ML14176A618
| ML14176A618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1981 |
| From: | Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Jackie Jones CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A619 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106030015 | |
| Download: ML14176A618 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1981006
Text
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UNITED STATES
0 oNUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
APR 2 31981
Carolina Power and Light Company
1
ATTN:
J. A. Jones
Senior Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC
27602
Gentlemen:
Due to an adminis
'
error, the enclosed material, which was an attachment
to Report No
-261/8
was inadvertently deleted. Please attach this to
the report.
Sincerely,
R. C.
1s, Acting Director
Division of Resident and
Reactor Project Inspection
Enclosure: As Stated
cc w/encl:
R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager
T. A. Kevern, IE:HQ
J. D. Richardson, FEMA -
RIV
8006080 0k7
Mlarch 26, 1981
Brigadier General George R. Wise
Lirector
Emergency Preparedness Division
1429 Senate Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Dear General Wise:
I have enclosed a report of deficiencies noted in, the H. B. Robinson REP
exercise conducted on March 11-12, 1981.
These were identified through
observations by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance
Committee and FLMA IV staff).
While I am aware your planning staff is in process of correcting your.plans
as a result of (1)
formal. RAC comment on site specific plans and (2) state/
local. exercise critique, there are some critical items which need special
attention and resolution prior to submitting the plan to FEMA National for
its .eview and acceptance.
Thus, at your earliest convenience, please
provide Mr. He rris Pope (Acting Regional Director, FEMA IV) with your
state's position on how, and within what time frame, these noted deficiencies
will be satiffied.
Upon receipt of this report, we will proceed with the plans
evaluation and, acceptance process.
Your state has done- much in a short period of time to accomplish what you have
on the REP plans.
I compliment you for the excellent effort and assure you
that RAC IV members and FEMA IV staff look forward to supporting future
REP activities in your state.
Lincerely,
Jack D. Richardson
Acting Chairman, RAC IV
Encloure
cc:
PP-S. Brown
RD
PP-R. Boyett
All RAC IV Members/
PP- Yellow
Hal Gaut/FEMA REP Division/ Washington, DC
Acting Executive Assistant
PP/JDichardson/fw/x347/3-26-81
DEFICIENCIES NOTED
IN THE
H B. ROBINSON REP
EXERCISE
CONDUCTED AT HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA
MARCH 11 -.
12, 1981
DEFICIENCIES IN THE H. B. ROBINSON EXERCISE
1. Notification and Alerting of Officials and Staff
Chesterfield, Darlington and Lee County Plans provide for the State Emergency
Preparedneps Division to notify the County EOC by telephone with redundant SLED
Teletype Communications. This procedure is to be followed when the FEOC has
not been established.
In Darlington County, the Civil Defense Director was
notified by State EPD. However, no redundant message was sent to the Law
Enforcement Communications Center.
This resulted in the Sheriff not being
notified promptly.
In this exercise the County EOC was occupied at time of
notification.
If the accident should happen during non-duty hours, there are
no provisions for notification to be sent to the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Warning Point.
2. Notification and Alerting of the Public
A statement from the Governor's Office was approved for release at 8:45 a.m.
This release was monitored on a local radio station EBS Broadcast at 9:40 a.m.
The exercise demonstrated a need for the public to be promptly notified and
be kept continuously apprised of the developing situation. Current system
does not meet NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1 requirements. However, existing system
was exercised within current capability.
3. External Communications Capability Between Sites
The exercise demonstrated a need for improvement in mobile communications
between field teams and the Forward Emergency Operations Center.
DHEC needs
to improve mobile radio efficiency and develop SOP's in event of communications
failures. The colocation of the radio and telephones in Chesterfield County
EOC led to confusion in message handling.
The exercise showed the FEOC will need more land line communications than those
which are currently installed.
The exercise demonstrated a need for additional radio communications at the
SEOC as well. as additional training for current personnel. Staff limitations
and need for additional training were evident.
While physical communications between the FEOC and EOF were generally effective
periodic telephone congestion caused some delay in the exchange of infor-mation.
The need for revision of communication procedures/SOP's between the FEOC and
the EOF was evident.
4. Emergency Operation.s Center (IEOC) Facility (Space, Comfort, etc.)
FEOC is basically a good facility, but needs better facility management and
utilization of available space.
The Control Center within the FEOC is too small to accommodate all of the
agencies represented. Additional phones are needed for use by responsible
agencies in the Control Center.
2
There is not an adequate EOC in Chesterfield County. Thus emergency conditions
can not be handled effectively.
5. EOC Internal Cornunications and Displays (Message Handling, Maps,
etc.)
The exercise showed that there is a need for a public address system in the
FEOC. In addition more frequent periodic briefings were needed. No briefings
for field monitoring teams were held and field teams were not fully aware
of the total situation.
In Chesterfield County displays consisted of paper or cardboard taped to walls
and there were no permanent displays.
Messengers in the SEOC should have orientation training in message handling
prior to an exercise. During the exercise briefing all departments/agencies
were not made aware that displays, maps, etc. were available in the Operations
Room.
6.
Adequacy of Staffing (Multiple Shifts, Competency, etc.)
The need for additional DHEC personnel became evident as the exercise progressed.
Support from DOE and the SMRAP States was simulated for exercise purposes.
More
planning in anticipation of a large scale Federal response is required.
Planning for shift operations in Chesterfield was lacking.
Appropriate clerical support for the State EPI Media Center Staff was not provided.
7.
Facility Access/Security
In Chesterfield County, the space utilized in the EOC is the day-to-day offices
of the Sheriff. Access to this space by his staff and the public was necessary
and thus contributed to confusion in the EOC.
8. Supp6rt by Responsible Elected and -Appointed Officials
No deficiencies noted.
9.
Direction and Control (Timely Decision Making, Management, etc.)
Conferences were conducted very informally and on a "one-to one" basis.
At
times the heads of two or three agencies would discuss matters and make decisions
without input from all concerned. By arriving at decisions in this manner, all
concerned could not share in the decision-making process.
The entire two mile radius sector was not evacuated prior. to evaluating other
sectors at greater distances. Provisions for recording activities for future
use were not evident during the exercise.
-
3
10.
Coordination (Between Officials, Agencies, Federal Agencies,
etc.)
Internal and external communications problems impacted on effective coordi
nation.
Coordination between Bureau of Radiological Health and Highway
Patrol in the field was not evident during the exercise.
The exercibe demonstrated a need for periodic SITREPS from the Forward Emer
gency Operations Center to the Technical. Support Center.
There was limited
feedback on utility requests/recommendations.
FEOC procedures did not provide for a briefing schedule in order that key
staff members were kept informed.
The size and physical location of agencies
require a paging system to keep all staff informed on current situation.
The FEOC Direction and Control Staff did not keep local government officials
adequately informed of the developing emergency situation.
State field monitoring data was not made available to the facility after the
first
2-3 hours of exercise play.
During the first 2-3 hours of exercise play State field monitoring data that
was provided to the utility conflicted with accident conditions..
11.
Emergency Plans (Adherence,
SOP's, and Checklists Consulted)
With the exception of DHEC participants were not observed making reference to
plans.
Some of the Chesterfield County Emergency Service personnel were not familiar
with the plan.
No SOP's for the EOC had been prepared.
12. Public Information (Interface with News Media)
It was observed that there was a need to identify and train more PIO's to pro
vide for shifts and continuous operations.
It
was observed that the first evacuation message bogged down in description
of Sector Boundaries.
It necessitated translation in Simple Local language
and landmarks. This procedure is too slow.
13.
Accident Assessment (Monitoring, Reporting,. Projecting, Coordination)
The field monitoring data on the first
morning appeared to conflict with inci
dent conditions. This -may have been a problem with the scenario. The exercise
demonstrated a need for closer coordination with the utility in the development
of "canned" field monitoring data.
There was no-field monitoring data received
by the Technical Support Center after noon of the first
day.
Field Monitoring
teams were not kept aware of detailed progression of the incident and situation.
Information provided by the FEOC to Darlington County did not adequately address"
the hazards of radiation releases, nor did the information address the full
. scope of protective actions.
4
The exercise did not reveal that Darlington County had the capability to per
form monitoring with the CDV 700.
Monitoring and registration at the Darlington Raceway were delayed over one
hour due to the late arrival of the DHEC team.
14.
Protective Actions (Evacuation, Shelter, Reception and Care)
There would have been a need for a greater number of radiological monitors at
the Reception Center if the number of evacuees had been as great as the number
indicated in the plan.
The need for the designation of alternate shelter managers was identified in
the exercise.
15.
Exposure Control (Access and Traffic Control, Use of KI Record Keeping)
Record keeping, as observed in the field was lacking, A need was demonstrated
for better organizational management in the issuing, recording and use of Pocket
Dosimeters, Dosimeters were distributed but were not recorded by serial number
nor were they read at time of distribution. The FEOC was simulated to be a high
radiation area, yet, little
concern was observed over the exposure of personnel.
Security of Dosimeters was lacking.
As. indicated in 10 above (i.e., the need for closer coordination in the field)
Righway Patrolmen remained in fields of 500 mr/hr with no advice or reporting
requirements,
No observations were made regarding the discussion and decision on the use of
KI for emergency workers.
Field monitoring teams were not advised to use K.
Decontamination monitoring of field staff and vehicles (other than DHEC) was
not evident,
16. Recovery and Re-Entry
Recovery and re-entry operations were observed only in their initial stages.
There were no deficiencies noted,
17.. Adequacy of Scenario to Test State and Local Plans
The scenario made available to Federal observers did not include a chronological
sequence of events.
This information, to include'off-site radiation levels, is
essential to ensure that significant response activities are observed and evaluated
The scenario did not provide enough activity for the agencies located in the SEOC.
Neither did the scenario provide Lee and Chesterfield Counties with enough exer
cise activity.
18.
Benefit of Exercise to the Participants
Exercise did not provide enough play at the SEOC.
Exercise did not provide enough activity at county level to adequately deter
mine benefit to participants.
19.
Capability of Observed Jurisdiction, Agency and/or Function to Execute
REP Plans to Protect the Public
The exercise demonstrated a Bureau of Radiological Health need to expand
standard operating procedures to promote closer coordination with the utility.
While definite improvements are needed,
the State of South Carolina is capable
of executing its Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans specific to the
H. B. Robinson Fixed Nuclear Facility.
The lack of adequate space and facilities in Chesterfield County creates
difficulties for county officials to implement the county plan.