ML14192A184
| ML14192A184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14192A183 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8106010442 | |
| Download: ML14192A184 (19) | |
Text
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety-related electrical equip ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety-related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and accident plant operation. In order to ensure compliance with the cri teria, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reactors to submit a reevaluation of the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsh environment.
2 BACKGROUND On February 8, 1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 79-01, "Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment."
This bulletin, together with IE Circular. 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform-reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1980) states that the DOR guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-01B) form the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)-4. This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all operating plants by February 1, 1981. In addition, this order requires that the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment installed in their plants by June 30, 1982.
Supplements to IEB 79-01B were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees. The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.. The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment-qualification records. The central file was mandated to be established by December 1, 1980. The order also required that all safety-related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982. In 810601 0
response, the licensee submitted information through letters dated March 10, in June, August 21, October 22, and November 1, 1980.
2.1 Purpose The purpose of this.SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments. The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
2.2 Scope The scope of this report is.limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability. The criteria described in the DOR guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed (1) a preliminary evaluation of the licensee's response, documented in a technical evaluation report (TER) and (2) an onsite verification inspection (August 25-29, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment. The reactor coolant, safety injection, auxiliary cooling, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems and electrical penetration assembly were inspected. All the equipment inspected is located inside containment. The inspection verified proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers' nameplate data. The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report. The site inspection is documented in report IE 50-261/80-20. No deficiencies were noted. For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with IEB 79-01B, the licensee was directed to (1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required tomitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures. The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per formance of the systems on the list. The systems list was established on the basis of the functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without regard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Based upon information in the licensee's submittal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal,. (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of signifi cant release of radi.oactive material to the environment. The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee.(listed in Appendix 0) are acceptable, with the exception of those items.discussed in Section 5 of this report.
Display instrumentation which provides information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee. A complete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB emergency procedures must be provided. Equipment qualifi cation information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all components of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments.
Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety related but which is mentioned in the emergency procedure should appear on the list. For these instruments,. (1) justification should be provided for not considering the instrument safety related and(2) assurance should be provided that its subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely.affect the mitigation of the consequences of the accident. The environmental qualifi cation of post-accident sampling and monitoring and radiation monitoring.
equipment is closely related to the review of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be performed in conjunction with that review.
The licensee identified 144 items of equipment which were assessed by the staff.
3.2. Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the DOR guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental.quali fication program. These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified.
in the licensee's Final Safety. Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes relative to the temperature, pressure, and the containment spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the qualification documentation to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the conditions estab lished by the licensee. During this review, the staff assumed that for plants designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray system which satis fies the single-failure criterion, the main-steam-line-break (MSLB) environmental conditions are enveloped by the large-break-LOCA environmental conditions. The staff assumed, and requires the licensee to verify, that the containment spray system is not subjected to a disabling single-component failure and therefore satisfies the requirements of Section 4.2.1 of.the DOR guidelines.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that the flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:
Max Temp (OF)
Max Press (psig)
Humidity (%}
LOCA 265 42 100 MSLB not provided not provided 100 The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile used in the specifications for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for higher-than-average temperatures.in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification, especially following a postulated MSLB. Use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for either a postulated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling, as to potential adverse environmental effects on equipment.
The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 265 0 F does not satisfy the above requirement. Furthermore, the licensee's specified pressure is low as compared to plants of similar design. The licensee is requested to verify that the pressure profile in the FSAR was calculated based on the Code requirements defined in NUREG-0588. If by using these codes the peak con tainment pressure is still 42 psig, then a saturation temperature corresponding to the pressure profile (2890 F peak temperature at 42 psig) should be used.
If, however, the calculated peak pressure is higher than 42 psig, the saturation temperature corresponding to the new pressure profile should be used. The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature, pressure, and humidity associated with an HELB outside containment, as well as applicable radiation levels associated with equipment in the proximity of recirculating fluid lines. The following area outside containment has been addressed:
(1) Auxiliary building The licensee has used ambient temperature conditions in some areas outside containment. The staff considers saturation temperature at the peak pressure resulting from a HELB as the minimum level for acceptance. The licensee should update his summary tables to reflect this change. If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must either provide justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under saturated conditions or propose corrective action.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee. Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
The licensee's value for maximum submergence is 231.2 ft elevation inside containment. Equipment below this level has been identified by the licensee.
The licensee identified three safety-related level transmitters mounted on the shield wall as having the potential for becoming submerged after a postulated event. The licensee stated that these transmitters are not the only source of data for operator assessment and decision needed for HELB and LOCA situations; therefore, their assumed failure upon submergence does not necessitate relo cation or replacement. In this regard, licensee should provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of these transmitters.
The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of these components will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator. Additionally, the licensee should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation to the time of submergence.
If the results of the licensee's assessment are acceptable, then these transmitters may be exempt from the submergence parameter of qualification.
It is not clear from the information submitted that submergence of safety related electrical equipment outside of containment was addressed. The licensee should address this area more specifically in the 90-day response and upgrade the CES as appropriate.
3.6 Chemical Spray The licensee has specified that boric acid solution constitutes the plant's chemical spray; however, the exact volume percent, concentration, and pH values were not provided. Therefore, for the purpose of this review, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved. The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
3.7 Aging Section 7 of the DOR guidelines does not require a qualified life to be estab lished for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, the following actions are required:
(1) Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identified in Appendix C of the DOR guidelines.
The first supplement to IEB-79-01B requires licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort. -
(2) Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations.
(3) Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
The licensee identified a number of equipment items for which a specified qualified life was established (for examples, 5 years, 15 years, or 40 years).
In its assessment of these submittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supple mental information to verify and identify the degree of conformance to the above requirements. The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments.
The licensee indicated that this phase of the response is outstanding and that the review is in progress. The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.8 Radiation.(Inside and Outside Containment)
The licensee has provided values for.the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA. The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented.to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria con tained in the DOR guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-01B, Supplement 2. Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria. The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the licensee.
The value required by the licensee inside containment ranges between 9.5 x 10s to 1.5 x 108 rads for the integrated dose. These values do not envelope the DOR guideline (4 x 107 rads) requirements and therefore are not acceptable.
The radiation service condition provided by the licensee is lower than pro vided in the guidelines for gamma and beta radiation. The licensee is required to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation. If the former option is chosen, then the analysis, including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calculation, should be provided.
A required value outside containment of 1.1 x 106 rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels within the RHR pump area of the auxiliary building. This value appears to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA recircula tion fluid lines and is therefore acceptable.
4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licen see's submittal, of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip ment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In.
its assessment.of the licensee s submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions presented by the licensee. Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licen-.
see (for example, test reports). It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualifi cation or replace the item(s) of concern. This effort will begin in early 1981.
An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is required. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficien cies. It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficiencies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 Equipment. Requiring Immediate Corrective Action Appendix A identifies equipment (if any) in this category. The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety-related electrical equipment. The licensee's review has concluded that the conductor pigtails of some electrical penetrations are unqualified, and a licensee event report (LER) number RSEP/80-1037, addressing this issue, was submitted to the NRC on July 3, 1980.
A qualification testing program, which is scheduled to be completed by May 1981, has been initiated by the licensee, and.results will be submitted to the NRC. The results will enable the licensee to determine whether further action is required. The licensee further stated that analysis of operating-time radiation exposure led to the conclusion that the plant.can continue operation until the testing is completed and the results reviewed. In this review, the staff has not identified any safety-related electrical equipment which is not.
able to perform its intended safety function during the time in which it must operate.
4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.. The.deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to thelegend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
Legend R
radiation T
temperature QT -
qualification time RT required time P
pressure H
humidity CS chemical spray A
- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
submergence M
margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM -
qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualification justification inadequate QI - qualification information being developed.
RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified. However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation. The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environ ment, and equipment failure'in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environ ment, and the adequacy for.the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented by.providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable), and so forth. The staff will.review the licensee's response, when it is submitted, and.discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
It should be noted that in cases where testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment does not satisfy the qualification test requirements.. For that equipment, the licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to. ensure that qualification-can be established by June 30, 1982.
4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory reso lution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was. conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and main tenance records in order to identify equipment degradation'which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established. The staff will review the licensee's response when it is sub mitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-018, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment and TMI lessons learned modifications.
The staff has required that this information be provided by February 1, 1981. The staff will provide a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns.
6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required.to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3 of this report. The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report. Outstanding information identi fied in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety-related electrical equip ment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant operation. However, the staff has determined that many items of safety related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for this review do not have adequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the harsh environmental service conditions. This review was based on a com parison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lack ing.in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the DOR guidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requalifi cation, replacement, relocation, and so. forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982. If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies. Where additional information is required, the licensee should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
The staff issued to the licensee Sections 3 and 4 of this report and requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), that the licensee review the deficien cies enumerated and the ramifications thereof to determine whether safe operation of the facility would be impacted in consideration of the deficiencies. The licensee has completed a preliminary review of the identified deficiencies and has determined that, after due consideration of the deficiencies and their ramification, continued safe operation would not be adversely affected.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance with the above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 will ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980. The staff further concludes that there is reasonableiassur ance of.continued safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions. This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) that there are no outstanding items which would require immediate correc tive action.to assure safety of plant operation 10 -
(2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental. conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low-probability events; events which might reasonably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.
11 -
APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration B-1 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration B-2 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration B-5 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration8-9 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-1 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-2 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-3 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-4 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-6 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire, of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-8 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration C-9 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration D-1 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration D-2 A-1
APPENDIX A (cont'd)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration D-3 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration 0-5 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration D-8 Conductor Pigtails Continental Wire of Electrical Penetrations and Cable Co.
Penetration D-9 Testing of equipment ongoing; licensee's integrated dose assessment provides justification for continued operation until testing is completed and analyzed.
A-2
APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R -
Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification Time RT -
Required Time P -
Pressure H -
Humidity CS -
Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S -
Submergence M -
Margi-n I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN -
Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN -
Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI -
Qualification information being developed RPS -
Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Model No.
Location' Deficiency Flow Transmitter Fischer & Porter 1OB2496PBBABBB 2
R,QT,AQM Pressure Transmitter Fischer & Porter 50EP1041BCXA 2
R,QT,AQM Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-00 1
R,CS,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-00 2
R,RT,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-3 1
R,CS,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB-1 2
R,RT,A Pump Motor Westinghouse 506UPZ 2
R,T,QTRT,PH, A,M 1
Location (1) Containment Building Location (2) Auxiliary Building B-1
APPENDIX B (cont'd)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Model No.
Location' Deficiency Temperature Element Rosemount 176KF 1
RCS,A Fan Motor Westinghouse 685.5-S 1
R,CS,A Electrical Penetration Crouse-Hinds 1.2.2 (745) 1 R,QT,RT,CSA Electrical Penetration Crouse-Hinds 1.2.2 (747) 1 R,QT,RT,CSA Electrical Penetration Crouse-Hinds 1.2.4 (749) 1 R,QT,RT,CSA Electrical Penetration Crouse-Hinds 1.2.5 (751) 1 R,QTRT,CS,A Cable Continental Wire
& Cable CC2115 1
R,RT,P,H,CSA Cable Kerite High temp, fire. resistant 1
R,RT,P,H,CS,A Transmitter Rosemount 1153A 1
R,H,CS,A,QMS Solenoid Valve ASCO NP831665E 1
R,CS,A Solenoid Valve ASCO NP8316E35E 1
R,CS,A Solenoid Valve ASCO 206-381-2U 1
R,CSA Cable Splices Raychem 1000-12N 1
R,T,RT,P,H,CS,A Cable Splices Raychem 500-12N 1
R,T,RT,PH,CS,A Cable Splices Raychem 300-12N 1
R,T,RT,P,H,CS,A Cable Splices Raychem 200-12N 1
RT,RT,P,H,CS,A Cable Splices Raychem 115-6N 1
R,T,RT,P,H,CS,A Cable Splices Raychem 070-6N 1
R,T,RT,P,H,CS,A Level Transmitter Fischer & Porter 10B2496 1
APPENDIX B (cont'd)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Model No.
Location' Deficiency Pressure Transmitter Fi scher & Porter 50EP1041BCXA-NS 1
CS,A,QM,S,RPS Flow Transmitter Rosemount 1151 1
QT,P,CS,A,QM, S,RPS Level Transmitter Fischer & Porter 13D2495 1
QT,CS,A,QM,S, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO LB8211C32 1
R,T,QT,P,H,CS, A,QM,S,RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO LB8316B25 1
R,T,QT,P,H,CS, A,QM,S,RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO LB8316B15 1
R,T,QT,P,H,CS, A,QM,S,RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO LB8316B14 1
R,T,QT,P,H,CS, A,QM,S,RPS Level Switch Madison 5602 1
RT,QT,RT,P,H, CS,A,QM Level Transmitter Fischer & Porter 13B2496 1
QT,CS,A,QM,S, RPS Cable for Continental Wire Instrumentation
& Cable CC2115 1
R,RT,P,H,CS, A,QI Silicon Rubber 3M/Electric Tape Products Division Scotch 70 1
RT,QT,RT,P,H, CS,A,QM,QI Cable Terminals and Splices AMP 53548-1 1
- RTRTPHCS, AQMQI B-3
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Model No.
Deficiency No equipment in this category.
C-1
APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems List' Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Reactor Protection Engineered Safeguards Actuation Chemical and Volume Control Reactor Coolant Containment Isolation Chemical and Volume Control Main and Auxiliary Steam Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Safety Injection Residual Heat Removal Cooling Water Containment Ventilation Reactor Core Cooling Safety Injection System Containment Heat Removal Containment Spray Containment Air Recirculation Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal Auxiliary Feedwater Main Feedwater Main Steam Cooling Water Safety Injection
'The NRC staff recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering design, consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names. In those instances, it was necessary to verify the function of the system(s) with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
D-1
APPENDIX D.
(continued)
Function System Prevention of Significant Containment Air Purification(1)
Release of Radioactive Material to Environment Containment Combustible Gas Control( 1 )
Post Accident Sampling and Monitoring Supporting Systems HVAC Emergency Power Covered as part of TMI-2 lessons learned.
D-2