ML14178A122
| ML14178A122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Garner L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A120 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-91-14, NUDOCS 9107160150 | |
| Download: ML14178A122 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1991014
Text
6* w REG&l
UNITED STATES
0
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
..
0
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No.: 50-261/91-14
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted:
May 11 - June 7, 1991
Lead Inspector:
r
z
14-1
L. W. Garner, Seni
Rident Inspector
Dte Signed
Other Inspector:
K. R. Ju
Resident Inspector
Approved by:
A
. (
.
4X4d. 0.iChristensen, Section Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational
safety verification, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, and
followup.
Results:
A violation was identified for failure to document a Technical Specification
limiting condition for operation entry into the Shift Foreman's Log
(paragraph 3).
A non-cited violation was identified for failing to enter the correct action
statement during an accumulator volume decrease on April 12, 1991
(paragraph 3).
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to implement the surveillance
schedule for a maintenance surveillance test (paragraph 3).
9I07160150 91625
ADOCK 05000261
2
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to include emergency diesel
generator components in the lubrication program (paragraph 4).
An unresolved item was identified to review the impact of entrainment losses
on the small break loss of coolant accident analysis (paragraph 2).
Valve tagging was not aggressively pursued during refueling outage 13.
Subsequent efforts have produced satisfactory results (paragraph 2).
Not providing a writers guide for operating and operations surveillance test
procedures, development, and reviews was a weakness (paragraph 2).
On May 20, 1991, a rededication ceremony was held to commemorate the Unit's
twentieth anniversary (paragraph 2).
System Engineer identification of missed lubrication points on the emergency
diesel generators was noteworthy (paragraph 4).
An Nuclear Assessment Department observation of questionable torque values
during leak repair to the B component cooling water pump discharge check valve
was noteworthy (paragraph 4).
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
C. Baucom, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- D. Bauer, Regulatory Compliance Coordinator, Regulatory Compliance
C. Bethea, Manager, Training
- W. Biggs, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department Site Unit
- S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- R. Chambers, Manager, Operations
- T. Cleary, Manager - Balance of Plant Systems and Reactor Engineering,
Technical Support
D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project
W. Doorman, Acting Manager, Nuclear Assessment Department
J. Eaddy, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Support
S. Farmer, Manager-Engineering Programs, Technical Support
R. Femal, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- D. Gainey, Senior Specialist, Nuclear Engineering Department
- W. Gainey, Manager, Plant Support
J. Kloosterman, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
D. Knight, Shift Supervisor, Operations
D. Labelle, Project Engineer, Nuclear Assessment Department Site Unit
- L. Lynch, Supervisor, Quality Control
- A. McCauley, Manager - Electrical Systems, Technical Support
R. Moore, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
D. Seagle, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- J. Sheppard, Plant General Manager, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
- R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Steele, Shift Supervisor, Operations
W. Stover, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- B. Toney, Senior Specialist, Environmental and Radiation Control
G. Walters, Operating Event Followup Coordinator, Regulatory Compliance
D. Winters, Shift Supervisor, Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview on June 7, 1991.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility
was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements.
These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours,
2
interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management,
verification of safety system status, and review of facility records.
To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors
reviewed shift logs, Operations records, data sheets, instrument traces,
and records of equipment malfunctions. Through work observations and
discussions with Operations Staff members, the inspectors verified the
staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms,
adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of
in-progress surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of
inoperable equipment status. The inspectors performed channel verifica
tions and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to
verify conformance with TS.
Shift changes were routinely observed,
verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper
control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was controlled
and Operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective
manner. Control room demeanor and communications were appropriate.
Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment
operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to
verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical
protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly
implemented.
Non-conservative Basis For Transfer To Recirculation
On May 14, 1991, while performing IPE activities, the licensee identified
that NFS Design Activity 89-0001 under-estimated the loss of inventory
from the RCS while transferring from the injection phase to the recircula
tion phase during a large break LOCA. The calculation failed to include
the inventory loss due to liquid entrainment in the steam. Subsequent
re-analysis demonstrated that with the ECCS systems operating in the
configuration contained in existing emergency procedures, the peak
cladding temperature would remain approximately 950 degrees F below the
maximum allowable temperature limit of 2200 degrees F specified in 10 CFR
50.46 (b) (1).
The applicable emergency procedure, EPP-9, Transfer to
Cold Leg Recirculation, requires one SI pump to be injecting into the RCS
during alignment of ECCS components prior to the recirculation phase
transfer.
The sequence of events associated with the above described deficiency is
as follows:
o
In May 1987, CP&L was notified by Westinghouse that RCS inventory
would be depleted more rapidly than was previously anticipated/analyzed
by decay heat boiling.
o
On June 5, 1987, Westinghouse provided the results of an
evaluation which demonstrated that with:
(1) the injection by two
SI pumps during the alignment for transfer to recirculation (2)
3
operation of one RHR pump for at least one minute immediately prior
to the transfer and (3) a less than 3 minute interruption of ECCS
flow during the transfer, peak cladding temperatures would be
maintained below the 10 CFR 50.46 limitation.
o
EPP-9 was revised on June 6, 1987, to incorporate the above described
operating restrictions.
o
On July 6, 1987, Westinghouse transmitted a more detailed evaluation
including equations and descriptive text of the large break LOCA
analysis previously summarized on June 5, 1987.
o
In January 1988, single failure considerations resulted in the
recognition that only one SI pump could be available during a LOCA.
Unit operation was restricted to 60 percent of full power by TS
Amendment 115.
o
On June 20, 1988, TS Amendment 119 authorized full power operation
with only one SI pump available for mitigation of postulated
accidents, including a LOCA. The supporting analysis did not address
the consequences of having only one SI pump available during
performance of EPP-9.
o
On January 5, 1989, NFS Design Activity 89-0001 was issued to
demonstrate that one SI pump would provide sufficient flow to
maintain core cooling within acceptable limitations during
performance of EPP-9.
o
On January 27, 1989, revision 5 to EPP-9 was issued to require
operation of only one SI pump during alignment of ECCS components
prior to the recirculation phase transfer.
o
On May 8, 1991, NED requested NFS to provide details and supporting
analysis for transfer to recirculation as provided for in EPP-9.
o
On May 14, 1991, NFS review of Design Activity 89-001 and discussions
with Westinghouse resulted in the recognition that the calculation
did not correctly model the vessel inventory depletion during
transfer to recirculation. Other existing analyses were available to
support safe operation up to 65 percent of full power.
o
On May 14, 1991, reactor power was decreased from 100 percent at
4:12 p.m., to less than 65 percent at 7:46 p.m..
o
Westinghouse, assuming a 700 degree F maximum peak cladding
temperature and an ANS-1979 decay heat load, justified return to
95 percent power. A power increase was initiated at 8:10 p.m. on
May 14, 1991, and 90 percent power was obtained at 5:25 a.m. on
May 15, 1991. Power was voluntarily limited to approximately
90 percent pending additional re-analysis.
S
4
o
On May 15, 1991, the NRC questioned utilization of the ANS-1979
decay heat load. The decay heat load of ANS-1971 plus 20 percent is
approved for 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K analyses. Subsequently, using
the latter heat load and a 700 degrees F maximum peak cladding
temperature, Westinghouse demonstrated that 92.5 percent power
operation was acceptable.
o
On May 29, 1991, using the ANS-1971 plus 20 percent model,
Westinghouse determined that operation of the ECCS system in
accordance with EPP-9 would result in a maximum peak cladding
temperature of approximately 1250 degrees F (well within the 10 CFR
50.46 ECCS performance criteria).
o
On May 29, 1991, results of the Westinghouse re-analysis was
discussed with the NRC.
Full power operation was resumed later
that day at 1:00 p.m..
As discussed above, the licensee failed in June 1988 to analyze the
consequences of having only one SI pump delivering ECCS flow during
performance of EPP-9. Furthermore, when EPP-9 was revised to require
operation of only one SI pump, the January 5, 1989 analysis (NFD Design
Activity 89-0001) failed to include losses due to entrainment. The
latter item is of special concern because the licensee had in their
possession since July 6, 1987, the Westinghouse analysis which addressed
entrainment inventory losses. In addition to the above large break LOCA
concerns, inventory losses due to entrainment during a small break LOCA
are presently under review. Pending the results of this review, this is
considered an Unresolved Item:
Review Impact of Entrainment Losses on
the Small Break LOCA Analysis, 91-14-01.
SI Accumulator In-Leakage (LER 91-005)
On April 10, 1991, the boron concentration in B SI accumulator was
identified as being below the administrative limit of 2,000 ppm.
Subsequent attempts to drain and fill the accumulator (using RWST water
supplied through the SI pumps) while maintaining level within the TS
required range, were unsuccessful in restoring the boron concentration to
above the administrative limit. On April 12, in order to restore the
boron concentration and to minimize SI pump cycling, the accumulator was
drained below the TS required minimum volume of 825 cubic feet and
refilled with water of the proper boron concentration. This evolution
took approximately one-half hour to complete. The cause of the decreased
boron concentration was considered to be check valve backleakage from the
RCS into the accumulator (via check valves SI-875B and 875E).
During this drain and fill evolution on April 12, TS Action Statement
3.3.1.2a., which states that "One accumulator may be isolated for a period
not to exceed four hours," was applied. As the accumulator was not
isolated however, the inspectors informed the licensee on April 13, 1991,
that since a specific action statement does not exist for an accumulator
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not meeting boron concentration, pressure, or volume requirements, literal
interpretation of TS required entrance into TS 3.0. Subsequent to this
discussion, the licensee agreed with this interpretation and issued LER 91-005 as required for an entrance to TS 3.0.
LER 91-005 discusses the basis utilized by the licensee in applying TS
action statement 3.3.1.2a. As addressed in the LER, the licensee
believed entrance into the specification to be consistent with past
applications, and that it was "considered to be conservative due to the
more limiting time requirements imposed by this action statement".
The
LER also addresses TS inconsistencies which contributed to the misapplica
tion of the action statement. The licensee initiated WRs 91-AGRH1 and
AGRG1 to document and investigate the backleakage through the series of
check valves between the RCS and B SI accumulator. Additionally, a review
is to be performed to determine wording enhancements to "ensure proper and
consistent application of associated action statement". This review, with
any proposed TS change(s) identified and submitted, is to be complete by
November 29, 1991. Accordingly, this LER remains open pending completion
of the review and submittal of any proposed TS change(s).
Not entering
the correct TS action statement is considered a violation; however, this
violation meets the criteria specified in Section V.A. of the NRC
Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cited.
This violation is identified as a NCV:
Failure To Enter Applicable TS
Action Statement, 91-14-02.
Facility Tours
On May 13, 1991, during an RTGB instrumentation channel check, the
inspectors observed that PI-501, RCS wide range pressure indicator, had
failed downscale. The control operator subsequently verified by ERFIS,
that the associated pressure transmitter was functioning properly. The
Regulatory Guide 1.97 indicator was subsequently repaired under WR/JO
91-AGZMI and returned to service on May 15, 1991.
OP And OST Writer's Guide
While reviewing log keeping practices associated with the overdue
surveillances described in paragraph 3, the inspectors observed inconsis
tencies with LCO entries and surveillance test activities. Operations
personnel are presently expected to be aware when a surveillance test
places the unit in an LCO; however, procedures do not consistently address
LCO entries. Operations procedure writers include a note immediately
preceding the applicable procedure steps that a TS LCO applies. In other
procedures, steps have been incorporated to ensure that when equipment is
removed from service for testing, the redundant TS required equipment is
available (i.e.., help ensure TS 3.0 is not inadvertently entered). A
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writers guide has not been developed to address this inconsistency in OPs
and OSTs.
Consistency is evidently attained by on-the-job training and
consensus. The failure to provide a writer's guide for the development
and review process of OPs and OSTs is a weakness.
This item was discussed
with the Operations Manager. A draft writer's guide for these procedures
is expected to be in place by the end of the year.
Valve Tagging
At the end of the RO 13, a total of 709 valves were identified as missing
valve tags. This number included 477 valves identified during end-of-outage
system lineups and 232 valves which were previously identified. The
large number of missing tags is indicative of a non-aggressive valve
tagging program during RO 13.
Tagging efforts subsequent to the outage
have produced satisfactory results. The number of identified valves with
missing tags has been reduced to approximately 200. Most of these valves
were located in either high radiation or locked high radiation areas, or
were spare valves. The inspectors discussed the concern with the valve
tagging program with the Operations Manager.
Robinson Rededication
On May 20, 1991, a rededication ceremony was held at the H. B. Robinson's
Visitor Center to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Unit 2
commercial operations which commenced on March 7, 1971.
Attendees
included U. S. Senator Strom Thurmond; U. S. Representative Robin Tallon;
William H. Young, Assistant Secretary For Nuclear Energy; state and local
politicians; and business leaders.
One violation with two examples and one NCV were identified.
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on
systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted
in accordance with license requirements.
For the surveillance test
procedure listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and
LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts
were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by
qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, the
test was completed at the required frequency, the test conformed to TS
requirements, and the system was properly properly returned to service.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following
test activities:
OST-401
Emergency Diesels
S
7
Overdue Surveillances
On May 19, 1991, at 8:00 p.m., Operations personnel were informed that
MST-101, Boric Acid Heat Tracing Operability, and MST-902, Battery Test
Daily, had not performed on May 17, 1991, as scheduled. The MSTs were
subsequently completed by 8:15 p.m..
The latter surveillance test (TS 4.6.3.1 requirement) measures the voltage and temperature of each battery
pilot cell at a frequency of 5 days per week. The first test, used to
demonstrate that two channels of heat tracing are operable for the flow
path from the boric acid storage tanks, is not a TS required surveillance
test. In accordance with PLP-024, Surveillance Testing Program, section
6.4, both safety-related batteries were determined to be out of service
from 8:00 p.m.; however, TS does not require equipment to be declared out
of service (inoperable) when a surveillance test is not performed. The
shift supervisor's log identified that the batteries were out of service
for 15 minutes and a potential reportable event per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
(vii)(A) existed. However, the log entry did not specifically identify
that with both safety-related batteries out of service, TS 3.0 was entered
(i.e., unit shall be placed in hot shutdown within eight hours). The
inspectors verified via interviews with the shift supervisor that he was
aware at the time of notification that TS 3.0 was applicable. Procedure
OMM-001, Operations - Conduct Of Operations, revision 25, paragraph 5.5.3,
required the Shift Foreman's Log to include entry into any LCO condition
with reference to the TS and time requirement. The failure to make the
required log entry involving TS 3.0 is considered a violation:
Failure To
Maintain Logs As Required By Operating Procedures, 91-14-03.
The licensee conducted an investigation into the circumstance involving
failure to perform MST-101 and MST-902 as scheduled. The procedures were
scheduled for night shift on May 17, 1991; however, other work activities
occupied the assigned crew. As a result, the procedures were left to the
next night shift for performance. Apparently, the turnover consisted of
attaching a note to the procedures and laying them on the night shift lead
technician's desk; during housekeeping activities, the procedures were
moved to another individual's desk. The informality of the turnover
process contributed to the MSTs not being performed as scheduled. This
was discussed with the Maintenance Manager who is reviewing the turnover
process. Additionally, work practices are being revised to place
additional controls on the maintenance surveillance scheduling process.
The inspector reviewed ACR 91-166 which documented the incident and
proposed corrective actions. Successful completion of these corrective
actions should preclude recurrence. Failure to perform surveillance
scheduling activities as required by TS 6.5.1.1.1.a and Item 1.f of
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 as implemented .by plant procedure
PLP-024 is a violation. This violation meets the criteria specified in
Section V. A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of
Violation and is not cited. The violation is identified as a NCV: Failure
To Implement Surveillance Scheduling Procedure For MST-902, 91-14-04.
One violation and one NCV were identified.
8
4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems
and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes
and standards. The inspectors determined that these activities did not
violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operable. The
inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing,
radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered to. In particular,
the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:
Daily Through Weekly Lubrication Procedure
WR/JO 91-ABIB1
Repair Check Valve CC-702B Leak
CCW Check Valve (CC-702B) Repair
During the leak repair (per TM 91-702 and WR 91-ABIB1) of CCW check valve
CC-702B on May 22 and 23, 1991, the inspectors observed effective
interface between the Technical Support System engineer, the Maintenance
mechanic, and the vendor representatives. This interface was evident
throughout the valve stud replacement evolution and associated
"troubleshooting". Additionally, the inspectors noted the NAD's
involvement in assessing this activity. The NAD representative identified
a concern with the self-assessment process, in that, the stud torque value
delineated in the TM was based upon lubricated threads, but no lubricant
was applied prior to the actual torquing process. Lubricant was not used
due to the vendor representative's concern with material incompatibility.
Although no apparent safety concern exists with not lubricating the studs,
the NAD representatives concern was noteworthy as this discrepancy was not
documented in neither the WR nor the TM packages. As a result, during
review of the packages it was not discernable that the studs' cap nuts
were not torqued as the referenced torquing procedures specify (i.e., with
lubricant). The inspectors discussed this concern with the Managers,
Technical Support, and Maintenance; they indicated that a memo which was
written to document torque acceptability would be attached to the TM
package.
Inadequate Lubrication Schedule
On May 13, 1991, the inspectors observed lubrication of the B EDG as
specified by PM-001, Daily Through Weekly Lubrication Procedure. The
inspectors noted that the procedure did not include the fuel oil pump for
the lubrication. The monthly, quarterly and semi-annual lubrication
procedures, as well as PM-201, Equipment Lubrication List, did not
include the EDG fuel oil pumps. The cognizant system engineer indicated
that the failure to include the EDG fuel oil pumps and the EDG air inlet
check valve bushings in the lubrication program had been identified in
9
April 1991.
Intra-office memorandum, dated April 30, 1991, documented a
telephone conversation between the system engineer and the EDG vendor
concerning lubrication requirements for these items.
Corrective actions included additional inspections of the EDG and
associated auxiliary components. This resulted in the identification of
another item, governor speed adjusting motors, which is to be added to the
lubrication program. Applicable procedures were being revised to
incorporate these items into the lubrication program at the end of the
report period. Regulatory Guide 1.33 Appendix A, item 9.b., and TS 6.5.1.1.1.a., require procedures for lubrication. Failure to adequately
establish lubrication schedules for the above mentioned items is a
violation of this requirement. This violation meets the criteria specified
in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of
Violation and is not cited. The violation is identified as a NCV:
Failure To Adequately Establish A Lubrication Schedule For EDG Components,
91-14-05.
The inspectors discussed the circumstances surrounding the EDG lubrication
deficiencies discovered in April 1991, with the cognizant system engineer
During a system walkdown, the engineer identified grease fittings that he
recognized as being lubrication points which were not included in the
- lubrication
program. Identification of this deficiency during a routine
walkdown demonstrated a strong sense of system ownership by the engineer.
One NCV was identified.
5. Followup (92700)
(Closed) LER 89-09, Relative Humidity Exceeds TS Limits With CV Purge In
Progress. The inspectors verified that a second relative humidity
standard has been procurred and the calibration frequency of the standrds
has been revised to semi-annual.
These actions are in accordance with the
corrective actions provided in the LER. This LER is considered closed.
(Closed) LER 89-015, Breach Of Containment Integrity Due To Failure Of
Airlock Equalizing Valve. A similar report, LER 90-006, Breach of
Containment Integrity Due To Failure Of The Personnel Air Lock Door, is
considered open.
Supplement 1 to LER 89-015 was issued on April 27, 1990.
This supplement combined the corrective action of LER 89-015 and LER 90-006, as well as, extending the completion date to RO 13.
Airlock
failure during RO 13 and associated root cause investigations resulted in
issuance of LER 90-006 Supplement 1 on February 7, 1991.
This supplement
identified that a modification requiring a TS change, would be necessary
to completely correct the root cause of the air lock door failures. The
inspectors verified that implementation of PM-038, CV Personnel Airlock
Maintenance And Inspection, issued February 21, 1991, was sufficient in
10
the interim to reduce the frequency of airlock door failures. Based upon
the implementation of PM-038, the corrective actions associated with LER 89-015 have been completed; LER 89-015 is considered closed. LER 90-006
remains open pending development of a modification to correct the root
cause of the failures.
(Closed) IFI 89-23-01, Review Of Shielding For Implementation Of The ALARA
Program. The inspectors discussed the present ALARA implementation
practices with cognizant plant personnel.
These work practices and
controls appear to be sufficient to preclude the type of observation
documented in the IR 89-23. This item is considered closed.
(Closed) VIO 89-23-06, Failure To Establish And Implement Procedures As
Required By 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V. The inspectors reviewed the
licensee's response to the NOV dated January 17, 1990. The inspectors
verified via training records that maintenance personnel received training
on the root cause of the specific events as committed. This corrective
action is considered sufficient to address the violation. This item is
considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
. 6. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 7, 1991, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1. In addition, URI 91-14-01 was
discussed with the Plant Manager on June 24, 1991.
The inspectors
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
findings listed below and in the summary. Dissenting comments were not
received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
Item Number
Description/Reference Paragraph
91-14-01
URI -
Review Impact of Entrainment Losses
on the Small Break LOCA Analysis
(paragraph 2)
91-14-02
NCV -
Failure To Enter Applicable TS
Action Statement (paragraph 2)
91-14-03
VIO - Failure To Maintain Logs As
Required By Operating Procedures
(paragraph 3)
91-14-04
NCV - Failure To Implement Surveillance
Scheduling Procedure For MST-902
(paragraph 3)
91-14-05
NCV -
Failure to Adequately Establish A
A Lubrication Schedule For EDG
Components (paragraph 4)
7. List of Acronyms and Initialisms
a.m.
Ante Meridiem
As Low As Reasonable Achievable
American Nuclear Society
Component Cooling Water
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Carolina Power & Light
CV
Containment Vessel
End Path Procedures
ERFIS
Emergency Response Facility Information System
F
Fahrenheit
i.e.
That is
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Independent Plant Examinations
IR
Inspection Report
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
Maintenance Surveillance Test
NAD
Nuclear Assessment Department
Non-cited Violation
NED
Nuclear Engineering Department
NFD
National Fuels Department
Nuclear Fuels Section
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OMM
Operations Management Manual
OP
Operations Procedure
OST
Operation Surveillance Test
p.m.
Post Meridiem
Pressure Indicator
PLP
Plant Program
Preventive Maintenance
Parts Per Million
Refueling Outage
Reactor Turbine Generator Board
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Safety Injection
TM
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item
Violation
W/R
Work Request
WR/JO
Work Request/Job Order