ML14190A653

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Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Pressurized Thermal Shock Issue & 150-day Response to NRC
ML14190A653
Person / Time
Site: Robinson 
Issue date: 03/16/1982
From: Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Jackie Jones
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
REF-GTECI-A-49, REF-GTECI-RV, TASK-A-49, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8203260294
Download: ML14190A653 (6)


Text

MAR mg DISTRIBUTION Docket File Gray File NRC PDR L PDR TERA Docket No. 50-261 NSIC ORB#l Rdg DEisenhut OELD Mr. J. A. Jones AEOD A

Senior Executive Vice President IERS1 Carolina Power and Light Company ACRS-10 336 FA etteville Street CParrish Ralefi, North Carolina 27602 GRequa SVarga

Dear Mr. Jones:

GVissing SHanauer During our meeting of February 24, 1982, with the Westinghouse Owners Group and the three Westinghouse NSS Owners, who received our August 21, 1981 letter concerning pressurized thermal shock (PTS),

it was requested that we provide a formal request for any additional information which would be desired regarding the PTS issue. The endlosure identifies the requested additional information. We request the information be submitted by April 30, 1982.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, 0MB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.

Sincerely, 9glal signed by Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #I Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/enclosure:

See next page 8203260294 820316 PDR ADOCK 05000261 P

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NRO FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM O240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-980

DISTRIBUTION:

DEisenhut Docket File CParrish TE NRC PDR GRequa L PDR SVarga.

Gray File ORB#lRdg GVissing Dockt No. 50-26 Hanauer AEOD /

Mr. J.. A. Jones Senior Executive Vice President Carolina Power and Light Company, 336 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Jones:

During our meeting of February 24, 1982, with the Westinghouse Owners Group and the three Westinghouse NSS Owners, who received our August 21, 1981 letter concerning pressurized thermal shock (PTS),

it was requested that we provide a forkalirequest for any additional information which would be desired regarding.the PTS issue.

The enclosure identifies the requested additional information.

We request, the information be submitted by March/31, 1982.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.

S ncerely, Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch Il Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/enclosure:

See next page

  • See previous 318 for concurrence.

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2 NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960

DISTRIBUTION:

DEisenhut IE Docket File CParrish ACRS-10 NRC PDR GRequa Gray File L PDR SVarga ORB#1 Rdg GVissing Docket No. 50-261 SHanauer OELD AEOD Mr. J. A. Jones Senior Executive Vice President Carolina Power and Light Company 336 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Jones:

During our meeting with the Westinghouse Owners Group and the three Westinghouse NSS Owners, who received our August 21., 1981 letter con cerning pressurized thermal sjhock (PTS) on February 24, 1982 it was requested that we provide a formal request for any additional infor mation which would be desired regarding the PTS issue.

The enclosure identifies the,.requested additional information.

We request the infor mation be submitted by March 31, 1982.

Sincerely, Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/enclosure:

See next page OFFICE 0.4:;DL C-4: DL ORBl :1DL C-ORB#. :DL D:DST AD-OR:DL FICE l

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/82 3/ /82 3/ /82 3/ /82 NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO:1981-335-960

Mr. J. A. Jones Carolina Power and Light Company cc: G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036 Hartsville Memorial Library Home and Fifth Avenues Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Route 5, Box 266-1A Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 Michael C. Farrar, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Richard S. Salzman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator - Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Enclosure REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PRESSURIZED THER4AL SHOCK AND REGARDING THE "150 DAY" RESPONSE TO NRC LETTER DATED AUGUST 21, 1981 FOR H. B. ROBINSON 2 DOCKET NO. 50- 261

1. Provide the following information related to fluenge determination:

(A) Plant specific information which would allow determination of the pressure vessel fluence.

Such information should contain as built core and pressure vessel dimensions, regional material composition and neutron source for a two-dimensional (R-O) and (R-Z) neutron transport solution, and (B) Plant specific values of the pressure vessel fluence and its estimated uncertainty.

2. Concerning Operator Action:

In your evaluation, the actions described do not provide the operator with clear direction for dealing with conflicting concerns that need to be evaluated when considering the operation of HPI and the charging flow as it relates to vessel integrity and maintaining core cooling.

Provide an evaluation of the need and effectiveness of procedure modifications to clearly identify the concerns in the emergency operating procedures themselves. This should be done in contrast of depending upon upgrading operator training alone.

3.

Concerning Input Data and Assumptions 3.0 Provide a description of the models or data used for:

(a) Heat sources (or sinks),

(b) Decay heat, (c) ECC and feedwater temperatures (enthalpies) and flow rates, (d) Primary and seconda-ry relief capacities, (e)

Empirical correlation coefficients used for PTS evaluations, (f) Operator Actions, (a) Initial conditions;

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION H. B. Robinson 2 (Continued)

-2 3.2 Provide a list of all transients or accidents by.class (for example:

excessive feedwater, operating transients which result from multiple failures including control system failures and/or operator error, steam line break and, small break LOCA) which could lead to inside vessel fluid te peratures of 300 F or lower. Provide any Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FM4EAs) of control systems currently available or reference any such analyses already submitted.

Estimate the frequency of occurrence of these events and provide the basis for the estimates. Discuss the assumptions made regarding reactor operator actions.

For a given initiating event, potential multiple and consequences failures need to be considered to identify those.,transients which could lead to a PTS problem.

3.3 Identify all potential PTS events which have occurred at your facility. Include a designation of the operator actions and identify potential additional failures (including operator) which could have resulted in a more severe event.

4. Concerning a Review of Operating History.

Review your operating history at your plant and identify events which have resulted in exceeding the cooldown rate of 100*F/hr. as well as those events which could have exceeded the cooldown rate limit if not mitigated by plant controls or operator actions.