ML14178A519

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Insp Rept 50-261/93-35 on 931122-1203.Apparent Violations Being Considered for Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Event Which Occurred on 931122 in Which a Diesel Generator Did Not Achieve Required Voltage
ML14178A519
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/1993
From: Christensen H, William Orders
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14178A518 List:
References
50-261-93-35, NUDOCS 9401040383
Download: ML14178A519 (6)


See also: IR 05000261/1993035

Text

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report No.:

50-261/93-35

Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company

P. 0. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-261

License No.: DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2

Inspection Conducted: November 22 - December 3, 1993

Lead Inspector:

W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector

Date Signed

Other Inspectors: C. R. gle, Resident Inspector

Approved by:

_

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H. 0. Christensen, Chief

Dafe

igned

Reactor Projects Section 1A

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This special inspection consisted of a review of an event which occurred on

November 22, 1993, in which your "A" diesel generator did not achieve the

required voltage when started and the "B" diesel generator would not start

during testing.

9401040383 931220

PDR ADOCK 05000261

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PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

  • R. Anderson, Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant
  • S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
  • B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
  • T. Cleary, Manager, Technical Support
  • A. McCauley, Manager, Electrical Systems, Technical Support
  • M. Pearson, Plant General Manager
  • R. Wallace, Manager, Licensing

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

engineers, mechanics,and office personnel.

  • Attended Exit Interview

2.

Event Summary

On the morning of November 22, 1993, the licensee was performing a

routine surveillance test on the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG).

They discovered that the generator voltage regulator was mis-adjusted to

440 volts as opposed to the required 480 volts. The licensee adjusted

the voltage regulator and successfully completed the test. Later that

morning the licensee attempted to perform the same test on the "B" EDG

when it was discovered that the engine would not roll when starting air

was applied.

The licensee failed to determine how the voltage regulator on the "A"

EDG became mis-adjusted,_ but concluded that two of the six pilot air

valves in the air start distributor on the "B" diesel had seized, which

had prevented starting air from being injected into two cylinders, and

had resulted in the engine's failure to start. Ultimately, the air

start distributor was repaired and the diesel returned for service on

November 29, 1993.

3.

System Description

Engineered safety features (ESF) equipment is connected to 480 volt

emergency buses El and E2.

Each emergency bus has a dedicated EDG;

diesel "A" for bus El and diesel "B" for bus E2.

The EDGs are Fairbanks Morse twelve cylinder, opposed piston engines

coupled to 2500 KW, 480 VAC generators. Engine starting is accomplished

with compressed air applied to the first six cylinders of the engine.

The starting air is applied to the individual cylinders through the

operation of six air start check valves on the air start header. The

air start check valves are actuated by pneumatic signals from pilot

valves contained in the air start distributor.

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2

The diesels are designed to start and reach rated speed and voltage

within 10 seconds. The EDGs are designed to start 900 hp of motor load

within a single load block and to pick up full rated load within 45

seconds.

The EDGs are designed to start automatically on receipt of a safety

injection (SI) signal, sensed undervoltage on the associated 480 volt

bus, or a manual start command.

4.

Event Details

During the conduct of safeguards systems testing on October 25, 1993,

the "B" EDG failed to start. Initial troubleshooting efforts failed to

detect the cause for this failure. The engine was started twice without

incident on October 26. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that the

springs for the air start distributor pilot air valves associated with

cylinders 2, 4, and 6 were broken. The broken springs were sent to the

Carolina Power and Light Environmental and Education Center for

evaluation to determine the failure mechanism. At the end of this

inspection, that evaluation had not been completed.

On October 27, the diesel was successfully started after temporary

replacement springs were installed. (The springs were obtained from the

training diesel, were not qualified, and were therefore considered

"temporary".)

Later that day, the diesel successfully started during

performance of a scheduled technical specification required surveillance

test.

Two days later on October 29, the diesel was again successfully started

during post maintenance testing after all the pilot air valve springs

were exchanged with new qualified replacements. The diesel was

successfully started again on November 8 during routine surveillance

testing.

On November 12, 1993 the licensee initiated a startup of the reactor

following the completion of refueling outage 15.

On November 14,

following completion of low power physics testing, the unit was placed

on line and reactor power increased to 30 percent power.

On November 16, the licensee detected that a weld on a main feedwater

drain valve was leaking. Ultimately the licensee was forced to shut the

unit down on November 17, to repair the leak.

On the morning of November 22, 1993, the licensee performed a routine

surveillance test on the "A" EDG. They discovered that the generator

voltage regulator was mis-adjusted to 440 volts as opposed to the

required 480 volts. The licensee adjusted the voltage regulator and

successfully completed the test. The licensee initiated an evaluation

to determine if the diesel generator could perform its intended safety

function with the voltage regulator mis-adjusted. At the conclusion of

this inspection, that evaluation was not complete.

3

Later on the morning of November 22,

the licensee attempted to perform

the same surveillance test on the "B" EDG when it was discovered that

the engine would not roll when starting air was applied. The licensee

declared the machine inoperable, quarantined the diesel generator rooms,

and assembled a team to evaluate the failure of the diesel.

On the following day, November 23, the licensee requested vendor

assistance. The licensee, aided by the vendor representative, concluded

that the number 2 and 6 pilot air valves had bound and that the failure

was most probably due to debris.in the system. The debris was believed

to be from other corrosion products in the pilot valve caps, or

fragments of the aforementioned broken springs.

The next day, November 24, a cleanliness inspection of air start

distributor was performed including blowing air through the associated

system piping but no attempt was made to capture debris. Later that day

repairs were completed and operations personnel successfully tested the

diesel.

It should be noted that when the EDG was tested, the licensee

determined that, similar to the "A" EDG, the generator voltage regulator

was mis-adjusted to 450 volts as opposed to the required 480 volts. The

licensee is also evaluating the "B" diesel generator to determine if it

could perform its intended safety function with the voltage regulator

mis-adjusted. At the conclusion of this inspection, that evaluation was

incomplete.

On November 28, after operations personnel performed fast and slow speed

starts of the EDG and licensee management had reviewed the maintenance

actions that had been performed, the "B" diesel was declared operable.

5.

Conclusions

a.

Technical Specification 3.7.1.d requires, in part, that the

reactor shall not be made critical unless two diesel generators

are operable.

Implicit in the definition of "operable" is the

requisites that the diesel generators, start, achieve the design

rated speed and produce the required voltage output.

On November 22, 1993, the licensee determined that the "A" EDG

would produce only 440 volts as opposed to the required 480 volts

and that the "B" EDG would not start. By definition, this implies

that both EDGs were inoperable.

The EDGs were previously tested and known to be operable on

November 8, 1993. Between November 8 and November 22, 1993,

the

reactor was made critical and operated at power levels up to 30

percent for a period of 5 days.

Given the above, it appears that both EDGs were inoperable

simultaneously when the unit was at power. This is an apparent

violation of the above referenced Technical Specification.

4

b.

During the conduct of safeguards systems testing on October 25,

1993, the "B" EDG failed to start. Subsequent troubleshooting

revealed that the springs for the pilot air valves associated with

cylinders 2,4, and 6, in the air start distributor were broken.

The springs were replaced and the EDG was returned to service.

On the morning of November 22, 1993, the licensee was performing a

routine surveillance test on the "B" EDG when it was discovered

that the engine would not roll when starting air was applied.

The licensee concluded that the numbers 2 and 6 pilot air valves

had bound and that the failure mode was most probably due to

debris in the system. The licensee believes that the debris was

either corrosion products in the pilot valve caps, or fragments of

the aforementioned broken springs. Either of these two causes are

indicative of inadequate corrective action related to the event of

October 25 and as such is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion XV1.

6.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 2, 1993,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described

the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings

listed below and in the summary. There were no dissenting comments from

the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection.

Item Number

Apparent Violation

93-35-01

Both EDGs Inoperable Simultaneously

When Unit Was at Power.

93-35-02

Inadequate Corrective Action Related

to Event of October 25, 1993.

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