiting walls were selected for detailed evaluation. Limiting wall margins (the factor by which the RLGM input spectral accelerations could be multiplied while still satisfying CDFM capacity criteria) are tabulated in Table 6. The remaining walls are bounded by the analysis of the two limiting walls.
Table 6 - Limiting Block Wall Results Wall Identifier Limiting Wall Key Failure Mode(s)
Margin KeyFailureModes)
SB-271-4 5.19 Mortar Tensile Stress Normal to Bed Joint Mortar Tensile Stress Parallel to Bed SB-271-8 2.78Joint 21
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWNS There are no inaccessible ESEL items that require follow-up seismic walkdown.
7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN / EVALUATION SCHEDULE / CLOSE OUT As stated in Section 7.1, there are no inaccessible ESEL items that require follow-up seismic walkdown.
Therefore, no schedule or commitments to perform additional seismic walkdowns are required.
8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION NAPS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 9.1). The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 9.2).
The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin for plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is part of the overall NAPS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 9.9) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...]
has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."
The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Reference 9.10) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."
An assessment of the change in seismic risk for NAPS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter. Therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter apply to NAPS.
In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter provided an attached "Perspectives on the 22
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.
The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for NAPS, which experienced the Mineral VA M5.8 earthquake in August 2011. The ground response spectra ordinates from the Mineral earthquake exceeded the NAPS SSE spectra in several frequency ranges and the PGA was also exceeded. There was no resulting damage to safety-related SSCs based on extensive plant walkdowns and equipment surveillance testing performed to support restart of the units. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:
Safety factors applied in design calculations Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra
" Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis Bounding requirements in codes and standards Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)
Bounding testing requirements, and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).
These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.
The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGMs used for the ESEP evaluation are either a scaled version of the NAPS SSE or the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS, a more detailed seismic risk 23
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report assessment (SPRA) is being performed for NAPS in accordance with EPRI 1025287 (Reference 9.16). As identified in the NAPS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report submittal dated March 31, 2014 (Reference 9.11), NAPS screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete risk evaluation will characterize the state-of-the-art probabilistic seismic ground motions, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS There were no modifications identified as a result of the performance of the ESEP.
8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE As stated in Section 8.2, there are no required plant modifications. Therefore, no implementation schedule is required.
8.4
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS No new regulatory commitments are required as a result of the performance of the ESEP.
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," dated March 12, 2012.
9.2 EPRI Report No. 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -
Seismic," May 31, 2013.
9.3 NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,"
Revision 0, dated August 2012.
9.4 NRC Order Number EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,"
dated March 12, 2012.
9.5 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162B dated February 28, 2013.
9.6 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements 24
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162D dated August 23, 2013.
9.7 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162E dated February 28, 2014.
9.8 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No.14-394 dated August 28, 2014.
9.9 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014.
9.10 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.
9.11 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1," Serial No.14-133 dated March 31, 2014.
9.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations",
April 9, 2013.
9.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.
9.14 NUREG/CR-6728, "Technical Basis for Revision of Regulatory Guidance on Design Ground Motions: Hazard-and Risk-Consistent Ground Motion Spectra Guidelines,"
November 6, 2001.
9.15 EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, Revision 1, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin".
9.16 EPRI Report No. 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," February 2013.
25
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A UNIT 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results A-i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety EMERGENCY 1
1-CN-TK-1 CONDENSATE STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.348 (1)(4)
Tank Sliding Capacity STORAGE TANK DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE NORMALLY 5.6 (2)(5)
Fire Pump Embedded Anchorage, 2
1-FP-P-2 PROTECTION PUMP STANDBY IN-SERVICE Shear/Tension Interaction (Steel Failure)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Pump Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 3 1-BY-B-05A CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 5 1-BY-B-05C CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 6 1-BY-B-05D CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL DRIVEN FP 0.44 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 7
1-EP-CB-70 PUMP 2 CONTROL INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE 8
1-FP-TK-4 PUMP 2 FUEL OIL INSTALLED INSTALLED 1.56 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction STORAGE TANK TURBINE DRIVEN NORMALLY (1)(5)
Embedded Anchor - Shear/Tension Interaction 9
1-FW-P-2 AUXILIARY IN-SERVICE 3.2 (tl(ur FEDAEPUP STAND-BY (Steel Failure)
FEEDWATER PUMP 1 -F-RV-TDAFW PUMP NRAL 10 100 DISCHARGE RELIEF NORMALLYOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened VALVE I
1-FWMOV-STEAM GENERATOR NOMLY()6 11
-FW-MOV-100D A FROM AFW PUMPS NORMALLYOPEN OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function INLET ISOL VV I
I I
A-1
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 12 1FW-OV-STEAM GENERATOR NRAL PN
>RG 1()
VleCmoetSrse!Fnto 1-FW-MOV-NORMALLY 12 100OA A FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1()
Valve Component Stresses/ Function ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 13 1OOB B FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/ Function 10013____
ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 1-FW-MOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY 100C C FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/Function ISOLATION VALVE TURBINE-DRIVEN 15 111B
-AFW PUMP STEAM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM ()(8)
Valve Function, Screened SUPPLY VALVE 1-MS-TV-_
TURBINE-DRIVEN NORMALLY (1)(8) 16 111A AFW PUMP STEAM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM Valve Function, Screened SUPPLY VALVE I-_MS-TV-_
AUX FEED PUMP NORMALLY (1)(6) 17 15M-IV TURBINE DRIVE NOPENLL 17 115 TRIEDVEOPEN OPEN
>RLGM (1()Valve Function, Valve Bonnet Neck INLET TRIP VALVE 1
18 1-FW-GOV-2 TDAFW PUMP NORMALLY OPEN Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 GOVERNOR VALVE OPEN TURBINE DRIVEN 19 1-FW-T-2 AUXILIARY NORMALLY IN-SERVICE Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 FEEDWATER PUMP STAND-BY TURB DRIVE 20 1-FW-RV-1-FW-T-2 RELIEF NORMALLY CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 604 VALVE CLOSED 21 1-MS-PCV-A SG POWER NORMALLY (1)(6) 21 1-S-AV OPERATED RELIEF CLOSEDLL 22 101A
-ME-ACV-BEPO ER CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 1_MSPCV_
B SG POWER NRAL 1 6 22 1-S-BV OPERATED RELIEF CLOSEDLL 22_101B VALE RELIE CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM_(_
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TA)II I
A-2
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-MS-PCV-C SG POWER NORMALLY (1)(6) 23 101C OPERATED RELIEF CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM Valve Component Stresses/Function VALVE (TCA) 24 1-QS-TK-1 REFUELING WATER STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.59 (3)(4)
Anchorage, Tank Overturning Moment Capacity STORAGE TANK A QUENCH SPRAY
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage PUMP
> RLGM (1)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage MAIN CONTROL 26 1-EI-CB-01 BENCHBOARD 1-1 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)
Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 27 l-El-CB-03 VERINCABOATRDOL INSTALLED INSTALLED VERTICAL BOARD 1-1
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 28 1-EI-CB-04 VERTICAL BOARD 1-2 INSTALLED INSTALLED RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 UNIT 1 SAFEGUARDS 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction PANEL /MAIN 29 l-El-CB-05 CONTRL VERTICA INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL VERTICAL
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened BOARD based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 30 1-EI-CB-23A PROCESS RACK A INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 31 1-EI-CB-23B PROCESS RACK B INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 32 1-EI-CB-23C PROCESS RACK C INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened A-3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 33 1-EI-CB-23D PROCESS RACK D INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened POST ACCIDENT 3.10 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Pullout in Expansion Anchor 34 1-EI-CB-34 MONITORING &
INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL PANEL
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 35 1-EI-CB-51 PROCESS RACK 1 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 36 1-EI-CB-52 PROCESS RACK 2 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 37 1-EI-CB-54 PROCESS RACK 4 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 38 1-EI-CB-53 PROCESS RACK 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 39 1-EI-CB-55 PROCESS RACK 5 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 40 1-EI-CB-56 PROCESS RACK 6 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 41 1-EI-CB-57 PROCESS RACK 7 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 42 1-EI-CB-58 PROCESS RACK 8 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 1-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 43 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80C 1-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened A-4
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 44 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80E 1-V
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 45 l-El-CB-112 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-800
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 46 1-EI-CB-127 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 1-103
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened NSRMNAIN>
RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 47 1-EI-CB-131 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 1-107
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 48 l-EI-CB-136 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-112
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 49 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-115
> RLGM (1)(9)
Instruments on Racks Function TECHNICAL 2.1 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 50 1-EI-CB-300 SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 4.96 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 51 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED (2)(8) 301A MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 3.53 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 52 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301C MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 2.29 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301D MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ('(8 Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET I
I I
A-5
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety ICC MULTIPLEXER 4.15 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 54 1-EI-CP-03 INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (1)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 55 1-EI-CP-04 ICC CABINET INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened MULTIPLEXER 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 56 1-EI-CP-05 MASTER RECEIVER INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 1-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 57 BASIS PANEL OPERATING PANEL 1(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function 1-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 58 PAE BASIS PANEL OPERATING OEAIG()9 PANEL 2(Distributio Panel OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function BEYOND DESIGN 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 1-BDB-DB BASIS PANEL 3, NOT 59 RECEPTACLE OPERATING OPERATING PANEL ASSEMBLY(Receptacle
> RLGM (2)(9)
Panel Function Panel) 1-MS-PI-A MAIN STM HDR TO 60 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II A MAIN STEAM 61 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 1474 PRESS TRANSMITTER 1-MS-PI-B MAIN STM HDR TO 62 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II B MAIN STEAM 63 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 1484 PRESS TRANSMITTER A-6
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-MS-PI-C MAIN STM HDR TO 64 1494 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II C MAIN STEAM 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE 65 1494 PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 TRANSMITTER CHANNEL II 1A STEAM 66 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1474 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1-FW-LT-1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 67 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING T
1474 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1 B STEAM 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 68 1484 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1484 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1 -FW-LT-1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 69 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING T
1484 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1 C STEAM 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 70 1
INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1494 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1-FW-LT-1C STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 71 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 1494 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 72 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1477A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened I_
_INDICATOR I
I I
I A-7
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARKE #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-FW-LT-1A STEAM 73 1477 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 48 RANGE LEVEL XMITR 1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1487A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR 1-FW-LT-1 B STEAM 75 1487 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 47 RANGE LEVEL XMTR lC STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 76 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1497A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR lC STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 77 1-FW-LT-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1497 RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (I)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER REACTOR 78 1-LM-Pl-CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 100A PRESSURE INDICATION (CH 1)
PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 79 1-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 100A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER PEN 57 LEAK MON 80 1-LM-Pl-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 110A PRESSURE INDICATOR PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 81 1-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 110A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER I
A-8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety REACTOR 82 1-LM-TI-100-CONTAINMENTAIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 1
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 1-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT 83 1-1 MONITOR NT OPERATING OPERATING 100-1 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT A LOOP REACTOR 1 -RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 84 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
A LOOP REACTOR 85 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (9)
Temperature Sensor Function 1410 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD A LOOP REACTOR 86 1413 TEMp COOLANTL HOELEMENTLEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD B LOOP REACTOR 87 1-RC-TR-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 1420 TEMP RECORDER (WIDE RANGE)
B LOOP REACTOR 88 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG 1420 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM ()(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD B LOOP REACTOR 1-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG 89 1423 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD I
I A-9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1 -RC-TR-LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE 90 HOT/COLD LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 RECORDER C LOOP REACTOR 91 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 1430 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 92 1-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 1433 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 1-RC-Pl-COOLANT HOT LEG 93 PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 INDICATOR (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 94 1-RC-P-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 27 1402B PRESS IND (NARROW RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 95 1-RC-PT-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 49 1402 PRESS TRANSMITTER LOOP A HOT LEG TO 1-RC-PI-RH PPS PRESSURE 96 1403B IC (NARRO OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 1403B INDICATOR (NARROW RANGE) 1-RC-PT-LOOP A HOT LEG TO
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 97 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING 1403 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM Transmitter Function, Screened 1 -RC-LI-PRESSURIZER LEVEL 98 INDICATION OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 CHANNEL I I
A-10
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-RC-LT-PRESSURIZER 99 L
TRANSMITER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 46 1459 LEVEL TRANSMITT-IER 1-CN-LI-EMERGENCY COND 100 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 LEVEL INDICATOR 1-CN-LT-EMERGENCY COND 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 101 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING 100B LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 102 TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 103 TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 100A TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 104 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 105 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 100B TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-Fl-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 106 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 107 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 1
100C TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 108 1-CM-MR-3 ICC MASTER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 56 RECIEVER 1 -RC-LQ-ICCM DISPLAY 109 101 POWER SUPPLY OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 50 TRAIN A 1-CM-MUX-REMOTE 110 32A MULTIPLEXER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 54 MODULE A-11
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 11 1-RC-KBD-ICCM CONTROL PAD OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 101 (TRAIN A) 1-RC-MON-GET/CCM/RVLIS 112 101 MNITO (TRAIN OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 101 MONITOR (TRAIN A)
CORE LOCATION E12 113 1 -RC-TE-T6 EXIT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function THERMOCOUPLE 1
1-RC-LR-REACTOR VESSEL 114 1310A RECORDER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 34 1310OA RECORDER TRAIN A 15 -RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 115 1313 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM 1 -RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 116 14 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM C LOOP HOT LEG 117 1RC-TE RVLIS TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT 18
-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 118 1316 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1) (9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM 1 -RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 119 17 THIMBLES RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 1-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 120 18 THIMBLES RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 1-RC-LIS-C LOOP RVLIS TRAIN 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 121 A HOT LEG ISOLATOR OPERATING OPERATING 1310 LVL INDR SW
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LIS-REACTOR VESSEL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 122 LEVEL INDICATING OPERATING OPERATING 1311 SYSTEM
> RLGM (1) 8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened A-12
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A SEAL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 123 TABLE ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 1312 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 124 TRAIN A PLENUM OPERATING OPERATING 1310 LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 125 TRAIN A NORMAL OPERATING OPERATING 1311 RANGE LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 126 TRAIN A WIDE RANGE OPERATING OPERATING 1312 LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 127 1-NM-PRO-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (2)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened PROCESSOR EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 128 1-NM-AMP-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (2)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened AMPLIFIER NEUTRON FLUX 1-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, WIDE 129 RANGE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 131 LVL,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL_3 NEUTRON FLUX 130 1-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, SOURCE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 131 1270A1 RANGE,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL_3 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 131 1-EI-CB-36C NIS CABINET 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened NM-NFD-NEUTRON FLUX 132 1270 DETECTOR (EXCORE)
INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM ()(9)
Detector Function 1270 CHANNEL 3 I
1 1
1 A-13
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM UMARKE#
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 133 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04A 1-1 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1-EP-BKR-134 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED INSTALLED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-135 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED INSTALLED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-136 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-137 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-138 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BD3 AC F E 139 04A BDB BAKEE OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER CKTBRK 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 140 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04B 1-11 (TCA)
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1-EP-BKR-141 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-142 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-143 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK I
I I
A-14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1 -EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 144 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 145 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04C 1-111 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1 -EP-BKR-146 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-147 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-148 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-149 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-150 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 151 04C OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER OPN CSE CKTBRK 1-.EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 152 0EC DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 041 1-IV
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1 -EP-BKR-153 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-154 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK I
I I
I A-15
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-BKR-155 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-156 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 157 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-158 80E-1 1-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-159 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-160 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-161 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-162 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-163 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-164 80C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 43 CKTBRK VITAL BUS 1.72 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 165 1-VB-INV-01 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1
1 1-1 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened A-16
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARKE DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 166 1-VB-INV-02 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-11 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 167 1-VB-INV-03 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-111 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(6)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 168 1-VB-INV-04 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-IV INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(6)
Inverter Function, Screened 169 1-BY-B-I-I STATION BATTERYI-I CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 170 1-BY-B-I-II STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 171 1-BY-B-i-Ill STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity III Battery Rack Structural Integrity 172 1-BY-B-1-IV STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IV 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 173 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12A 1-1
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 174 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 173 12A-1 3 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 175 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12B 1-11
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 176 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 175 12B-14 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 177 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12C 1-111
> RLGM (2)(I)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 178 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 177 12C-12 A-17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 179 12D DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 1 -IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 180 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 180 12D-11 CHARGING PUMP 181 1-CH-MOV-SUCTION FROM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 1115B RWST ISOLATION VALVE
> RLGM (1) (6)
Anchorage 182 1-CH-P-1A A CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 183 1-CH-P-1B B CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 184 1-CH-P-1C C CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened SI COLD LEG 185 1836 ALTERNATECTIONHEADER CLOSED OPEN 0.71 (1)(4)
Yoke Leg Stress ISOLATION Note: The superscripts in the column "HCLPF (g) or Factor of Safety" are described in Section 6.6 of the report.
A-18
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report DPENDIX B UNIT 2 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results B-i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety EMERGENCY 1
2-CN-TK-1 CONDENSATE STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.348 (1)(4)
Tank Sliding Capacity STORAGE TANK TURBINE DRIVEN 2
2-FW-P-2 AUXILIARY STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 3.2(l)(5)
Embedded Anchor-Shear/Tension Interaction FEEDWATER PUMP (Steel Failure)
TURBINE DRIVEN 3
2-FW-RV-AFW PUMP NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 200 DISCHARGE RELIEF CLOSED VALVE 2-FW-MOV-SEMGNRTR NORMALLY
()6 STEAM GENERATOR 4
200C C FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/ Function ISOLATION VALVE 5 2-FWMOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY (1)Vpe 5 2-FWMOV B FROM AFW INLET NOPENLL 5
200B B RMAWILT OPEN OPEN
> RLGM (1()
Valve Component Stresses /Function ISOLATION VALVE 2-FW-MOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY 200A A FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function ISOLATION VALVE 7
2-MS-TV-2-FW-P-2 STEAM NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 211B SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED 8
2-MS-TV-2-FW-P-2 STEAM NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 211A SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED C
ERMVvuiSe 9 2-MSTV_
AUX FEED PUMP NOMLY()7 2-MS-TV-TURBINE DRIVE O
OPEN
> RLGM (1)(7)
Valve Function, Valve Bonnet Neck 215 TRIEDIEOPEN INLET TRIP VALVE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY 10 2-FW-T-2 FEEDWAR STAND-BY IN-SERVICE Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 FEEDWATER PUMP TURB DRIVE 11 2-FW-RV-2-FW-T-2 RELIEF NORMALLY CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 704 VALVE CLOSED B-1
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-MSPCV-A SG POWER NOMLY()6 12 2-MS-PCV-OPERATED RELIEF O
CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses /Function 201A OEAEREIF CLOSED VALVE (TCA)
B SG POWER 13 2-MS-PCV-OPERATED RELIEF NORMALLY 201B VALE (TCA)
CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 2-MSPCV-C SG POWER NRAL
)6 14 201C OPERATED RELIEF NORMALLYOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 15 2-QS-TK-1 REFUELING WATER STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.593(
Anchorage, Tank Overturning Moment Capacity STORAGE TANK B QUENCH SPRAY
>RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 16 2-QS-P-1IB STAND-BY STAND-BY PUMP
> RLGM (2)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (2) (7)
Anchorage MAIN CONTROL 17 2-El-CB-01 BEINCHOATRDO2-INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
BENCHBOARD 2-1
> RLGM (2)
Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 MAIN CONTROL
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 18 2-EI-CB-02 BOARD, BENCH INSTALLED INSTALLED Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened BOARD SECTION 2-2.
> RLGM (2)
BnhBadEupetFntoSree based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 MAIN CONTROL 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 19 2-EI-CB-03 VERTICAL BOARD INSTALLED INSTALLED Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened SECTION 2-1
> RLGM (2)
VeiclBadEupetFnioSrnd based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 20 2-El-CB-04 VERINCABOATRDO2-INSTALLED INSTALLED 20)VERTICAL BOARD 2-2 IT
()
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 B-2
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety MAIN CONTROL 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 21 2-El-CB-05 VERTICAL BOARD I
UNIT 2 SAFEGUARDS
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened PANEL based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 22 2-EI-CB-23A PROCESS RACK A INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 23 2-EI-CB-23B PROCESS RACK B INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 24 2-EI-CB-23C PROCESS RACK C INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 25 2-EI-CB-23D PROCESS RACK D INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened POST ACCIDENT 3.10 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Pullout in Expansion Anchor 26 2-EI-CB-34 MONITORING INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 27 2-EI-CB-51 PROCESS RACK 1 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 28 2-EI-CB-52 PROCESS RACK 2 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CHANNELII PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 29 2-EI-CB-53 PROCESS RACK 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 30 2-EI-CB-54 PROCESS RACK 4 INSTALLED INSTALLED I
PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened B-3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 31 2-EI-CB-55 PROCESS RACK 5 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 32 2-EI-CB-56 PROCESS RACK 6 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 33 2-El-CB-57 PROCESS RACK 7 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 34 2-EI-CB-58 PROCESS RACK 8 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 120VAC
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 2-EP-CB-INSTRUMENTATION 35 ITRBTONPNL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80A DISTRIBUTION PANEL
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-1 2-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 36 80C DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80C__
2-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 37 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 2-V
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (2)(6)
Anchorage 38 2-EI-CB-114 RC282 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-802
> RLGM (2)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 39 2-EI-CB-124 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-101
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 40 2-EI-CB-128 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-104
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 41 2-EI-CB-139 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-115
> RLGM (1)(9)
Instruments on Racks Function B-4
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 42 2-El-CB-145 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 2-120
> RLGM (1) (8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened TECHNICAL 2.1 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 43 2-E-CB-300 SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ("('
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 4.96 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301A MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ()'
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 3.53 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301C MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ("('
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 2.29 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 46 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301D MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET ICC MULTIPLEXER 4.15 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 47 2-EI-CP-03 INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (1)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 48 2-EI-CP-04 ICC CABINET INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened MULTIPLEXER 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 49 2-EI-CP-05 MASTER RECEIVER INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 50 BASIS PANEL OPERATING PANEL 1(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function 2-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(9)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 51 BASIS PANELOPRTN PANEL 2(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING_______
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function B-5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety BEYOND DESIGN 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-BDB-DB BASIS PANEL 3, NOT 52 RECEPTACLE OPERATING OPERATING PANEL ASSEMBLY(Receptacle
> RLGM (2)(9)
Panel Function Panel) 2-MS-P I-A MAIN STM HDR TO 53 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II A MAIN STEAM 54 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2474 PRESS TRANSMITTER 2-MS-PI-B MAIN STM HDR TO 55 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II B MAIN STEAM 56 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2484 PRESS TRANSMITTER 2-MS-PI-C MAIN STM HDR TO 57 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II C MAIN STEAM 58 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2494 PRESS TRANSMITTER 1A STEAM 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 59 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2474 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 60 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 2474 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function B-6
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1B STEAM 2-FN-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 61 2484 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2484 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1 B STEAM 62 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 42 TRANSMITTER 1C STEAM 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 63 2494 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2494 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1C STEAM 64 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 41 TRANSMITTER 1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 65 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2477A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR 1A STEAM 2-FW-LT-1ASTM 66 2477 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 40 RANGE LEVEL XMITR 1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 67 2-RN-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2487A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR l B STEAM 68 2487 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 42 RANGE LEVEL XMTR 1C STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 69 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2497A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM ()(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR I
I B-7
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MR STATE STATE Safety 1C STEAM 70 2-FW-LT-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 39 2497 RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER 71 2LMP1 REACTOR CONT OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 200A PRESS PI PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 72 2-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 200A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER PEN 57 LEAK MON 73 2-LM-PI-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 210A PRESSURE INDICATOR PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 2-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 210A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER REACTOR 75 2LMT1200 CONTAINMENTAIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 1
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 2-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT 76 2-1 MONITOR NT OPERATING OPERATING 200-1 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT REACTOR 77 2-LM-TI-200-CONTAINMENT AIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 2
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 78 2-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT AIR OPERATING OPERATING 200-2 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT I
I B-8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety A LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 79 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
A LOOP REACTOR 80 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2410 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD A LOOP REACTOR 81 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2413 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD B LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 82 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
B LOOP REACTOR 83 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 2420 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD B LOOP REACTOR 84 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 2423 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 85 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 2430 TEMP RECORDER (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 86 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9) 2430___
IEPDA LMN PRTN PRTN LM()9 Temperature Sensor Function 2430 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT I
I_
RTD__
B-9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety C LOOP REACTOR 87 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2433 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-Pl-COOLANT HOT LEG 88 PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 INDICATOR (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-PI-COOLANT HOT LEG 89 2402B PRESS IND (NARROW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RANGE) 2-RC-PT-LOOP C HOT LEG TO
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 90 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING 2402 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function LOOP A HOT LEG TO 91 2-RC-PI-RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 17 2403B INDICATOR (NARROW RANGE) 2-RC-PT-LOOP A HOT LEG TO 3.66 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 92 2403 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 2-RC-LI-PRESSURIZER LEVEL 93 INDICATION OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 CHANNEL I 2-RC-LT-PRESSURIZER 94 2-CL-PESRZR OPERATING OPERATING 2459 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-CN-LI-EMERGENCY COND 95 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 LEVEL INDICATOR 2-CN-LT-EMERGENCY COND 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 96 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING 200B LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(I)
Transmitter Function, Screened B-1 0
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 97 TO SIG A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 98 200A TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200A TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 2-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 99 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 100 200B TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200B TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1
2-FW-F-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 101 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 102 20WC TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200C TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (
I(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 103 2-CM-MR-3 ICC MASTER RECIEVER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 49 104 2-RC-LQ-201 ICCM DISPLAY POWER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 43 SUPPLY TRAIN A 105 2-CM-MUX-REMOTE MULTIPLEXER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 47 32A MODULE 106 2-RC-KBD-ICCM CONTROL PAD OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 18 201 (TRAIN A) 107 2-RC-MON-GET/CCM/RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 19 201 MONITOR (TRAIN A)
I 108 2-RC-TE-T6 CORE LOCATION E12 OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function EXIT THERMOCOUPLE II B-11
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1
109 2-RC-LR-REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 2310A RECORDER TRAIN A 0
2-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE RVLIS 110 2313 TRAIN A TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE RVLIS 2314 TRAIN A TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2
2-RC-TE-INCORE THIMBLES 112 2315 RVLIS TRAIN A TUBING OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 2-RC-TE-B LOOP HOT LEG RVLIS 113 2316 TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (11(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT 4
2-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 114 2317 THIMBLES RVLIS TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 115 2318 THIMBLES RVLIS TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-INCORE THIMBLES 116 2319 RVLIS TRAIN A TUBING OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1) (9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 2-RC-LIS-B LOOP RVLIS TRAIN A 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 117 HOT LEG ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2310 INDR SW
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 2-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A RX VSL 2.14(1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 118 HEAD ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2311 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened B-1 2
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A SEAL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 119 TABLE ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2312 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 10 2-RC-LT-RECEELVI 120 2TRAIN A PLENUM LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 2310 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 2-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 121 TRAIN A NORMAL OPERATING OPERATING 2311 RANGE LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 12 2-RC-LT-RECVSLRLI 122 TRAIN A WIDE RANGE OPERATING OPERATING 2312 LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 123 2-NM-PRO-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (1)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened PROCESSOR EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 124 2-NM-AMP-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (1)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened AMPLIFIER NEUTRON FLUX 2-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, WIDE 125 2NMNF3 RANGE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 128 LVL,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL 3 NEUTRON FLUX 126 2-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, SOURCE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 128 2270A1 RANGE,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL 3 7
2-NM-NFD-NEUTRON FLUX 127 2270 DETECTOR (EXOCRE)
INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(9)
Detector Function I_
_ CHANNEL3 I
IIII B-13
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2.28 (2) (5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 128 2-EI-CB-36C NIS CABINET 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened ISOLATION
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 129 2-EP-ST-03 TRANSFORMER FOR OPERATING OPERATING EXCORE NI CHAN III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 130 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04A 2-1 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-BKR-131 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-132 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-133 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-134 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-135 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-136 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 137 04A OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER OPN CSE CKTBRK 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 138 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04B 2-11 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened B-14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MR STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-139 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-140 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-141 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 142 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRKI 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 143 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04C 2-111 (TCA)
>GDri a
F oe 2-EP-BKR-144 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-145 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-146 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-147 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-148 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-149 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK B-1 5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 150 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 151 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04D 2-IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-BKR-152 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-153 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-154 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-155 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 16 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEEDOPN CSE 16 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER OECLSDRule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-157 80A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 35 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-158 80C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 36 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-159 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-160 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK I
B-16
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MARK #
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-161 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-162 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-163 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK VITAL BUS 1.72 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 164 2-VB-INV-01 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-1 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 165 2-VB-INV-02 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-11 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 166 2-VB-INV-03 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-111 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.33 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 167 2-VB-INV-04 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-IV INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened 168 2-BY-B-2-I STATION BATTERY 2-1 CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 169 2-BY-B-2-11 STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 11 Battery Rack Structural Integrity 170 2-BY-B-2-111 STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IIIBatteryRackStructuralIntegrity 171 2-BY-B-2-IV STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IV Battery Rack Structural Integrity 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 172 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12A CABINET 1-1
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 13 2-EP-BKR-173 CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 172 12A-1 3 111 B-17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 174 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12B CABINET 1-11
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 175 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 174 12B-14 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 176 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12C CABINET 1-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 177 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 176 12C-12 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 178 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12D CABINET 1-IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 179 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 178 12D-11 A LOW HEAD SI PUMP 180 2SI-MOV SUCTION FROM OPEN CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 2862ARW T_
RWST 2-SI-MOV-B LOW HEAD SI PUMP 181 2B SUCTION FROM OPEN CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 11 2862B R S RWST 2-CH-MOV-CHG PUMP SUCTION 182 2115B FROM RWST CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened ISOLATION VALVE 1
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 183 2-CH-P-1C C CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
- RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 184 2-CH-P-1B B CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 185 2-CH-P-1A A CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (')(8)
Pump Function, Screened B-1 8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety Sl COLD LEG 186 2836 ALTERNATECTIONHEADER CLOSED OPEN 0.71 (1)(4)
Yoke Leg Stress ISOLATION 187 2-FW-GOV-2 TDAFW PUMP NORMALLY OPEN Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 GOVERNOR VALVE OPEN Note: The superscripts in the column "HCLPF (g) or Factor of Safety" are described in Section 6.6 of the report.
B-19
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 December 17, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.14-565 Attention: Document Control Desk NL&OSANVDC R3 Washington, DC 20555 Docket Nos.
50-338/339 License Nos.
NPF-4/7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 RESPONSE TO MARCH 12. 2012 INFORMATION REQUEST EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 2.1
References:
- 1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012
- 2. Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to NRC, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1," dated March 31, 2014
- 3. EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic"
- 4. NRC Letter, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, 'Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,' as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," dated May 7, 2013 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status.
In Reference 2, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) provided the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for North Anna Power Station in response to the Reference 1 request. In that submittal, Dominion committed to perform, as an interim measure, an Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) in accordance with Reference 3 and to provide the results of the evaluation to NRC by December 31, 2014.
Reference 3 contains industry guidance and detailed information to be included in the ESEP Report submittal. NRC endorsed this industry guidance in Reference 4.
The attached ESEP Report for North Anna Power Station provides the information described in Section 7 of Reference 3.
I Cl
Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 2 of 3 If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact Mr. Thomas Shaub at (804) 273-2763.
Sincerely, David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Commitments made in this letter:
None
Attachment:
Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Vicid L. M11l
'NOTARY,M.IC j
- i commonwealth of Virgini~a COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA m n-eg. # LoVi542 lia
)mýýommrission Expires May 31, 2018 COUNTY OF HENRICO
)
The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by David A. Heacock, who is President and Chief Nuclear Officer of Virginia Electric and Power Company. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Acknowledged before me this /7
--7 day of Ile C',)-" &
,/
2014.
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
4f Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 3 of 3 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Regional Administrator Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Dr. V. Sreenivas Project Manager - North Anna U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08 G-9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. K. Cotton-Gross Project Manager - Surry U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08 G-9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station J. E. Reasor, Jr.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Innsbrook Corporate Center, Suite 300 4201 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 50.54fSeismic. Resource@nrc.gov
Serial No.14-565 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 ATTACHMENT EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT December 2014 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS I AND 2
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Executive Summary In response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter of March 12, 2012 on Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, a seismic evaluation program, entitled the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP), was conducted for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 (NAPS) as an interim measure until the long-term seismic risk evaluation is completed. The ESEP evaluated the impact of higher than design basis earthquakes on select equipment associated with FLEX strategies that are being implemented for mitigation of beyond design basis events to protect the reactor core. The ESEP was completed for NAPS because the recently developed Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS), which was prepared using probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, exceeds the plant's Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The ESEP was performed in accordance with the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic.
This report provides summary information resulting from the ESEP performed for NAPS. The report includes a description of the Review Level Ground Motion Spectra (RLGM), the equipment selection process, the seismic capacity walkdown approach, the screening of components, the methodology used to perform the seismic margin assessment, and the results.
The results include seismic factors of safety or high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacities for the selected structures, systems and components (SSCs) for both structural integrity and functional failure modes, and, for some SSCs, the basis for screening out from further evaluation.
The report concludes that the SSCs have seismic factors of safety greater than unity and/or HCLPF capacities that are greater than the selected RLGM.
Therefore, no upgrades to the plant or modifications to any SSC are required as a result of the ESEP.
i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table of Contents Executive Summary.............................................................................................................. i 1.0 Purpose and Objective........................................................................................................
1 2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies..........................................
2 2.1 Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal.................................................................
2 2.2 RCS Inventory Control / Long-Term Subcriticality.....................................................
3 2.3 Containment Function................................................................................................
3 2.4 Core Cooling and Heat Removal during Modes 5 & 6..............................................
3 2.5 Powering Key Parameter Instrumentation................................................................
4 3.0 Equipment Selection and ESEL..............................................................................................
5 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL...................................................................
5 3.1.1 FLEX Equipment List...................................................................................
5 3.1.2 ESEL Development.....................................................................................
7 3.1.3 ESEL........................................................................................................
8 4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)........................................................................
9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee.................................................................
9 4.2 Comparison to SSE...................................................................................................
10 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion..................................................................................................
12 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected...................................................................................
12 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra.................................................
15 6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach......................................................................................
15 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used..............................................................................
15 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process.......................................................................................
17 6.3 Seismic W alkdown Approach......................................................................................
18 6.3.1 W alkdown Approach.....................................................................................
18 6.3.2 Application of Previous W alkdown Information............................................
19 6.3.3 W alkdown of Block W alls..............................................................................
19 6.3.4 Significant W alkdown Findings......................................................................
20 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process.....................................................................................
20 6.5 Functional Evaluations of Relays..............................................................................
20 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)...............................
21 7.0 Inaccessible Items.......................................................................................................................
22 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for W alkdowns........................................
22 7.2 Planned W alkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.............................................
22 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results..............................................................................................
22 8.1 Supporting Information..............................................................................................
22 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications......................................................................
24 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule.....................................................................
24 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments.....................................................................
24 9.0 R e fe re n ce s..................................................................................................................................
2 4 Appendix A - Unit 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results..... A-i Appendix B - Unit 2 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results..... B-i ii
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system.
The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 (Reference 9.1), which requested information to assure that these recommendations were addressed by all U.S.
nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.
Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff included a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA).
Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff would determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for North Anna Power Station (NAPS) Units 1 and 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 9.1) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (Reference 9.2).
The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to provide the NRC a clear understanding of the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 2.0 BRIEF
SUMMARY
OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES Diverse and flexible (FLEX) strategies have been developed for NAPS in accordance with NEI 12-06 (Reference 9.3) to respond to NRC Order EA-12-049 (Reference 9.4). The NAPS submittal to NRC dated February 28, 2013 (Reference 9.5) and subsequent updates (References 9.6 through 9.8), hereafter collectively referred to as the Overall Integrated Plan (OIP), provide a description of the strategies developed to mitigate a Beyond Design Basis (BDB) event.
FLEX strategies relevant to the ESEP are listed in Table 3-2 of Reference 9.2 and include reactor core cooling and heat removal, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory control and long-term subcriticality, containment function, and core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5 & 6. These strategies, as described in the NAPS OIP, are summarized below.
2.1 REACTOR CORE COOLING AND HEAT REMOVAL PHASE 1 Reactor core cooling and heat removal is achieved through steam release from the Steam Generators (S/Gs) via remote or local manual operation of the S/G Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). S/G makeup is provided from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) during FLEX Phase 1 with suction from the Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST). Upon depletion of the ECST, the suction of the TDAFWP is aligned to the Fire Protection (FP) System, with water flow supplied from the Service Water (SW) reservoir via the diesel-driven FP pump.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy includes deployment of the portable BDB high capacity pump taking suction from Lake Anna or the SW reservoir and providing flow to the suction of the TDAFWP or a deployed portable BDB Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump (while simultaneously refilling the ECST via the permanently installed BDB ECST refill connection.)
The portable BDB AFW pump discharges to the S/Gs via the permanent tie-in connection to the AFW system. This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 3 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategy is required for core cooling and heat removal, since the TDAFWP and/or the portable BDB AFW pump can provide S/G makeup indefinitely.
However, additional pumps, acquired from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC), provide backup capability should multiple failures occur during extended operation. These pumps will utilize the same flowpaths described above.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 2.2 RCS INVENTORY CONTROL / LONG-TERM SUBCRITICALITY PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for ensuring adequate RCS inventory and reactivity control consists of monitoring pressurizer level and RCS pressure, and controlling RCS cooldown by S/G depressurization to a steam pressure of 290 psig.
PHASE 2 RCS inventory control and long-term subcriticality is maintained by injecting borated water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the RCS via the permanently installed BDB RCS pump discharge connection in the Safety Injection (SI) system using the portable BDB RCS injection pump. The BDB RCS injection pump draws the contents of the RWST through the BDB RCS pump suction connection installed in the Quench Spray (QS) pump suction piping.
This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 4 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategy is required as the portable BDB RCS injection pump can provide RCS makeup indefinitely. However, additional pumps acquired from the NSRC provide backup capability should multiple failures occur during extended operation. The NSRC pumps will utilize the same flowpaths described above.
2.3 CONTAINMENT FUNCTION PHASE 1 The Phase 1 strategy for containment function is to monitor containment temperature and pressure using installed instrumentation.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy for containment function is to continue to monitor containment pressure and temperature.
PHASE 3 The Phase 3 strategy for containment function is to continue to monitor containment pressure and temperature.
No primary or alternate strategies are required to be defined to maintain the containment function (Reference 9.8).
2.4 CORE COOLING AND HEAT REMOVAL DURING MODES 5 & 6 PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6 involves the initiation of 3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the gravity feed and spill method of removing decay heat.
Several different flowpaths can be utilized for gravity feed and spill depending on plant conditions.
Valves are aligned in the SI system to allow borated water from the RWST to flow into the cold leg piping of the RCS using the installed plant piping flowpath. A spill path is established through the pressurizer PORVs or a removed pressurizer safety valve.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 response for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6 includes utilization of the portable BDB AFW pump to provide RCS boration and makeup water flow.
Temporary suction hoses for the pump are routed to the permanent FLEX connection in the QS pump suction piping to provide a borated water source from the RWST. Temporary discharge hoses are routed and connected to the permanent FLEX connection in the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) piping. Flow can be directed to either unit's RCS by aligning the manual cross-tie valves in the Unit 1 "C" and Unit 2 "A" CVCS charging pump cubicles.
PHASE 3 No additional Phase 3 strategies or equipment are required for core cooling during Modes 5 & 6.
The continued implementation of the Phase 2 strategy ensures adequate decay heat removal indefinitely.
2.5 POWERING KEY PARAMETER INSTRUMENTATION PHASE I The Phase 1 strategy for powering key parameter monitoring instrumentation includes relying on the installed Class 1 E 125 VDC station batteries to power 120 VAC vital bus panels through the installed Class 1 E inverters, and includes stripping non-critical loads to extend battery life.
PHASE 2 The Phase 2 strategy for re-powering key instrumentation upon depletion of the 125 VDC station batteries involves the deployment of portable 120/240 VAC diesel generators that will be connected to 120 VAC vital buses through installed FLEX cabling, connections and distribution panels. This configuration is graphically shown in Figure 10 of the OIP.
PHASE 3 Although the Phase 3 electrical re-powering strategy includes deployment of a 4160 VAC diesel generator, this strategy is established to provide redundancy and is not the primary strategy. Therefore, it is not included in the scope of the ESEP since the primary strategy described under Phase 2 above is capable of powering the required instrumentation for the duration of the event.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION AND ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 9.2).
3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The selection of equipment was based on installed plant equipment credited in selected FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as described in the NAPS OIP and summarized in Section 2.
Equipment was selected following the guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3 for reactor core cooling and heat removal, RCS inventory control and long-term subcriticality, containment function, and core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5
& 6 FLEX strategies, including the key parameter monitoring instrumentation that is required to implement the response strategies.
Station drawings and the Equipment Data System (EDS) were reviewed to populate the list and to provide supporting information.
The initial plant conditions that define the starting point for identification of FLEX strategy-credited equipment and development of the ESEL is consistent with the boundary conditions identified in NEI 12-06, i.e., the BDBEE impacts all units at the site concurrently, all units are initially operating at power, and each unit successfully shuts down when required. For the core cooling and heat removal during Modes 5 &
6 FLEX strategy, the reactor initial condition is shutdown in either Mode 5 or 6.
3.1.1 FLEX EQUIPMENT LIST Initially, a FLEX Equipment List was determined for each Unit through the evaluation of the FLEX strategies supporting the core cooling and containment functions to determine the mechanical and electrical flowpaths, installed FLEX connections that support the use of portable FLEX equipment, and key parameter monitoring instrumentation that supports strategy implementation.
The following mechanical and electrical flowpaths support the FLEX strategies and key parameter monitoring instrumentation and were evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
AFW System from the ECST to the suction of the TDAFWP SW reservoir to the suction of the TDAFWP via the diesel-driven FP system pump AFW from the discharge of the TDAFWP to the S/Gs
" Steam flow from the S/Gs to the atmosphere via the S/G PORVs Steam flow from the S/Gs to the TDAFWP turbine RCS injection flowpath to the RCS from the RWST via the portable RCS injection pump Gravity feed flowpath to the RCS from the RWST 5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Vital instrument power from the station batteries through the inverters or from the portable electrical generators via BDB receptacles and distribution panels, to the vital bus distribution panels and to the instrumentation on instrument racks, Main Control Room (MCR) boards, etc.
The following installed FLEX connections support the FLEX strategies and key parameter monitoring instrumentation and were evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
BDB AFW pump discharge connection (flow to the S/Gs)
BDB ECST refill connection (suction supply source for AFW pump)
BDB RCS Pump discharge connection (RCS inventory makeup)
BDB RCS Pump suction connection (borated water source)
Charging pump discharge header connection (Modes 5&6 RCS inventory makeup) 120/240V portable generator connection receptacle (supply to 120VAC vital buses)
The following Key Parameter Instrumentation supports the FLEX strategies and was evaluated for identification of equipment for inclusion on the FLEX Equipment List:
S/G level indication and pressure indication located in the MCR RCS temperature indication and pressure indication located in the MCR ECST level indication located in the MCR AFW flowrate indication located in the MCR Pressurizer level indication in the MCR Core Exit Thermocouples indication in the MCR Excore Nuclear Instrumentation indication in the MCR Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) indication in the MCR Containment pressure and temperature indication located in the MCR The FLEX Equipment List was developed through detailed review of the mechanical and electrical flowpaths, FLEX connections, and key parameter instrumentation to identify specific supporting equipment.
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components, and applicable P&IDs were annotated to define flowpaths and major branch isolation points as part of the review. Components within the flowpath, and associated branch lines to an isolation device, were identified from this review.
Instrumentation loop diagrams and electrical schematic drawings were used to identify electrical and instrumentation components, cabinets, panels, etc., that are required to support operation of the key parameter instruments.
Mechanical and electrical components were tabulated to produce the FLEX Equipment List. The EDS database and station physical piping drawings were utilized to identify the installed location for each component.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Structures; piping; conduit; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct; and nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components were not included in the FLEX Equipment List tabulation consistent with the guidance provided in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3.2.
3.1.2 ESEL DEVELOPMENT The guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Section 3.2 was applied to the FLEX Equipment List in order to develop the ESEL by removing components from the list that met the exclusion criteria. The following guidance from EPRI 3002000704 was applied to ESEL component selection:
- 1. The scope of components was limited to those required to support the Primary FLEX strategy success path. For the Core Cooling and Heat Removal during Modes 5 & 6 strategy, several different flowpaths can be utilized for gravity feed to the RCS depending on plant conditions. The flowpath chosen through the Charging pumps represents one of the flowpaths that are available to operators.
- 2. The following types of components were not included on the ESEL:
Manual valves, check valves, and rupture disks Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.
- 3. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, only one train component is included in the ESEL.
The following additional considerations were applied when generating the ESEL for NAPS.
Multiple Trains/Channels Supporting a Strategy For cases in which multiple trains or channels supported the primary strategy, only components associated with a single train/channel are included in the ESEL.
Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Implementation of FLEX strategies at NAPS includes manual operation of certain power operated valves.
The power operated valves that are manually manipulated to change position are included in the ESEL to ensure their ability to be actuated during FLEX implementation.
Flow Orifices and Flow Venturis Flow orifices and venturis are located within the pressure boundary of the piping and provide no active function. These components were considered piping components and were excluded from the ESEL.
7
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Electrical Junction Boxes Junction boxes provide completely passive locations for pulling, installing, or joining cables.
These boxes were considered to be equivalent to conduit and were excluded from the ESEL.
Electrical Panels and Cabinets Electrical panels and cabinets provide consolidated locations for connecting multiple cables and mounting instrumentation.
The cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
Cabinets and panels are also included if the routing of instrumentation or power cable was found to pass through a cabinet without termination.
Key Parameter Instrumentation Key parameter instrumentation (indicators and recorders) are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included in the ESEL as separate components.
3.1.3 ESEL The list of components that comprise the ESEL for NAPS Units 1 and 2 are provided in Appendices A and B, respectively.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 4.0 4.1 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)
PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE The North Anna control point elevation and GMRS are unchanged from the March 2014 submittal (Reference 9.11).
The Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) control point elevation was identified following the guidance in EPRI Report 1025287 (SPID)
(Reference 9.16) as the highest rock-founded, safety-related structure, which is the Casing Cooling Tank and Pump House structure at elevation 268 ft, or 3 ft below plant grade. A plot of the GMRS at the control point elevation is provided in Figure 1; tabular data are provided in Table 1.
North Anna Unit 1 & 2 GMRS at Contol Point Elevation Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 1.20 01I -
-GMI 1.00 i
r-0.80 J
0.60i i
0.40
/
i 0.20 100.0 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz]
Figure 1 - Control Point GMRS 9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table I - Control Point GMRS Tabular Data at 5% Damping Freg [Hz]
Accel [g]
Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
100.0 0.5721 5.000 0.4847 90.00 0.6149 4.000 0.3702 80.00 0.6965 3.000 0.2667 70.00 0.8132 2.500 0.2159 60.00 0.9601 2.000 0.1770 50.00 1.1145 1.500 0.1317 45.00 1.1652 1.250 0.1065 40.00 1.2155 1.000 0.0806 35.00 1.2617 0.900 0.0745 30.00 1.2226 0.800 0.0677 25.00 1.1889 0.700 0.0602 20.00 1.1670 0.600 0.0522 15.00 1.1707 0.500 0.0435 12.50 1.1525 0.400 0.0347 10.00 1.0508 0.300 0.0260 9.000 0.9622 0.200 0.0174 8.000 0.8562 0.167 0.0145 7.000 0.7346 0.125 0.0109 6.000 0.6068 0.100 0.0087 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The North Anna SSE response spectrum at 5% damping for structures founded on rock is taken at 0.12g for horizontal ground motion. For structures founded on soil, the design basis earthquake is 0.18g for horizontal ground motion. North Anna SSE response spectra are plotted in Figure 2. Tabular data are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for rock and soil-founded structures, respectively.
The North Anna control point GMRS exceeds the site SSE (both at rock) in the 1 to 10 Hz range; therefore, North Anna screens in for ESEP.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Safe Shutdown Earthquake Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 0.60 -
0.50
.2 0.30 -
-0.20 0.10 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz]
SSE (Rock-Founded Structures)
SSE (Sol-Founded Structures)
Figure 2 - North Anna Safe Shutdown Earthquake Table 2 - North Anna SSE Data for Rock-Founded Structures at 5% Damping Freq [Hz]
0.125 0.173 0.201 0.252 0.307 0.357 0.415 0.470 0.532 0.603 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 1.183 1.308 1.500 1.720 1.901 Accel [g]
0.0030 0.0050 0.0070 0.0110 0.0170 0.0230 0.0300 0.0360 0.0440 0.0530 0.0670 0.0820 0.0980 0.1160 0.1490 0.1740 0.2140 0.2650 0.3090 Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
2.000 0.3330 10.00 0.3330 10.64 0.3180 11.18 0.3070 11.47 0.3010 12.05 0.2910 13.00 0.2750 15.09 0.2460 18.43 0.2120 20.36 0.1970 22.50 0.1830 25.49 0.1670 28.16 0.1550 30.35 0.1470 35.26 0.1320 38.00 0.1250 40.00 0.1200 50.00 0.1200 100.0 0.1200 11
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table 3 - North Anna SSE Data for Soil-Founded Structures at 5% Damping Freq [Hz]
0.125 0.173 0.201 0.252 0.307 0.357 0.415 0.470 0.532 0.603 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 1.183 1.308 1.519 1.720 1.901 Accel [g]
0.0060 0.0110 0.0150 0.0230 0.0340 0.0460 0.0620 0.0800 0.0970 0.1140 0.1370 0.1610 0.1860 0.2130 0.2610 0.2960 0.3560 0.4150 0.4700 Freq [Hz]
2.000 7.000 7.502 8.085 8.499 9.160 9.629 10.122 10.640 11.184 11.467 12.054 13.000 15.090 Accel [g]
0.5000 0.5000 0.4670 0.4350 0.4140 0.3850 0.3670 0.3490 0.3330 0.3170 0.3090 0.2950 0.2740 0.2370 18.425 0.1950 20.359 0.1800 22.496 0.1800 50.000 0.1800 62.784 0.1800 100.0 0.1800 5.0 5.1 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION DESCRIPTION OF RLGM SELECTED The review level ground motion spectra (RLGM) selected for the ESEP are in accordance with the two criteria described in Section 4, page 4-1 of EPRI 3002000704, as follows:
Case 1 The RLGM is a scaled version of the SSE. For NAPS, the SSE is defined separately for rock-founded structures (with a PGA of 0.12g) and soil-founded structures (with a PGA of 0.18g).
The maximum ratio of the GMRS-to-SSE (both rock-based) in the 1 to 10 Hz range occurs at a frequency of 10 Hz and is greater than 2. Thus, in accordance with EPRI 3002000704, Section 4, criterion 1, the RLGM is taken as two times the SSE. Since there are two SSEs for NAPS, there are two RLGMs defined for the ESEP evaluations - one for rock-founded structures and one for soil-founded structures. Each SSE spectrum is scaled up by a factor of 2 to produce the associated RLGM.
Figure 3 shows the plots of the Case 1 horizontal direction RLGMs used for ESEP for rock-founded structures and 12
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report soil-founded structures at 5% spectral damping.
Table 4 and Table 5 provide the corresponding digitized values of frequencies and accelerations for these two RLGMs. In the vertical direction, the rock and soil SSEs are 2/3 of the horizontal SSEs; thus, the RLGM in the vertical direction are taken as 2/3 of the horizontal direction, respectively.
Case 2 The RLGM for this case is taken directly as the control point GMRS consistent with EPRI 3002000704, Section 4, criterion 2. This RLGM was applied for the evaluation of two tanks (i.e., the Refueling Water Storage Tanks, one per unit), which are located outside in the yard area. The tank foundations are located on rock surface at approximately the same elevation as the control point GMRS. The Case 2 RLGM (GMRS) is plotted in Figure 1 of Section 4.1 at 5% spectral damping and the digitized values of frequencies and accelerations are provided in Table 1 of Section 4.1.
Vertical GMRS at the control point elevation was developed using V/H ratios consistent with the guidance in NUREG/CR-6728 (Reference 9.14).
North Anna ESEP RLGM Horizontal Direction, 5% Damping 1.20 1.00 IlI 0.80
.2_o 2 0.60 -
-7 0.40 I
0.20 0.00 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency [Hz)
ESEP RLGM (Rock-Founded Structures)
ESEP RLGM (Soil-Founded Structures)
Figure 3 - North Anna ESEP RLGM (2xSSE) 13
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Table 4 - North Anna 2 x SSE RLGM Data for Rock-Founded Structures at 5%
Damping Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
0.125 0.0060 0.173 0.0100 0.201 0.0140 0.252 0.0220 0.307 0.0340 0.357 0.0460 0.415 0.0600 0.470 0.0720 0.532 0.0880 0.603 0.1060 0.700 0.1340 0.800 0.1640 0.900 0.1960 1.000 0.2320 1.183 0.2980 1.308 0.3480 1.500 0.4280 1.720 0.5300 1.901 0.6180 Table 5 - North Anna 2 Damping Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
0.125 0.0120 0.173 0.0220 0.201 0.0300 0.252 0.0460 0.307 0.0680 0.357 0.0920 0.415 0.1240 0.470 0.1600 0.532 0.1940 0.603 0.2280 0.700 0.2740 0.800 0.3220 0.900 0.3720 1.000 0.4260 Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
2.000 0.6660 10.00 0.6660 10.64 0.6360 11.18 0.6140 11.47 0.6020 12.05 0.5820 13.00 0.5500 15.09 0.4920 18.43 0.4240 20.36 0.3940 22.50 0.3660 25.49 0.3340 28.16 0.3100 30.35 0.2940 35.26 0.2640 38.00 0.2500 40.00 0.2400 50.00 0.2400 100.0 0.2400 x SSE RLGM Data for Soil-Founded Structures at 5%
Freq [Hz]
Accel [g]
1.183 0.5220 1.308 0.5920 1.519 0.7120 1.720 0.8300 1.901 0.9400 2.000 1.0000 7.000 1.0000 7.502 0.9340 8.085 0.8700 8.499 0.8280 9.160 0.7700 9.629 0.7340 10.122 0.6980 10.640 0.6660 Freq [Hz]
11.184 11.467 12.054 13.000 15.090 18.425 20.359 22.496 50.000 62.784 100.0 Accel [g]
0.6340 0.6180 0.5900 0.5480 0.4740 0.3900 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA The in-structure response spectra (ISRS) corresponding to the Case 1 RLGMs were derived by scaling the existing design basis (SSE) ISRS for North Anna structures.
The spectral ordinates of the SSE-based ISRS were multiplied by a factor of 2 at each frequency to obtain ISRS corresponding to the RLGM.
No estimate of ISRS is required for the Case 2 RLGM because this RLGM (GMRS) is directly used in the analysis of the RWST.
6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH The seismic margin evaluation approach for ESEP consisted of the following steps:
- 1. Development of the components list (ESEL - described in Section 3 of this report)
- 3. Seismic capability walkdowns of equipment on the ESEL (described in Section 6.3)
- 4. Screening of components for which explicit margin calculations were not performed because of previously evaluated large margins or other applicable screening (described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2)
- 5. Calculation of high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacity or factor of safety for ESEL components (described in Sections 6.1 and 6.4) 6.1
SUMMARY
OF METHODOLOGIES USED The seismic margin calculations for the ESEL components were performed using the EPRI seismic margin assessment methodology described in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Revision 1 (Reference 9.15).
In some cases, explicit seismic margin calculations were not performed, such as for components that are part of a larger assembly (rule-of-the-box) or for selected seismically-rugged components that were determined to be acceptable based on Seismic Capability Engineer inspections and judgment during the seismic capacity walkdowns. Additionally, where the factor of safety to the RLGM-based ISRS, as determined by review of previous seismic margin calculations performed for the Individual Plant Examination of External Event (IPEEE) program or component design basis calculations, were determined to be large, explicit calculations to quantify the seismic margin were not required or performed.
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North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Seismic Margin Calculations The seismic margin to the RLGM was calculated for ESEP as either a HCLPF capacity or a factor of safety. Based on EPRI NP-6041, a simplified expression to calculate the HCLPF capacity of a component can be stated as:
HCLPF = ((C-DNs)/Ds) x RLE Where C represents the capacity, DNS represents the concurrent non-seismic demand (typically deadweight), Ds is the seismic demand, and RLE is the review level earthquake, which is the RLGM for ESEP (typically, peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the RLE is used).
For some ESEL components, the HCLPF capacities were calculated and reported using the above approach.
For other ESEL components, a factor of safety to the RLGM-based ISRS was calculated and reported. The factor of safety is simply a ratio of the component's load carrying capacity to the demand or load placed on the component. The factor of safety to the RLGM-based seismic demand provides the assessment of acceptable seismic margin when the factor is greater than unity. The calculated factor of safety, when multiplied with the PGA of the applicable RLGM, will yield an estimate of a component's HCLPF capacity. For the purposes of the ESEP, if the factor of safety was greater than unity, the HCLPF was concluded to be greater than the RLGM and acceptable seismic margin was shown.
Failure Modes Both structural (anchorage or other load path) and functional failure modes were considered in performing screening evaluations or calculations to determine factors of safety or HCLPF capacities. The governing failure modes were determined and reported.
Seismic Interactions Seismic interactions, including nearby block walls and piping attached to tanks, were evaluated as part of the seismic margin assessment.
The seismic evaluation of the equipment included evaluating the capacity of nearby masonry block walls whose failure could impact the functionality of the equipment.
Block walls whose failure could affect safety related equipment were previously evaluated in response to NRC IE Bulletin 80-11.
During the IEB 80-11 effort, for some block walls, steel supports were installed to provide additional support to the walls and increase their ability to withstand earthquakes. The masonry block walls were also later evaluated as a part of the IPEEE program. For the IPEEE, block wall capacities were calculated for the bounding walls of interest following the approach in EPRI NP-6041. A similar approach was followed for the ESEP. Bounding walls in 16
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the proximity of ESEL equipment were selected for further evaluation based on wall configuration as discussed in Section 6.6. below.
Piping attached to tanks was reviewed as part of the seismic capacity walkdown of tanks on the ESEL to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements.
6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS EPRI NP-6041 contains a set of screening criteria tables that can be used to "screen out" components from further review because of their generically good performance in earthquakes or seismic simulation tests at or above certain levels. EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4, Summary of Equipment and Subsystems Screening Criteria for Seismic Margin Evaluations, was used for screening ESEL components. The table provides screening bins based on ground peak spectral accelerations of <0.8g and 0.8 - 1.2g.
For rock-founded structures, the RLGM peak spectral acceleration is less than 0.8g.
Therefore, the lower screening bin of <0.8g was used to screen equipment located in rock-founded structures.
For soil-supported structures, the RLGM peak spectral acceleration is greater than 0.8g, but less than 1.2g. Therefore, the higher screening bin of 0.8 - 1.2g was used to screen equipment located in soil-founded structures.
The use of screening Table 2-4 included the following considerations:
Caveats and restrictions associated with each specific system or component type are required to be met, as indicated in the table notes.
The table is applicable to equipment up to 40 ft above grade.
For equipment that did not satisfy the corresponding component caveats or restrictions from Table 2-4 or were located above 40 ft above grade, alternate methods, such as the use of component specific seismic test data, were used to evaluate component functionality.
The screening values given in Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 are for the functional capacity of the component and do not include consideration of anchorage or other load paths. Thus, equipment anchorage was addressed in addition to the guidance given in the screening tables.
The anchorage capacity calculations used the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) approach from EPRI NP-6041.
Alternatively, the anchorage conditions for some equipment items were found to be acceptable based on either large available margins demonstrated by a previous calculation, or a determination by inspection that the anchorage was very robust compared to the seismic demand (i.e., weight of component small and component robustly anchored). In such cases, an explicit HCLPF calculation was not performed.
17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 WALKDOWN APPROACH Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704, which refers to EPRI NP-6041 for the Seismic Margin Assessment process.
Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041 describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:
"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.
Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.
A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.
If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component of each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical.
This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, 18
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report potential SI [Seismic Interaction1] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection."
6.3.2 APPLICATION OF PREVIOUS WALKDOWN INFORMATION Previous seismic walkdowns performed for the USI A-46 program, IPEEE program, and in response to the 10CFR 50.54(f) information request related to Fukushima NTTF 2.3: Seismic (Reference 9.1) were used to support the ESEP seismic evaluations.
Seismic capacity walkdowns were performed for several ESEL components during the USI A-46 I Seismic IPEEE program in the 1990's. Those walkdown results were reviewed and the following steps were taken to confirm that the previous walkdown conclusions remained valid.
A walk by was performed to confirm that the equipment material condition and configuration is consistent with the walkdown conclusions and that no new significant interactions related to block walls or piping attached to tanks exist1.
If the ESEL item was screened out based on the previous walkdown, that screening evaluation was reviewed and reconfirmed for the ESEP.
An exception to the first bulleted item was taken for the components on the ESEL that were included in the seismic walkdowns recently conducted (2012) for the Fukushima NTTF 2.3: Seismic effort. These walkdowns confirmed the equipment material condition and configuration and the potential for seismic interaction were consistent with the IPEEE/USI A-46 programs walkdown information, such that additional confirmatory walkdown or walk-by inspections were not required for these components.
6.3.3 WALKDOWN OF BLOCK WALLS Plant layout drawings were reviewed to determine locations which may have masonry block walls near equipment on the ESEL. Walkdowns were performed in 1 EPRI 3002000704 page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287."
19
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report the areas that included block walls and equipment on the ESEL. Block walls in close proximity to ESEL equipment were identified for further evaluation. Block walls that could not impact ESEL equipment because of the distance from the equipment, or because the wall was blocked from impacting the equipment, were screened from further evaluation.
6.3.4 SIGNIFICANT WALKDOWN FINDINGS Consistent with the guidance from NP-6041, no significant outliers or anchorage concerns were identified during the seismic walkdowns. The following findings were noted during the walkdowns and subsequently resolved.
In all cases, the ESEL items had capacities greater than the RLGM.
Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM.
During walkdown of the ECST, it was noted that for each tank, there was one piping penetration through the missile shield that was identified to be grouted, which limits flexibility of the piping to accommodate any tank displacement. This walkdown observation was reviewed against the ESEP analysis for the ECSTs and the tanks were demonstrated to have adequate capacity for the RLGM.
There were walkdown observations relating to anchorage that required further review. These observations included gaps between the bottom of base plate or cabinet and the concrete surface and bolt spacing or edge distances that reduced the capacity of the anchor bolts.
After reviewing the anchorage capacity for these items, it was determined that the anchor bolts had adequate capacity for the RLGM.
6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041. The evaluations included the following steps:
Performing seismic capability walkdowns as described in Section 6.3.
Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041 or other approach, as described in Section 6.2.
Performing HCLPF or factor of safety calculations, as necessary, considering various failure modes that include both structural failure (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure.
Section 6.1 describes the method / approach used to perform these calculations.
6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATIONS OF RELAYS Not applicable since no relays were identified for inclusion in the ESEL.
20
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES)
The results of the seismic margin assessment for each component on the ESEL are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the tabulated information in these appendices.
The tabulated results are annotated to clarify the reported HCLPF / Factor of Safety and Failure Modes. Notes (1) through (9) are applicable to the tables in Appendices A and B and are defined below:
RLGM used for evaluation:
(1) 2 x SSE Rock-Founded Structure (PGA anchored to 0.24g)
(2) 2 x SSE Soil-Founded Structure (PGA anchored to 0.36g)
HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported:
(4) HCLPF Capacity (g)
(5) Factor of Safety to RLGM Methods for evaluating anchorage or structural integrity (if no explicit HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported):
(6) HCLPF > RLGM based on large margins in previous analysis (7) HCLPF > RLGM based on walkdown inspection (rugged design)
Methods for evaluating equipment function (if no explicit HCLPF or Factor of Safety reported):
(8) HCLPF > RLGM based on NP-6041 screening tables (9) HCLPF > RLGM based on review of additional data (e.g., test reports, experience data, etc.)
The evaluation of masonry block walls located near ESEL equipment determined that the capacity of the walls exceeded the applicable ESEP RLGM of 2 x SSE. Of the eight masonry walls identified for evaluation based on review of drawings and plant walkdowns, two limiting walls were selected for detailed evaluation. Limiting wall margins (the factor by which the RLGM input spectral accelerations could be multiplied while still satisfying CDFM capacity criteria) are tabulated in Table 6. The remaining walls are bounded by the analysis of the two limiting walls.
Table 6 - Limiting Block Wall Results Wall Identifier Limiting Wall Key Failure Mode(s)
Margin KeyFailureModes)
SB-271-4 5.19 Mortar Tensile Stress Normal to Bed Joint Mortar Tensile Stress Parallel to Bed SB-271-8 2.78Joint 21
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWNS There are no inaccessible ESEL items that require follow-up seismic walkdown.
7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN / EVALUATION SCHEDULE / CLOSE OUT As stated in Section 7.1, there are no inaccessible ESEL items that require follow-up seismic walkdown.
Therefore, no schedule or commitments to perform additional seismic walkdowns are required.
8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION NAPS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 9.1). The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 9.2).
The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin for plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is part of the overall NAPS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 9.9) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...]
has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."
The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Reference 9.10) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."
An assessment of the change in seismic risk for NAPS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter. Therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter apply to NAPS.
In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter provided an attached "Perspectives on the 22
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.
The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for NAPS, which experienced the Mineral VA M5.8 earthquake in August 2011. The ground response spectra ordinates from the Mineral earthquake exceeded the NAPS SSE spectra in several frequency ranges and the PGA was also exceeded. There was no resulting damage to safety-related SSCs based on extensive plant walkdowns and equipment surveillance testing performed to support restart of the units. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:
Safety factors applied in design calculations Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra
" Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis Bounding requirements in codes and standards Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)
Bounding testing requirements, and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).
These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.
The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGMs used for the ESEP evaluation are either a scaled version of the NAPS SSE or the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS, a more detailed seismic risk 23
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report assessment (SPRA) is being performed for NAPS in accordance with EPRI 1025287 (Reference 9.16). As identified in the NAPS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report submittal dated March 31, 2014 (Reference 9.11), NAPS screens in for a risk evaluation.
The complete risk evaluation will characterize the state-of-the-art probabilistic seismic ground motions, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization.
8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS There were no modifications identified as a result of the performance of the ESEP.
8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE As stated in Section 8.2, there are no required plant modifications. Therefore, no implementation schedule is required.
8.4
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS No new regulatory commitments are required as a result of the performance of the ESEP.
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," dated March 12, 2012.
9.2 EPRI Report No. 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -
Seismic," May 31, 2013.
9.3 NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,"
Revision 0, dated August 2012.
9.4 NRC Order Number EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,"
dated March 12, 2012.
9.5 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162B dated February 28, 2013.
9.6 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements 24
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162D dated August 23, 2013.
9.7 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No. 12-162E dated February 28, 2014.
9.8 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), Serial No.14-394 dated August 28, 2014.
9.9 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014.
9.10 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.
9.11 Virginia Electric and Power Company Letter to U. S. NRC Document Control Desk, "North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) for Recommendation 2.1," Serial No.14-133 dated March 31, 2014.
9.12 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations",
April 9, 2013.
9.13 NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.
9.14 NUREG/CR-6728, "Technical Basis for Revision of Regulatory Guidance on Design Ground Motions: Hazard-and Risk-Consistent Ground Motion Spectra Guidelines,"
November 6, 2001.
9.15 EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, Revision 1, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin".
9.16 EPRI Report No. 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," February 2013.
25
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A UNIT 1 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results A-i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety EMERGENCY 1
1-CN-TK-1 CONDENSATE STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.348 (1)(4)
Tank Sliding Capacity STORAGE TANK DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE NORMALLY 5.6 (2)(5)
Fire Pump Embedded Anchorage, 2
1-FP-P-2 PROTECTION PUMP STANDBY IN-SERVICE Shear/Tension Interaction (Steel Failure)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Pump Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 3 1-BY-B-05A CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 5 1-BY-B-05C CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL FIRE PUMP 2.8 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 6 1-BY-B-05D CHARGING OPERATING BATTERIES
> RLGM (2)(8)
Battery Function, Screened DIESEL DRIVEN FP 0.44 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 7
1-EP-CB-70 PUMP 2 CONTROL INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened DIESEL DRIVEN FIRE 8
1-FP-TK-4 PUMP 2 FUEL OIL INSTALLED INSTALLED 1.56 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction STORAGE TANK TURBINE DRIVEN NORMALLY (1)(5)
Embedded Anchor - Shear/Tension Interaction 9
1-FW-P-2 AUXILIARY IN-SERVICE 3.2 (tl(ur FEDAEPUP STAND-BY (Steel Failure)
FEEDWATER PUMP 1 -F-RV-TDAFW PUMP NRAL 10 100 DISCHARGE RELIEF NORMALLYOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened VALVE I
1-FWMOV-STEAM GENERATOR NOMLY()6 11
-FW-MOV-100D A FROM AFW PUMPS NORMALLYOPEN OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function INLET ISOL VV I
I I
A-1
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 12 1FW-OV-STEAM GENERATOR NRAL PN
>RG 1()
VleCmoetSrse!Fnto 1-FW-MOV-NORMALLY 12 100OA A FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1()
Valve Component Stresses/ Function ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 13 1OOB B FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/ Function 10013____
ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 1-FW-MOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY 100C C FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/Function ISOLATION VALVE TURBINE-DRIVEN 15 111B
-AFW PUMP STEAM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM ()(8)
Valve Function, Screened SUPPLY VALVE 1-MS-TV-_
TURBINE-DRIVEN NORMALLY (1)(8) 16 111A AFW PUMP STEAM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM Valve Function, Screened SUPPLY VALVE I-_MS-TV-_
AUX FEED PUMP NORMALLY (1)(6) 17 15M-IV TURBINE DRIVE NOPENLL 17 115 TRIEDVEOPEN OPEN
>RLGM (1()Valve Function, Valve Bonnet Neck INLET TRIP VALVE 1
18 1-FW-GOV-2 TDAFW PUMP NORMALLY OPEN Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 GOVERNOR VALVE OPEN TURBINE DRIVEN 19 1-FW-T-2 AUXILIARY NORMALLY IN-SERVICE Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 FEEDWATER PUMP STAND-BY TURB DRIVE 20 1-FW-RV-1-FW-T-2 RELIEF NORMALLY CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 9 604 VALVE CLOSED 21 1-MS-PCV-A SG POWER NORMALLY (1)(6) 21 1-S-AV OPERATED RELIEF CLOSEDLL 22 101A
-ME-ACV-BEPO ER CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 1_MSPCV_
B SG POWER NRAL 1 6 22 1-S-BV OPERATED RELIEF CLOSEDLL 22_101B VALE RELIE CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM_(_
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TA)II I
A-2
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-MS-PCV-C SG POWER NORMALLY (1)(6) 23 101C OPERATED RELIEF CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM Valve Component Stresses/Function VALVE (TCA) 24 1-QS-TK-1 REFUELING WATER STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.59 (3)(4)
Anchorage, Tank Overturning Moment Capacity STORAGE TANK A QUENCH SPRAY
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage PUMP
> RLGM (1)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage MAIN CONTROL 26 1-EI-CB-01 BENCHBOARD 1-1 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)
Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 27 l-El-CB-03 VERINCABOATRDOL INSTALLED INSTALLED VERTICAL BOARD 1-1
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 28 1-EI-CB-04 VERTICAL BOARD 1-2 INSTALLED INSTALLED RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 UNIT 1 SAFEGUARDS 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction PANEL /MAIN 29 l-El-CB-05 CONTRL VERTICA INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL VERTICAL
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened BOARD based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 30 1-EI-CB-23A PROCESS RACK A INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 31 1-EI-CB-23B PROCESS RACK B INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 32 1-EI-CB-23C PROCESS RACK C INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened A-3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 33 1-EI-CB-23D PROCESS RACK D INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened POST ACCIDENT 3.10 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Pullout in Expansion Anchor 34 1-EI-CB-34 MONITORING &
INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL PANEL
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 35 1-EI-CB-51 PROCESS RACK 1 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 36 1-EI-CB-52 PROCESS RACK 2 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 37 1-EI-CB-54 PROCESS RACK 4 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 38 1-EI-CB-53 PROCESS RACK 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 39 1-EI-CB-55 PROCESS RACK 5 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 40 1-EI-CB-56 PROCESS RACK 6 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 41 1-EI-CB-57 PROCESS RACK 7 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 42 1-EI-CB-58 PROCESS RACK 8 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 1-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 43 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80C 1-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened A-4
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 44 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80E 1-V
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 45 l-El-CB-112 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-800
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 46 1-EI-CB-127 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 1-103
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened NSRMNAIN>
RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 47 1-EI-CB-131 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 1-107
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 48 l-EI-CB-136 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-112
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 49 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 1-115
> RLGM (1)(9)
Instruments on Racks Function TECHNICAL 2.1 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 50 1-EI-CB-300 SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 4.96 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 51 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED (2)(8) 301A MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 3.53 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 52 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301C MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 2.29 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 1-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301D MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ('(8 Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET I
I I
A-5
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety ICC MULTIPLEXER 4.15 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 54 1-EI-CP-03 INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (1)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 55 1-EI-CP-04 ICC CABINET INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened MULTIPLEXER 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 56 1-EI-CP-05 MASTER RECEIVER INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 1-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 57 BASIS PANEL OPERATING PANEL 1(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function 1-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 58 PAE BASIS PANEL OPERATING OEAIG()9 PANEL 2(Distributio Panel OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function BEYOND DESIGN 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 1-BDB-DB BASIS PANEL 3, NOT 59 RECEPTACLE OPERATING OPERATING PANEL ASSEMBLY(Receptacle
> RLGM (2)(9)
Panel Function Panel) 1-MS-PI-A MAIN STM HDR TO 60 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II A MAIN STEAM 61 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 1474 PRESS TRANSMITTER 1-MS-PI-B MAIN STM HDR TO 62 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II B MAIN STEAM 63 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 1484 PRESS TRANSMITTER A-6
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-MS-PI-C MAIN STM HDR TO 64 1494 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDR CHANNEL II C MAIN STEAM 1-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE 65 1494 PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 45 TRANSMITTER CHANNEL II 1A STEAM 66 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1474 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1-FW-LT-1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 67 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING T
1474 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1 B STEAM 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 68 1484 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1484 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1 -FW-LT-1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 69 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING T
1484 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1 C STEAM 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 70 1
INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 1494 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
1-FW-LT-1C STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 71 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 1494 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 72 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1477A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened I_
_INDICATOR I
I I
I A-7
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARKE #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-FW-LT-1A STEAM 73 1477 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 48 RANGE LEVEL XMITR 1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1487A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR 1-FW-LT-1 B STEAM 75 1487 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 47 RANGE LEVEL XMTR lC STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 76 1-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1497A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR lC STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 77 1-FW-LT-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 1497 RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (I)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER REACTOR 78 1-LM-Pl-CONTAINMENT OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 100A PRESSURE INDICATION (CH 1)
PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 79 1-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 100A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER PEN 57 LEAK MON 80 1-LM-Pl-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 110A PRESSURE INDICATOR PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 81 1-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 110A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER I
A-8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety REACTOR 82 1-LM-TI-100-CONTAINMENTAIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 29 1
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 1-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT 83 1-1 MONITOR NT OPERATING OPERATING 100-1 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT A LOOP REACTOR 1 -RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 84 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
A LOOP REACTOR 85 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (9)
Temperature Sensor Function 1410 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD A LOOP REACTOR 86 1413 TEMp COOLANTL HOELEMENTLEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD B LOOP REACTOR 87 1-RC-TR-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 1420 TEMP RECORDER (WIDE RANGE)
B LOOP REACTOR 88 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG 1420 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM ()(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD B LOOP REACTOR 1-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG 89 1423 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function RTD I
I A-9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1 -RC-TR-LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE 90 HOT/COLD LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 RECORDER C LOOP REACTOR 91 1-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 1430 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 92 1-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 1433 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 1-RC-Pl-COOLANT HOT LEG 93 PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 INDICATOR (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 94 1-RC-P-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 27 1402B PRESS IND (NARROW RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 95 1-RC-PT-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 49 1402 PRESS TRANSMITTER LOOP A HOT LEG TO 1-RC-PI-RH PPS PRESSURE 96 1403B IC (NARRO OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 1403B INDICATOR (NARROW RANGE) 1-RC-PT-LOOP A HOT LEG TO
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 97 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING 1403 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM Transmitter Function, Screened 1 -RC-LI-PRESSURIZER LEVEL 98 INDICATION OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 CHANNEL I I
A-10
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-RC-LT-PRESSURIZER 99 L
TRANSMITER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 46 1459 LEVEL TRANSMITT-IER 1-CN-LI-EMERGENCY COND 100 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 LEVEL INDICATOR 1-CN-LT-EMERGENCY COND 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 101 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING 100B LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 102 TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 103 TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 100A TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 104 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 105 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 100B TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1-FW-Fl-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 106 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 28 INDICATOR 1-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 107 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING 1
100C TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 108 1-CM-MR-3 ICC MASTER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 56 RECIEVER 1 -RC-LQ-ICCM DISPLAY 109 101 POWER SUPPLY OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 50 TRAIN A 1-CM-MUX-REMOTE 110 32A MULTIPLEXER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 54 MODULE A-11
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 11 1-RC-KBD-ICCM CONTROL PAD OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 101 (TRAIN A) 1-RC-MON-GET/CCM/RVLIS 112 101 MNITO (TRAIN OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 27 101 MONITOR (TRAIN A)
CORE LOCATION E12 113 1 -RC-TE-T6 EXIT OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function THERMOCOUPLE 1
1-RC-LR-REACTOR VESSEL 114 1310A RECORDER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 34 1310OA RECORDER TRAIN A 15 -RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 115 1313 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM 1 -RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 116 14 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM C LOOP HOT LEG 117 1RC-TE RVLIS TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT 18
-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE 118 1316 RVLIS TRAIN A OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1) (9)
Temperature Sensor Function TUBING TEMP ELEM 1 -RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 119 17 THIMBLES RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 1-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 120 18 THIMBLES RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 1-RC-LIS-C LOOP RVLIS TRAIN 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 121 A HOT LEG ISOLATOR OPERATING OPERATING 1310 LVL INDR SW
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LIS-REACTOR VESSEL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 122 LEVEL INDICATING OPERATING OPERATING 1311 SYSTEM
> RLGM (1) 8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened A-12
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A SEAL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 123 TABLE ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 1312 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 124 TRAIN A PLENUM OPERATING OPERATING 1310 LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 125 TRAIN A NORMAL OPERATING OPERATING 1311 RANGE LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 1-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 126 TRAIN A WIDE RANGE OPERATING OPERATING 1312 LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 127 1-NM-PRO-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (2)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened PROCESSOR EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 128 1-NM-AMP-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (2)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened AMPLIFIER NEUTRON FLUX 1-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, WIDE 129 RANGE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 131 LVL,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL_3 NEUTRON FLUX 130 1-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, SOURCE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 131 1270A1 RANGE,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL_3 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 131 1-EI-CB-36C NIS CABINET 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened NM-NFD-NEUTRON FLUX 132 1270 DETECTOR (EXCORE)
INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM ()(9)
Detector Function 1270 CHANNEL 3 I
1 1
1 A-13
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM UMARKE#
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 133 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04A 1-1 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1-EP-BKR-134 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED INSTALLED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-135 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED INSTALLED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-136 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-137 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-138 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BD3 AC F E 139 04A BDB BAKEE OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 133 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER CKTBRK 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 140 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04B 1-11 (TCA)
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1-EP-BKR-141 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-142 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-143 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK I
I I
A-14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1 -EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 144 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 140 CKTBRK 1-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 145 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04C 1-111 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1 -EP-BKR-146 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-147 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-148 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-149 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-150 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 151 04C OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 145 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER OPN CSE CKTBRK 1-.EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 152 0EC DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 041 1-IV
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened 1 -EP-BKR-153 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-154 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK I
I I
I A-15
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-BKR-155 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-156 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 157 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 152 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-158 80E-1 1-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1 -EP-BKR-159 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-160 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-161 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-162 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-163 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 44 CKTBRK 1-EP-BKR-164 80C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 43 CKTBRK VITAL BUS 1.72 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 165 1-VB-INV-01 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1
1 1-1 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened A-16
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARKE DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 166 1-VB-INV-02 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-11 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 167 1-VB-INV-03 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-111 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(6)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 168 1-VB-INV-04 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 1-IV INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(6)
Inverter Function, Screened 169 1-BY-B-I-I STATION BATTERYI-I CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 170 1-BY-B-I-II STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 171 1-BY-B-i-Ill STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity III Battery Rack Structural Integrity 172 1-BY-B-1-IV STATION BATTERY 1-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IV 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 173 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12A 1-1
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 174 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 173 12A-1 3 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 175 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12B 1-11
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 176 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 175 12B-14 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 177 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 12C 1-111
> RLGM (2)(I)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 178 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 177 12C-12 A-17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX A ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 179 12D DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 1 -IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 180 1-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 180 12D-11 CHARGING PUMP 181 1-CH-MOV-SUCTION FROM CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 1115B RWST ISOLATION VALVE
> RLGM (1) (6)
Anchorage 182 1-CH-P-1A A CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 183 1-CH-P-1B B CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 184 1-CH-P-1C C CHARGING PUMP STAND-BY STAND-BY
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened SI COLD LEG 185 1836 ALTERNATECTIONHEADER CLOSED OPEN 0.71 (1)(4)
Yoke Leg Stress ISOLATION Note: The superscripts in the column "HCLPF (g) or Factor of Safety" are described in Section 6.6 of the report.
A-18
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report DPENDIX B UNIT 2 Expedited Seismic Equipment List and Seismic Margin Assessment Results B-i
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety EMERGENCY 1
2-CN-TK-1 CONDENSATE STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.348 (1)(4)
Tank Sliding Capacity STORAGE TANK TURBINE DRIVEN 2
2-FW-P-2 AUXILIARY STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 3.2(l)(5)
Embedded Anchor-Shear/Tension Interaction FEEDWATER PUMP (Steel Failure)
TURBINE DRIVEN 3
2-FW-RV-AFW PUMP NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 200 DISCHARGE RELIEF CLOSED VALVE 2-FW-MOV-SEMGNRTR NORMALLY
()6 STEAM GENERATOR 4
200C C FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses/ Function ISOLATION VALVE 5 2-FWMOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY (1)Vpe 5 2-FWMOV B FROM AFW INLET NOPENLL 5
200B B RMAWILT OPEN OPEN
> RLGM (1()
Valve Component Stresses /Function ISOLATION VALVE 2-FW-MOV-STEAM GENERATOR NORMALLY 200A A FROM AFW INLET CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function ISOLATION VALVE 7
2-MS-TV-2-FW-P-2 STEAM NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 211B SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED 8
2-MS-TV-2-FW-P-2 STEAM NORMALLY CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 211A SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED C
ERMVvuiSe 9 2-MSTV_
AUX FEED PUMP NOMLY()7 2-MS-TV-TURBINE DRIVE O
OPEN
> RLGM (1)(7)
Valve Function, Valve Bonnet Neck 215 TRIEDIEOPEN INLET TRIP VALVE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY 10 2-FW-T-2 FEEDWAR STAND-BY IN-SERVICE Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 FEEDWATER PUMP TURB DRIVE 11 2-FW-RV-2-FW-T-2 RELIEF NORMALLY CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 704 VALVE CLOSED B-1
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-MSPCV-A SG POWER NOMLY()6 12 2-MS-PCV-OPERATED RELIEF O
CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses /Function 201A OEAEREIF CLOSED VALVE (TCA)
B SG POWER 13 2-MS-PCV-OPERATED RELIEF NORMALLY 201B VALE (TCA)
CLOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 2-MSPCV-C SG POWER NRAL
)6 14 201C OPERATED RELIEF NORMALLYOSED CLOSED
> RLGM (2)(6)
Valve Component Stresses / Function VALVE (TCA) 15 2-QS-TK-1 REFUELING WATER STAND-BY IN-SERVICE 0.593(
Anchorage, Tank Overturning Moment Capacity STORAGE TANK B QUENCH SPRAY
>RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 16 2-QS-P-1IB STAND-BY STAND-BY PUMP
> RLGM (2)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (2) (7)
Anchorage MAIN CONTROL 17 2-El-CB-01 BEINCHOATRDO2-INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
BENCHBOARD 2-1
> RLGM (2)
Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 MAIN CONTROL
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 18 2-EI-CB-02 BOARD, BENCH INSTALLED INSTALLED Bench Board Equipment Function, Screened BOARD SECTION 2-2.
> RLGM (2)
BnhBadEupetFntoSree based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 MAIN CONTROL 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 19 2-EI-CB-03 VERTICAL BOARD INSTALLED INSTALLED Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened SECTION 2-1
> RLGM (2)
VeiclBadEupetFnioSrnd based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction MAIN CONTROL 20 2-El-CB-04 VERINCABOATRDO2-INSTALLED INSTALLED 20)VERTICAL BOARD 2-2 IT
()
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 B-2
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety MAIN CONTROL 1.57 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 21 2-El-CB-05 VERTICAL BOARD I
UNIT 2 SAFEGUARDS
> RLGM (2)
Vertical Board Equipment Function, Screened PANEL based on Guidance in EPRI TR-1019200 SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 22 2-EI-CB-23A PROCESS RACK A INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 23 2-EI-CB-23B PROCESS RACK B INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL II
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 24 2-EI-CB-23C PROCESS RACK C INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened SECONDARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 25 2-EI-CB-23D PROCESS RACK D INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened POST ACCIDENT 3.10 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Pullout in Expansion Anchor 26 2-EI-CB-34 MONITORING INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 27 2-EI-CB-51 PROCESS RACK 1 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION CH I
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 28 2-EI-CB-52 PROCESS RACK 2 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROTECTION
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CHANNELII PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 29 2-EI-CB-53 PROCESS RACK 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED PROT CHANNEL III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 30 2-EI-CB-54 PROCESS RACK 4 INSTALLED INSTALLED I
PROT CHANNEL IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened B-3
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 31 2-EI-CB-55 PROCESS RACK 5 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 32 2-EI-CB-56 PROCESS RACK 6 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 33 2-El-CB-57 PROCESS RACK 7 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened PRIMARY PLANT 2.75 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Tensile Stress in Cabinet Bolt 34 2-EI-CB-58 PROCESS RACK 8 INSTALLED INSTALLED CONTROL CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 120VAC
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 2-EP-CB-INSTRUMENTATION 35 ITRBTONPNL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80A DISTRIBUTION PANEL
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-1 2-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 36 80C DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 80C__
2-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-CB-120VAC INSTRUMENT
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 37 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 2-V
> RLGM Distribution Panel Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (2)(6)
Anchorage 38 2-EI-CB-114 RC282 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-802
> RLGM (2)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 39 2-EI-CB-124 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-101
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 40 2-EI-CB-128 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-104
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened INSTRUMENTATION
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 41 2-EI-CB-139 INSTALLED INSTALLED RACK 2-115
> RLGM (1)(9)
Instruments on Racks Function B-4
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 42 2-El-CB-145 INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage RACK 2-120
> RLGM (1) (8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened TECHNICAL 2.1 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 43 2-E-CB-300 SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ("('
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 4.96 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301A MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ()'
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 3.53 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301C MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM ("('
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET TECHNICAL 2.29 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 46 2-EI-CB-SUPPORT CENTER INSTALLED INSTALLED 301D MULTIPLEXER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened CABINET ICC MULTIPLEXER 4.15 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 47 2-EI-CP-03 INSTALLED INSTALLED CABINET
> RLGM (1)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2.28 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 48 2-EI-CP-04 ICC CABINET INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened MULTIPLEXER 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Support Flange Bending Stress 49 2-EI-CP-05 MASTER RECEIVER INSTALLED INSTALLED 1
CABINET
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened 2-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 50 BASIS PANEL OPERATING PANEL 1(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function 2-BDB-DB BEYOND DESIGN NOT 7.356 (2)(9)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 51 BASIS PANELOPRTN PANEL 2(Distribution Panel)
OPERATING_______
> RLGM (2)(9)
Distribution Panel Function B-5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety BEYOND DESIGN 7.356 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 2-BDB-DB BASIS PANEL 3, NOT 52 RECEPTACLE OPERATING OPERATING PANEL ASSEMBLY(Receptacle
> RLGM (2)(9)
Panel Function Panel) 2-MS-P I-A MAIN STM HDR TO 53 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II A MAIN STEAM 54 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2474 PRESS TRANSMITTER 2-MS-PI-B MAIN STM HDR TO 55 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II B MAIN STEAM 56 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2484 PRESS TRANSMITTER 2-MS-PI-C MAIN STM HDR TO 57 TURBINE PRESS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDR CHANNEL II C MAIN STEAM 58 2-MS-PT-HEADER TO TURBINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 38 2494 PRESS TRANSMITTER 1A STEAM 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 59 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2474 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 60 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 2474 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function B-6
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1B STEAM 2-FN-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 61 2484 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2484 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1 B STEAM 62 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 42 TRANSMITTER 1C STEAM 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR LEVEL 63 2494 INDIATOR CHNEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 2494 INDICATOR CHANNEL I
2-FW-LT-1C STEAM 64 GENERATOR LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 41 TRANSMITTER 1A STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 65 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2477A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR 1A STEAM 2-FW-LT-1ASTM 66 2477 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 40 RANGE LEVEL XMITR 1B STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 67 2-RN-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2487A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR l B STEAM 68 2487 GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 42 RANGE LEVEL XMTR 1C STEAM
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 69 2-FW-LI-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING 2497A RANGE LEVEL
> RLGM ()(8)
Instrument Function, Screened INDICATOR I
I B-7
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MR STATE STATE Safety 1C STEAM 70 2-FW-LT-GENERATOR WIDE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 39 2497 RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER 71 2LMP1 REACTOR CONT OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 200A PRESS PI PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 72 2-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 200A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER PEN 57 LEAK MON 73 2-LM-PI-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 210A PRESSURE INDICATOR PEN 57 LEAK MON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 2-LM-PT-SUPPLY LINE OPERATING OPERATING 210A PRESSURE
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened TRANSMITTER REACTOR 75 2LMT1200 CONTAINMENTAIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 1
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 2-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT 76 2-1 MONITOR NT OPERATING OPERATING 200-1 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT REACTOR 77 2-LM-TI-200-CONTAINMENT AIR OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 21 2
MONITOR TEMP INDICATOR REACTOR
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 78 2-LM-TE-CONTAINMENT AIR OPERATING OPERATING 200-2 MONITOR TEMP
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT I
I B-8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety A LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 79 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
A LOOP REACTOR 80 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2410 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD A LOOP REACTOR 81 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2413 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD B LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD AND 82 HOT LEG TEMP OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RECORDER(WIDE RANGE)
B LOOP REACTOR 83 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 2420 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD B LOOP REACTOR 84 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM Temperature Sensor Function 2423 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 85 2-RC-TR-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 2430 TEMP RECORDER (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 86 2-RC-TE-COOLANT COLD LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9) 2430___
IEPDA LMN PRTN PRTN LM()9 Temperature Sensor Function 2430 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT I
I_
RTD__
B-9
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety C LOOP REACTOR 87 2-RC-TE-COOLANT HOT LEG OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function 2433 TEMP DUAL ELEMENT RTD C LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-Pl-COOLANT HOT LEG 88 PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 INDICATOR (WIDE RANGE)
C LOOP REACTOR 2-RC-PI-COOLANT HOT LEG 89 2402B PRESS IND (NARROW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 RANGE) 2-RC-PT-LOOP C HOT LEG TO
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 90 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING 2402 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function LOOP A HOT LEG TO 91 2-RC-PI-RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 17 2403B INDICATOR (NARROW RANGE) 2-RC-PT-LOOP A HOT LEG TO 3.66 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 92 2403 RH PPS PRESSURE OPERATING OPERATING TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(9)
Transmitter Function 2-RC-LI-PRESSURIZER LEVEL 93 INDICATION OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 19 CHANNEL I 2-RC-LT-PRESSURIZER 94 2-CL-PESRZR OPERATING OPERATING 2459 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-CN-LI-EMERGENCY COND 95 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 LEVEL INDICATOR 2-CN-LT-EMERGENCY COND 3.05 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 96 STORAGE TANK OPERATING OPERATING 200B LEVEL TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(I)
Transmitter Function, Screened B-1 0
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 97 TO SIG A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 98 200A TO S/G A FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200A TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 2-FW-FI-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 99 TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 100 200B TO S/G B FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200B TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 1
2-FW-F-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 101 TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 20 INDICATOR 2-FW-FT-AFW PUMPS OUTLET 3.05(l)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 102 20WC TO S/G C FLOW OPERATING OPERATING (1)(8) 200C TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (
I(8)
Transmitter Function, Screened 103 2-CM-MR-3 ICC MASTER RECIEVER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 49 104 2-RC-LQ-201 ICCM DISPLAY POWER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 43 SUPPLY TRAIN A 105 2-CM-MUX-REMOTE MULTIPLEXER OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 47 32A MODULE 106 2-RC-KBD-ICCM CONTROL PAD OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 18 201 (TRAIN A) 107 2-RC-MON-GET/CCM/RVLIS OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation -See Item 19 201 MONITOR (TRAIN A)
I 108 2-RC-TE-T6 CORE LOCATION E12 OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function EXIT THERMOCOUPLE II B-11
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 1
109 2-RC-LR-REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 26 2310A RECORDER TRAIN A 0
2-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE RVLIS 110 2313 TRAIN A TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-RX VSL VENT LINE RVLIS 2314 TRAIN A TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2
2-RC-TE-INCORE THIMBLES 112 2315 RVLIS TRAIN A TUBING OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 2-RC-TE-B LOOP HOT LEG RVLIS 113 2316 TUBING TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (11(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEMENT 4
2-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 114 2317 THIMBLES RVLIS TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-RX VSL INCORE 115 2318 THIMBLES RVLIS TEMP OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1)(9)
Temperature Sensor Function ELEM 2-RC-TE-INCORE THIMBLES 116 2319 RVLIS TRAIN A TUBING OPERATING OPERATING
> RLGM (1) (9)
Temperature Sensor Function TEMP ELEM 2-RC-LIS-B LOOP RVLIS TRAIN A 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 117 HOT LEG ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2310 INDR SW
> RLGM ()(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 2-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A RX VSL 2.14(1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 118 HEAD ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2311 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened B-1 2
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-RC-LIS-RVLIS TRAIN A SEAL 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 119 TABLE ISOLATOR LVL OPERATING OPERATING 2312 INDR SWITCH
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 10 2-RC-LT-RECEELVI 120 2TRAIN A PLENUM LEVEL OPERATING OPERATING 2310 TRANSMITTER
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened 2-RC-LT-REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 121 TRAIN A NORMAL OPERATING OPERATING 2311 RANGE LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)(8)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened REAC VESSEL RVLIS 2.14 (1)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 12 2-RC-LT-RECVSLRLI 122 TRAIN A WIDE RANGE OPERATING OPERATING 2312 LEVEL XMTR
> RLGM (1)
Instruments on Racks Function, Screened EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 123 2-NM-PRO-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (1)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened PROCESSOR EXCORE NEUTRON
> RLGM (1)(7)
Anchorage 124 2-NM-AMP-FLUX MONITOR OPERATING OPERATING NM3 CHANNEL 3
> RLGM (1)(8)
Equipment Function, Screened AMPLIFIER NEUTRON FLUX 2-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, WIDE 125 2NMNF3 RANGE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 128 LVL,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL 3 NEUTRON FLUX 126 2-NM-NFI-INDICATOR, SOURCE OPERATING OPERATING Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 128 2270A1 RANGE,(EXCORE)
CHANNEL 3 7
2-NM-NFD-NEUTRON FLUX 127 2270 DETECTOR (EXOCRE)
INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(9)
Detector Function I_
_ CHANNEL3 I
IIII B-13
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2.28 (2) (5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 128 2-EI-CB-36C NIS CABINET 3 INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (2)(8)
Cabinet Function, Screened ISOLATION
> RLGM (2)(7)
Anchorage 129 2-EP-ST-03 TRANSFORMER FOR OPERATING OPERATING EXCORE NI CHAN III
> RLGM (2)(8)
Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 130 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04A 2-1 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-BKR-131 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-132 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-133 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-134 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-135 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-136 04A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 137 04A OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 130 CKTBRK CIRCUIT BREAKER OPN CSE CKTBRK 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 138 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04B 2-11 (TCA)
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened B-14
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MR STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-139 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-140 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-141 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 142 04B CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 138 CKTBRKI 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 143 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04C 2-111 (TCA)
>GDri a
F oe 2-EP-BKR-144 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-145 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-146 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-147 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-148 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-149 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK B-1 5
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEED 150 04C CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 143 CKTBRK 2-EP-CB-120VAC VITAL BUS 0.428 (2)(4)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 151 DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTALLED INSTALLED 04D 2-IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 2-EP-BKR-152 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-153 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-154 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-155 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 16 2-EP-BKR-BDB BACKFEEDOPN CSE 16 04D CIRCUIT BREAKER OECLSDRule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 151 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-157 80A CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 35 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-158 80C CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 36 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-159 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-160 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK I
B-16
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ESELT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
ITEM MARK #
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-BKR-161 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-162 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK 2-EP-BKR-163 80E CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 37 CKTBRK VITAL BUS 1.72 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 164 2-VB-INV-01 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-1 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 165 2-VB-INV-02 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-11 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.22 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 166 2-VB-INV-03 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-111 INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened VITAL BUS 2.33 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 167 2-VB-INV-04 DISTRIBUTION PANEL OPERATING OPERATING 2-IV INVERTER
> RLGM (2)(8)
Inverter Function, Screened 168 2-BY-B-2-I STATION BATTERY 2-1 CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 169 2-BY-B-2-11 STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity 11 Battery Rack Structural Integrity 170 2-BY-B-2-111 STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IIIBatteryRackStructuralIntegrity 171 2-BY-B-2-IV STATION BATTERY 2-CHARGING OPERATING 0.477 (2)(4)
Battery Rack Structural Integrity IV Battery Rack Structural Integrity 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 172 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12A CABINET 1-1
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 13 2-EP-BKR-173 CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 172 12A-1 3 111 B-17
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM MARK #
DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 174 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12B CABINET 1-11
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 175 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 174 12B-14 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 176 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12C CABINET 1-111
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 177 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 176 12C-12 2-EP-CB-125 VDC 3.67 (2)(5)
Anchorage, Shear/Tension Interaction 178 DISTRIBUTION INSTALLED INSTALLED 12D CABINET 1-IV
> RLGM (2)(8)
Distribution Panel Function, Screened 179 2-EP-BKR-CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CLOSED Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 178 12D-11 A LOW HEAD SI PUMP 180 2SI-MOV SUCTION FROM OPEN CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 2862ARW T_
RWST 2-SI-MOV-B LOW HEAD SI PUMP 181 2B SUCTION FROM OPEN CLOSED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened 11 2862B R S RWST 2-CH-MOV-CHG PUMP SUCTION 182 2115B FROM RWST CLOSED OPEN
> RLGM (1)(8)
Valve Function, Screened ISOLATION VALVE 1
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 183 2-CH-P-1C C CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
- RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 184 2-CH-P-1B B CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (1)(8)
Pump Function, Screened
> RLGM (1)(6)
Anchorage 185 2-CH-P-1A A CHARGING PUMP INSTALLED INSTALLED
> RLGM (')(8)
Pump Function, Screened B-1 8
North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report APPENDIX B ESEL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT HCLPF (g) or ITEM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NORMAL DESIRED Factor of Key Failure Mode(s)
STATE STATE Safety Sl COLD LEG 186 2836 ALTERNATECTIONHEADER CLOSED OPEN 0.71 (1)(4)
Yoke Leg Stress ISOLATION 187 2-FW-GOV-2 TDAFW PUMP NORMALLY OPEN Rule of the Box Evaluation - See Item 2 GOVERNOR VALVE OPEN Note: The superscripts in the column "HCLPF (g) or Factor of Safety" are described in Section 6.6 of the report.
B-19