ML14175B306

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Insp Rept 50-261/85-22 on 850624-28.Violation Noted:Failure to Perform Inservice Testing in Accordance W/Asme Section XI
ML14175B306
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/11/1985
From: Blake J, Kleinsorge W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14175B304 List:
References
50-261-85-22, NUDOCS 8508080384
Download: ML14175B306 (11)


See also: IR 05000261/1985022

Text

C1jptREG&j4

UNITED STATES

o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

4o

REGION II

o 0101

MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-261/85-22

Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company

411 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-261

License No.:

DPR-23

Facility Name: H. B. Robinson

Inspection Conducted:

June 24 - 28, 1985

Inspector:

<'E

_I__

__7

11

_

_

W. P. Keinsorge

Date Signed

Approved by: & ,e.

-7,1 5

J. J. Blake, Section Chie

V

Date Signed

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 42 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of Licensee action on previous enforcement matters (92702B), Service

Water Piping degradation (92706B),

Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves,

and

Inspector Followup Items.

Results:

One violation was identified - "Failure to Perform IST in accordance

with ASME Section XI - paragraph 7a.

No deviations were identified.

8508080384 850717

PDR

ADOCK 05000261

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  • R. E. Morgan, Plant General Manager
  • J. Curley, Manager of Technical Support
  • D. Stadler, Director of Regulatory Compliance
  • W. Farmer, Sr. Engineer - Inservice Inspection

C. Hawley, Project Engineer - Plant Engineering

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and

office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • H. Krug
  • H. Whitcomb

.

  • Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 28,

1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed

below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Open) Violation 50-261/85-22-01: "Failure to Perform IST in Accordance with

ASME Section XI - paragraph 7.a.

(Open)

Unresolved Item 50-261/85-22-02:

"Allowable Delta P Range"

paragraph 7.b.

The licensee did identify as proprietary materials provided to and reviewed

by the inspectors, however, this material is not discussed in this report.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

a. (Closed) Violation 261/84-11-01: "Procedure Inadequate for Segregation

of Weld Rods with Exposure Time"

Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) letters of response dated June 8 and

July 24,

1984 have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by

Region II. The inspector held discussions with the responsible

engineer and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letters

2

of response. The inspector concluded that CP&L had determined the full

extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary survey and

follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the

necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circum

stances. The corrective actions identified in the letters of response

have been implemented.

b. (Closed) Violation 261/84-27-01: "Failure to Identify Valve Status"

CP&L letter of response dated September 14, 1984 has been reviewed and

determined to be acceptable by Region II.

The inspector held

discussions with the responsible engineer and examined the corrective

actions as stated in the letter of response. The inspector concluded

that CP&L had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance,

performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the

present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to

preclude recurrence to similar circumstances. The corrective actions

identified in the letter of response have been implemented.

c. (Closed) Violation 261/84-27-02: "Failure to Follow RT Code"

CP&L letter of response dated September 14, 1984 has been reviewed and

determined to be acceptable by Region II.

The inspector held

discussions with the responsible engineer and examined the corrective

actions as stated in the letter of response. The inspector concluded

that CP&L had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance,

performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the

present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to

preclude recurrence to similar circumstances.

The corrective actions

identified in the letter of response have been implemented.

d. (Closed) Violation 261/85-12-01: "Failure to Provide Adequate IST

Procedure"

CP&L letter of response dated April 9, 1985 has been reviewed and

determined to be acceptable by Region II.

The inspector held

discussions with the responsible engineer and examined the corrective

actions as stated in the letter of response. The inspector concluded

that CP&L had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance,

performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the

present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to

preclude recurrence to similar circumstances. The corrective actions

identified in the letter of response have been implemented.

e. (Closed) Unresolved Item 261/84-11-02: "Uncontrolled Copy of Cooperheat

QA Manual"

This item concerned the fact that at the time of the 261/84-11

inspection, Cooperheat did not have a controlled copy of their Quality

Assurance (QA) Manual onsite. The licensee determined that no work was

performed to an uncontrolled cooperheat QA Manual.

The manual was an

3

information copy of the latest revision - July 1983.

The July 1983

revision was in effect at that time and it

is also the current

revision. There are no copies of the Cooperheat QA manuals on site now

to verify the above, therefore, this matter is considered closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia

tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed

in paragraph 7b.

5. Independent Inspection Effort (92706B)

The inspector conducted a general inspection of the protected area to

observe activities such as welding, material handling and control, house

keeping and storage.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Service Water Piping Degradation (92706B)

a. Background

The degradation of the service water system is described in RH Report

No. 261/84-45. Additional inspection in this area is reported in RH

Report Nos. 261/84-48 and 261/85-12. This inspection is a continuation

of the inspection described in the above reports.

The licensee committed in CP&L letter RESP/84-1267,

dated January 4,

1985, to an inservice monitoring program to include 15 service water

welds that would represent a variety of configurations, lengths of

corrosion (microbiological attack) and sleeved as well as nonsleeved

joints. These joints were to be radiographed (baseline) prior to start

up and re-radiographed (inservice monitoring) in six weeks +/- one week.

Should no further attack be identified the next radiographic examina

tion would be scheduled three months +/- two weeks later.

The licensee radiographed fifteen weld joints (baseline)

on

December 12, 1984, (except for weld 2SO3-2 radiographed on November 19,

1984), re-radiographed the same 15 weld joints on February 26,

1985,

and re-radiographed the same 15 weld joints between May 31,

1985 and

June 14, 1985.

In addition two more welds 3-SO3-3 and 3-SO3-5, were

added to the sample.

b. Inspections

The inspector reviewed the radiographs that had been taken, 17 joints

(baseline) and the same 17 joints (inservice monitoring). The licensee

informed the inspector that the above radiographs were for information

only.

Therefore,

no attempt was made to provide code quality

4

radiographs, as only corrosion growth was required to be determined.

The inspector reviewed the radiographs to determine whether there had

been any corrosion growth between the baseline radiographs of 12/28/84,

and the inservice monitoring radiographs of 5/31 - 6/14/85, the results

of this examination are shown below.

Weld No.

Location

Type/Configuration

Remarks

4-SPA-5

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved


1-RPA-4

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved


4-RPA-4

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved


3-RCH-1

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved

Increment 1-2 of

the 5/31/85 radio

graphs was moved

during the expo

sure thereby

obscuring the

images and pro

viding question

able data

3-SCH-2

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved

---

3-RCA-2

Auxiliary Building

Sleeved Welded Wet -------

2-RCH-8

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved


3-SCH-5

Auxiliary Building

Not Sleeved

Increment 1-2 of

the 5/31/85 radio

graphs has some

of the corrosion

indications

obscured by the

image of the

lead number joint

identification

thereby providing

questionable data.

3-SO3-1

Containment

Sleeved Welded Wet Increment 1-2 of

the 5/31/85 radio

graphs has pro

cessing marks and

scratches

that

obscure a portion

of the area of

5

interest on all

four films. Cor

rosion indica

tions are present

in the 5/31/85

radiographs that

are not visible

in the 12/28/84

radiographs due

to poor sensi

tivity and defi

nition of the

12/28/84 radio

graphs and also

not visible in

the 2/26/85 radio

graphs because

the

corrosion

location is

obscurred by the

image of the lead

number joint

identification

of the 2/26/85

radiographs.

2-N-33

Containment

Not Sleeved

A portion of

increment

1-2

and 2-1 of the

5/31/85 radio

graphs are to

dark to inter

pret

(density

5+).

Increment

2-1 exhibits the

backscatter

lead letter "B".

These radiographs

provide only

questionable

data.

30-2

Containment

Sleeved Welded Wet

20-1

Containment

Sleeved Welded Wet

6

2-N-32

Containment

Not Sleeved

A portion of

increment

1-2

and 2-1 of the

6/14/85 radio

graphs are too

dark to inter

pret (density

4+) thereby

providing

questionable

data.

2-S03-2

Containment

Sleeved Welded Wet

2-SO3-2

Containment

Sleeved Welded Dry

Increment 1-2 of

the

6/14/85

radiographs

exhibit the

backscatter lead

letter "B" in

all four films.

thereby pro

viding question

able data.

3-SO3-3

Containment

Sleeved Welded Dry

Increment 3-1

of the 6/14/85

radiographs

exhibit

the

backscatter

lead letter "B"

in all four

films.

Due to

a difference

in technique

(error in cen

tering), indica

tions visible

in 12/84 radio

graphs are not

visable in the

6/14/85 radio

graphs, thereby

providing ques

tionable data.

3-S03-5

Containment

Sleeved Welded Dry ---

7

The inspector could not identify any indications of corrosion that had

increased in size from the baseline radiographs of 12/28/84, to the

inservice monitoring radiographs of 5/31 - 6/14/85 (The only exception

was the 3-SO3-1 radiograph of 5/31/85 which showed corrosion

indications not seen in the 12/28/84 and 2/26/85 radiographs.

This

difference is explained by poor technique and placement of lead

identification in the earlier radiographs).

There are ten examples of

obscurred, improperly processed, backscattered and excessively dense

(too dark)

radiographs which provide questionable data for the

determination of corrosion growth.

These ten examples were caused by

poor workmanship on the part of the radiographers as acceptable

radiographs of the joints in question were produced during the first

inservice monitoring inspection in February of this year.

With a

little more attention to details, the above 10 problem radiographs

could have been corrected.

The above 10 increments represent only

approximately 10% of the radiographs (baseline and inservice moni

toring) that were made. In view of the fact that the remaining 90% did

not exhibit any corrosion growth over the second inservice monitoring

period, there appears to be an acceptable margin of safety for the

safety of the service water system integrity at the present time. The

licensee indicated that at present, plans are under way to re-radio

graph the inservice monitoring sample during the refueling outage

planned for late 1985/early 1986 and to replace the pipe during the

following refueling outage late 1986/early 1987.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves (92706B)

The inspector reviewed procedures and records as described below, to

determine whether applicable code, procedure,

and regulatory requirements

were being met. The applicable code for Inservice Testing (IST) of pumps

and valves is ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section XI, 1977

Edition with Addenda through Summer 1978.

The inspector reviewed the below listed procedures in the following areas:

general technical and administrative adequacy; plant equipment status;

description of hydraulic circuit; location and type of each measurement for

each quantity; allowable ranges for test quantities; minimum flow and/or

pressure for pump to fulfill safety function; minimum system operation time;

realignment of hydraulic circuit; plant equipment status changes properly

identified; review of test results and recording requirements.

Procedures Reviewed

Procedure No.

Title

0s

OST-201, Rev. 11

"Auxiliary Feedwater System

Component Test (Monthly)

8

OST-302, Rev. 8

"Service Water System Component

Test (Monthly)

a. With regard to the inspection above, the inspector noted that the

Baseline test data for Vibration ampitude of the service water pumps

varied from 0.86 mils to 3.4 mils. The established allowable ranges as

specified in CP&L Procedure OST-302 for vibration amplitude (based an

operational evaluation - a CP&L value of 3.0 mils) are:

Acceptable

Range - less than or equal to five mils; Alert Range - greater than five

mils, but less than six mils; and Required Action Range - equal to or

greater than six mils.

This is clearly contrary to ASME B&PV Code,

Section XI, Table IWP-3100-2 which specifies the following ranges for a

pump with vibration of 0.86 mils; Acceptable Range - zero to two mils;

Alert Range - two to three mils; and an Required Action Range - over

three mils. Therefore, the licensee's values are not in compliance

with the Code.

The inspector further noted that for the below listed gauges the ratio

of range to reference value exceeded the requirement of ASME B&PV Code

Section XI,

paragraph IWP-4120 which states "the full scale range of

each instrument shall be three times the reference value or less."

Pressure Gauge

No., System and

Average

Ratio of

and IST

Range

Operating

Range to

Procedure No.

PSIG

Pressure PSIG

Pressure

Component Cooling

0-100

16.9

5.92

Water-PI-639A

OST-908

Component Cooling

0-100

15

6.67

Water-PI-639B

OST-908

Component Cooling

0-100

16

6.25

Water-PI-639C

OST-908

Diesel Fuel Oil

0-60

7.43

8.07

Transfer PI-1964A

OST-403

Diesel Fuel Oil

0-60

6.78

8.85

Transfer PI-1964B

OST-403

Residual Heat

0-600

157

3.82

Removal PI-600

OST-251

Resident Heat

0-600

156

3.85

Removal PI-601

OST-251

The above examples indicate that the licensee was not performing

inservice testing of pumps in accordance with ASME

B&PV

Code,

Section XI.

Failure to perform inservice testing of pumps,

whose

function is required for safety, to verify operational readiness, is a

violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.55(g). This

violation will be identified as 261/85-22-01: "Failure to Perform IST

in Accordance with ASME Section XI."

b.

With regard to the inspection above, the inspector noted that the

acceptance criteria for Delta P for the motor driven Auxiliary Feed

Pumps in Procedure OST-201 was not consistent with the ranges specified

in ASME B&PV Code Section XI, Table IWP-3100-2. The ranges were much

wider than allowed by the Code.

The licensee indicated that they had

identified this matter and were in the process of amending all such

affected procedures. The inspector stated that it could not be readily

determined whether the excessively large ranges in the procedures

allowed the pumps to operate in an Alert Range without increased

testing or in a Required Action Range without declaring the affected

pump inoperable. Pending the resolution of the above, this matter will

be identified as unresolved item 261/85-22-02:

"Allowable Delta P

Range".

Within the areas examined,

no violations or deviations were identified

except as noted in paragraph 7a above.

8. Inspector Followup Items (92701B)

a. (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 261/83-30-01:

"Welding Program

Review"

This matter concerns a Corporate Welding Program Manual that was in the

review cycle at the time of the 261/83-30 inspection.

This manual is

still in the review cycle; however, the site has instituted a new

welding program for H.B. Robinson Plant.

The plant welding program is implemented by CP&L Procedure MMM-007,

Rev. 0 "Control

of Welding,

Brazing and Heat Treating",

which

implements the Special Process Procedures

(SPP)

SPP-001 through

SPP/GWS-WEC contained in Volume 4, Part 8 of the H.B.

Robinson SGE

Plant Operating manual,

and PMC-011 contained in Volume 2, part 3 of

the same manual.

The inspector reviewed the above and has no further

questions. This matter is considered closed.

b. (Closed) Item 261/84-27-05: "PT Procedure Revision Requirements"

10

This item concerns the fact that Westinghouse (W) Procedure W-ISI-11

did not address the requirements of ASME B&PV Code,

Section XI,

paragraph T-632.2 requirements. These requirements are addressed in an

internal W procedure which the inspector reviewed.

The inspector has

no further questions in this area. This matter is considered closed.

c. (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 261/84-33-01:

"ISI

QA Program

Approval"

This item concerns the unavailability of documented evidence of CP&L

Approval of the Babcock and Wilcox and Westinghouse QA programs for

Inservice Inspection.

The licensee made the approval documentation

available. This matter is considered closed.

d. (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 261/84-48-02:

"Water Filled Pipe

Welding"

This concerned the licensee's lack of documentation of welding sleeves

on the Service Water System with water in the piping.

The licensee

issued a "Temporary Repair" that completely documents the service water

repair welding program.

The inspector has no more questions in this

area. This matter is considered closed.

e. (Open) Item 261/84-45-01:

"Service Water Degradation"

This matter was further examined during this inspection and is

discussed in paragraph 6 of this report. This item remains open.