ML14181A115

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Summarizes 930308 Meeting W/Util in Atlanta,Ga Re 230-kV Switchyard Breaker Replacement
ML14181A115
Person / Time
Site: Robinson 
Issue date: 03/19/1993
From: Merschoff E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 9303300202
Download: ML14181A115 (46)


Text

Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:

Mr. R. A. Watson Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- ROBINSON UNIT 2 This letter refers to the management meeting conducted at your request in the NRC Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia on March 8, 1993.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 230 kv switchyard breaker replacement project being planned for your H. B. Robinson facility. A list of attendees and a copy of your slides are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial in that it provided a better understanding of-the initiatives you have planned to enhance switchyard breaker performance. I recommend that you also review the lessons learned from recent weather related electrical distribution system problems at Brunswick for applicability to the Robinson site.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely, Original signed by:

Jon R. Johnson/for Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl:

(See page 2 9:3033002-93O319 pDR ADOCK O POO2.

P PD

Carolina Power and Light Company 2

cc w/encl:

C. R. Dietz Vice President Robinson Nuclear Project H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, SC 29550 R. H. Chambers Plant General Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, SC 29550 Heyward G. Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources P. 0. Box 27687 Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 McCuen Morrell, Chairman Darlington County Board of Supervisor County Courthouse Darlington, SC 29535 H. Ray Starling Vice President -

Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.

P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 H. A. Cole Special Deputy Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Robert Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626-0520 (cc w/encl cont'd -

See page 3)

Carolina Power and Light Company 3

(cc w/encl cont'd)

J. L. Harrison, Manager Regulatory Compliance H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, SC 29550 Ms. Gayle B. Nichols Staff Counsel SC Public Service Commission P. 0. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 2.9211 bcc w/encl:

H. Christensen, RII S. Vias, RII B. Mozafari, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 5, Box 413 Hartsville, SC 29550 RII:DRP RII:DRP RI GHais:tj HCh stensen DV rel1i 03/

/93 03/( /93 03/',/93

ENCLOSURE 1 Carolina Power & Light Company C. R. Dietz, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project (RNP)

R. D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance, RNP G. E. Attariah, Chief Electrical Engineer, RNP W. J. Flanagan, Manager, Operations, RNP R. 0. Moore, Shift Supervisor, RNP J. C. Prim, Senior Staff Engineer, RNP R

i W. Prunty, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, RNP D. M. Tolman, System Engineer, RNP Nuclear Regulatory Commission S.- D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (R)

L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, R A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), R J. R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII H. 0. Christensen, Chief, Reactor Projects Section A, DRP, R B. L. Mozafari, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

D. M. Verrelli, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, DRP, Rh

3. A. Mitchell, Acting Director, Project Directorate hI-i, NRR W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, RNP G. A. Harris, Project Engineer, DRP, Rh

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2 230kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT NRC TECHNICAL PRESENTATION ATLANTA, GEORGIA MARCH 8, 1993

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview

-J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz 93-0446

INTRODUCTION Purpose To Describe the Replacement of Twelve (12) 230 kV Breakers in the H. B. Robinson Switchyard To Describe the Work Process and Actions Taken to Minimize the Site's Vulnerability to a Switchyard Related Event Performance Objective To Complete This Work Activity Without Event and Without a Safety System Challenge

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz

PROJECT OVERVIEW Existing Generation/Transmission System Major Equipment to be Removed:

(12) 230 kV 3-cycle interrupting time, gang operated oil -circuit breakers Major Equipment to be Installed:

(12) 230 kV 2-cycle interrupting time, independent-pole-operated, SF6 gas circuit breakers

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz

PROJECT SCOPE Reason For Project Foundation Work 115kV Bus Outages Breaker Replacement Testing

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Reason For Project Unit Stability Criteria Unique Facility Meeting Stability Criteria

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Foundation Work Requires Larger Foundation Slab Foundation Orientation

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued) 115 kV Bus Outages In order to tie in the new power potential transformers, separate East and West 115kV Bus Outages will be required Outage time will be minimal (4-6 hours) for each Bus

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Breaker Replacement OCB Removal GCB Installation

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Circuit Breaker Replacement:

Once the station service conversion work and the gas circuit breaker foundations have been completed, the breaker replacement can begin.

Oil Circuit Breaker Removal:

Following is a broad outline of the major steps to be taken in removing the existing 230 kV oil circuit breakers from the 230 kV switchyard.

1. Circuit breaker will be cleared, tagged and grounded.
2. Oil will be pumped from oil circuit breaker into oil tanker and control wiring disconnected.
3. Conductors removed from bushing connectors.
4. Bushings removed.
5. Oil circuit breaker tanks disconnected from foundation and all conduit disconnected.
6. Circuit breaker will be jacked off foundation, rotated approximately 90, while sliding into access way. A 100 ton crane will lift circuit breaker onto "low boy" trailer. Circuit breaker will be moved out of switchyard.
7. Circuit breaker, bushings, and oil transported to next in-service site or storage location.

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Gas Circuit Breaker Installation:

Following is a broad outline of the major steps to be taken in installing the new 230 kV independent pole operated gas circuit breakers in the 230 kV switchyard.

1. The independent poles of the gas circuit breakers and bushings will be brought from Darlington County Electric Plant into the switchyard on "low boy" trailers.
2. 100 or 30 ton crane will set each pole on foundation.
3. Circuit breaker will then be secured to foundation and assembled.
4. Install bushings and connect conductors.
5. Complete all conduit work and wire circuit breaker.
6. Terminate AC and DC sources.
7. Fill circuit breaker with SF6 gas.

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Testing De-energized Testing Procedures and Standards Tests QA Verification and Tracking Test Energizing the Circuit Breaker In-service Tests

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Testing De-energized Testing All de-energized tests will be performed on the subject circuit breaker with the breaker electrically isolated from the Transmission System via clearance tagged, locked-open, gang-operated 230 kV disconnect switches on both sides of the circuit breaker. Additionally, functional tests (Trip Tests), including the adjacent circuit breaker, will be performed with the adjacent circuit breaker electrically isolated from the Transmission System in the same manner as the subject breaker. All de-energized tests will be performed with the subject circuit breaker's Breaker Failure Relaying scheme disabled.

  • Procedure and Standards All testing will be performed in accordance with CP&L approved procedures outlined in the following documents:

- CP&L Substation Maintenance Standards

- CP&L Substation Construction Standards CP&L Relay Maintenance Standards

- CP&L Relay Construction Standards

- CP&L Relay Maintenance and Construction Installation Interface Document

- CP&L Safety Manual

  • Tests

- Verify that no SF6 gas leaks are present.

- Verify that SF6 gas moisture content is within manufacturers' specs.

- Verify proper operation of operating mechanism.

- Verify proper operation of SF6 gas and pneumatic systems.

PROJECT SCOPE (Continued)

Testinqi De-energized Testing (Continued)

- Verify that power contact resistance is within manufacturers' specs.

- Perform visual inspection of breaker intervals.

- Verify that speed and timing tests are within Manufacturers' tolerances.

- Verify integrity of all insulation (dielectric) using hypot, megger, and power factor tests as appropriate.

- Verify proper operation of all electrical components.

- Verify internal wiring accuracy.

- Verify internal wiring insulation.

- Verify proper wiring termination.

- Verify external wiring accuracy, insulation integrity and continuity.

- Verify all alarm functions for both local and remote sites.

- Verify all supervisory functions.

- Verify all protection schemes are functional.

o Line o Bus o Pilot Wire o Differential o Breaker Failure

- Verify all metering functions are accurate.

- Verify all CT circuits.

Test Energizing the CB

  • In-Service Tests

- Current, Voltage and Phase Angle measurements

- Differential Relay mismatch calculations

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz

SCHEDULE Station Service Foundations Breaker Replacements

SCHEDULE (Continued)

Station Service Jan April Foundations Breaker Replacements

.__Dec 93

SCHEDULE (Continued)

As was outlined in the PROJECT SCOPE, all station service and foundation addition work must be completed prior to the first circuit breaker replacement.

This work began January 4, 1993, and will be completed prior to April 4, 1993.

Immediately following completion of this work, East and West 115 kV Bus outages will be required (separately but consecutively) to complete the station service conversion. Each bus outage is expected to last approximately 4-6 hours. Unit No. 1 is the driving force in scheduling this work because for an East 115 kV Bus outage, Unit No. 1 must be retired and be "black plant" for the duration of the outage. The East 115 kV Bus Outage is scheduled for Sunday, April 4, 1993.

The circuit breaker replacement is scheduled to begin April 5, 1993. There are two major driving forces in scheduling the first breakers to be replaced:

1. The two Unit No. 2 circuit breakers (52-8 & 52-9) must be replaced during the RFO-15 outage window and the schedule must be flexible enough to shift with the RFO-15 window.
2. In order to trip test the North 230 kV Bus, all circuit breakers fed from the North Bus must have been replaced by the end of RFO-15.

SCHEDULE (Continued) 115 kV BUS OUTAGES:

All power potential transformer work and gas circuit breaker foundation work must be completed prior to the first oil circuit breaker replacement. After this preliminary work has been completed and system conditions will allow, an East and West 115 kV Bus outage will be required to connect the new power potential transformers. Estimated outage time is approximately 4-6 hours on each bus. The East Bus outage requires that Unit No. 1 be retired and be "black plant" for the duration of the outage.

UNIT #1 START-UP T RANSFORMER

  1. 1 MAIN EANK TRANSFORMER
  1. 2 START-UP TRANSFORMER MOTOR
  1. 1 20/15KV ANKOPERATED 230/15KV EANK D I SCONNECT 2-1 C SAN 2-100 BUS 115 KV EAST EUS 115KV WEST EUS SEE NOTE 2 SEE NOTE i

1,15 xV CAMDEN 15 KV JUNCTION FLCRENCE 15 KV ROCK I NGHAM

  1. 2 230/115 KV BANX CAPACITOR BANK NOTES 1-FIRST STATION SERVICE OUTAG SATURDAY APRIL 3,1993 2-SECOND STATION SE.VICE OUTAGE SUNDAY APRIL 4,1993

UNIT #2

.#2 START-UP TRANSFORMER

  1. 2 MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER MOTOR OPERA TED.

D I SCCNNECTS TO 115 KV SPAN EUS NORTH 230 KV 5

.TO 115 KV 41 AUTO 52-2-

52-TRANSFORMIER WEST BUS

12.

53; 52-52-52-52 11 I

8 I

2 TO 115 KV

  1. 2 AUTO EAST BUS TRANSFORMER 522-52-52 iolip i230 KV ROCKINGHAM 230 KV 230 KV 230 KV 230 KV DARLINGTON SUMTER DARLINGTON FLORENCE COUNTY (SCPSA)

PLANT SOUTH 230KV BUS 0-REPLACEMENT SEaUENCE D-230 KV C5

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim, Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz

RISK MANAGEMENT Industry Switchyard Event Response Formalized Planning Process Offsite Power Support Minimize Impact Communications Barriers

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Industry Switchyard Event Response NUMARC 91-06 Learning From Others IN 91-81 IN 92-13 SOER 90-1

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

INDUSTRY SWITCHYARD EVENT RESPONSE EVENT LOCATION CONSEQUENCES RNP RESPONSE

  • Vehicle backed into Vogtle Loss of Off-Site Power

- Mandatory backing guides.

transmission structure.

During Mid-Loop Ground guides at all times Operations.

for heavy equipment.

- Vehicle access to Switchyard coordinated through Control Room.

- Minimize vehicle use inside Switchyard.

  • Switchyard equipment McGuire Loss of Off-Site Power Customer/Supplier malfunction during to Unit 1.

agreement requires post-maint. testing.

contact before and after Switchyard activities.

EDG Maint./Breaker progress w/o Control replacement coordination..

Room knowledge.

(EDG o.o.s.)

Daily meeting in Control Room between Operations and Project Coordinator during breaker replacement.

  • Crane boom contacts lines Fermi Loss of Off-Site Power Personnel dedicated to in Switchyard.

in one case.

monitor crane clearances during work.

Diablo Circuit breaker trip.

Canyon Work planned to minimize use of crane in Palo Verde Switchyard.

  • Improper testing causes Sequoyah Loss of Off-Site Power Vendor representative to breaker failure.

to Units 1 and 2.

be on-site for first two breaker replacements.

Plant Trips.

All protective circuits in Damage to Equipment.

service when breaker energized.

  • Wiring error during Main Cofrentes Plant Trip.

Maintenance standards.

Transformer maintenance.

Independent verification of all wiring.

  • Improper clearance Peach Plant Trip.

All instructions written instructions.

Bottom and reviewed by all parties in advance to implementation.

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Formalized Planning Process Inter-Departmental Procedure Project Team

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Formalized Planning Process: Affected Departments Carolina Power & Light Company Interdepartmental Procedure FG&PTG-TD-005, "Coordination of Transmission Activities at All Generating Plants" established a formalized interdepartmental planning process for transmission construction and maintenance activities at generating plants to supplement the planning performed by the System Coordinating Committee. This interdepartmental procedure applies to the following departments:

  • Fossil Plant Betterment Department
  • Fossil Operations Department
  • System Planning and Operations Department
  • Nuclear Engineering Department
  • Transmission Department
  • Brunswick Nuclear Project Department
  • Robinson Nuclear Project Department
  • Harris Nuclear Project Department
  • Nuclear Services Department

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Formalized Planning Process: Affected Departments (Continued)

A Project Coordinator assigned to a particular transmission construction/maintenance activity performs the following activities for the assigned project:

  • Determine work groups involved and their responsibilities.
  • Obtain detailed work plans from each work group involved.
  • Coordinate switchyard/plant activities.
  • Develop and review preliminary project work plan.
  • Perform risk assessment and potential problem analysis.
  • Modify work plan as needed.
  • Perform project critique after activity is completed and share appropriate critique information with appropriate departments.

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Offsite Power Support 230/115 kV Transmission Lines Clearances

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Minimize Unit & System Impact On-line Considerations Grid Stability Line Clearance Restrictions EDG PM Schedule RFO 15 Coordination NUMARC 91-06 Compliance Flexible Window 115 kV Switchyard Restrictions

CAROLINA POWER G LIGHT COMPANY REFUELING OUTAGE 15 SCHEDULE 1 993 RECORD ACOF IY SART FINISH SI N

1 2784 RNPO 12 OFFLINE 10 UNIT ON LINE.

11-SEP-93 1-NOV-93 if 2

1094 DS DIESEL GENERATOR DOS 14-SEP-93 18-SEP-93 a

2 3

1729 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 'a' DOS 19-SEP-93 1-OCT-93 3

4 2607 CORE OFFLOAD PERIOD 25-SEP-93 9-OCT-93 4_i_

4 5

1726 BUS El. 'A' BATTERY 9 CHARGER DOS 1-OCT-93 7-0CT-93 5

6 1727 START UP TRANSFORMER DOS 1-OCT-93 6-OCT-93 B

7 1729 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 'A' DOS 1-OCT-93 9-OCT-93 7

8 2598 OCB'S IBREAKERS 52/8991 DOS 9-OCT-93 25-OCT-93 at 8

9 27896 CORE RELOAD IN PROGRESS 9-OCT-93 11-OCT-93 10 100B GP-002 -

RCS HEAT UP AND CROSS 200 DEGREES 26-OCT-93 26-OCT-93

.10 jl"r

'n T

B"18 25 2"

_9" 18 3

__,30 __"S SEP OCT NOV ACTIVITY COMPLETED CRITICAL ACTIVITY ID 67 PROJ R93 FIL NRC ARTEMIS 8000 Barchart Drawing System 7:45 am 5-MAR-93 Page of I

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Impact on the plant emergency power sources takes priority over switchyard work. Scheduled Emergency Diesel Generator Preventative Maintenance outages have been provided to the concerned parties as follows:

"A" Emergency Diesel "B" Emergency Diesel April 26, 1993 May 10, 1993 July 19, 1993 August 2, 1993 During the periods that one of the Emergency Diesels are inoperable, no critical work will be allowed to be performed in the switchyard.

This includes heavy machinery use such as concrete trucks, 100 ton crane lifts, electrical switching to clear or restore lines, etc.

Unit CB replacement is a flexible window which will be coordinated with the RFO-15 schedule The two (2) Unit CB's (52-8 and 52-9) will be changed during a three week period in RFO-15 GSU Transformers will be cleared during Unit CB replacement No work will be allowed in the 115 kV switchyard while Unit CB replacement is ongoing

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Communications Project Management Project Coordinator Designated Operations & Technical Support Representatives Assigned

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Communications Operational Impact Energy Control Center Limits maintenance activities on Robinson 230/115 kV LINES Impact on emergency power sources takes priority over switchyard work

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Communications Work Control Pre-approval of Clearance Requests &

Switching Instructions Plan of the Week/DSR will show switchyard work Project Coordinator attends daily Operations Pre-Shift Briefing Project Coordinator Conducts daily construction work crew meetings Additional switchyard work controlled through Project Coordinator

0

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Physical Barriers Switchyard Controls

- Customer/Supplier Agreement

- Specific Project Guidelines Fenced area with unique locks installed on access gates Signs posted on the access gates Approved work practices Periodic inspection of work areas by Management

RISK MANAGEMENT (Continued)

Physical Barriers All personnel will check in and out with both Unit #1 and Unit

  1. 2 Shift Supervisors
  • .All established written work practices and CP&L safety rules will be followed 0

Vehicle and personnel traffic in the switchyard will be minimized High security padlocks installed on all gates in switchyard and distribute registered, non-duplicatable keys to authorized personnel At least two (2) ground guides/spotters will be utilized whenever any heavy equipment is moved in the switchyard Backing guides will be used There will be an employee watching from an aerial bucket truck whenever necessary to ensure minimum working distances are maintained between crane booms and energized equipment Boundary Tape will be used to distinguish energized and critical equipment

230 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Introduction C. R. Dietz Project Overview J. C. Prim Scope J. C. Prim Schedule J. C. Prim Risk Management R. 0. Moore Summary C. R. Dietz

SUMMARY

Objective of this presentation was to inform and share information...not to convey a sharing of our responsibility to perform this work safely!

The 230 kV Breaker Replacement Team is totally accountable and responsible to complete the work without incident Work Scope is Complex and Threatening Preparations are well founded Teamwork and well-defined responsibilities ensure effective communications Prognosis Assumed the "Worst" and established prudent risk avoidance strategies to assure success