ML14181A700
| ML14181A700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1995 |
| From: | Ogle C, William Orders, Verrelli D NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Carolina Power & Light Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A698 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-95-14, NUDOCS 9506200304 | |
| Download: ML14181A700 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1995014
Text
og REGoj
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Co
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report No.:
50-261/95-14
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Inspection Conducted: April 23 - May 13, 1995
Lead Inspector:
- 12 -V5
QT T. Or ers, S ior/Resident Inspector
ate igne
Other Inspector:
/ -"1.
q
R J
OgIe, Res ent nspector
ate Signed
Approved by:
4
-OL
-
4 -.--
.
Davi(d M. Verelli, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Prdjects Branch 1A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
SCOPE:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant
operations, maintenance activities, engineering efforts, and plant support
functions. The inspection effort included reviews of activities during non
regular work hours on April 28, 29, and 30, as well as May 5, 7, and 9, 1995.
RESULTS:
Plant Operations:
One of three examples of a Violation pertaining to inadequate control of
contracted services was identified in this functional area. An Unresolved
Item was identified concerning an inadequate equipment clearance.
Maintenance:
Two of three examples of a Violation concerning inadequate control of
contracted services were identified in this functional area. A Violation was
also identified pertaining to an inadequate operations surveillance test
procedure.
9506200304 950612
ADOCK 05000261
G
Engineering:
A Non-Cited Violation was identified concerning deficiencies in the fuel pool
inventory process.
Plant Support:
A Non-Cited Violation was identified concerning the failure of a contracted
technician to follow RWP requirements. An unresolved item was identified
pertaining to the administration of the fire protection program.
1. PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee Employees:
- B. Baum, Director, Robinson Nuclear Project, Human Resources
W. Brand, Supervisor, Environmental Radiation Control
- M. Brown, Manager, Design Engineering
A. Carley, Manager, Site Communications
- A. Canterbury, Project Engineer/Technical Support
G. Castleberry, Manager Plant Electrical Engineering
- B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Compliance
- W. Dorman, Supervisor, Quality Control
- M. Foerster, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support Section
Administration and Programs
- A. Garrou, Acting Manager, Licensing Regulatory Programs
C. Gray, Manager, Materials and Contract Services
D. Gudger, Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- C. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
P. Jenny, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
J. Kozyra, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- D. Markle, Senior Specialist, Configuration Control
E. Martin, Manager, Document Services
- B. Meyer, Manager, Operations
G. Miller, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support Section
- H. Moyer, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
- E. Rossman, Engineer, Robinson Engineering Support Section
B. Steele, Manager, Shift Operations
- D. Taylor, Plant Controller
G. Walters, Manager, Support Training
- R. Warden, Manager, Plant Support Nuclear Assessment Section
- D. Weber, Senior Specialist, Robinson Engineering Support Section
W. Whelan, Industrial Health and Safety Representative
D. Whitehead, Manager, Plant Support Services
- T. Wilkerson, Manager, Environmental Control
- S. Williams, Senior Engineer, Robinson Engineering Support Section
L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support
- D. Young, Plant General Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
engineers, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel:
- W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Ogle, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2. PLANT STATUS AND ACTIVITIES
a.
Operating Status
The unit began the report period operating at full power, and had
operated at or near full power for 265 days prior to April 28 when
a planned shutdown was begun for refueling outage 16. The report
period ended with the unit in day 15 of a planned 37 day refueling
outage.
b.
Other NRC Inspections and Meetings
One Region II based inspection was conducted during the report
period. The inspection, conducted on May 9 and 10, 1995, was
performed by M. Ernstes. The inspection results are documented in
report 50-261/95-300.
3. OPERATIONS
a.
Plant Operations (71707)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance to determine
if the facility was operated safely and in conformance with
regulatory requirements. These activities were assessed through
direct observation, facility tours, discussions with licensee
personnel, evaluation of equipment status, and review of facility
records.
The inspectors reviewed shift logs, operation's records, data
sheets, instrument traces, and the equipment malfunctions list to
assess equipment operability and compliance with TS. The
inspectors evaluated the operating staff to determine if they were
knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms,
adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, and
were cognizant of in-progress surveillance and maintenance
activities. The inspectors performed instrument channel checks,
reviewed component status, and assessed safety-related parameters
to determine conformance with TS. Shift changes were routinely
observed to determine that system status continuity was maintained
and that proper control room staffing existed. It should be noted
that during this report period, a major modification to the
control room was initiated. The modification process had a
dramatic effect on the internal control room boundaries and access
to the active control room area. The inspectors devoted increased
attention to this operator challenge, and determined that access
to the control room was adequately controlled, and operations
personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective
manner. Control room demeanor and communications were
appropriate.
Routine plant tours were conducted to evaluate equipment
operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and
to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls,
physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures
were properly implemented.
b.
Unit Shutdown
Between April 28, 1995, and April 30, 1995, the inspectors
witnessed portions of the unit shutdown for refueling outage 16
including reactor and secondary plant shutdown, transition to RHR
cooling, and collapsing the pressurizer bubble. For the most
part, these evolutions were well conducted. Strong procedure
usage was evident. The inspectors also noted increased crew
emphasis in areas which had represented previous challenges;
namely monitoring pressurizer cooldown rates and ensuring that
signatures were appropriately transferred from field copies of
procedures. Pre-evolution briefs were adequate but the inspectors
noted that the quality varied widely.
c.
Inadequate Control Of Contract Refueling Personnel
On May 8, 1995, a refueling crew signed off nineteen steps of
procedure FMP-019, Fuel and Insert Shuffle, indicating that an
equal number of thimble plugs had been moved. In actuality, none
of the plugs had been moved. It was determined that the thimble
plug tool, used by a contracted refueling technician, had been
rotated 90 degrees out of alignment. This had prevented effective
tool engagement. After the tool was realigned and additional
lighting was employed, the crew started over.
The refueling crew consisted of a contracted refueling technician,
two CP&L refueling technicians who were to be trained on the use
of the thimble plug tool, and a licensed RO. The contractor was
to actually perform the relocation of the thimble plugs and train
the CP&L refueling technicians. The RO was responsible for
coordinating the activities and for ensuring adherence to
procedures.
The contractor and the trainees were located on the SFP bridge.
The RO was located on the side of the SFP reading the steps of the
procedure to the contractor and initialing the completion of each
step. He was also updating the fuel location status board in the
SFP area and communicating the moves to the CR.
The first thimble plug was documented as being moved at 2:10 p.m.,
on May 8, 1995. The RO stated that he was able to verify the grid
locations of the fuel assemblies but was unable to see the
assemblies themselves. The RO presumed that the contractor was
actually performing the steps, but the contractor stated that he
also had difficulty seeing. As the evolution proceeded to an area
in the SFP where lighting conditions were better, it was noticed
that a thimble plug that had supposedly already been moved was
still in the assembly. They lowered a light for a closer
S
.
4
inspection and noted that none of the thimble plugs had been
moved. The contractor, after referring to a copy of FHP-001, Fuel
Handling Tools Operating Procedure, discovered that the thimble
plug tool had been rotated 90 degrees out of alignment. The
correct orientation was clearly delineated in FHP-001. It should
be noted that FHP-001 was one of approximately 10 procedures the
contractor had attested to having read on April 18, 1995.
After restarting the evolution and successfully completing two
steps, problems were experienced on step three during the
installation of a thimble plug in a fuel assembly. Investigation
revealed a bent finger on the thimble plug. The crew was
instructed to place the damaged thimble plug in a receptacle in
the SFP. The RO notified the CR of this specific problem but
failed to mention the original problem experienced with the tool.
By this time, it was close to shift turnover and no further steps
of the procedure were performed. During turnover with the
oncoming shift, the personnel communicated to their relief that
they had repeated nineteen steps of the procedure due to the tool
being improperly oriented, but management was not informed.
The contractor failed to follow the instruction afforded in
FHP-001, Fuel Handling Tools Operation, which clearly described
the correct alignment of the thimble plug tool.
The RO failed to
verify that the procedure steps had actually been performed before
signing off the procedure. This event is the first of three
examples which collectively constitute Violation 50-261/95-14-01,
Inadequate Control Of Contractor Services.
d.
Inadequate Clearance For Work On Valve V1-8A
On April 17, 1995, routine preventive maintenance was to be
performed on valve V1-8A, a motor operated valve which supplies
motive steam to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Due to
an inadequate clearance, valve MS-20 which is immediately
downstream of V1-8A, was left open. As a result, the steam driven
auxiliary feedwater pump started when valve VI-8A was manually
opened. It was also discovered that if valve V1-8A were to be
greater than 96 percent open with the steam driven auxiliary
feedwater pump not running, a close signal would be sent to the
other two valves which supply steam to the pump. That would
result in the pump being inoperable.
At the end of this report period, the inspectors had not completed
their review of the circumstances associated with this event.
Accordingly, pending the completion of these efforts, this issue
will be tracked as Unresolved Item URI 50-261/95-14-02,
Inadequate Clearance For Work On Valve V1-8A.
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is
required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve
violations or deviations.
5
MAINTENANCE
a.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were
conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and
appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors
determined that these activities did not violate -LCOs and that
required redundant components were operable. The inspectors
verified that required administrative, material, testing,
radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered to. In
particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following
maintenance activities detailed below:
WR/JO 95FXU002
Disassemble, Inspect, and Reassemble MS
VI-3C
WR/JO 95AGUQ001
Perform MST-925 Molded Case Circuit
Breakers Thermal and Instantaneous Trips
Test (MCC-10 Feed Only)
WR/JO 95ACDIO01
Fabricate Hydro Rig For SI-856A/B Testing
WR/JO 95AGF002
El Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test
(Partial)
Inadequate Control Of Contract Crane Operators
Collision of Polar Crane And Manipulator Crane Event
At approximately 7:20 p.m., on May 3, 1995, the Robinson
containment polar crane collided with the refueling manipulator
crane. A contracted refueling technician had moved the
manipulator crane into the path of the polar crane. Subsequently,
a contracted polar crane operator, began moving the polar crane
without verifying the position of the manipulator crane. The
polar crane impacted a cross piece on the manipulator crane's
monorail.
The top of the manipulator crane was bent approximately
two or three feet which broke welds in three places. Some of the
broken welds were repairs from a previous, similar collision that
occurred in the late 1970s. The manipulator crane was repaired
and returned to service.
An investigation of the event revealed that the refueling
technician had apparently not received CP&L crane operator
training; the contracted organization, which had the
responsibility for coordinating and operating the cranes, did not
have a formal coordination process to use when multiple cranes
were being used simultaneously; the polar crane operator had not
been trained on MI-510 which contains a requirement to check the
manipulator crane's position prior to polar crane movement; a copy
of MI-510, Polar Crane General Instructions, was not posted in the
polar crane cab as required; and the polar crane operator did not
6
receive a cogent proficiency verification on the polar crane's
operation.
This event is indicative of inadequate measures to control the
quality of contracted services. This constitutes the second of
three examples which collectively comprise Violation 50-261/
95-14-01, Inadequate Control of Contractor Services.
Polar Crane Auxiliary Hook Strikes Steam Generator Cubicle
At approximately 10:00 p.m., on May 4, 1995, the polar crane
auxiliary hook struck the concrete cubicle surrounding the "C"
steam generator. The polar crane's operator had been operating
the crane from the refueling floor, using the remote control. He
had lowered the auxiliary hook for a planned lift. Before that
lift could be made, the priorities for the polar crane changed.
The polar crane operator left the auxiliary hook down (6 to 8 feet
off the floor) and began moving the polar crane into position for
the next lift. He did so from his position on the floor, from
which he could not see the auxiliary hook. Furthermore, the
operator began the repositioning of the polar crane on his own
initiative, with no communication or direction from the signalman.
The polar crane's auxiliary hook hit the north side of the
concrete cubicle around steam generator "C", causing superficial
damage.
The contract polar crane operator was the same operator involved
in the collision of the polar crane and manipulator crane.
Therefore, the aforementioned deficiencies delineated in the
previous section will not be reiterated.
This constitutes the third of three examples which collectively
comprise Violation 50-261/95-14-01, Inadequate Control Of
Contractor Services.
OST-156 Valve Lineup Improperly Established
On May 8, 1995, the inspectors questioned the valve lineup for
Operations Surveillance Test, OST-156, Safety Injection and
Containment Spray Systems Suction Lines Leak Test. This test is
used to qualify the atmospheric leakage of portions of the safety
injection, residual heat removal, and containment spray systems in
accordance with license condition 3.G.(2). During a plant tour,
the inspectors noted that SI-887, the RHR Pump Discharge to SI and
CV Spray Suction valve was closed. The inspectors concluded that
with this valve closed, test pressure would not be applied to the
piping between valves SI-887 and the SI-863 A and B. The licensee
confirmed the inspectors observation on May 8, 1995, and revised
OST-156 to require SI-887 be open during the test. The licensee
also added additional valves to the procedure in a subsequent
temporary procedure change on May 8, 1995.
7
In response to this issue, the inspectors scrutinized OST-156 and
interviewed the coordinator involved in its initial performance.
The inspectors were advised that SI-887 was closed as the result
of a clearance on the valve, and the impact of this mis
positioning had not been previously recognized. The inspectors
noted that SI-887 is a normally locked open valve and it was not
included in the valve lineup contained in OST-156.
On May 15, 1995, while conducting a post-test review, the
inspectors detected another deficiency in OST-156. The OST valve
lineup requires that SI-862A, RWST to RHR valve be closed. In
that configuration, the piping between SI-862A and SI-862B would
not be tested. However, End Path Procedure, EPP-9, Transfer To
Cold Leg Recirculation permits the operators to close either SI
862A or SI-862B while establishing the CV sump recirculation valve
lineup. The inspectors were concerned that OST-156 as conducted,
failed to test all portions of piping which could be in contact
with highly radioactive fluids during an accident. This was
identified to the licensee for resolution. After confirming the
inspectors' observation, the licensee stated that a condition
report would be generated and that the piping between SI-862A and
SI-862B would be tested.
The inspectors concluded that procedure OST-156 was inadequate.
This is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.5.1.1 and is
identified as a violation, VIO 95-14-03, OST-156 Valve Lineup
Improperly Established.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance
activities on systems and components to ascertain that these
activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements.
On a selective basis, the inspectors determined that precautions
and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals
and tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was
accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with approved
test procedures, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the
tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the tests
conformed to TS requirements. Upon test completion, the
inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete, accurate,
and met TS requirements, test discrepancies were properly
documented and rectified, and that the systems were properly
returned to service. One such test was SP-1353, Leak Test SI-864A
and B and SI-856A and B.
Leak Test Of RWST Isolation Valves
On May 8, 1995, the inspectors witnessed portions of Special
Procedure, SP-1353, Leak Test SI-864A and B and SI-856A and B.
This procedure was performed to quantify individual seat leakage
through SI-864A, SI-864B, SI-856A, and SI-856B, to demonstrate
compliance with license condition 3.G (2).
Overall, the conduct
of the test was satisfactory. Anomalies associated with the
initial test performance were recognized by the licensee and
resolved. Applicable portions of the test were performed again
with satisfactory results on May 10, 1995.
(Closed) URI 94-12-02, Basis For Closed System Outside
Containment, documents inspectors' concerns with the licensee's
basis for closed systems outside containment which are normally
vented to the RWST. The testing accomplished by SP-1353 provides
reasonable assurance that significant flow past these valves would
not occur in the event of sump recirculation. Based on this, URI
94-12-02 is closed.
5. ENGINEERING
Onsite Engineering (37551)
Fuel Pool Inventory Discrepancy
On April 19, 1995, during fuel movement within the SFP, a fuel
assembly could not be fully lowered into its planned storage
position, MM-24. The assembly was withdrawn and returned to its
original storage location. A visual examination revealed an
undocumented filter canister stored in rack position MM-24. The
fuel movement was subsequently completed without incident. The
licensee generated a CR in response to this event.
As a followup to this event, the inspectors reviewed Fuel
Management Procedure, FMP-021, Control of Materials in the Spent
Fuel Pit, interviewed an operator involved in the fuel movement,
and the spent fuel pool system engineer.
The inspectors determined that the filter canister was not
documented as having been stored in MM-24 on the spent fuel pool
storage log sheet which is maintained in accordance with procedure
FMP-021. Hence, nothing precluded the reactor engineering staff
from utilizing MM-24 as a fuel storage location during the SFP
fuel movement. The inspectors concluded that this error was the
result of an administrative oversight on the part of the system
engineer while implementing FMP-021. The inspectors also noted
that the licensees implementation of the spent fuel pool inventory
process failed to include basic safeguards to preclude fundamental
administrative errors such as the one described.
As corrective action, the licensee conducted a visual inspection
of all SFP locations involved in the SFP fuel shuffle and fuel
offload. No additional undocumented material was identified.
Additionally, the licensee committed to revising FMP-021 to
require a second party verification of the SFP storage log sheets
and SFP location data sheets.
The failure to properly control the material stored in the SFP is
contrary to the requirements of FMP-021.
However, this violation
will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's
efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the
criteria specified in section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
This is identified as a Non-Cited Violation, NCV 50-261/95-14-04,
Fuel Pool Inventory Not Properly Maintained.
6. PLANT SUPPORT
a.
Plant Support Activities (71750)
CO2 Bottle Explosion
Event Summary
On April 30, 1995, a 5 lb. CO2 cylinder, which had been stored in
a compressed gas storage shed, exploded. The explosion destroyed
a storage cage, the cylinder ricocheted off one of six stationary
hydrogen storage cylinders used as emergency make-up for the
Unit 2 hydrogen supply system, and ultimately came to rest some 20
feet from the shed. The hydrogen cylinder was torn from its
mounts and came to rest approximately 10 feet from its original
location. The hydrogen manifold tubing was severed, creating an
unrestricted leak path for the remaining five hydrogen cylinders.
The hydrogen gas ignited, engulfing the immediate area. The Site
Fire Brigade responded and the fire was out within seven minutes.
No off-site fire assistance was required. Damage was restricted
to the CO2 cylinder, the six hydrogen cylinders, associated
piping, and the storage cage.
Event Details
At approximately 1:55 p.m., on the afternoon of April 30, 1995, a
Unit 2 outside auxiliary operator heard an explosion in the
vicinity of the compressed gas shed. This shed is located
approximately 70 feet east of the perimeter of the Unit 2
Protected Area. Upon investigating, the operator observed a
hydrogen cylinder laying on the ground, about 10 feet west of the
shed. He also heard a loud "blow down" noise being emitted from
the same general area. The operator notified Unit 2 Control Room
personnel who in turn dispatched the Fire Brigade. As previously
mentioned, the Fire Brigade responded and the fire was out within
seven minutes.
The licensee sent the ruptured CO2 cylinder to the metallurgy lab
at their E&E Center. Preliminary results indicated that the
rupture was caused by tensile strength overload, and that there
was no apparent flaw in the cylinder. The licensee's analysts
indicated that over-filling the cylinder would be strongly
suspected as the cause of the cylinder failure.
10
It was determined that the CO2 cylinder which failed and another
5 lb. CO2 cylinder had been taken off site for vendor servicing on
April 24, 1995, and were returned the following day. Licensee
personnel performed OST-621, Diesel Generator CO2 Cylinder Weight
Test later that day. The test revealed that the cylinder which
failed was charged to 180 percent of full weight and the other CO2
cylinder was charged to 131 percent of full weight. The latter
cylinder was placed in service at approximately 2:00 p.m. that
same day as the control cylinder for the Diesel Generator CO2
System. The cylinder which failed was placed in the storage area
of the Unit 1 gas shed. The licensee's surveillance procedure,
OST-621, did not limit the maximum quantity of charge on the
cylinders, only the minimum quantity of charge.
These cylinders were originally fitted with a rupture disk
designed to prevent cylinder over-pressurization. The original
rupture disks were designed to relieve at approximately 3000 psi.
The licensee determined that the cylinder which failed had three
rupture disks installed in series. The licensee removed the other
CO2 cylinder from service to determine if a similar situation
existed. The licensee found two rupture disks installed on that
cylinder. With multiple rupture disks installed, the cylinders
could be pressurized to pressures exceeding their rating. The
licensee determined that due to the cylinder being overfilled and
the negation of the overpressure protection, the cylinder which
failed had been pressurized to approximately 6,583 psi.
At the
end of this report period, the inspectors have not completed their
review of the circumstances associated with this event.
Accordingly, pending the completion of these efforts, this issue
will be tracked as an Unresolved Item, URI 50-261/95-14-05,
Operations Surveillance Test 621 Deficiency.
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is
required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve
violations or deviations.
RWP Requirements For Protective Clothing Not Followed
On May 11, 1995, during a routine tour of containment, the
inspectors observed a contract worker involved in MOD-1074, work
which required full anti-Cs, yet the worker was not wearing an
anti-contamination head covering. The inspectors questioned the
HP assigned to coverage of the first level of the CV on the
appropriateness of this observed dress. After examining the
situation, the HP advised the inspectors that the worker's outfit
was incomplete and not in compliance with the assigned RWP. The
worker was subsequently escorted from containment and a condition
report was generated.
The inspectors reviewed the appropriate RWP, interviewed the lead
HP, and reviewed Plant Program Procedure, PLP-016, Radiation Work
Permit Program.
The inspectors noted that the RWP required a cloth hat or single
cloth hood. The inspectors were advised that the worker had
entered the CV with a cloth hat beneath a hard hat. The cloth hat
was inadvertently removed with the hard hat when the worker put on
a phone headset. The licensee stated that the worker did not
recognize this error at the time. As corrective action, the
licensee counselled personnel involved in the modification on the
need to comply with RWP requirements.
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the worker's failure to
comply with the RWP was contrary to the requirements of PLP-016.
However, this NRC identified violation is not being cited because
criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy
were satisfied. This is identified as a Non-Cited Violation, NCV
50-261/95-14-06, RWP Requirement For Protective Clothing Not
Followed.
It should be noted that since the start of the refueling outage
the inspectors have noted several isolated incidents involving HP
work practices that fall short of established plant practices.
All of these observations have been relatively minor and involved
personnel not permanently assigned to the facility. The
inspectors have discussed these observations with licensee
management. Based on these observations, the inspectors concluded
that additional emphasis on routine HP practices by contract
workers may be required.
At the exit, the licensee stated that their trending program had
also detected a similar trend in contractor performance in the
radiological controls area. Furthermore, the licensee advised the
inspectors that they had implemented corrective actions to resolve
these concerns. The licensee subsequently provided the inspectors
a copy of the CR generated in response to this effort. The
inspectors reviewed the CR and have no further questions on this
issue.
7. EXIT INTERVIEW
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 19, 1995.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection as they are detailed in this report. The licensee
representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection. No dissenting comments from the
licensee were received.
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
VIO 95-14-01
Opened
Inadequate Control Of Contractor
Services/paragraphs 3, 4
URI 95-14-02
Opened
Inadequate Clearance For Work On
Valve VI-8A/paragraph 3
VIO 95-14-03
Opened
OST-156 Valve Lineup Improperly
Establ ished/paragraph 4
NCV 95-14-04
Opened/Closed
Fuel Pool Inventory Not Properly
Maintained/paragraph 5
URI 95-14-05
Opened
Operations Surveillance Test 621
Deficiency/paragraph 6
NCV 95-14-06
Opened/Closed
RWP Requirement For Protective
Clothing Not Followed/paragraph 6
URI 94-12-02
Closed
Basis For Closed System Outside
Containment/paragraph 4
.8.
ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Carolina Power and Light
CR
Condition Report, Control Room
CV
Containment Vessel
E&E
Energy And Environmental
End Path Procedure
Fuel Handling Procedure
FMP
Fuel Management Procedure
Health Physics
LCO
Limiting Condition For Operation
Motor Control Center
Noncited Violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
0P&
Operations Surveillance Test
Public Document Room
PLP
Plant Program Procedure
psi
Pounds Per Square Inch
Refueling Outage
Reactor Operator
Radiation Work Permit
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Spent Fuel Pit
'I
Safety Injection
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item
Violation
WR/J
Work Request/Job Order