ML14176A885
| ML14176A885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A883 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-90-13, NUDOCS 9008200101 | |
| Download: ML14176A885 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1990013
Text
C,"pkREG&Z
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET,N.\\N.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
AL 2 7 9
Report No.:
50-261/90-13
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted:
Ju
17-21, 1990
Inspecto.,------------------
!/
W. M. Sartor, Jr.
-
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel: J. Kreh
W. Rankin
J. Will
Approvedby-&
--
'5_____Z
9O
William H. Rankin, Chief
/Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation
and response were selectively observed in the Control Room, Technical Support
Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC),
and Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF).
The inspection also included a review of the exercise
objectives and scenario details, as well as observation.of the licensee's post
exercise critique activities.
The exercise was conducted from 6 p.m., June 18
to 1:30 a.m. on June 19, 1990.
Results:
In the areas inspected,
one violation and one exercise weakness were
identified. The violation addressed the failure to correct a weakness from the
1989 exercise for untimely activation of the OSC and TSC (Paragraph 6).
The
exercise weakness was a failure to classify the General Emergency (Paragraphs 2
and 5).
Exercise strengths included the licensee's ability to maintain the
start time and exercise day as unannounced; the applicability of the fuel
handling scenario as it relates to near term operations at H.B. Robinson; and
the excellent critique provided to licensee management.
As a result of the
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2
exercise findings, licensee management committed to prompt corrective action,
a drill to demonstrate the effectiveness of the correction action, and
requested a management meeting within 30 days with Region II management for
discussions of improvements needed.
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Curley, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
- D. Dixon, Manager, Control and Administration Section
- H. Goodwin, Project Specialist, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel
Management Section
- W. Hammond, Senior Engineer, Technical Support
- J. Harrison, Program Director, Plant Support
- J.
Kloosterman, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- B. McFeaters, Project Specialist, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel
Management Section
- T. McLeod, Office Supervisor
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
- D. Quick, Manager, Plant Support Unit
- J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations
- B. Slone, Records Management Supervisor
- R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance
- L. Williams, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness and Security
- H. Young, Manager, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen,
engineers,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- K. Jury
- Attended exit interview
2. Exercise Scenario
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and
local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.N.
2
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and
was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for
this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the onsite and offsite
emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency
information to the State and local government agencies for their limited
communications-only participation in the exercise. A significant strength
of the scenario development was the licensee maintaining the start time
and day as unannounced; this was very effective to test the augmentation
times of the emergency response facilities.
While no major problems with
the scenario were identified during the review, several inconsistencies
became apparent during the exercise. One inconsistency detracted from the
overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization by providing
conflicting radiological data as to whether or not the Emergency Action
Level for a General Emergency had been exceeded. The licensee identified
the failure to classify the General Emergency as a weakness requiring
corrective action during their management critique. This finding was also
identified as an exercise weakness (50-261/90-13-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Assignment of Responsibility
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and
that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made
for the licensee's emergency response organization,
and there were
adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The
initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee
representatives.
The capability for long-term or continuous staffing
appeared to be questionable due to a lack of depth in certain positions
and was identified by the licensee during their management critique for
corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Onsite Emergency Organization
The licensee's on-shift emergency organization was observed to determine
that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility
accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A,
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.B.
3
the inspectors observed that the initial on-shift emergency organization
was well defined and the responsibility and authority for directing
actions necessary to respond to the emergency were unambiguously defined.
Adequate staff was on-shift to fill
key functional positions within the
emergency organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response
organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel
and corporate assistance.
The procedure for the augmentation was Plant
Emergency Procedure PEP-171, titled "Emergency Communicator and Staff".
An inspector noted that the callout procedure as implemented did not
provide for timely augmentation.
For example,
it was noted that the
Operational Support Center (OSC) Leader arrived eighty minutes after the
Alert declaration, however, a review of PEP-171 indicated the OSC Leader
was in a call tree that required a minimum of fifteen personnel to be
notified sequentially prior to the OSC Leader being called. This probably
contributed significantly to the delayed activation of the OSC as further
discussed in Paragraph 6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Emergency Classification System
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility
licensee as required by
Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in
effect as stated in the Radiological
Emergency Plan and in the
Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the
classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures
provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the
simulated emergency; however,
after the TSC had been activated, an
inspector observed confusion regarding emergency classification when
radiological data was being interpreted differently by the TSC personnel
and Control Room personnel. Specifically, the Control Room personnel were
interpreting the data as requiring a General Emergency classification
whereas the Radiological Control Director in the TSC informed the Site
Emergency Coordinator (SEC) in the TSC that the model used by the Control
Room personnel was conservative and believed a Site Area Emergency (SAE)
to be the proper classification.
The SEC declared a SAE.
During the
licensee's management critique, the failure to classify the General
Emergency was identified for corrective action as previously identified in
Paragraph 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
Paragraph
IV.D of Appendix E to
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of
NUREG-0654, this area was observed to determine whether procedures were
4
established for notification of State and local response organizations and
plant emergency personnel by the licensee, and whether the content of
initial and follow-up messaces to response organizations was established.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established and were effectively used to provide prompt and accurate
offsite notifications to the State and local authorities.
The NRC was
also notified whenever required. However, the inspector determined that
the licensee's commitments for activation of the OSC and TSC (viz.,
partial activation within 45 minutes and full activation within
75 minutes of an Alert declaration) were not acceptably demonstrated as
indicated by the following observations:
o
The OSC was activated 89 minutes after the Alert declaration, but
even then without personnel to fill
the designated positions of
Access Control Clerk, Dosimetry Clerk, and PASS/Chemistry Technician.
(Absence of the access control function at the OSC was of particular
concern to the inspector.)
o
The TSC was activated 125 minutes after the Alert declaration.
These activation times were significantly longer than observed during the
November 1989 exercise. An Exercise Weakness was identified during that
previous inspection for failure to (1) adequately implement the
notification procedure for staff augmentation and (2) activate the TSC and
OSC in a timely manner (see NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/89-27).
The current inspection disclosed that the Exercise Weakness identified in
November 1989.was not adequately corrected. Further evidence of this was
obtained through review of the licensee's documentation of off-hour staff
augmentation drills conducted on May 9 and June 11 and 14,
1990.
The
inspector concluded that all three of these drills were unsuccessful in
demonstrating the capability to activate the TSC and OSC within 75 minutes
of a simulated emergency declaration.
The licensee's critique of the November 1989 exercise identified a
weakness for failure to demonstrate the ability to adequately notify and
activate the emergency response organization for the TSC and the OSC (a
finding substantively identical to the Exercise Weakness discussed earlier
in this paragraph).
Failure to correct this previous weakness,
as
indicated by the results of the three augmentation drills and the current
exercise as discussed above,
was determined to be a violation of
Section IV.F.5 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, which specifies that any
weaknesses that are identified by the licensee's critique of an emergency
preparedness exercise shall be corrected.
Violation 50-261/90-13-02:
Failure to demonstrate adequate corrective
action for a previous exercise weakness regarding inability to notify
and activate the emergency response organization for the TSC and OSC in a
timely manner.
5
One violation and no deviations were identified.
7. Emergency Communications
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt
communications
among principal response organizaticn and emergency
personnel. as required by
Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and
emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response
organization and offsite authorities were good.
The one communications
equipment problem noted by the licensee was the loss of the Emergency
Notification System (ENS) telephone in the TSC when the power to the TSC
was shut off as part of the exercise. This did not negatively impact the
exercise because the responsibility for making offsite notifications to
include the NRC remained in the Control Room; however, it did require.a
50.72 reporting requirement for the licensee which was promptly made.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Accident Assessment
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods,
systems and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or. potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and
criteria in Section II.1 of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Although sufficient
personnel and teams appeared to be available for accident assessment, this
area was not aggressively pursued.
For example, although severe after
shocks followed the initial earthquake,
walkdowns of areas previously
examined were not inspected again. It was also noted in the TSC that it
took almost two hours to regain power to the TSC, an event the scenario
developers anticipated to take 15 to 30 minutes.
The inconsistencies
addressing the radiological accident assessment have been discussed in
Paragraph 5.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Exercise Critique
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were
brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
action pursuant to
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.N.
6
The licensee conducted effective player critiques immediately following
exercise termination.
Evaluator critiques were also held with a formal
licensee critique being held on June 21,
1990 with controllers,
evaluators,
key participants, licensee management,
and NRC personnel
attending.
The licensee critique was thorough and indicated five
significant deficiencies had been identified.
Follow-up of corrective
actions taken by the licensee will be accomplished through subsequent NRC
inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a. (Open)
Exercise Weakness 50-261/89-27-01:
Failure to produce a
technically consistent scenario and to demonstrate proper exercise
control.
Although the licensee's scenario was greatly improved and
exercise control was not a problem, this item remains open because of
the inconsistent radiological data that created confusion regarding
the General Emergency classification.
b. (Open) Exercise Weakness 50-261/89-27-02:
Failure.of a shift foreman
to recognize an initiating condition for a NOUE.
This item remains
open because of the observations discussed in Paragraph 5.
c. (Closed') Exercise Weakness 50-261/89-27-03:
Failure to adequately
implement the notification procedure for plant augmentation staff and
to activate the TSC and OSC in a timely manner. Failure to correct
this weakness has been reclassified as violation 50-261/90-13-03 (See
Paragraph 6).
d. (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item 50-261/89-27-05:
Notifying the
OSC prior to placing the RHR system in service.
Inspectors noted
that the TSC kept the OSC fully informed of any plant conditions that
could endanger OSC repair teams.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 21, 1990, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The team leader described the
areas inspected and discussed the inspection results.
No proprietary
information is contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not
received from the licensee.
Following the NRC exit interview, senior
licensee management committed to prompt corrective action and a drill to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the correction action, and requested a
management meeting within 30 days with Region II management for discussion
of improvements needed.
On July 24, 1990, in a conversation with the
7
Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department, one item that was identified
separately for followup by the NRC was combined with item 90-13-02 below.
Item Number
Description and Reference
50-261/90-13-01
Exercise Weakness -
Failure to
classify
the
General
Emergency
(Paragraph 2).
50-261/90-13-02
Violation - .Failure to correct previous
weakness of not activating the TSC and
OSC in a timely manner (Paragraph 6).
The licensee was also informed that four previously identified open items
were reviewed, and two were being closed with the other two remaining open
(Paragraph 10).
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and
Narrative Summary of Scenario
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
1990 ROBINSON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
SCOPE
An emergency will be simulated at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear
plant (HBR2) which will escalate in emergency classification
to at least a SITE AREA EMERGENCY and possibly to a GENERAL
EMERGENCY and will involve planned response and recovery
actions to include: emergency classification; notification of
off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions to correct
or mitigate the emergency, conditions;
and initiation of
accident assessment and protective. actions as necessary to
cope with the accident.
The exercise will simulate an
emergency which requires appropriate responses by state and
local government personnel (state and county participation
will be limited to communications functions to support plant
exercise play).
This simulated event is
a utility
only
exercise for 1990.
OBJECTIVES
A. ACCIDENT DETECTION AND ASSESSMENT
1.
Demonstrate the ability to detect emergency accident
conditions, assess and project radiological consequences,
and formulate near term mitigating actions.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center
in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose
assessment, and communication/notification activities.
B.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
1.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and classify the
emergency
in
accordance with the emergency plan and
appropriate plant implementing procedures.
C.
NOTIFICATION OF ON-SITE & OFF-SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSON
NEL
1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting,
notifying, and mobilizing on-site and off-site emergency
response organization personnel.
CAROLINA POWER
LIGHT COMPANY
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
1990 ROBINSON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
(continued)
2.
Demonstrate the timeliness and adequacy of the informa
tion provided in the initial notifications to state and
county agencies.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up notifica
tions to the state and county agencies.
4.
Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate
notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Actual participation of the NRC Operations Center may be
simulated.
D.
COMMUNICATIONS
1.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency
response facilities, as well as environmental monitoring
teams and damage control teams.
2.
Demonstrate that the radiological, meteorological,
and
process data transmittal to the Technical Support Center,
Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations
Facility is adequate.
E.
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL
1.
Demonstrate that emergency exposure control procedures
have been established and are utilized in the protection
of emergency workers.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to monitor personnel and
equipment for contamination.
2
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
1990 ROBINSON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
(continued)
F.
STAFF AUGMENTATION
1.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency
response organization within the time limits specified
within the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
2.
Demonstrate that emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC,
and EOF) can be activated in accordance with the emergen
cy plan and procedures.
G.
SHIFT STAFFING
1.
Demonstrate that sufficient emergency response organiza
tion personnel are identified and can be made available
to support the emergency response on a round-the-clock
coverage schedule.
H.
PUBLIC INFORMATION
1.
Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation,
review and release of information to the news media.
I.
FIELD MONITORING
1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment utilized for
the off-site radiological monitoring.
J.
ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
1.
Demonstrate the ability to perform on-site accountability
as required by the emergency plan.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to evacuate nonessential person
nel
from the Protected Area
and to conduct on-site
monitoring of these evacuees.
Release of nonessential
personnel from the site may be simulated.
3.
Demonstrate that adequate control measures have been
established for plant access control.
3
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
1990 ROBINSON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
(continued)
K.
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center
in providing additional manpower support and coordination
of emergency repair and damage control activities.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations
Facility in providing off-site dose assessment, environ
mental monitoring,
and evaluation/coordination of off
site activities.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency.kits and equipment
in emergency response facilities.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the Technical Support Center
to perform their functions under loss of primary and
backup electrical power to the facility.
L.
USE OF FIRE CONTROL TEAMS
1.
Demonstrate proper procedures for the fire brigade
response to the type of fire chosen for the exercise.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between off
site fire support personnel and the plant fire brigade.
M.
GENERAL
1.
Demonstrate that the previously identified NRC exercise
weaknesses from the 1989 annual Emergency Preparedness
exercise have been resolved.
4
CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
EXERCISE
3.0
SCENARIO
SCN-90-1356
3.0-0
RNPD-90-04-RO
The Shift Foreman is now the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC).
Concern for
potential earthquake - related problems may prompt him to halt the movement of
spent fuel.
Therefore, he may communicate with workers in the Spent Fuel Pit
(SFP)
and direct them to halt the fuel movement.
Presently one fuel element has
already been moved into the cask, and a second fuel element is directly over the
cask. As the second fuel element is moved,
it accidently disengages from the
spent fuel handling tool and falls.
It comes to rest in a leaning position, its
bottom is on the rim of the cask and its top is propped against the SFP wall.
An immediate evacuation of all personnel from the SFP occurs.
While evacuating,
workers encounter difficulty in opening the SFP door, but successfully exit the
SFP and force the door closed.
The Control Room announces the location of the
accident over the PA, and sounds the Local Evacuation alarm.
The first aftershock occurs and the associated seismic alarm is received
in the Control Room.
The leaning fuel element falls into the cask and damages
the one.(1) fuel element already in the cask.
Also due to the aftershock, a fire
is caused when the Artemis computer fails and "shorts" to ground.
The fire is
discovered in the southeast corner of the Design Engineering Building.
The fire
spreads rapidly and involves a large portion of this building..
Given the
magnitude of the fire, and the other ongoing plant situations, the SEC should
conclude that offsite fire company assistance might be needed.
The plant fire
brigade responds, begins initial fire attack, and indeed requests the offsite
assistance. The City of Hartsville Fire Department is called and responds to
provide assistance.
Shortly after the combined firefighting begins, the fire is
extinguished with no further complications.
If an attempt is made to determine
the source of the fire, it will be observed that the Artemis Computer room was
most heavily damaged.
Meanwhile, efforts to recover from the situation of the dropped spent fuel
element continue.
Radiation monitoring outside the SFP door and vicinity shows
no appreciable increases in radiation levels. Therefore, the Shift Foreman forms
an investigation team to determine the condition of the dropped fuel element.
The team assembles and attempts to enter the SFP but finds the computer-operated
latching mechanism' on the SFP door has become jammed and it will not open.
Maintenance and security could be dispatched to assist the team to gain access
to the SFP.
Maintenance accesses the door without much delay.
The team enters
the SFP and finds the dropped fuel element has fallen onto the top of the open
cask and a single stream of bubbles is seen. rising from within the cask.
They
observe that the fallen element has struck the top of the one fuel element that
was already in the cask.
The fallen element is still in a leaning position, its
bottom rests on the top of the spent fuel cask, and the top of the element is
still propped against the SFP wall.
While the investigation team continues to evaluate the situation, radiation
levels have risen slightly in the SFP.
The fuel element already inside the cask
has been damaged by the falling element such that GAP gas is
escaping.
The
radiation monitor for the spent fuel pit alarms' in the Control Room.
Again,
there is an immediate evacuation of all personnel from the SFP.
90-1219
3.0-2
Upon considering the known information, the SEC realizes there has been
fuel damage to at least one fuel element.
The SEC makes an ALERT declaration
based upon one fuel element being damaged.
Because an ALERT has been declared,
(TSC)
and the Operations Support Center
(OSC)
personnel are notified and begin to assemble.
Off-site notifications are
accomplished within 15 minutes of the ALERT declaration.
During the next 30 to
45 minutes and 60 to 75 minutes respectively,
the OSC
and TSC members are
mustering and.their organizations are preparing to activate.
Shortly after the TSC activates, a second aftershock occurs and another
seismic alarm is received in
the Control Room.
The entire TSC/EOF building
experiences a loss of all lighting as well as all power.
This loss is caused by
the loss of the offsite power feeding the building (NOT the offsite power feeding
Unit 2) and the subsequent failure of the automatic transfer switch (ATS#1) to
operate. Investigation will reveal that the TSC/EOF/Security emergency diesel
generator is operating, and that the relay controlling the automatic transfer
switch (ATS#l)
did not function.
A manual bypass can be accomplished at ATS#l
using the method described in the vendor tech manual. As soon as this or some
other suitable method is accomplished, the lights and power will be restored.
Shortly after the second aftershock, a chemical spill (ammonium hydroxide) is
observed which must be cleaned up. Concurrent with the second aftershock, the
Control Room will receive a Grid Under Frequency alarm of less than 59 Hertz
which should cause operators to perform a manual trip of the unit and maintain
it in hot shutdown status.
Meanwhile the radiation levels in the SFP have been decreasing. The OSC
determines they need radiological samples from'the SFP.
Sampling team members
are designated and preparations are made to collect the various samples.
The
sampling team enters the SFP.
The dropped element is still leaning against the
wall.
At this time the third aftershock occurs.
This causes the leaning
element to slide from its position and fall across the spent fuel racks and
damage itself severely and strikes a fresh spent fuel element.
Large bubbles
(GAP
gas) rush to the surface.
One of the wall panels in
the SFP becomes
detached,
leaving a large opening in the wall.
All personnel immediately
evacuate the spent fuel building.
Radiation levels increase rapidly.
This new
information regarding damage to the spent fuel is given to the appropriate OSC,
TSC and/or Control Room personnel.
Since bubbles are seen coming from the sheared fuel element, the top of the
SFP rack, and from within the cask, it is evident that at least two different
fuel elements have been damaged.
Several radiation monitors alarm and go
offscale high.
Upon observing the increase
in radiation levels and dose
projections
of
greater
than 5 Rem thyroid dose,
the SEC declares
a
GENERAL EMERGENCY.
Then based on Environmental Monitoring data which is collected by field
teams, the. SEC will probably maintain that classification.
90-1219
3.0-3