ML14178A271
| ML14178A271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Garner L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A269 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-92-22, NUDOCS 9209020095 | |
| Download: ML14178A271 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1992022
Text
01REG( qUNITED
STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.V.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-261/92-22
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.: DPR-23
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Inspection Conducted: July 18 - August 7, 1992
Lead Inspector:
ci/-
7 f
L. W. Garner, Senior Re
ent
spector
Date Signed
Other Inspectors: C. R. Ogle, Resident Inspector
D. J. Roberts, Project Inspector
Approved by:
4-?.- >, L
H. 0. Christensen, Chief
D e igned
Reactor Projects Section 1A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational
safety verification, maintenance observation, and followup.
Results:
One violation was identified involving failure to follow an annunciator
procedure (paragraph 3).
9209020095 920821
ADOCK 05000261
0
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- R. Chambers, Plant General Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project
B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
C. Dietz, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
- D. Dixon, Manager, Control and Administration
J. Dobbs, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Department Site Unit
R. Femal, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- W. Flanagan, Manager, Operations
R. Moore, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- A. Padgett, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
D. Seagle, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- D. Stadler, Onsite Licensing Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
W. Stover, Shift Supervisor, Operations
D. Winters, Shift Supervisor, Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
engineers, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Managements Visits
J. P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, was
on site July 21, 1992, to meet with plant management and tour the
facility with the inspectors.
- Attended exit interview on August 11, 1992.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2. Plant Status
The unit remained at full power operation during the inspection period.
3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the
facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory
requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct observation,
facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and
management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility
records.
To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors
reviewed shift logs, Operations' records, data sheets, instrument
traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. Through work
observations and discussions with Operations staff members, the
2
inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions,
responded properly to alarms (except as discussed below), adhered to
procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in
progress surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of
inoperable equipment status. Theinspectors performed channel
verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related
parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were observed,
verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper
control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was
controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in
an effective manner. Control room demeanor and communications were
appropriate.
Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment
operability; assess the general condition of plant equipment; and verify
that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical
protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly
implemented.
B EDG Jacket Water Temperature Switch Malfunction
On June 30, 1992, the inspectors noted that the B EDG jacket water
temperature was 97 degrees F, well below the jacket water heater
actuation temperature of 110 degrees F. Additionally, it was noted by
the inspectors that despite this low temperature condition, the low
jacket water temperature alarm of 105 degrees F had not activated.
Subsequent troubleshooting by Operations and Maintenance Department
personnel indicated that both the temperature control switch for the
jacket water heater (TC-4515B) and the temperature alarm switch (TS
4514B) were out of calibration. The jacket water heater control switch
was replaced, and both the control and alarm temperature switches were
calibrated. Engineering evaluation 92-011 for the B EDG was conducted
to demonstrate that the B EDG remained operable despite this low jacket
water temperature condition.
CST High Level Alarm Procedure Not Implemented
On July 23, 1992, the inspectors noted that a condensate storage tank
(CST) HI/LO level annunciator was lit on the RTGB due to high CST level
(95%).
As a result of this observation, the inspector subsequently
questioned the makeup water treatment operator as to the level in the
CST. Upon noting the high level condition, the makeup water treatment
operator secured filling the CST. Discussions between the inspectors,
the shift supervisor, makeup water treatment operator and other control
room personnel indicated that the makeup water to the CST was throttled,
but not stopped as required by alarm procedures. Makeup flow was
throttled to allow the temporary truck mounted makeup water treatment
system to remain in service verses being shutdown. Alarm procedure E7
of annunciator panel procedure APP-006, S/G & PPS Systems, required that
the following action be taken, "If High Level, STOP source of CST makeup
water."
Subsequent review by the licensee revealed that the control
room operator had informed the makeup water treatment operator that a
3
high level alarm had been received, but failed to inform him of the
required action. The failure to follow the procedural requirements of
APP-006, (i.e., stop filling the CST on the receipt of a high level
alarm) is considered a VIO:
Failure To Implement Alarm Procedure When
High CST Level Alarm Was Received, 92-22-01.
One violation was identified. Except as noted above, the program area
was adequately implemented.
4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
accordance with TS and approved procedures. The inspectors-determined
that these activities did not violate LCOs and that administrative,
testing, and radiological controls were adhered to. In particular, the
inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:
WR/JO 92-AEE323
A And B EDG Governor Brush Cap Inspection
WR/JO 92-AKTP1
Control Rod Drive Room Temperature Alarm
Repair
No violations or deviations were identified. Based on the information
obtained during the inspection, the program area was adequately
implemented.
5. Followup (92700, 92701, 92702)
(Closed) IFI 90-03-01, Review Containment Spray Header Penetration
Isolation Configuration With GDC. A question was raised as whether
manual CV spray isolation valves SI-891A and B met the containment
'isolation boundary requirements of the draft GDCs to which the plant was
licensed. Specifically, the inspectors had questioned whether or not CV
spray pump discharge check valves SI-890A and B were also part of the CV
isolation boundary. In discussions between the licensee and NRR, it was
determined that SI-890A and B did not perform a containment isolation
function. In a letter to the NRC, dated May 14, 1992, the licensee
confirmed this position and committed to change the check valve IST
classification to category A/C and provide specific quantitative
acceptance criteria for backflow leakage. The inspectors verified that
TMM-004, In-Service Inspection Testing, was revised to classify the
check valves as category A/C, and EST-058, SI-890 and 890B Check Valve
Test, was revised to include a maximum allowable backleakage rate of 3.7
gpm. The actions taken addressed the inspectors questions. This item
is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified. Based on the information
obtained during the inspection, the program area was adequately
implemented.
4
6. Exit Interview (71701)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1992,
with those.persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings
listed below and in the summary. The licensee did not identify as
proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Description/Reference Paragraph
92-22-01
VIO - Failure To Implement Alarm Procedure When
High CST Level Alarm Was Received (paragraph 3)
7. List of Acronyms and Initialisms
APP
Annunciator Panel Procedure
Condensate Storage Tank
CV
Containment Vessel
F
Fahrenheit
GDC
General Design Criteria
gpm
Gallons Per Minute
i.e.
That is
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
Inservice Test
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LVL
Level
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Penetration Pressurization System
Reactor Turbine Generator Board
S/G
Safety Injection
TMM
Technical Support Management Manual
TS
Technical Specification
Violation
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order