ML14181A761
| ML14181A761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1995 |
| From: | Moorman J, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A760 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-95-25, NUDOCS 9509180342 | |
| Download: ML14181A761 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1995025
Text
pjk REGou
UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
0
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report No.: 50-261/95-25
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Inspection Conducted: August 28 - September 1, 1995
Inspector:
s
JaiseH. Moorman, I
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel: D. Charles Payne
Approved by:
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Thomas A. Peebles, Chief
Date Signed
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of the licensed
operator requalification program during the period August 28-September 1,
1995. The purpose of the inspection was to (1) verify that the licensee's
requalification program for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor
operators (SROs) ensures safe power plant operation by evaluating how well the
individual operators and crews had mastered training objectives and (2) assess
the licensee's effectiveness in ensuring that the individuals who are licensed
to operate the facility, satisfy the conditions of their licenses as specified
in 10 CFR 55.53.
Results:
The examination team concluded that (1) the licensee's requalification program
for ROs and SROs was adequate to ensure safe power plant operations and (2)
the facility licensee was effective in ensuring that individuals who are
licensed to operate the facility, would satisfy the conditions of their
licenses.
The inspectors identified one item for follow-up concerning various weaknesses
in AOP-14, "Component Cooling Water System Malfunction" (paragraph 2.c.1).
9509180342 950912
Enclosure
PDR ADOCK 05000261
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- D. Gudger, Regulatory Affairs
- M. Herrell, Training Manager
- R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- B. Meyer, Operations Manager
- T. Natale, Operations Training Supervisor
- B. Steele, Assistant Operations Manager
- D. Young, Plant General Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included training department
instructors, licensed operators, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel
- W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2. Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation (71001)
a. Summary
The NRC conducted a routine, announced inspection of the
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant licensed operator requalification
program during the period August 28 - September 1, 1995. The purpose
of the inspection was to (1) verify that the licensee's
requalification program for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor
operators (SROs) ensures safe power plant operation by evaluating how
well the individual operators and crews had mastered training
objectives and (2) assess the licensee's effectiveness in ensuring
that the individuals who are licensed to operate the facility, satisfy
the conditions of their licenses as specified in 10 CFR 55.53. Based
on a review of records and observation of examinations, those
activities appeared to be satisfactorily conducted.
b. Examination Administration
The inspectors observed the training department evaluators and
licensed operators during the administration of operating tests to
determine if the tests were administered in accordance with the
guidelines in NUREG-1021. The operating test consisted of an
evaluation on the plant reference simulator and an evaluation using
Job Performance Measures (JPMs), which tests an operator's ability to
use procedures. The licensee evaluators administered the simulator
examinations and JPMs in accordance with plant procedures. In
addition to training department evaluators, the Operations Manager and
Assistant Operations Manager conducted evaluations of operator
performance during the simulator examinations. In addition to
emphasizing the importance of training to the operators, Operations
Enclosure
Report Details
2
Management can also provide feedback directly to the operators and
training department personnel on management expectations for operator
performance and in specific areas that may require interpretation. Of
the two crews observed during the inspection, one crew exhibited
performance that was not at the level of management expectations.
While technically satisfactory, the crew did not approach their tasks
in a manner commensurate with the responsibility conferred by their
licenses. This crew was designated to receive remedial training prior
to returning to shift.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c. Examination Development
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's requalification written and
operating examinations by comparing them to guidelines provided in the
licensee's procedures and NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards," Revision 7. The inspectors found that the licensee
developed examinations were adequate. A review of selected
examinations indicated that test items were constructed to test to
adequate knowledge and abilities levels. The examinations generally
complied with the guidelines of NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing
Examiner Standards." A review of the examinations also revealed an
adequate knowledge level and adequate difficulty separation between RO
and SRO questions. Additionally, the examinations tested operator
proficiency at performing tasks that were identified as important to
risk by the H. B. Robinson probabilistic safety assessment.
No violations or deviations were identified
d. Plant Procedure Improvements
Examiners observed the walk-through portion of an operating test
evaluation that included use of the following JPMs: JPM-IP-45, "Align
Charging Pump Emergency Cooling IAW AOP-014, Attachment 1;"
JPM-IP-019, "Operate PZR PORV PCV-456 at Local Control Station;" and
JPM-IP-008, "Shed Non-Vital DC and AC Loads IAW EPP-1."
The
simulation of each task was successfully completed by the operator.
However, within the boundaries of each task, there existed some
impediment that could either delay or result in a failure to complete
the task if performed under the conditions of an actual event.
(1) Abnormal Operating Procedure 14, "Component Cooling Water System
Malfunction"
The H. B. Robinson probabilistic safety assessment states that a
reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
contributes 38 percent to the overall core damage frequency. As
initiating events, the loss of component cooling water (CCW) and
loss of service water contribute 23 percent and 20 percent
Enclosure
Report Details
3
respectively to the RCP seal LOCA core damage sequences. Reactor
coolant pump seals require either CCW or seal injection from the
chemical and volume control system (CVCS) for cooling. Component
cooling water also supplies cooling water to the CVCS charging
pump oil coolers.
Operator actions for loss of component cooling water are
contained in AOP-14, "Component Cooling Water System
Malfunction." To maintain RCP seal cooling during a loss of CCW
event, Attachment 1 to AOP-14 provides direction to locally
establish cooling water to the charging pump oil coolers. The
inspectors observed operators simulate performance of the actions
of AOP-14, Attachment 1 and noted some impediments to the timely
completion of the procedure. Steps 4 and 9 direct the operator
performing the task to notify the shift Fire Protection
Technician and Chemistry Technician, respectively, of abnormal
conditions that will result from the emergency alignment. Since
this task is performed under emergency conditions, halting the
procedure for these notifications causes an unnecessary delay in
procedure completion.
Emergency cooling water to the charging pumps is routed from the
emergency source to hoses and fittings that are stored in a
special locker. The operator is provided direction on how to
assemble the hoses and fittings in Attachment 1. The fittings
are kept in a tray in the top of the locker for easy access, but
they are not labeled in any way nor are they grouped according to
location of eventual usage.
The inspectors questioned the sequence of performance of AOP-14
and the assumptions that were made concerning the length of time
that a CVCS system charging pump would run without cooling water.
The charging pump assembly consists of a single speed motor
coupled to a positive displacement pump by a fluid drive that
allows variable speed operation of the pump. The inspectors were
provided with charging pump vendor information that stated that
the charging pumps should not be run for longer than five minutes
without cooling water. This limitation is considered in AOP-14
as the operators are directed to rotate the charging pumps on
5-minute intervals to ensure pump survivability until emergency
cooling is aligned. The charging pumps were tested in 1992 to
determine the length of time that they would run without cooling.
The test determined that the pump would run for different times
depending on the load on the pump. With a low load, the
allowable run time is shorter since oil in the fluid drive
absorbs the excess energy from the pump. The pump will fail when
oil in the fluid drive overheats and is no longer able to
lubricate the bearings. In a loss of CCW or service water
scenario, the plant operators will be performing AOP-14 and the
emergency operating procedures in parallel.
With the many
Enclosure
Report Details
4
requirements placed on the operator in emergency situations, it
is possible that charging pumps will be run for longer than five
minutes during the initial phases of accident mitigation. The
licensee has determined that from the information available to
them, the charging pumps will survive a loss of CCW accident
until emergency cooling is established, but does not have a
coping analysis specifically addressing the survivability of
charging pumps.
The inspectors observed operators performing JPM-CR-066, "Respond
to a loss of CCW to the RCP Motor Coolers."
This JPM is
evaluated in the simulator under real-time conditions. For a
loss of CCW to all RCPs, AOP-14 directs the operator to trip the
reactor and stop the RCPs. This procedure contains no immediate
operator actions which would require the operator to take actions
prior to referencing the procedure. The basis document for
AOP-14 states that the RCPs should be tripped within two minutes
of a loss of cooling. None of the operators observed performing
this JPM tripped the RCPs within two minutes. Although the
AOP-14 basis document states that the 2-minute trip requirement
comes from the RCP technical manual, the responsible system
engineers could not locate the source of the requirement and were
unaware of it's existence. The above items are identified as
Inspector Follow-up.Item 50-261/95-25-01, "AOP-14 weaknesses."
(2) Dedicated Shutdown Procedure 12, "Pressurizer PORV Control/Power
Repair Procedure"
Step 15 of this procedure directs the operator to adjust voltage
using a voltage adjust potentiometer. One of the operators
simulating performance of this procedure was momentarily delayed
because the potentiometer was not labeled. The licensee
installed a label prior to the inspectors leaving site.
Step 18 of this procedure states "Check Motive Force For PCV-456
- available." The operator performing the simulation of this
task appeared confused by the step and completion of the task was
significantly delayed while he attempted to perform the step.
The valve, PCV-456, is an air operated valve with a back-up
nitrogen supply.
(3) End Path Procedure 1, "Loss of all AC power"
Attachment 2, Load Shed Listing, provides the operators with
direction for removing loads from the station batteries to
increase the service time of the battery. The list provided in
the procedure contains a breaker number and the noun name of the
breaker (i.e., Breaker 7, "Startup Transformer Motor Operated
Disconnects"). At the 125VDC MCC-A and Distribution Panel A, the
labeling for the breakers contains only the noun name of the
Enclosure
Report Details
5
breaker. The "B" panel is similar. The number 2, 7B, and 3
Instrument Bus breakers are labeled with only the breaker
numbers.
Inside each instrument bus cabinet is a page from a
procedure with the breaker noun names on it. The page is folded
and stored in a plastic pouch affixed to the back of the cabinet
door. This procedure will be performed with only emergency
lighting and an operator's flashlight available for illumination.
Under these conditions, it is advantageous to provide the
operator with labeling that is consistent with the procedure and
that unambiguously identifies the component that is to be
operated.
4. Exit Interview
At the conclusion of the site visit, the inspectors met with
representatives of the plant staff listed in paragraph one to discuss the
results of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary
any material provided to, or reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors
further discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. The
licensee did not express any dissenting comments.
Item Number
Status
Description and Reference
IFI 50-261/95-25-01
Open
AOP-14 weaknesses.
Enclosure