ML14175B477

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-261/87-07 on 870406-09.Violations Noted:Drawing 219 Had Incorrectly Identified Piping Matl as 8-inch Schedule 120,instead of 8-inch Schedule 160
ML14175B477
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/08/1987
From: Blake J, Coley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14175B475 List:
References
50-261-87-07, 50-261-87-7, NUDOCS 8706300355
Download: ML14175B477 (12)


See also: IR 05000261/1987007

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.:

50-261/87-07

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company.

P. 0. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-261

License No.:

DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson

Inspectio

d ct

April 6-9 and 20-24, 1987

Inspecto :

L,4

/

/Z5

J.

.py

Bat Signed

Approvl b

7

SJ./B ake, Section Chief

ate Signed

gi/eering Branch

i

sion of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of licensee

actions on previous open matters (92701B),

inservice inspection (ISI) - review

of program

(73051),

review of procedures (73052),

observation of work

activities (73753) and review of recorded data and evaluations (73755).

Results:

One violation was identified

-

ISO Drawing

Discrepancy

paragraph 6.c.

8706300355 870619

PDR

ADOC:K 05000261

a

PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  • J. M. Corley, Acting General Manager
      • A. R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support
      • E. M. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
      • H. J. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)

.*D. A. Sayre, Acting Director, Regulatory Compliance

      • S. W. Farmer, Performance Engineer
    • S. A. Griggs, Regulatory Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

engineers, technicians, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

J. Hancock, Authorized Nuclear Inspector, Kemper Group

J. Campbell, ISI Coordinator, Westinghouse

B. Hughes, ISI Supervisor, Westinghouse

R. Muth, Project Engineer, Westinghouse

NRC Resident Inspectors

      • H. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector
      • R. Latta, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview on April 9, 1987
    • Attended exit interview on April 24, 1987
      • Attended exit interview on April 9, 1987 and April 24, 1987

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 9 and 24, 1987,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection

findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Open) Violation 50-261/87-07-01, ISO Drawing Discrepancy - paragraph 6.c.

On May 6, 1987, CP&L's Manager of Technical Support notified Region II by

telecon that a notation had been found in the Authorized Nuclear Inspector

log

(Kemper

Group Insurance Company)

dated August 6, 1984,

which

indicated that the licensee was aware of the drawing error reported in

the violation above, in 1984. The licensee also had requested and received

approval from the Authorized Nuclear Inspector to apply the calibration

2

block thickness tolerance of 1/4 inch which was approved in Code Case N-98

for a basic calibration block shown in figure T-533(2) of Article 5, of

Section V, to the 1974 Edition of the ASME Code.

The block depicted in

figure T-533(2) to the 1974 Edition of the ASME Code has side drill hole

reflectors in lieu of the less sensitive OD/ID notch reflectors currently

required by the ASME Code and CP&L's special procedure for the examination

of piping. The purpose of the telecon notification by the licensee was to

determine if this additional information would reduce the inspector's

above violation to an unresolved item.

The inspector informed the

licensee that the item would remain a violation for the following reasons:

-

The licensee had discovered the drawing was in error in 1984 but had

not revised the drawing to reflect actual plant conditions.

-

Special Procedure SP-681 and the ASME Code require that notched

calibration blocks be the same nominal thickness and diameter of the

pipe being examined. Code case N-98 does not apply for calibration

blocks with notches.

-

The Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) does not have the authority to

allow calibration block tolerances to a less sensitive calibration

block.

If the licensee had requested to use the side drill hole

block in lieu of the notch block the examination would have been an

enchanced examination and the ANI could have approved the use of the

side drill hole block in accordance with Section V and Section XI of

the ASME Code.

Relief to ASME Code requirements can only be

approved by the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.552(a)(3).

-

The licensee's UT procedure does not require thickness readings or

profiles be taken of the examination area.

When calibration blocks

have been manufactured to drawing requirements that are incorrect

the UT examiner could mis-interpret the reflectors and classify valid

indications as non-valid indications. In addition, if the calibration

standard is thinner than the pipe examined as in the situation reported

by the inspectors, the examination area scanned may be inadequate.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

.0

3

5. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector conducted a general inspection of the reactor containment

building and the auxiliary building to observe construction progress and

construction activities such as welding, material handling and control,

housekeeping and storage.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Inservice Inspection (ISI)

The inspector reviewed CP&L's program for ISI, reviewed vendor examination

procedures,

observed ISI work activities, conducted a "hands on" audit

of examiner techniques using Region II equipment and reviewed record

data and evaluations from CP&L's spring 1986 outage to determine if the

present outage plan was incorporating followup examinations of reported

indications.

Unit 2 commenced commercial operation on March 4, 1971,

and is presently in the second 40 month period of the second ten year

ISI interval March 7, 1981 to February 19,

1992,

as permitted by ASME

Section XI subsection IWA-2400(c) due to the 349 day duration of the steam

generator replacement outage.

The applicable code for this 10 year

interval is the ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI (77S78).

The ISI activities are being performed this outage by Westinghouse and the

authorized nuclear inspector services are provided by Kemper Group.

a. Review of Program (73051)

CP&L's ISI Program was reviewed in part, in Region II,

Inspection

Report No.

261/87-03.

The extent of the inspector's review this

inspection was focused on CP&L's ISI program., interfacing procedures

and the 10 year plan.

The inspector reviewed the ISI program and referenced documents to

ascertain whether adequate

QA plans and procedures have been

established (written, reviewed, approved and issued) to assure the

ISI

program is complete and in conformance with regulatory

requirements and licensee commitments.

The following documents were reviewed:

CP&L - "Second Ten Year Inservice Inspection Plan"

CP&L - PLP-025, Rev. 0, "Inservice Inspection Program"

CP&L - PLP-030 Rev. 0, "Independent Verification"

CP&L - PLP-032 Rev. 0, "Nuclear Safety Reviewer Qualification

Program"

CP&L - PLP-1024 Rev. 2, "Surveillance Test Procedure"

4

CP&L - AP-004 Rev.

18,

"Development,

Review and Approval of

Procedures, Revisions and Temporary Changes"

CP&L - AP-001 Rev. 3, "Plant Organization and Responsibilities"

CP&L - AP-006 Rev. 0, "Procedure Adherence"

CP&L - AP-014 Rev. 0, "Safe Handling and Storage of Chemicals"

CP&L - AP-030, Rev. 3, "NRC Reporting Requirements"

CP&L -

PLP-024 Rev.

11,

"Technical Specification Surveillance

Program"

CP&L - TMM-004 Rev. 12, "Inservice Inspection Testing"

CP&L - TMM-015 Rev. 4, "Inservice Inspection Repair and Replace

ment Program"

CP&L - OQA-101 Rev. 0, "Preparation, Review and Approval of OQA

Procedures"

CP&L -

OQA-103 Rev. 0, "Personnel

Indoctrination Training,

Qualification and Certification"

CP&L - OQA-201 Rev. 0, "Surveillance Program"

CP&L - QQA-202 Rev. 0, "Document Review"

CP&L - OQA-306 Rev. 0, "Stop Work Authority"

CP&L - OQA-310 Rev. 0, "Calibration of QA/QC Inspection and

Examination Equipment

CP&L - QQA-501 Rev. 0, "Quality Assurance Engineering Document

Review"

With regard to the inspection above,

the inspector noted the

following:

(1) The ISI program provides no guidance other than the assignment

of responsibility for the preparation of plans and schedules and

filing the same with appropriate regulatory authorities.

(This

comment was also noted in Region II Inspection Report 261/87-03).

(2) The "Second Ten Year Inservice Inspection Plan" is a ledger of

components and ISO drawings for the components. It provides no

specific guidance as to applicable calibration blocks augumented

inspections, relief requests or interfacing procedures, etc.

CP&L, however, is in the process of updating the 10 year plan into

5

a computer base document. During the week of April 20-24 the

inspector observed that the outage plan had been retrieved from

the computer. This plan listed the components by category and

item number, gave the calibration block number, drawing number

applicable to each item and had picked up items that were being

monitored for re-examination because of previously reported

indications.

The computer read-out for this outage was a

significant program improvement and an indicator that CP&L is

making progress in updating their second ten year inservice

inspection plan.

During the April 9, 1987, exit meeting the ISI performance

engineer committed to review the ISI program and ten year plan

and to upgrade these documents to address the inspector's

programmatic concerns.

b. Review Of Examination Procedures (73052)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's ultrasonic examination and

recording procedures listed below to determine whether the procedures

adequately covered all required aspects of the approved ISI program

and contained sufficient technical content to adequately examine the

welds required to be examined by the Code of Federal Regulations

10 CFR 50,

Chapter 50.55a(g)(4).

The following procedures were

examined:

Procedure

Title

CP&L Special Procedure SP-681

Manual Ultrasonic Examination

Rev. 0

of Welds (Westinghouse No. ISI

206 Rev. 1)

CP&L Special Procedure SP-684

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of

Rev. 0

Welds in Vessels (Westinghouse

No. ISI-47 Rev. 4)

CP&L Special Procedure SP-679

Preservice and Inservice

Rev. 0

Inspection Documentation

(Westinghouse No. OPS-NSD-101

Rev. 5)

With regard to the above review of CP&L Special Procedure SP-681

which is applicable to piping systems (.25 inch to 6 inch thick) and

vessel materials (.25 inch to 2 inch thick) in ferritic or austenitic

steels of either wought or cast product forms, the inspector had the

following editorial and technical comments:

(1) Paragraph 2.8.1 states that, calibration blocks shall be

fabricated from the same material specification as one of the

materials in the weld assembly to be examined. Alternatively,

for welds in austenitic materials, material of equivalent

P-number or P-number grouping may be used.

6

Inspector's Concern:

There is no material ultrasonically

equivalent to P-8 (austenitic) materials.

This P-number

material is always handled as a unique material in the ASME

Code.

(2)

Included in "Interpretation and Investigation," is paragraph

6.1.1 that states,

"valid indications are reflectors caused by flaws, such as

cracks, lack of penetration or fusion, inclusions and

porosity. All other indications are considered non-valid,

including those due to:

scanning noise, grain structure,

beam redirection, internal liquid levels, clad interface,

straight beam back surface and geometric reflectors."

paragraph 6.3 states,

"Other transducers, search units, frequencies, techniques,

etc., may be used to aid interpretation and investigation."

Inspector's Concern:

The licensee's procedure requirements are

weak for determining whether an indication is non-valid in

piping.

The procedure indicates that the examiner makes the

determination without verifying his analysis of the reflector by

reviewing the fabrication drawing or radiographs of the weld.

This weakness in evaluation to classify reflectors is further

complicated by the inherent technical weakness noted in this

procedure.

For instance, ID profiles or thickness readings

are not taken with this procedure to accurately identify where

counterbores are located or whether the material varies in

nominal thickness as to effect the plotting of indications. The

procedure does not require checking the angle of the transducer

in a material similar to that being examined.

This also will

increase the error in interpretation.

The ASME Code require

ments for classifying a reflector as geometrical in piping are

as follows:

"(a)

Ultrasonic indications that can be identified as

reflectors due to piping surface configuration (such as

weld root geometry)

or variations in metallurgical

structure of materials at interfaces (such as weld-to-base

metal interface) may be classified as geometric reflectors.

Such reflectors need not be characterized as indications or

compared with the allowable indication standards of

IWB-3514.2 and IWB-3514.3.

The presence of a geometric

reflector shall be noted for the record.

(b)

To qualify an ultrasonic indication as a geometric

reflector, the following requirements shall be met.

7

(1) The area containing the geometric reflector shall

be examined

and interpreted in accordance with

Appendix III.

(2) The presence of geometric reflectors shall be

confirmed either by review of the fabrication drawings

of the pipe weld edge preparation, the nondestructive

examination records,

or supplemental

examination

results.

(3) Supplemental examination methods shall be used,

if

necessary, to confirm the presence of geometric

reflectors."

The code notation of "shall be" in nearly every sentence above

indicates the importance the code attaches to this evaluation

process.

(3) Included in "Recording of Indications" is paragraph 7.4 that

states, "Non-valid indications,

and the absence of valid

indications shall be considered as, no indications and noted as

NI."

Inspector's Concern:

As noted in (2a) above, the code requires

that geometric reflectors in piping shall be noted for the

record. CP&L's procedure invokes this requirement by referring

the examiner to Special Procedure SP-679 for recording

examination results.

The two procedures appeared to have

contradictory requirements.

CP&L's Spring 1986 outage summary

reports were reviewed by the inspector to determine how the

ultrasonic examiners

implemented the requirements.

The

inspector found that four welds were noted to have geometry.

All four of the welds were examined using either a 410, 130 or

270 transducer.

Welds that require transducers with these

angles are unique and geometrical indication are common place.

However, during the 1986 outage numerous dissimilar metal welds

and pipe to fittings were examined and no interface signal,

counterbore or root configuration reflectors were documented.

CP&L's performance engineer for ISI agreed that the procedure

should be enhanced in the areas discussed above,

so that

examiners would not be confused as to the intent of the

requirements.

The engineer committed to have the procedure

revised by the next refueling outage.

The inspector will

review the revised procedure at that time.

8

c. Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)

The inspector observed Westinghouse examiners during examination of

two pressure vessel welds.

The welds and the procedures used are

delineated below:

Weld ID

Component

Procedure

CSW-4

Steam Generator B

CP&L Special Procedure SP-648

VCSW-A-1

Pulsation Damp Vessel

CP&L Special Procedure SP-681

During the calibration of weld CSW-4 CP&L's surveillance examiner

inquired of an Westinghouse examiner if

he was going to check the

beam angle of the transducer since he had not observed the normal

calibration function.

The Westinghouse examiner stated that the

angle was checked when the transducer was manufactured.

The CP&L

examiner reminded the Westinghouse examiner that transducers that are

used on large pressure vessels wear and the angle changes increasing

his chance of error in plotting indications or determining if an

indication is valid or non-valid.

During the calibration for the

pulsation damp vessel, which is an austenitic steel the Westinghouse

examiners had a IIW block on the job to check the transducer beam

angle.

The inspector noted, however, that the IIW block they were

using was not an austenitic steel (stainless steel) block.

Trans

ducer beam angle can vary significantly between these two materials.

The inspector later found out that CP&L did not have a stainless

steel IIW block or a stainless steel rompas block on site.

As a

result, the inspector loaned the examiners one of the Region II

stainless steel rompas blocks to verify their transducer angle.

The

check revealed the beam angle to be satisfactory.

The inspector observed the examination of the above welds to

determine whether approved procedures were available and being

followed.

Examination

personnel

were knowledgeable of the

examination method and the test equipment; examination personnel with

the proper level of qualifications and certifications were performing

the various examination activities; and examination results were

being recorded as specified in the ISI program and nondestructive

examination procedures.

In addition to observing the work activities of the Westinghouse

ultrasonic examiners,

the inspector also examined their work by

"hands on" re-examination.

The ultrasonic examinations were

performed by the inspector using Region II equipment.

The objective

was to determine if

good techniques had been used in order to

identify and record reflectors within the inspection zone on

stainless steel piping.

The welds examined and the problems

encountered are delineated below.

Weld ID

Diameter of Pipe

Configuration

CPW-219-188

8 Inch

Pipe To Reducer

CPW-219-187

10 Inch

Reducer To Fitting

The inspector's re-examination of the 8" piping weld, CPW-219-188,

revealed that the Westinghouse examination of this weld was not

acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) Drawing notes on CPL-219 ISO indicated that the stainless steel

pipe was 8"diameter schedule 120.

Thickness readings taken by

the inspector prior to performing his examination indicated that

the pipe was schedule 160. This is a difference in thickness of

nearly 1/4".

CP&L's examination procedure SP-681 and the ASME

Code require that piping calibration blocks that contain notch

reflectors shall be of the same nominal diameter and nominal

wall thickness as the item to be examined.

(2) CP&L does not require thickness readings or ID profiles be taken

on weld joints. This has never been a requirement and CP&L does

not have an ultrasonic base line of "as-built" conditions for

the Robinson Unit 2 plant.

In addition to this inspector's

findings,

NRC Followup Item 261/84-48-03 "Stress ISOs weld

location", identifies a similar drawing discrepancy.

(3) The calibration block used by the Westinghouse examiners was

not in accordance with CP&L's Special Procedure SP-681 and CP&L

does not have a calibration block to use on welds for this size

piping.

(4) When welds are examined using an incorrect size calibration

block and thickness readings are not taken, as in this particular

situation, ID/OD positions on the examiner's ultrasonic

instrument are incorrect; consequently, the inspection coverage

may be inadequate and evaluations may be incorrect as to whether

an indication is classified as a valid or invalid indication.

In summary,

the findings identified above indicate drawings are

incorrect, inspection techniques are poor, weld coverage may be

inadequate and evaluations may be incorrect. The ASME Code recognizes

the inherent difficulty of examining ausenitic stainless steel and

recommends that enhanced procedures and techniques be used for this

material.

This position is further amplified in ASME Code Case N-335

where nearly every examination parameter has been tightened to insure

that plotting and classification of indications will be accurate.

The inspector reported the above finding to the licensee as a

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and identified

the item as violation 261/87-07-01, ISO Drawing Discrepancy."

10

The inspector also held discussions with CP&L's Performance

Engineer for ISI activities.

Procedure weakness,

drawing

discrepancy and technique weakness were discussed in detail.

The engineer committed to the following corrective actions:

(a) Thickness reading will be taken

(b) Drawings will be reviewed for accuracy of requirements

(c) An 8" schedule 160 calibration block will be procured

(d) Procedure requirements for classifying geometrical

reflectors will be enhanced

(e) Transducer beam angles will be checked in stainless steel

(f) Weld CPW-219-188 will be re-examined next outage

d. Data Review and Evaluation (73755)

The inspector reviewed examination records in the licensee's summary

report for the spring outage of 1986 to ascertain whether the

licensee's disposition of adverse findings and subsequent

re-examination was consistent with regulatory requirements.

The

following weld examination records were:

Method of

Weld Identification

Inspection Method

Acceptance

CPL-107-A Weld 4

Surface Examination

IWB-3514.3(a)

CPL-118-A Weld 5

Surface Examination

IWB-3514.3(b)

accepted

with UT, weld

scheduled to

be monitored

this outage

460-A&B

LCV-460-A&B

Visual Examination

Indication was

removed

CPL-118-A Weld 6

Surface Examination

IWB-3514.3(b)

accepted with

UT, weld sched

uled to be

monitored this

outage

CPL-118-A Weld

Surface Examination

IWB-3514.3(2)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's disposition for each of the

reportable indications observed in the above welds.

The present

outage plan was also reviewed to insure that examination followup was

scheduled where required.

Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified

except as noted in paragraph 6.c above.

7. Inspector Followup Items (92701)

(Closed) 50-261/87-03-01, RHR, HX, Surface Examination Relief Request. In

CP&L Letter NSL-84-167, the licensee requested relief from the volumetric

and surface examination requirements of IWC-2500 for the nozzle to vessel

welds on the residual heat removal

(RHR)

heat exchangers.

The basis of

the request for relief is as follow:

The nozzle-to-vessel welds of the

RHR heat exchangers are covered by a reinforcement ring and are not

accessible for examination as required by IWC-2500.

The geometric

configuration such that alternative NDE methods cannot be substituted.

The reinforcement ring covering the RHR heat exchanger nozzle-to-vessel

weld contain "Tell-Tale" holes such that visual examination can be

performed for evidence of leakage for evidence of leakage. The NRC Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),

Division of Licensing, Operating

Reactors Branch #1 in their letter dated January 11,

1985,

concluded:

"Relief should be granted from performing vloumetric examination of two

nozzle-to-vessel welds among the RHR heat exchangers for each unit,

provided that:

a. Surface examination is performed on the reinforcement ring welds that

make the nozzle-to-vessel welds inaccessible.

b. Visual examination of the welds for leakage is performed during

periodic hydrostatic testing in accordance with IWC-5000.

The NRC letter of January 11,

1985, was silent on the subject of relief

from the surface examination requirements

of IWC-2500 for the

nozzle-to-vessle welds.

On April 7, 1987,

CP&L's Nuclear Licensing

personnel contacted the NRC Project Manager concerning this relief

request.

The Project Manager affirmed that CP&L's relief request was

granted as requested. This item is considered closed.

Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was observed.