ML14176A494
| ML14176A494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1990 |
| From: | Lo R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9005210037 | |
| Download: ML14176A494 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 May 14, 1990 LICENSEE:
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY FACILITY: H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
- SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION/ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS APRIL 19, 1990 The subject meeting was held for Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) to address the staff's request under 10 CFR 50.54(f) that CP&L outline plans to assure the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBR-2) facility complies with the single failure requirement of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K related to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) as well as plans to identify and correct single electrical failure (as defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A) vulnerability problems associated with other safety systems. is an attendance list.
CP&L's presentation followed closely that outlined in their viewgraphs (Enclosure 2).
To comply with the staff's request that CP&L assure compliance with the single failure criterion of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K related to ECCS, CP&L is performing a failure modes and effects analysis. Several hundred possible ECCS failure modes have been analyzed and resulted in the identification of two vulnerabilities requiring consideration under CP&L's Discrepancy Resolution Program. The resolution of these vulnerabilities is expected prior to the restart of HBR-2 following the next refueling outage in September 1990.
As for electrical systems associated with safety systems other than the ECCS, CP&L proposes to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 17 and its requirements on single failure by the on-oing Design Basis Documentation (DBD) and the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA programs.
The following highlights some of the discussion.
o The scope of the ECCS is defined by CP&L to include the High-head Safety Injection, Low-head Safety Injection, the Accumulators and the Refueling Water Storage Tank. The associated electrical system would include electrical components from the bus breakers to the connector terminals of the ECCS pumps or valves. The staff pointed out that a more,
encompassing review of the ECCS would include the on-site electrical distribution system to assure power supply to the mechanical ECCS components. Such a review might also substantially satisfy the staff's request regarding "the other safety systems," because they are powered from the common emergency buses.
o CP&L stated that in the DBD process the Shearon Harris design is used as the benchmark for system design baseline. The staff suggested that a thorough application of the Shearon Harris design (which satisfies the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, single failure criteria for electrical systems) as the template for electrical system components may lead to the identification of single failure vulnerabilities of HBR-2. However, CP&L reiterated that it is not the intent of the DBD to identify every electrical system single failure vulnerability.
9005:21 00'7 90051.4 0\\h~
PDR ADOCK 05000261 PPDC May 14, 1990 o
CP&L stressed that the PRA would quantify risks associated with all events, including multiple, single and mode common failures. Therefore, those single failures with unacceptable risks will be identified and corrected through the PRA program. CP&L believes that this approach is more efficient and provides a level of safety assurance that meets the intent of the GDC.
Orignal signed by:
Ronnie H. Lo, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/I1 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/enclosures:
See next page DISTRIBUTION See attached page
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DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING
SUMMARY
DATED:
Facility: Robinson Docket File,,
NRC PDR Local PDR T. Murley 12-G-18 F. Miraglia 12-G-18 J. Partlow S. Varga G. Lainas E. Adensam 14-B-20 P. Anderson 14-B-20 R. Lo 14-B-20 OGC 15-B-18 E. Jordan MNBB-3302 F. Rosa N. Mailer A. El-Bassion J. Pulsipher B. Gramm G. Hubbard K. Jury M. Pohida B. Mozafari P. Kang C. McCracken ACRS (10)
P-315 B. Borchardt 17-G-21
Mr. L. W. Eury H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Carolina Power & Light Company Plant, Unit No, 2 cc:
Mr. R. E. Jones, General Counsel Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Director Carolina Power & Light Company Department of Environmental, P. 0. Box 1551 Health and Natural Resources Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Division of Radiation Protection P. 0. Box 27687 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-7687 Mr. H. A. Cole Special Deputy Attorney General Mr. Robert P. Gruber State of-North Carolina Executive Director P. 0. Box 629 Public Staff -
NCUC Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0520 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. C. R. Dietz Resident Inspector's Office Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Department Route 5, Box 413 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief 101 Marietta Street Bureau of Radiological Health Suite 2900 South Carolina Department of Health Atlanta, Georgia 30323 and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Mr. R. Morgan Columbia, South Carolina 29201 General Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 CP&L - NRC MEETING ATTENDEES APRIL 19, 1990 Ronnie Lo PDII-1 Bob Prunty CP&L Leonard Loflin CP&L Faust Rosa NRR/SELB S. Varga NRR/DRP Norman Wagner NRR/SELB Adel El-Bassion NRR/RAB E. Adensam NRR/PDII-1 Jim Pulsipler NRR/Plant System Branch Bob Gramm NRR/DRIS/SIB George Hubbard NRR/SPLB Rich Miller Tenera LP J. Bradley Tenera LP Gus Lainas NRR/AD RH Keith Jury NRC Marie Pohida NRR/PRAB Brenda Mozafari NRR/DRP Peter Kang NRR/DST Conrad McCracken NRR/SICB Grant Chappell CP&L Richard Anoba CP&L Rudolph Oliver CP&L George Attarian CP&L James Moxley CP&L M. Macon CP&L James Kloosterman CP&L
CP&L-NRC MEETING APRIL 19, 1990 AGENDA Docket # 67 -j 6 Accession # 966
/e)
Date of Lr II.
PURPOSE Regulatory Docket File A. ECCS CHRONOLOGY B. 10CFR50.54(F)
C. CP&L RESPONSE, NLS-89-173 III.
BACKGROUND A. DBD EFFORTS B. PRA EFFORTS IV.
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION A. DBD PROGRAM B. ELECTRICAL DBDs V.
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT A. OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH B. PROCESS C. INSIGHTS/RESULTS/ACTIONS D.
STATUS/PLANS IV.
CONCLUSIONS/
SUMMARY
PURPOSE UPDATE NRC ON PROGRESS OF DBD AND PRA PROGRAMS ENHANCE NRC UNDERSTANDING OF DBD AND PRA PRESENT BASIS FOR CP&L POSITION ON DBD AND PRA O
STRUCTURED, RIGOROUS APPROACH TO EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY o
DBD EFFORTS BASELINE PLANT DESIGN 0
PRA PROVIDES A RISK-SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION OF THIS DESIGN TO ENHANCE SAFETY
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM (SEP)
NRC REVIEWED THE DESIGN OF OLDER OPERATING NUCLEAR REACTOR PLANTS TO RECONFIRM AND DOCUMENT THEIR SAFETY.
TEN PLANTS REVIEWED; H. B. ROBINSON WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN THE NEXT PLANT SELECTED HAD THE PROGRAM CONTINUED.
CP&L USE OF DBD/PRA IS A CLOSE ANALOGY TO SEP.
O GOALS SIMILAR TO INTEGRATED PLANT SAFETY ASSESSMENT PHASE OF SEP BALANCED AND INTEGRATED DECISIONS FOCUS ON SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OPTIMIZE UTILIZATION OF NRC AND CP&L RESOURCES o
BETTER TOOLS THAN AVAILABLE DURING SEP PROCESS FOR PLANTS OF HBR2 DESIGN VINTAGE
ECCS CHRONOLOGY NRC QUESTIONS 1/14/88 SINGLE FAILURE IDENTIFIED, PLANT SHUTDOWN 1/29/88*
PLANT RETURNED TO 60% POWER 3/12/88*
NRC ISSUED NOV AND PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY 6/15/88 PLANT RETURNED TO 100% POWER 6/20/88*
CP&L RESPONDED (DENIED VIOLATION) 7/15/88 NRC ISSUED ORDER 3/17/89 CIVIL PENALTY PAID 4/14/89 RESPONSE PLAN SUBMITTED 4/19/89 ECCS FMEA DESCRIBED 5/19/89 DBD/PRA PROGRAMS DESCRIBED 6/14/89
- APPROXIMATE FIVE-MONTH RECOVERY ACTION
10CFR50.54(F)
YOUR SUBMITTAL SHOULD ALSO ADDRESS YOUR PLANS TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT SINGLE ELECTRICAL FAILURE (AS DEFINED IN 10CFR PART 50, APPENDIX A) VULNERABILITY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER SAFETY SYSTEMS. THIS INFORMATION IS SOUGHT BY THE NRC TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE CURRENT LICENSING BASIS OF YOUR FACILITY.
NLS-89-173 "SINCE THE GDC ARE INTENDED TO PROVIDE ENGINEERING GOALS BY WHICH REACTOR SAFETY CAN BE SATISFACTORILY GAUGED, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE [DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION AND PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT WILL ASSURE THAT THE PLANT MEETS THE BASIC INTENT OF THE GDC, WHICH IS TO ENSURE THAT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY ARE DESIGNED AND CONSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE PLANT CAN BE OPERATED WITHOUT UNDUE RISK TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC."
DBD PROGRAM INITIATED 1988 PRESENTATION TO NRC RII 9/88 PRESENTATION TO NRC HQ 1/89 VISIT BY NRC SPECIAL INSPECTIONS BRANCH 2/89 &
(GENE IMBRO TEAM LEADER) 6/89 DBDs COMPLETE AND VALIDATED:
SAFETY INJECTION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER REACTOR SAFEGUARDS AND PROTECTION COMPONENT COOLING WATER ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION ELECTRICAL CABLE/RACEWAY VALIDATION DISCREPANCY/COMMENT RESOLUTION IN PROGRESS OTHER SYSTEM EFFORTS IN PROGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE
BRUNSWICK PLANT PRA INITIATED OCTOBER 1986 SUBMITTED MAY 1988 NUREG ISSUED AWAITING SER HARRIS PLANT PRA INITIATED DECEMBER 1986 PEER REVIEW DECEMBER 1988 REVISING MODEL AND INCORPORATING PEER REVIEW COMMENTS ROBINSON PLANT PRA INITIATED MAY 1988 PEER REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1989 REVISING MODEL AND INCORPORATING PEER REVIEW COMMENTS STRENGTHS INITIATED PRIOR TO IPE REQUIREMENT USED AT ALL THREE SITES TO ASSIST IN ISSUE IDENTIFICATION AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION
DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION BY GRANT CHAPPELL PRINCIPAL ENGINEER RNP CIVIL/MECHANICAL UNIT
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM
- TRIC PLANT -
UNIT 2 DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION PROJECT PROGRESS TO DATE AND FORECAST 4','
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMe AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM X
REACTOR SAFEGUARDS & PROTECTION SYSTEMS*
x COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM x
HVAC SYSTEM**
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.
NIS (INCORE
& EXCORE)
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS.......
CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RV LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM.
THE SYSTEM DBDe BELOW ARE IN PROGRESS IN RESPONSE TO 1987 NRC SSFI ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ELECTRICAL CABLE/RACEWAY 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 LEGEND
- PILOT PROGRAM SYSTEM OD DBD DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE eePOST ACCIDENT RESPONSE PORTIDNS ONLY 050 DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS D1D VALIDATION SCHEDULE
("X" INDICATES COfPLETE)
DBD RECONSTITUTION PROJECT APPLICABILITY:
PLANT SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AND ACCIDENT MITIGATION OBJECTIVES:
STRUCTURE THE CURRENT DESIGN BASES AND CALCULATIONS OF RECORD CONTROL THE CURRENT DESIGN BASES AND CALCULATIONS OF RECORD VALIDATE CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS RELATED TO THE PLANT PROCEDURES AND HARDWARE AGAINST THE STRUCTURED DESIGN BASIS CREATE AND MAINTAIN AN EXPERIENCED KNOWLEDGE BASE WITHIN CP&L THROUGH USE OF INTERNAL EMPLOYEE RESOURCES
DEFINITION - SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS
- NSSS IMPOSED FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
- REGULATORY IMPOSED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
- DESIGN CODES/STANDARDS OF RECORD
H. B. ROBINSON, UNIT 2 DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION PROGRAM
SUMMARY
OF DBDS THAT HAVE BEEN VALIDATED 30,000 25,000 LEGEND TD:
TOTAL DOCUMENTS EXAMINED.
ID:
TOTAL DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED AS HAVING A RELEVANCE TO THE 20,000 GENERAL SUBJECT OF ROBINSON DESIGN BASIS (est, 5,000)
D:
DISCREPANCIES OF A MAGNITUDE REQUIRING A REPORT TO THE NRC (4 15,000 10,000 490 t5 89 184 166 17413 1L132 CRS EPDS SI RSPS AFW CCW 4/11/90 (0d)
TD ID Design Basis Statements D
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT TYPICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1.0 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 1.1 GENERAL SYSTEM FUNCTION 1.2 SYSTEM INTERFACES 1.3 SPECIFIC SYSTEM TRANSIENT RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 2.0 REGULATORY IMPOSED DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA OF 10CFR50, PROPOSED APPENDIX A -
- 1967, AS COMMITTED IN THE ORIGINAL FSAR 2.2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY REGULATORY COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE OF 2.1 ABOVE
TYPICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D) 3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 3.1 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 3.2 ELECTRICAL 3.3 MECHANICAL 3.4 CIVIL/STRUCTURAL 3.5 MATERIALS AND CHEMISTRY 3.6 GENERAL 4.0 COMPONENT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 5.0 DESIGN MARGIN 6.0 DOCUMENT REFERENCE LIST 7.0 APPENDICES
DBD VALIDATION OBJECTIVES SYSTEM DESIGN THE SYSTEM INSTALLATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIGN BASIS AND CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTIONS.
SYSTEM OPERATION SYSTEM LINE-UPS SYSTEM LINE-UPS ARE CONSISTENT WITH DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENTS.
PROCEDURES EMERGENCY AND NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIGN BASIS.
SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TESTING TEST PROGRAMS /
PROCEDURES DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SYSTEM PERFORMS ITS SAFETY FUNCTION.
DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION THE DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION PROCEDURE REQUIRES o
ADHERENCE TO 10CFR50 REPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.
o USE OF A PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO IDENTIFY, CONFIRM, PRIORITIZE, TRACK, AND CLOSE OUT EACH POTENTIAL DISCREPANCY.
o USE OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) IN PRIORITIZING DISCREPANCIES AND RESOLUTION EFFORT.
REPORTABLE DEFICIENCIES o
ELECTRICAL OVERLOAD OF MCC 5 AND 6 o
POSSIBLE COMMON MODE FAILURE CAUSING FLOODING OF BOTH RHR PUMPS o
INSUFFICIENT NPSH FOR AFW PUMPS o
SAFETY RELATED MOTOR OVERLAP DURING SI SEQUENCE
PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM PILOT PROGRAM
- 1. UNDERLINE "DESIGN BASIS" STATEMENTS IN DBD.
- 2. QUALIFY DEGREE OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS IN DBD TEXT.
- 3. PLACE GENERIC ISSUE DOCUMENTS ON PROJECT SCHEDULE AS "DELIVERABLES."
- 4. INTERVIEW ORIGINAL HBR-2 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TEAM MEMBERS FOR INSIGHT INTO "LAST MINUTE" DESIGN CHANGES.
ECCS SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
PERFORMED BY NUS FOLLOWING THEIR STANDARD METHODOLOGY WHICH IS COMPLIANT WITH ANSI/IEEE 352-1987.
ANALYSIS INVESTIGATED SEVERAL HUNDRED POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES.
TWO VULNERABILITIES HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO CP&L FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER THE DISCREPANCY RESOLUTION PROGRAM.
SUMMARY
o THE DBD PROCESS COLLECTS AND STRUCTURES DESIGN BASIS INFORMATION AND IS GIVING CP&L A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLANT'S DESIGN BASIS.
o THE DBD PROCESS VALIDATES CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS.
o DISCREPANCIES ARE IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED SUCH THAT CP&L ADHERES TO 10CFR5O REPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.
o A NUMBER OF DISCREPANCIES HAVE REQUIRED REPORTS TO THE NRC AS WOULD BE EXPECTED FOR THIS TYPE PROGRAM.
o THE DBD PROCESS IS THOROUGH AND IS IDENTIFYING ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVIATIONS FROM THE PLANT'S DESIGN BASES.
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT BY MIKE MACON PROJECT ENGINEER RNP ELECTRICAL UNIT
ELECTRICAL DESIGN BASIS EFFORTS AGENDA DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT o CONTENT o PROCESS DESCRIPTION/FLOW CHART o OBSERVATIONS RESULTING WORK ACTIVITIES
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT o CONTENT o SYSTEM LEVEL CODES/STANDARDS OF RECORD o SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN BASIS o REGULATORY COMMITMENTS o CONFIRMATORY CALCULATIONS/TESTS
PROCESS DEFINITIONS O BOUNDARY/INTERFACE DEFINITION DEFINES THE SYSTEM SCOPE (ITS WIDTH/BREADTH)
DEFINES THE CONCEPTUAL TRANSITION/INTERFACES POINTS WITH OTHER SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING SYSTEMS 0 SYSTEM BASELINE COMPILATION OF CURRENT DAY STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS o IEEE(s) o REG.
GUIDES o SRP (Nuc. REG. 0800) 0 SHEARON HARRIS PLANT -
BENCHMARK INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE RATIONAL BEHIND THE STANDARDS/GUIDANCE PROVIDED IDENTIFIES RESPONSIBLE DISCIPLINE(S)/GROUP(S) FOR REQUIREMENTS LISTED o SEISMIC - CIVIL o SWITCHYARD -
TRANSMISSION o
CONTROL LOGIC -
H.
B.
ROB I N UNIT 2
ELECTRICAL BASELINE REPORT ITEM REQUIREMENT SOURCE REASON/CLARIFICATION 2.2 System Requirements 2.2.1 The onsite ac power system IEEE 308 This is an extension of the shall have two redundant RG 1.6 requirements of the criteria electrical distribution SRP for the mechanical system GDC systems.'
8.3.1 (see 2.2.3).
Related Harris
-Criteria.
2.2.2 Each electrical distribution IEEE 308 Related Harris Criteria system shall have redundant electrical onsite sources and distribution buses establishing
_redundant electrical trains 2.2.3 Each redundant electrical train SRP Each GDC listed requires that shall provide power to its 8.3.1 either the offs te or onsite respective load group to power assuming one Is not satisfy the requirements of available be capable of GDCs 33 34, 35, 38 41, and providing power to the
- 44.
electrical loads of that GDC.
2.2.4 Each redundant electrical train IEEE 308 shall have access to an offsite power source RG 1.6 2.2.5 The loss of either RG 1.6 Minimum safety features is electrical/distribution train IEEE 308 defined by the accident or of any one load group will analysis not prevent the minimum safety features from being provided.
ARCHIVE ACTUALS COMPILATION OF ACTUAL DESIGN BASIS INFORMATION RETRIEVED FROM ARCHIVE SOURCES REVIEWED MAJOR ELEMENTS/PHASE o BOUNDARY/INTERFACE DEFINITION o SYSTEM BASELINE DEVELOPMENT o ARCHIVE REVIEWS FOR ACTUALS o DISCREPANCY IDENTIFICATION/EVALUATION o ACTION IDENTIFICATION/COMPLETION o
FEEDBACK ACTION RESOLUTIONS VALIDATION PROCESS FLOW CHART
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT o OBSERVATIONS o H. B. ROBINSON PREDATES MOST KNOWN CODES & STANDARDS o LITTLE DRIVING DESIGN CRITERIA o EMPLOYED ENGINEERING PRACTICES AND THUMB RULES o PRE OL CALCULATIONS WEAK/INDETERMINATE
DEVEL. BOUNDARY/
INTERF.
Ie.
DEVEL. SYS. BASELINE CONDUCT ARCHIVE REV I EWS DEAD A-DC DI DONE.
DICRPSAVE FOR CRITERIA
&VAL IDAT ION LAYIN"ACTUALS AGAINST BASELINE AND PERFORM NONDISCREP-. INFO (40%)
DISCREP. REVIEW ID'D DISCREP UNACCEPT DISCREP.
EVAL. DISCREP. AS (PRIM. "HOLES")
ACCEPT/UNACCEPT (APPROX. 3S%)
ACCEPT DISCREP.(APPROX 25%)
EVAL. RELATIVE TO ACCEPT FUTURE WORK UNACCEPT ASSIGN ACTION ENGR. PRACTICE NO
& DEVELOPE ALREADY EXIST RESOLUTION PLAN IMPLEMENT ACTION YES
& FEED BACK INTO DBD OR DESIGN GUIDES (AS APPLICABLE)
INTEGRATE INT 080 DESIGN GUIDESDESIGN CAD-RE-1 046 UIE
ELECTRICAL DESIGN BASIS EFFORTS RESULTING WORK ACTIVITIES By GEORGE ATTARIAN ELECTRICAL DIscIPLINE MANAGER -
CDO PRINCIPAL ENGINEER -
RNP ELECTRICAL UNIT
RESULTING WORK ACTIVITIES CALC MATRIX AC SYSTEMS DC SYSTEMS VITAL AC INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN GUIDES
CALC MATRIX PURPOSE:
To PROVIDE A GUIDELINE & STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINING THE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS THAT DEMONSTRATE DBD VALIDATION AND ARE NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANT MODIFICATIONS ELEMENTS:
PLANT OPERATIONAL MODE PLANT BUS ALIGNMENT OFFSITE, ONSITE, AC, DC, VITAL AC, DEDICATED SHUTDOWN TECHNICAL CAPACITY SHORT CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DROP TRANSIENT/STEADY STATE
AC SYSTEMS SYSTEM LEVEL CALCS (IN PROGRESS)
LOAD FACTOR ANALYSIS CAPACITY SHORT CIRCUIT VOLTAGE COORDINATION DG STATIC TIMELINE ANALYSIS DG DYNAMIC ANALYSIS AC SYSTEM EVALUATION
AC POWER SYSTEM CALCULATION DEVELOPMENT CPI oK VOLAG OK CR-LOAD OK PROCEED EVALUATION EVALUATION EVALUATION CRH NOT OKNOT OK NOT OK NOT OK ID SHORT-TERM NOT OK NOTOKNOT OK STATION PLANT LIFE BLACKOUT EXTENSION EDG CAPACITY EDG DYNAMIC OLONG-TERM AC SYSTEM EVALUATION EVALUATION II EVALUATIONIUPGRADE
DC SYSTEMS/VITAL AC SYSTEM BATTERY LOAD STUDY BATTERY SIZING SHORT CIRCUIT VOLTAGE CAPACITY
o DESIGN GUIDES o PURPOSE o DEFINE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS/STANDARD o DETAIL PLANT SPECIFICS o FEEDBACK "LESSONS LEARNED" o PROVIDE CONSISTENCY IN DESIGN o 23 GENERAL AND RNP DESIGN GUIDES o SYSTEM LEVEL GUIDES o AC SYSTEM COORDINATION AND PROTECTION o DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM CHANGE CONTROL o AC MCC PROTECTIVE DEVICES o DC FAULT CALCULATIONS o AUXILIARY SYSTEM LOAD STUDY 0 DC SYSTEM COORDINATION AND PROTECTION o COMPONENT LEVEL GUIDES o CABLE SIZING o BATTERY SIZING o BATTERY CHARGER SIZING 0 SELECTING UPS SYSTEMS o AC MOV MOTOR EVALUATION O CONTROL CABLE SIZING
- IN
SUMMARY
0 STRONG DYNAMIC PROCESS FOR DBD DEVELOPMENT THAT IS ATTENTIVE TO TODAYS ISSUES BASELINE ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS "GREY BEARD" COMMITTEE o
RECONSTITUTION OF THE CRITICAL ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT 0
GREATER AWARENESS OF OUR RELATIVE POSITION TO LATER DAY CODES AND STANDARDS WHERE PRUDENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN GUIDES.
O GONE BEYOND THE PRODUCTION OF A DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT TO ESTABLISH A SOUND TECHNICAL ELECTRICAL BASE FOR THE HBR ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND TO RE-ENFORCE OUR COMMITTMENT TO THE HIGH STANDARDS OF ELECTRICAL DESIGN AT H.B. ROBINSON.
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT SAFETY ISSUE ANALYSIS FOR H.B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 USING PRA BY JAMES C. MOXLEY H.B. ROBINSON PRA/IPE PROJECT MANAGER CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY SECTION APRIL 19, 1990
AGENDA PRA OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH PRA PROCESS INSIGHTS / RESULTS / ACTIONS STATUS / PLANS
PRA OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE A HIGHER CONFIDENCE LEVEL OF SAFETY ISSUE ANALYSES BY ADDING QUANTITATIVE RISK PERSPECTIVE TO
'CLASSIC' SAFETY ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT MORE INFORMATION MORE EFFECTIVE SAFETY DECISIONS
SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODS DETERMINISTIC APPROACH o
POSTULATES A WORST CASE BOUNDING DESIGN EVENT o
SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION o
DESIGN PREVENTS UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES o STATEMENTS ABOUT RISK ARE QUALITATIVE
SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODS PROBABILISTIC APPROACH o "ALL" EVENTS CONSIDERED, INCLUDING WORST CASE o CONSIDERS MULTIPLE, SINGLE,'AND COMMON FAILURES o OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE FACTORS ARE INCLUDED o ALL AVAILABLE MITIGATION FEATURES ARE MODELED (INCLUDING HUMANS) o RELATIVE RISK ESTIMATES QUANTITATIVE
CP&L PRA CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT
- 1. SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (1982)
- 2. INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ANALYSES (ISSUES DRIVEN)
- 3.
LEVEL I
PRA BY CONTRACTOR (BSEP, 1986)
- 4. LEVEL I PRA WITH CONTRACTOR (HARRIS, 1986)
- 5. LEVEL I PRA IN-HOUSE (ROBINSON UNIT 2, 1988)
- 6. NUMEROUS APPLICATIONS (ALL CP&L PLANTS)
- 7. INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION (IPE) PROGRAM
STAFF CAPABILITIES / EXPERIENCE 30 + MAN-YEARS OF PRA EXPERIENCE RECOGNIZED CAPABILITY IN MOST PRA DISCIPLINES DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN REMAINING AREAS, DATA AND EXTERNAL EVENTS.
BASIS:
o INDUSTRY COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION (NUREG 1150 REVIEW, BWROG, EPRI / ESAF) o PEER REVIEW CONCLUSIONS
INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW TEAM CONCLUSIONS ON CAPABILITY "THE H.B. ROBINSON LEVEL 1 PRA EXHIBITS A HIGH DEGREE OF TECHNICAL SOPHISTICATION AND PROVIDES A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR CONTINUING PRA ACTIVITIES AND PLANT-SPECIFIC RISK MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS AT CP&L."
"CP&L HAS ACHIEVED A LEVEL OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND MATURITY IN RISK ANALYSIS THAT IS CURRENTLY MATCHED BY ONLY A FEW UTILITIES."
INITIATING EVENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION o
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE / SUCCESS CRITERIA ANALYSIS o
SYSTEMS FAULT TREE MODEL DEVELOPMENT o
EQUIPMENT FAILURE RATE DATA o
HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSES (SIMULATOR EXERCISES, AUXILIARY OPERATOR PROJECT)
480V EMERGENCY BUS LOSS OF EMERGENCY t"
RELAY SPUR OPER THREE PHASE BOLTED 410V BUS El SOURCE Ei FAULT ULE BUS El CAUSING A CONTIN ON EMERGENCY BUS FAILS tw SIGNAL ON El DURING DO TEST
' ;E-06 5.40E-0s 7.66E-03 450E-0 NO POWER AT 4OUTPUT NO POWER AT OUTPUT OF 8KF S211711 OF BKR S2/18S Page 2 Page 4 TITLE H.B.ROBINSON AC POWER SYSTEM DRAWING NUMBER DATE 1
2 3
4 5
Page 1 4/17/90
EDG0 A DEPEINDENT EDG A OR OUTPUT OKI, EDG A INDEPENDENT EDG 'A' OUTPUT DIESEL GENERATOR EE ACTUATION SIGNAL FALURES BREAKER INDEPENDENT EDG-A FAILS TO AUN I
FAIL FAILURES T
p 3
1P~D.911E42 126E403 135E 02 EDO A #4TIM EDO START COON EDO RUN COMMON LOSS OF S FROM LOSS OF AREA SLOSS OF POWER AT CADS FAILURE MODULE CAUSE FAILURE MODULE TR AFO COOLING IN EO 12AL DC tUS A
ROOM E0 78E-05 2
75E4
.00E00 000E.00 000E.00 TITLE H.B.ROBINSON AC POWER SYSTEM DRAWING NUMBER DATE 2Page 2
4/17/90
Page 2 P0 OSS OF POWER AT BUS El UV RELAYS BUS El IN RELAY BUS El UV RELAY 125V DC BUS A FAIL TO CLOSE CV 271X11E1 FAILS TO 271X41E1 FAILS TO CONTACT ENERGIZE ENERGIZE I
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0.00E+00 E05 7.65E-05 7.65E-05 TITLE H.B.ROBINSON AC POWER SYSTEM DRAWING NUMBER DATE 2
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H.B. Ro n Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Fault Tree riTr~-
PRA PROCESS, CONTINUED o
KEY ELEMENT IN PRA MODELING INFORMATION GATHERING AND EXCHANGE o
KEY PLAYERS PRA STAFF ENGINEERING PLANT:
OPERATIONS TRAINING TECHNICAL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE
INSIGHTS / RESULTS / ACTIONS
- 1. SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ISOLATION - MODEL
- 2. LOSS OF DC BUS PROCEDURES - MODEL
- 6. DEDICATED SHUTDOWN SYSTEM PROCEDURES ENG./OPS
- 7. DB-50 BREAKER ISSUE - ENG.
- 9. SIMULATOR TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS - MODEL
EXAMPLE APPLICATION SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC BUS TRANSFER SINGLE FAILURE CONCERN ISSUE: LOSS OF SAFETY INJECTION FUNCTION DURING A SMALL LOCA DUE TO FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC BUS TRANSFER FEATURE THAT DIRECTS 'AC POWER TO THE SWING "B" SI PUMP.
ACTIONS:
PLANT SHUTDOWN FOR MODIFICATIONS
- SWING "B" PUMP REMOVED FROM ABT (NO AUTO START)
- SINGLE FAILURE MODE ELIMINATED
SI PUMP / ABT ISSUE, CONTINUED THE RELATIVE RISK PERSPECTIVE PERCENT OF SEQUENCE CDF CONTRIBUTORS CONTRIBUTION (1E-6/YR)
- 1. SI PUMPS 24%
(COMMON CAUSE FAILURE TO START)
- 2.
SEQUENCER TIME DELAY RELAYS 17.5%
(FAILURE TO ENERGIZE)
- 3. NOV'S SI-870 A & B 16%
(FAILURE TO OPEN)
- 4. CHECK VALVE SI-839 8.5%
(FAILURE TO OPEN)
- 5. ABT (CROSS-TIE FAULT OR 1.2%
EDG VOLTAGE OR FREQUENCY REGULATION)
STATUS / PLANS o
LEVEL 1 PRA SUBJECT OF INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW MODEL REFLECTS OCTOBER 1989 PLANT CONFIGURATION PLUS SEQUENCER MODIFICATION o
NEAR TERM PLANS
- 1. INCORPORATE PEER REVIEW COMMENTS
- 2. UPDATE FOR MODIFICATIONS
- 3. INCORPORATE PLANT SPECIFIC DATA
- 4. EXPAND MODEL TO MEET IPE LEVEL 1 REQUIREMENTS
- 5. ACCOMMODATE APPLICATIONS (DBD ISSUES, OTHERS)
ON-GOING ACTIVITIES
- 1. COMPLETE LEVEL II TO MEET IPE COMITMENT
- 2. ON-GOING USE TO:
IDENTIFY VULNERABILITIES SUPPORT ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT OVERALL CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT
- 3. UPDATE MODELS WITH IN-HOUSE CAPABILITIES
SUMMARY
CP&L IS USING A HIGHLY DEVELOPED PRA CAPABILITY TO FURTHER ENHANCE, DEVELOP AND APPLY THE MODELS TO FULFILL THE IPE REQUIREMENTS, AND TO SUPPORT AN ON GOING RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.
NEW DESIGN AND OPERATING INFORMATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED AND INCORPORATED THROUGH PROCESSES SUCH AS THE DBD PROGRAM AND OPERATING AND TRAINING INFORMATION IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY, ANALYZE AND RESOLVE NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES.
CONCLUSION/
SUMMARY
HBR2 LICENSED PRIOR TO 1971 ISSUANCE OF GDC.
GDC PROVIDES FRONT-END DESIGN CRITERIA TO ENHANCE SAFETY DBD EFFORTS BASELINE PLANT DESIGN PRA PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE, RISK-SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION OF THIS DESIGN TO ENHANCE SAFETY DBD AND PRA EFFORTS CONTINUE TO BRING ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN DESIGN, HARDWARE, PROCEDURES, AND TRAINING THEREFORE, THESE PROGRAMS, SIMILAR TO THE SEP PROCESS, ARE PROVIDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY ADEQUACY OF THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE H. B. ROBINSON NUCLEAR PLANT AND WILL ENSURE THAT THE PLANT CAN BE OPERATED SAFELY IN TODAY'S REGULATORY ARENA.