ML14181A704
| ML14181A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1995 |
| From: | Blake J, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A702 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-95-13, NUDOCS 9506280042 | |
| Download: ML14181A704 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1995013
Text
61
REGo-
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report No.:
50-261/95-13
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Plant Unit 2
Inspection Cond c d:
ril 7- and May 15-19, 1995
Inspector:/
,
./
- 5
j1 m . leinsorge P.E.
Date Si ned
Re
In
or
Approved by.
JWome J.
ake, Chief
Dite Signed
terial
and Process Section
/ nginee ing Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Inservice
Inspection (ISI), Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC), 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump
(RCP) main flange stud degradation, and licensee actions on previous
inspection findings.
Results:
ISI program and procedures were well written and appropriate for their
intended application.
ISI records support the conclusion that examinations
were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and regulatory
commitments.
Enclosure 2
9506260042 950616
PDR ADOCK 05000261
G
2
The current FAC program, based on EPRI's CHECMATE, was first implemented
during the last refueling outage. The program shows great promise for
maintaining high energy carbon steel piping systems within acceptable wall
thickness limits. Time is necessary for the fulfillment of that promise.
A weakness was identified related to the control of metallurgical failure
analysis specimens.
The licensee failed to provide work instructions requiring direct or indirect
visual inspection of the C RCP main flange studs after the removal of the
boric acid residue and the associated corrosion products. This failure
permitted degraded studs to remain in the RCP without an evaluation of
operability.
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified concerning a failure to
provide adequate work instructions for the inspection of degraded RCP studs.
No deviations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- M. Brown, Manager, Design Engineering
- G. Castleberry, Manager, Plant Electrical Engineering
- W. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Compliance
- W. Dorman, Quality Control Supervisor
- A. Garrow, Acting Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- C. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
- R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- B. Meyer, Manager, Operations
- J. Moyer, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
- E. Rossman, Engineer
- D. Taylor, Plant Controller
- R. Wardern, Manager, Plant Support Nuclear Assessment Section
- R. Webber, Senior Specialist
- T. Wilkerson, Manager, Environmental Control
- S. Williams, Senior Engineer
- D. Young, Plant General Manager
NRC Personnel:
- C. Ogle, Resident Inspector
- W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) (73753)
The inspector reviewed documents and records, and observed activities,
as indicated below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in
accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and
licensee commitments.
The applicable code for ISI, for Unit 2 is the ASME B&PV Code,
Section XI, 1986 Edition with no Addenda (86NA). Unit 2 is in refueling
outage (RFO) 16, the third outage of the first 40-month period of the
third ten-year interval (03, PI, 13) ending February 19, 2002. Unit 2
was granted a construction permit July 12, 1966, received its Operating
License on July 31, 1970, and commenced commercial operations on
March 7, 1971.
During RFO 15 (02,P1 13), Nuclear Energy Services (NES) nondestructive
examination (NDE) personnel, were performing liquid penetrant (PT),
2
magnetic particle (MT), ultrasonic (UT), and visual (VT) examinations
under the umbrella of the NES Quality Assurance (QA) Program.
During RFO 16, (03, P1, 13), Westinghouse Company (W) NDE personnel,
were performing UT examinations under the umbrella of the W QA Program.
CP&L NDE personnel were performing VT and MT examinations under the
envelope of the CP&L QA Program.
a.
ISI Program Review, Unit 2
The inspector reviewed the following documents relating to the ISI
program to determine whether the plan had been approved by the
licensee and to assure that procedures and plans had been estab
lished for the applicable activities.
Documents Reviewed
ID
Rev.
Title
-
1
Carolina Power and Light Company H. B.
2/10/94
Robinson Nuclear Project Third Ten Year
Interval Examination Program Plan
-
Examination Program Plan For Carolina Power
And Light Company H.B. Robinson Unit #2
Inservice Inspection Interval-3 Period-1
Outage-3
These documents were well written and appropriate for their
intended application.
b.
Review of NDE Procedures, Units 1 and 2
The inspector reviewed 'the procedures listed below to determine
whether these procedures were consistent with regulatory require
ments and licensee commitments. The procedures were also reviewed
for technical content.
Procedures Examined
ID
Rev.
Title/Subject
CP&L ETS-083
12
Inservice Inspection Pressure Testing
2/15/95
of Reactor Coolant System (Refueling
Shutdown Interval)
CP&L OST-052
8
RCS Leakage Test and Examination
3/14/91
Prior to Startup Following an Opening
Of The Primary System (Refueling
and/or Startup Interval)
3
Procedures Examined
ID
Rev.
Title/Subject
CP&L PLP-040
5
Program for Prevention of Boric Acid
7/19/95
Corrosion of RCS Carbon Steel Bolting
CP&L PLP-037
4
Conduct of Infrequently Performed
2/15/95
Tests or Evolutions
CP&L AP-006
6
Procedure Use and Adherence
6/24/94
NES 80A9053
9
Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity
0
Verification
9/1/93
NES 83A6071
1
Ultrasonic Sizing of Planer Flaws
0
8/10/93
NES 83A6161
2
VT-i Visual Examination of Nuclear
0
Power Plant Components
9/3/93
NES 83A6164
1
Ultrasonic Examination of Steam
0
Generator Feedwater Nozzle Inner
8/31/93
Radius Area
NES 80A9055
5
Calibration of Thermometers
0
8/17/93
NES 83A6165
1
Ultrasonic Examination of Steam
0
Generator Main Steam Nozzle Inner
8/31/93
Radius Area
NES 83A6166
1
Manual Examination of Wrought
0
Stainless Steel Reactor Coolant Pipe
8/10/93
Welds and Primary Loop Cast Stainless
Steel Elbow Longitudinal Welds
NES 83A6083
0
Ultrasonic Examination of Bolting
3
Material
8/12/93
NES 80A9068
10
Procedure for Certifying
0
Nondestructive Examination Personnel
8/17/93
NES 83A6101
2
Liquid Penetrant Examination
1
Procedure
10/1/93
4
Procedures Examined
ID
Rev.
Title/Subject
NES 83A6131
0
Ultrasonic Examination of Component
0
Welds in Ferritic and Austenitic
8/12/93
Materials
NES 83A6111
0
Magnetic Particle Examination
0
9/3/93
NES 83A6061
1
Ultrasonic Examination of Piping
0
8/17/93
NES 83A6163
3
VT-3 Visual Examination of Nuclear
0
Power Plant Components
8/31/93
NES 83A6091
1
PSI/ISI Examination Areas and Volumes
0
8/17/93
NES 83A6031
1
Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel
0
Welds Greater Than Two Inches in
8/12/93
Thickness
NES 83A6041
1
Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for
0
Pressurizer Nozzles Inner Radius
9/14/93
Areas
W 93-QA-1092
3
Qualification and Certification of
11/9/94
Personnel in Nondestructive
Examination
W CPL-ISI-10
0
Qualification of Ultrasonic Manual
0
Equipment
4/14/95
W CPL-ISI-55
0
Manual Ultrasonic Examination for the
0
Reactor Vessel Threads in Flange
4/14/95
W CPL-ISI-247
0
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of
0
Feedwater Extension Piece
4/14/95
W CPL-ISI-115BH
0
Ultrasonic Examination of Studs From
0
the Bore Hole
4/14/95
5
The procedures were well written and appropriate for their
intended application.
c.
Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 2
The inspector observed work activities, reviewed certification
records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personnel
qualifications for personnel who had been utilized in the ISI
examinations during this outage. The observations and reviews
conducted by the inspector are documented below.
Activities Observed
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT)
The inspector observed PT examinations of the welds listed below.
Welds marked (t)
were examined by document review. The
observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the
Code.
Liquid Penetrant Examinations Observed
Weld No.
Drawing No.
System
25t
CPL-122A
Chemical and Volume
(RFO 15)
Control
28t
CPL-122A
Chemical and Volume
(RFO 15)
Control
42At
CPL-122A
Chemical and Volume
(RFO 15)
Control
2t
CPL-141
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
3t
CPL-141
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
18t
CPL-141
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
2t
CPL142
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
3t
CPL-142
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
14t
CPL-143
High Head Injection
(RFO 15)
6
The examinations were performed satisfactorily.
The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the PT
cleaner, developer and penetrant (See Table 1 below).
The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and
visual acuity documentation for the PT examiners (See Table 2
below).
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT)
The inspector observed MT examinations of the component listed
below. Welds marked (t)
were examined by document review. The
observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the
Code.
Magnetic Particle Examinations Observed
Component
Drawing No
System
No.
At
CPL-215
(RFO 16)
RCP Stud 13t
RCP C
(RFO 16)
RCP Stud 8t
RCP C
(RFO 16)
6t*
CPL-205
(RFO 15)
7tt
CPL-205
(RFO 15)
The examinations were performed satisfactorily.
The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the
magnetic particles, the yoke, and the 10 Lbs. test weight (See
Table 1 below).
The ten LBS test weight certificates were not linked to data sheet
for the examinations marked (t)
certificate.
The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and
visual acuity documentation for the MT examiners (See Table 2
below).
7
Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
The inspector observed UT examinations of the welds listed below.
Welds marked (t)
were examined by document review. The
observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the
Code.
Ultrasonic Examinations Observed
Weld No.
Drawing No
System
At
CPL-215
(RFO 16)
it
CPL-215
(RFO 16)
2t
CPL-215
(RFO 16)
it
CPL-216
(RFO 16)
The examinations were performed satisfactorily.
The inspector reviewed the certification documentation for the UT
instruments, transducers, calibration blocks, and couplant (See
Table 1 below).
The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and
visual acuity documentation for the UT examiners (See Table 2
below).
Visual Examination (VT)
The inspector observed VT examinations of the components listed
below. Items marked (t)
were examined by document review. The
observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the
Code.
Visual Examinations Observed
Component No.
Drawing No
System
RCP Stud 8t
RCP C
(RFO 16)
RCP Nut 13t
RCP C
(RFO 16)
8
Visual Examinations Observed
Component No.
Drawing No
System
RCP Stud 13t
RCP C
(RFO 16)
The examinations were performed satisfactorily.
The inspector reviewed the certification, qualification, and
visual acuity documentation for the VT examiners (See Table 2
below).
Table 1
NDE Equipment and Consumables Records Examined
Equipment/Consumables
Serial No/ Heat No./ Lot No./
Batch No.
PT Cleaner
92DO2P
PT Developer
92A01P
PT Penetrant
93E01K
MT Red No. 8A particles
83LO67
MT 10 Lbs. Test Weight
SRO-MT-001 and CPL 5343B
423 t and QC-11
UT Calibration blocks
CPL-54 and CPL-57
UT Instruments
136-472F
UT Transducers
42890, 138314, 138311 and
43987
Thermometers
2278
UT Couplant
092311
The ten Lbs test weight certificates were not linked to the data
sheet for the examinations, or to the calibration certificate for
ASME B&PV Code Section V 86NA paragraph T-625(b) states:
"When
examining austenitic stainless steel or titanium, all materials
shall be analyzed individually for chlorine and fluorine
contents..."
T-625 further requires that the analysis for
chlorine be accomplished in accordance with ASTM D 808 or SE-165
annex 2 and the analysis for fluorine be accomplished in
0
9
accordance with SE-165 annex 3, both reported as a percentage of
the residue by weight. The certification documentation, provided
by the licensee, reported the contaminants in the PT consumables
as total halogens only. From the report provided the inspector,
it could not be determined whether the PT consumables were
consistent with the 86NA Edition of ASME B&PV Code Section V. The
licensee is in the process of changing their purchase
specification to require individual analysis for both chlorine and
fluorine. Another utility has submitted an inquiry to the ASME
B&PV Code Section V committee for clarification in this matter.
An assessment of the certification documentation for the PT
materials used in previous outages, will be made based on the
answer to the Code inquiry.
Table 2
Qualification, Certification, and Visual Acuity Re
cords Examined
Examiner
Method-Level
JWB
T
VT-II
T
T
TAS
MT-II
PT-II
UT-II
PAW
MT-III
VT-111
PT-III
UT-III
KAD
MT-II
TJO
MT-II
PT-II
UT-II
MT-III
VT-II
PT-III
UT-III
CDJ
PT-II
UT-II
GSL
MT-III
PT-III
UT-III
ISI program and procedures were well written and appropriate for their
intended application. ISI records support the conclusion that
examinations were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) (49001)
During the last refueling outage, RFO 15, in the fall of 1993, the
licensee implemented a FAC inspection program which implements the
CHECMATE* (Chexal Horowitz Erosion/Corrosion Methodology for Analyzing
Iwo-phase Environment) EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) computer
code, industry experience, and previous inspection data as predictive
tools for determining and prioritizing inspection locations. Previous
10
to RFO 15 the licensee used engineering judgement to select components
for examination. The inspector conducted interviews with licensee
personnel and reviewed records as indicated below to evaluate the FAC
Program.
The licensee is in the process of converting their data to CHECWORKS@
(Chexal Horowitz Engineering Corrosion WorkStation) EPRI computer code,
which operates in the Windows* environment. The licensee anticipates
using CHECWORKSO for the next inspection opportunity, RFO 17.
Observations/Findings
During RFO 16, the licensee planned to examine 237 locations in their
FAC program. Of the 237 locations selected, 102 locations had been
previously examined. There are approximately 2800 inspection locations
identified in the Robinson FAC Program. The licensee expanded the
sample by eight locations for a total sample size, this outage, of 245
locations. These examinations necessitated the replacement of five
components. Replacements were made prior to the components reaching
their minimum wall thickness.
Procedures Examined
ID
Rev.
Title/Subject
CP&L PLP-051
2
Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
1/15/95
Monitoring Program
3
FAC Program Implementation and
2/10/95
External Inspections Of Carbon Steel
Piping
CP&L VII.5
2
Design Guide:
Corporate Flow
2/14/95
Accelerated Corrosion Program
0
FAC Process Control
9/28/94
CP&L NDEP-1012
1
Gridding of Components for
9/28/94
Erosion/Corrosion
CP&L NDEP-427
1
Digital Ultrasonic Thickness
3/28/94
Measurement (Pananetrics Model 26DL
Plus) for Erosion/Corrosion Detection
and Monitoring
EPRI NSAC/2021
-
Recommendations for an Effective
11/93
Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
Procedures Examined
ID
Rev.
Title/Subject
ASME Code Case
-
Examination Requirements for Pipe
N-480
Wall Thinning Due to Single Phase
5/10/90
Erosion and Corrosion Section XI,
Division 1
-
H B Robinson Plant FAC Monitoring
7/15/94
Program RO-15 Inspection Report
The inspector reviewed the Wall Thickness Engineering Evaluations made
during Unit 2 RFO 15 for the below listed components.
Wall Thickness Engineering Evaluations Examined
Inspection
Component
System
Disposition
Point Identifi-
Type
cation
H 59-8
8" Pipe
Heater Drain
Replaced
H 55-08
6" 90* Elbow
Heater Drain
Replaced
H 55-27
6" 90' Elbow
Heater Drain
Replaced
CD 82-21
22" Tee
Condensate
Acceptable for continued
service.
CD 12-03
16" 90* El-
Condensate
Acceptable for continued
bow
service. Evaluate pip
ing down stream.
3" Tee
Steam Gener- Acceptable for continued
ator Blow-
service.
down
B41-6
2"Tee
Steam Gener- Reinspect RFO 17
ator Blow
down
The licensee had an independent assessment conducted of their FAC
program,which indicated weaknesses in the following areas: selection of
examination locations not consistent with EPRI guidelines and in some
cases the assumed original wall thickness was not conservative. The
licensee has adequately addressed these issues.
The current FAC program, based on EPRI's CHECMATE*, was first imple
mented during the last refueling outage. The program shows great
promise for maintaining high energy carbon steel piping systems within
12
acceptable wall thickness limits. Time is necessary for the fulfillment
of that promise.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
4.
C Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Main Flange Stud Degradation
During a plant walkdown, the licensee discovered that the C RCP high
pressure tap flange gasket had failed. This failure resulted in a spray
of reactor coolant (high temperature borated water) into the annulus
between the underside of the main flange and the pump casing, impinging
on the shanks of a number of studs. The licensee video taped the as
found condition, and then swept, wire brushed and vacuumed the annulus
area. A verbal request was made to the CP&L Harris Energy and Environ
mental Center (HE&EC), near New Hill NC, to evaluate the extent of
corrosion damage to the studs due to borated water, and to provide
recommendations.
A representative of the CP&L Laboratory Services Section Metallurgical
Unit (LSSMU) visually and tactilely examined the accessible portions of
stud Nos 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The LSSMU
report indicated that stud Nos. 20, 21, 22, 7, 8 and 9 appeared to
exhibit no metal loss.
Figure 2, attached to the LSSMU report,
indicated that stud Nos. 20, 21, 22, 7, 8 and 9 were "OK".
The LSSMU
report recommended that stud Nos. 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which
exhibited obvious metal loss, be replaced. The LSSMU report warned that
if the remaining boric acid residue become wet by other sources, there
could be further corrosion of carbon steel or low alloy steel compo
nents. The LSSMU report recommended that the remaining boric acid
residue be removed. The licensee subsequently pressure washed the pump
main flange area to remove the remaining boric acid residue. The
licensee removed and replaced stud Nos. 23, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 with
spares, one at a time.
To evaluate the licensee's actions related to the C RCP main flange stud
degradation issue, the inspector interviewed licensee personnel,
examined removed studs, visually and tactilely examined the accessible
portions of installed stud Nos 22, 7 and 8.
1
The LSSMU requested that stud No. 2, the most severely degraded stud, be
sent to the HE&EC for metallurgical evaluation. Upon his arrival at the
site, the inspector was informed that the studs removed from the C RCP
were in the Hot Machine Shop (HMS).
The licensee indicated that stud
No. 2 had been marked "save" per the system engineer, pending its
shipment to HE&EC. When the inspector accompanied by the licensee went
to the HMS to examine the studs, only one stud, of the eight removed,
could be found. Stud No. 2 was subsequently found, decontaminated by
sand blasting, in a trailer destined for burial at the low level
13
radioactive waste disposal facility at Barnwell SC. The sand blasting
had removed the corrosion product/base material interface, thereby
rendering the stud of little value for metallurgical evaluation.
Eventually a total of four studs were located. The licensee was able
identify stud No. 2 because of the degree of wastage exhibited. The
remaining three could not be correlated with respect to their removal
location, with any degree of certainty, because they were not marked
after pressure washing and before removal from the pump. The above
demonstrates a weakness in the control of metallurgical failure analysis
specimens.
Figure 1 Stud No 2
Figure 1 above shows the wastage on stud No 2 after sand blasting. The
wastage is located on the stud at the stud lower thread/pump body interface.
The inspector reviewed Engineering Service Request (ESR) 9500433,
Revision 0, Reactor Coolant Leakage on C RPC Studs and noted the
following:
Root cause determination of the thermal barrier pressure tap
flange gasket was absent. The thermal barrier pressure tap flange
gasket was identified as the proximate cause of the leakage, but
the cause of the gasket failure was not discussed.
A discussion of the inspections performed by the licensee on the
RCP studs pursuant to the W Technical Bulletin on the subject of
RCP stud degradation was absent.
The licensee indicated that Revision I to ESR 9500433 will address the
above issues.
14
The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of C RCP. Examination of
stud Nos. 22 and 7 (the studs immediately adjacent to the replaced
studs), revealed a significant amount of wastage. It should be noted
that the wastage was not visable without the aid of a mirror or other
indirect viewing device.
After some investigation, it appears that the licensee accepted at face
value, that the eight degraded studs required replacement and the
remainder of the studs were acceptable ("OK") based on the tactile
examination conducted by the LSSMU prior to pressure washing. The
licensee subsequently pressure washed the area to remove the potential
threat of renewed boric acid wastage. This washing removed additional
boric acid and corrosion products, from the studs, revealing additional
wastage, on the studs adjacent to the studs previously identified as
degraded. This degradation was in areas not accessible to direct view.
The eight previously identified degraded studs were replaced. No
further visual examination, of a type that would have detected the
degradation on stud Nos 22 and 7, was attempted or planned for the
remaining studs. Absent the NRC intervention, the plant would have
returned to operation at the close of the outage with at least two
degraded studs in place in C RCP without an evaluation of operability.
TS 6.5.1.1, Procedures, Tests, and Experiments, requires in part that
written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering
activities recommended in appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2,
1978 including procedures for inspections.
The licensee failed to
establish adequate work instructions (procedures) requiring direct or
indirect visual inspection of the C RCP studs after the removal of the
boric acid residue and corrosion products. This failure permitted
degraded studs to remain in the RCP without an evaluation of operabil
ity. This failure to provide adequate procedures will be identified as:
Violation 50-261/95-13-01:
"Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instruc
tion for Degraded Stud Inspection."
5.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed)
Violation 50-261/93-25-01:
"Missing Welds at Supports
FW-6B-73 and FW-6C-109"
This violation concerned missing welds on two pipe supports. The
NRC reviewed the licensee's letters of response dated
September 16, 1993 and January 27, 1994 and found them acceptable.
The licensee's reasons for the violation, corrective steps taken
and results achieved, and corrective steps to be taken to avoid
recurrence were examined on site August 15-19, 1995 and reported
in NRC Inspection Report 50-261/94-21 dated August 31, 1994.
15
At the close of NRC Inspection 50-261/94-21, the licensee decided
to perform additional hardware inspections to verify that their
previous document reviews were correct and that the condition was
isolated, as their review indicated. The licensee initiated ESR
9500224, Weld Inspections Regarding NRC Inspection 93-25 to
address this issue. The ESR identifies eleven new and reworked
pipe supports of a configuration similar to the complex configura
tion of the supports identified in the violation. To date the
licensee has inspected five of the eleven supports, indicated
above, and has identified no missing welds.
In view of the following facts:
the licensee's actions regarding
this violation were found acceptable with the exception of the
hardware inspections;
the licensee has established an inspection
plan to assure that the entire sample of eleven will be inspected;
no missing welds were identified in the supports inspected to
date;
and the ESR program will assure any discrepancies will be
appropriately pursued, this item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 50-261/94-21-02:
"Failure To Sign Off VT
Hold Points"
This violation concerned the licensee's failure to sign off a Hold
Point for a final visual examination. The inspector of record for
NRC Inspection Report 50-261/94-21, verified that the visual
examinations had in fact been accomplished but had not been docu
mented.
The NRC has reviewed the licensee's September 27, 1994 response to
the August 31, 1994 Inspection Report, and found it acceptable.
The licensee acknowledged the violation and attributed it to an
isolated personnel error.
The licensee performed a review of a sample of 37 Weld Data
Reports to confirm that the identified occurrence was isolated.
To prevent recurrence the licensee's inspection organization, the
QC inspector and the ISI reviewer were counselled on the need to
provide sufficient attention to detail.
The Authorized Nuclear
Inservice Inspector (ANII) and his supervision were notified of
the concern to emphasize the ANII's responsibility for thurough
review of ASME Section XI work. Full compliance was achieved by
the date stated in the licensee's September 27, 1994 response
letter.
16
The inspector is satisfied that the licensee has corrected the
specific discrepant conditions, and performed the necessary survey
to determine the full extent of the problem. The inspector
examined the licensee's corrective actions as described in their
letter of response, and determined that the licensee has taken
appropriate actions to prevent recurrence. This matter is consid
ered closed.
c.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-261/94-21-01:
"ASME Sec
tion XI Suitability Evaluations for Replacements"
This matter is related to the resolution of the ANII's concerns
associated with the documentation of ASME Section XI suitability
evaluations for replacements as discussed in ANII Audit HSP 94-01
dated July 19, 1994.
The licensee has revised the below listed procedures to include
suitability of replacement evaluations.
Procedures Revised
Identification
Rev.
Title
PLP-025
7
Inservice Inspection Program
11/15/94
TMM-015
20
Inservice Repair and Replacement
1/12/95
Program
MMM-003
43
Maintenance Work Requests
3/4/95
MMM-003 Appendix A
44
Maintenance Work Requests
5/13/95
The inspector reviewed the above procedures and had no further
questions. This issue is considered closed.
6.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized, on May 19, 1995, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and the findings listed below. Although reviewed during
this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this
report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Violation 50-261/95-13-01:
Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instruc
tion for Degraded Stud Inspection.
17
5.
Acronyms and Initialisms
ANII
-
Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector
-
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
-
Boiler and Pressure Vessel
CHECMATE
-
Chexal Horowitz Erosion/Corrosion Methodology
for Analyzing Two-phase Environment
CHECWORKS
-
Chexal Horowitz Engineering Corrosion WorkStat
ion
-
Carolina Power and Light
-
Demonstration Power Reactor
-
Electric Power Research Institute
-
Engineering Service Request
-
HE&EC
-
Harris Energy and Environmental Center
HMS
-
Hot Machine Shop
ID
-
Identification
-
Inservice Inspection
LSSMU
-
Laboratory Services Section Metallurgical Unit
-
Magnetic Particle
NC
-
-
NES
-
Nuclear Energy Services
No.
-
Number
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.E
-
Professional Engineer
-
Preservice Inspection
-
-
Quality Assurance
-
Rev.
-
Revision
-
Refueling Outage
SC
-
T.S.
-
Technical Specification
-
Ultrasonic
-
Visual
W
-