ML14176A526
| ML14176A526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1990 |
| From: | Lo R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-72969 NUDOCS 9012120269 | |
| Download: ML14176A526 (37) | |
Text
ERE 4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Deceber 7, 1990 Docket No. 50-261 LICENSEE: CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY FACILITY: H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION/MEETING SYSTEMS - NOVEMBER 20, 1990 (TAC NO. 72969)
The subject meeting was held for Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) to address the staff's March 17, 1989 requests under 10 CFR 50.54(f). These requests were that CP&L outline plans to (1) assure the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric.Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBR-2) facility complies with the single worst failure requirement of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K and (2) identify and correct single electrical failure (as identified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A) vulnerability problems associated with other safety systems. Enclosure 1 is an attendance list.
CP&L's presentation closely followed the outline in the first of their viewgraphs (Enclosure 2). The presentation centered around two topics:
(1) the ECCS Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FHEA) and (2) the on-site electrical distribution system design basis review. The following highlights some of the discussion.
o A FMEA has been performed to confirm that the ECCS can meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. The scope of the ECCS as defined in the HBR2 Updated FSAR consists of the high-head and low-head Safety Injection.(SI) Pumps, the SI Accumulators.and the Refuellng Water Storage Tank.
o The FMEA included 372 ECCS components, 24 line segments and analyzed approximately 3,500 potential failures of the ECCS.
These failures included single failures of passive electrical components.
o The FMEA did not identify any potential failure that was more damaging than those originally analyzed for compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K. CP&.contends that these results confirm that the ECCS meets the current GDC with respect to single failure.
o The design basis review finds that the electrical distribution system is designed for redundancy and has independence attributes. The on-site emergency power system (including emergency diesel generators, AC and DC systems) consists of two redundant electrical trains each.capable of supplying 100%
of the emergency load of the redundant safety equipment of the respective safety train.
PDR A2iC-lc P07 K)JC.C 000261 Pric
DISTRIBUTION-FOR MEETING
SUMMARY
DATED:
December 7, 1990 Facility:
Robinson Doc1ketFile NRC PDR Local PDR T. Murley 12-G-18 F. Miraglia 12-G-18 E. Adensam 14-B-20 P. Anderson 14-B-20 R. Lo 14-B-20 08C 15-B-18 E. Jordan MNBB-3302 F. Rosa P. Kang L. Garner J. Moore
- 0. Chapra J. Wechselberger ACRS (10)
P-315
- Copies sent persons on facility service list
-2 o
The on-site electrical distribution system was designed prior to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems."
However, independence design features were incorporated, e.g., functional separation, spatial separation of equipment, and separate raceway systems for the redundant safety trains.
o The design basis revision to date indicates that the single failure vulnerability of the on-site electrical distribution system is bounded by failures of non-safety cables in cable raceways containing safety related cables.
The significant of this potential vulnerability is evaluated in the plant-based PRA.
o The staff agrees with CP&L that the redundancy and separation characteristics of the on-site electrical distribution system as described by CP&L would come close to the present-day criteria. The staff concluded that the safety significance of the potential discrepancy in single failure vulnerability of passive electrical components other than the ECCS would not warrant NRC action under the backfit regulation.
Original Signed By:
Ronnie H. Lo, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects -
I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page DISTRIBUTION See attached page OFC
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- EA ensam DATE 1'b/90
- /2./7/90
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FFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name:
ROBINSON MEETING
SUMMARY
Mr. L. W. Eury H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Carolina Power & Light Company Plant, Unit No. 2 cc:
Mr. R. E. Jones, General Counsel Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Chief Carolina Power & Light Company Radiation Protection Branch P. 0. Box 1551 Division of Facility Services Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
-Department-,of--Hunan Resources 701 -Barbour Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27603-2008 Mr. H. A. Cole Special Deputy Attorney General Mr. Robert P. Gruber State of North Carolina Executive Director P. 0. Box 629 Public Staff -
NCUC Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0520 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. C. R. Dietz Resident Inspector's Office Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Department Route 5, Box 413 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief 101 Marietta Street Bureau of Radiological Health Suite 2900 South Carolina Department of Health Atlanta, Georgia 30323 and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Mr. R. Morgan Columbia, South Carolina 29201 General Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550
LIST OF ATTENDEES November 20, 1990 NRC G. Lainas F. Rosa E. Adensam R. Lo P. Kang L. Garner J. Moore
- 0. Chapra CP&L A. Cutter C. Dietz R. Prunty G. Clappell G. Attarian R. Parsanr S. Floyd T. Clements J. Kloosterman T. Baxter B. Sullivan
CP&L/NRC MEETING APPENDIx K SINGLE FAILURE EVALUATION AND ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REVIEW AGENDA I.
INTRODUCTION Ii.
BACKGROUND, OVERVIEW, AND OBJECTIVE III.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
A. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS B. MODELING METHODS C. ASSUMPTIONS D. SINGLE FAILURE RESULTS (ACTIVE, PASSIVE)
E. CONCLUSIONS IV.
ON-SITE AC AND DC SYSTEMS A. DESIGN CONFIGURATION AND BASIS B. REDUNDANCE AND INDEPENDENCE C. EDS REVIEWS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS D. CONCLUSIONS V.
SUMMARY
AND QUESTIONS
CP&L/NRC SINGLE FAILURE MEETING OVERVIEW WHILE HBR2 WAS LICENSED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE 1971 GDC, CP&L REMAINS CONFIDENT THAT THE PLANT WAS DESIGNED, LICENSED, AND IS BEING OPERATED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. ACTIONS THAT ARE COMPLETED OR ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY INCREASE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PLANT DESIGN AND OPERATIONS AND RESULT IN AN ENHANCEMENT OF OUR HEALTH AND SAFETY CHARGE.
DEMONSTRATED SAFE OPERATION TO DATE DBD PROGRAM ECCS FMEA
- IPE/PRA EDS CALC AND HARDWARE UPGRADES THE PRESENT EMPLOYMENT OF OUR RESOURCES PROVIDES THE OPTIMAL MEANS FOR ENSURING SAFE DESIGN AND OPERATION. FURTHER SUBDIVISION OF THESE PLANT KNOWLEDGEABLE RESOURCES WOULD DILUTE THESE ONGOING EFFORTS AND WOULD NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO IMPROVED SAFETY.
CP&L/NRC SINGLE FAILURE MEETING OBJECTIVES PRESENT INFORMATION, PER NRC REQUEST, ON DETAILS OF THE ECCS FMEA AND THE ONSITE AC AND DC ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS.
PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR NRC TO CONCUR THAT CP&L IS OPERATING HBR2 IN A MANNER WHICH IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANT S LICENSING BASIS AND WHICH ENSURES THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SCOPE AND OVERVIEW SCOPE DEFINED BY CP&L LETTER OF APRIL 19, 1989 MEETS INDUSTRY STANDARD IEEE 352 ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY NUS 372 COMPONENTS AND 24 LINE SEGMENTS EVALUATED APPROXIMATELY 3500 POTENTIAL FAILURES ANALYZED
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SCOPE AN FMEA WAS PERFORMED FOR THE ECCS, EXPANDING THE EXISTING SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS IN SECTION 6.3 OF THE HBR2 UFSAR.
ECCS INCLUDES HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HHSI), Low HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (LHSI),
ACCUMULATORS, AND THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST).
THE FMEA WAS PERFORMED UNDER A QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR5O, APPENDIX B.
THE ANALYSIS FOCUSED ONLY ON LOCA EVENTS POSTULATED IN CHAPTER 15 OF THE UFSAR.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SCOPE (CONTINUED)
NO EXTERNAL EVENTS WERE CONSIDERED (I.E., FIRE, FLOOD, EARTHQUAKE, SABOTAGE, ETC.).
NO ADDITIONAL PIPE BREAKS WERE CONSIDERED.
BOTH INJECTION AND RECIRCULATION PHASES OF THE LOCA WERE EVALUATED.
THE ECCS WAS EVALUATED BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT OFF-SITE POWER AVAILABLE.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SCOPE (CONTINUED)
THE ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION OF THE ECCS.
THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE PER 10CFR50.46 AND OUR NOVEMBER 1974 AND JULY 1984 SUBMITTALS TO NRC. THE MOST DAMAGING SINGLE FAILURE OF ECCS EQUIPMENT PER THE CRITERION OF APPENDIX K, SECTION D.1 WAS CONSIDERED.
DISCREPANCIES RESULTING FROM THE ANALYSIS WERE HANDLED UNDER THE DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION PROCEDURE OF OUR DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION PROJECT.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS MODELING METHODS FMEA GUIDELINES GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS COMPONENT FAILURE MODES MANUALLY OPERATED COMPONENTS BOUNDARIES HIGHLIGHTED ON FLOW DIAGRAMS COMPONENT AND LINE SEGMENT LISTS DEVELOPED CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAMS USED TO IDENTIFY POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS DURING THE ECCS INJECTION PHASE ONLY ACTIVE FAILURES ARE ASSUMED. DURING THE ECCS RECIRCULATION PHASE, BOTH ACTIVE AND PASSIVE FAILURES ARE CONSIDERED.
THE EFFECTS OF LOCALIZED FLOODING RESULTING FROM ECCS LEAKAGE ARE CONSIDERED.
LEAKAGE INTO AND OUT OF THE ECCS SHALL BE ADDRESSED.
A COMPONENT FAILURE WHICH CAUSES THE ECCS TO DELIVER LESS THAN THE MINIMUM INJECTION FLOW REQUIREMENTS INTO THE RCS COLD LEGS SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A POTENTIAL ECCS SINGLE POINT FAILURE.
THE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LEAK ASSUMED DURING THE RECIRCULATION PHASE SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN BASIS.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS POTENTIAL SINGLE POINT VULNERABILITIES Quantity RESOLUTION 69 FAILURE PROPAGATES SI ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE AND/OR LEVEL DECAY WHICH IS IMMEDIATELY ALARMED. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TAKEN PER TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS.
3 FAILURE PROPAGATES SI ACCUMULATOR HIGH HIGH LEVEL ALARM BEFORE OPERATING LIMIT IS REACHED. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TAKEN PER TECH SPEC IF OPERATING LIMIT IS EXCEEDED.
21 OPERATING PROCEDURES PROHIBIT FAILURE MODE WHEN PLANT IS OPERATING AT POWER OR DURING ECCS OPERATION.
21 THE CHECK VALVE PERIODIC TESTING PROGRAM PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR EXEMPTING THE CHECK VALVES FROM CONSIDERATION AS POTENTIAL ACTIVE ECCS SINGLE POINT FAILURES.
1 NOV CAN BE MANUALLY OPENED (PER EOP) BY THE HANDWHEEL.
1 PASSIVE FAILURES NOT APPLICABLE DURING INJECTION.
2 REFERRED TO DBD DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION PROGRAM FOR RESOLUTION. THE PROBABILITY OF ECCS FAILURE IS < 7.1E-8 PER YEAR.
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716M-P-100 Revision 0 Page 8-71 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Inherent Symptoms and Lo al 1letts M utlud ul Lumpe lisa ly i eiaik s aiid No Name Failure Mode Cause including Dependent Failures Detection Provision Effect Upon ECCS Other Effects 170.4 AOVSI-856A Internalleakage Mechanical See 170.1 SI pump or See 170.1 See 170 1 failure accumulator flow test, valve PT oi indicating lights on RTG8.
170.5 AOV SI-856A External leakage Mechanical During normal plant operation, the Decreasing HWST None No effect during I he potential for failure RWSI pressurizes this line and will level, visual the injection localized supply the leak. RWST level will observation phase. S pump flooding and the decay at the maximum rate of injection flow is identification of 50gpm. Localized flooding may decreased by a any equipment result.
maximum of disabled by the 50 gpm during flooding is the recitculation assessed phase This separately by the failure mode is SIA report not applicable during the Si infjection phase 170.6 AOV SI-856A Lossof power Electrical failure Valve is normally open and fails Valve position Power for Aux.
See 170 1 125 VDC power open on loss of electrical power.
lights all off.
Pni GC is is provided by Indication lights and power are led provided by train tain 0 Aux Pil from a common fuse See 170 1 B station GC ckt 22 batteries See 170 1 The valve is blocked closed prior to the stdrt of the recircula tion phase
716M-P-100 Revision 0 Page 8-72 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Symptoms and Local Effects Inherent Method of Compensating Remarks and No.
Name Failure Mode Cause Detection Provision Effect Upon ECCS Other Effects 170.7 AOV S-56A Lossofar Electrical or Valve is normally open and feols PT or indicating Backup See 170.1 Instrument air is mechanical open on loss of air See 170 1 lights on RIGts instrument air is supplied by failure MSS provided by.
instrument air instrument air compressors A compressor C and B and station air.
Seel70 1 The valve is blocked closed prior to the start of the recirculation phase.
171.1 AOV Si-856A Acontact set Electrical or Valve failsclosed. See 170.2 P1 or indticing None -
See 170 2 handswitch fails closed mechanical lights onRTG8 HS-856A failure MSS 171.2 AOV SI-856A Acontact set Electrical or Valve fails open. See 170.1 PT or indicating See 170 1 See 170 1 handswitch fails open mechanical lights on RTGS HS-856A failure M55 171.3 AOV SI-856A Handswitch fails Mechanical Valve fails open. See 170 1 PT or indicating See 170.1 See 170.1 handswitch to open' failure or lights on RTGB HS-856A positon operator error M55 171.4 AOV SI-856A Handswitch fails Mechanical Valve fails closed. See 1702.
PT or indicating None See 170.2 handswitch to'close, failure lights on RTGS HS-856A position M55
716M-P-100 Revision 0 Page 8-73 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Inherent Symptoms and Local Effects Symptdmn Depndent fcalues Method of Compensating Remarks and including Dependent Failures No.
Name Failure Mode Cause Detection Provision Effect Upon ECCS Other Effects 172.1 AOV 1-856A Contact set'ac' Electrical or No effect on valve operation.
PT, red None required None position switch fails open mechanical Contact set operates red indicating indicating light ZS-856A failure light. only at HIGB M55 fails off 172.2 AOV SI-856A Contact set 'ac' Electrical or No eflect on valve operation.
PT. red None required None position switch fails closed mechanical Contact set operates red indicating indicating ight ZS-856A failure light, only.
at RTGB M55 fails on 172 3 AOV SI-856A Contact set 'bo' Electrical or No effect on valve operation.
PT. green None required None position switch fails open mechanical Contact set operates green indicating light ZS-856A failure indicating light, only.
at RTGH MSS fails off 172 4 AOV S-856A Contact set bo' Electrical or No effect on valve operation.
PT. green None required None position switch fails closed mechanical Contact set operates green indicating light ZS-856A failure indicating light. only at RTG8 MSS fails on 173.1 AOV SI-856A Failsopen Electrical failure Valve fails open. See 170 1 Valve position See 170.1 See 170 1 125VDCAum.
lights all of Pnl. power and control source fuse 173.2 AOV SI-856A Fails shorted Electrical failure Power and control over current None Additional fault None 12S V DC Aux.
protection at Aux. Pnl. defeated.
is required Pnl. control before Aux. Pni.
source fuse can be degraded.
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SI-856A&B, POTENTIAL SINGLE POINT VULNERABILITIES VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN PRIOR TO THE RECIRCULATION PHASE FAIL OPEN ON LOSS OF AIR OR CONTROL POWER IF EITHER FAILS CLOSED, SI PUMPS' MINIFLOW LINE IS ISOLATED
- A SHORT CIRCUIT IN HANDSWITCH COULD CAUSE SPURIOUS CLOSURE FOR PIPE BREAK < 1", CHARGING PUMPS CAN HANDLE MAKEUP FOR BREAKS 2 1", DEPRESSURIZATION OCCURS IN 70 SEC.
PUMPS CAN OPERATE 110 SEC.
WITHOUT DAMAGE
ECCS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS ALTHOUGH RNP WAS DESIGNED AND CONSTRUCTED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF MANY OF THE CURRENT STANDARDS, THE ECCS STANDS UP VERY WELL UNDER SCRUTINY BASED ON A CURRENT-DAY SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS THIS ANALYSIS DID NOT IDENTIFY A SINGLE FAILURE THAT WAS MORE DAMAGING THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED WE REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF HBR2 ASSURES PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DESIGN CONFIGURATION DESIGN BASIS REDUNDANCY AND INDEPENDENCE ATTRIBUTES ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN REVIEWS ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SINGLE FAILURE ISSUES ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS CONCLUSION
SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM
.H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 T0 230KV SWr TO $35 V SwYD u
SAT 62 UTLN Y/
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ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS FSAR "AN EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE SHALL BE PROVIDED AND DESIGNED WITH ADEQUATE INDEPENDENCY, REDUNDANCY, CAPACITY, AND TESTABILITY TO PERMIT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO AVOID UNDUE RISK TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.
THIS POWER SOURCE SHALL PROVIDE THIS CAPACITY ASSUMING A FAILURE OF A SINGLE ACTIVE COMPONENT."
H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
-ONSITE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SAFETY TRAIN A
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ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY & INDEPENDENCE ATTRIBUTES THE ON-SITE EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM SHALL BE DESIGNED TO CONSIST OF TWO REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL TRAINS TO SUPPLY REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AS REQUIRED BY INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS. EACH REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL TRAIN SHALL REPRESENT AN INDEPENDENT POWER SYSTEM WITH 100% EMERGENCY LOAD CAPACITY AS A MINIMUM.
REDUNDANT AC SYSTEMS REDUNDANT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS REDUNDANT DC SYSTEMS
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY & INDEPENDENCE ATTRIBUTES (CONTINUED)
REDUNDANT INVERTER SYSTEMS SPATIAL SEPARATION OF EQUIPMENT SEPARATE RACEWAY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION TRAIN SEPARATION SEPARATE RooMS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN REVIEWS GENERIC SEISMIC TURBINE MISSILE FLOODING HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PIPE WHIP JET IMPINGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS APPENDIX R THREE MILE ISLAND ELECTRICAL ADEQUACY OF STATION ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE IEEE 450 SURVEILLANCE STATION BLACKOUT IE BULLETIN 79-27 IEEE-383 CABLE WALKDOWN
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN REVIEWS (CONT.)
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM LEVEL CODES/STANDARDS OF RECORD SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN BASIS REGULATORY COMMITMENTS CONFIRMATORY CALCULATIONS/TESTS SYSTEM BASELINE COMPILATION OF CURRENT DAY STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS
- IEEE(s)
REG. GUIDES
SHEARON HARRIS PLANT -
BENCHMARK INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE STANDARDS/GUIDANCE PROVIDED
H. B. ROBINSON UNIT - 2 ELECTRICAL BASELINE REPORT ITEM REQUIREMENT SOURCE REASON/CLARIFICATION 2.2 System Requirements 2.2.1 The onsite ac power system IEEE 308 This is an extension of the shall have two redundant RG 1.6 requirements of the criteria electrical distribution SRP for the mechanical system GDC systems.
8.3.1 (see 2.2.3).
Related Harris Criteria.
2.2.2 Each electrical distribution IEEE 308 Related Harris Criteria system shall have redundant electrical onsite sources and distribution buses establishing redundant electrical trains 2.2.3 Each redundant electrical train SRP Each GDC listed requires that shall provide power to its 8.3.1 either the offaite or onsite respective load group to power assuming one is not satisfy the requirements of available be capable of GDCs 33. 34. 35. 38. 41. and providing power to the
- 44.
electrical loads of that GDC.
2.2.4 Each redundant electrical train IEEE 308 shall have access to an offsite power source RG 1.6 2.2.5 The loss of either RG 1.6 Minimum safety features Is electrical/distribution train IEEE 308 defined by the accident or of any one load group will not prevent the minimum safety features from being provided.
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN REVIEWS (CONT.)
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION (CONT.)
ARCHIVE ACTUALS COMPILATION OF ACTUAL DESIGN BASIS INFORMATION RETRIEVED FROM ARCHIVE SOURCES REVIEWED CALC MATRIX To PROVIDE A GUIDELINE & STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINING THE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS THAT DEMONSTRATE DBD VALIDATION AND ARE NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANT MODIFICATIONS PLANT OPERATIONAL MODE PLANT BUS ALIGNMENT OFFSITE, ONSITE AC, DC, VITAL AC, DEDICATED SHUTDOWN TECHNICAL CAPACITY SHORT CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DROP TRANSIENT/STEADY STATE
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DESIGN REVIEWS (CONT.)
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION (CONT.)
CALC MATRIX (CONT.)
RESULTS SYSTEM LEVEL AC CALCULATION
- DG LOADING CALCULATION
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SINGLE FAILURE ISSUES SWING SI PUMP AUTOMATIC BUS TRANSFERS (ABT'S)
DC SYSTEM TIES SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CONTROL
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS DBD PROCESS CALC MATRIX EVALUATION OF THE AC SYSTEM EVALUATION OF THE DC SYSTEM EVALUATION OF THE VITAL AC SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM CONCLUSION ALTHOUGH THE H.B. ROBINSON ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED PRIOR TO GDC 17, THE SYSTEM HAS INHERENT TO IT SEVERAL OF THE REDUNDANCY AND INDEPENDENCE ATTRIBUTES FOUND IN ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OF MORE RECENT PLANTS.
THE DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION PROGRAM ASSURES THE CONTINUED REVIEW AND ATTENTION TO THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM THAT REINFORCES OUR COMMITMENT TO THE HIGH STANDARDS OF ELECTRICAL DESIGN AT H.B. ROBINSON.
OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE PROVIDING EVEN MORE ASSURANCE IN A LOGICAL SEQUENCE THAT THE EDS Is DESIGNED SAFELY.