ML14175B285

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Insp Rept 50-261/85-05 on 850114-18.Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Written Procedures in That Dye Penetrant Not Removed from Svc Water Piping & Failure to Adequately Implement Licensed Operator Requalification Program
ML14175B285
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1985
From: Debs B, Julian C, Julian C, Mccoy F, Modenos L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14175B283 List:
References
50-261-85-05, 50-261-85-5, NUDOCS 8507010074
Download: ML14175B285 (9)


See also: IR 05000261/1985005

Text

pR REGI

UNITED STATES

05

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No.:

50-261/85-05

Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company

411 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-261

License No.:

DPR-23

Facility Name:

H. B. Robinson

Inspection Conducted: January 14 -

18, 1985

Inspectors:

A -------

d

B. T. Debs

Date S'igned

L. P. Modenos

D e Si _ed

F. R. McCoy

W

Da

Sig ed

Approved by:

oLt

C. Julian, Section Chief

D-e Signed

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 105 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of maintenance activities, non-licensed employee training, and

licensed operator requalification training.

Results:

Of the 3 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified

in 1 area and 2 apparent violations were found in 2 areas.

(Failure to follow

written procedures in that dye penetrant was not removed from service water

piping; see paragraph 5.a and failure to adequately implement the licensed

operator requalification program in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A in that

licensed training staff personnel were exempted from annual requalification

written examinations contrary to Training Instruction requirements which define

the requalification program

and contrary to 10

CFR

55 Appendix A; see

paragraph 7.d).

8507010074 850308

PDR ADOCK 05000261

G

PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Licensee Employees Contacted

  • J. M. Curley, Manager, Technical Support
  • W. J. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering
  • F. L. Lowery, Manager, Operations
  • A. R. Wallace, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
  • H. S. Young, Director, QA/QC
  • D. C. Stadler, Director, Regulatory Compliance
  • E. Paine, Technical Support
  • R. Chambers, Maintenance Supervisor
  • S. W. Farmer, Senior Engineer
  • R. Allen, Senior Specialist, Training
  • V. L. Smith, Senior Specialist, Training

C. Bethea, Director, Training

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • H. E. P. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector
  • H. Whitcomb, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 18, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above and by telecon (Fredrickson,

Region II NRC/Curley, H.B. Robinson,

Manager Technical

Support) on

January 24, 1985.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia

tions.

One unresolved item was identified in the area of licensed operator

requalification training and is discussed in paragraph 7.

5.

Inspection of Maintenance Activities

.

(a) Service Water System Piping

An

inspector entered the licensee's Unit No. 2 Containment and

inspected selected sections of Service Water piping. A majority of the

system within containment had recently been insulated.

The inspector

observed wetted insulation on one run of Service Water piping.

At the

inspector's request, the licensee removed approximately two feet of

2

wetted insulation.

An inspection of this section of pipe indicated

that the wetting was due to condensation and not pipe leakage.

On

January 16,

1985,

while in containment, the inspector observed a

vertical run of uninsulated Service Water piping associated with

HVH-2 (Containment Ventilation Cooler) with apparent dye penetrant

over an approximate two foot section of the pipe.

A member of the

licensee's engineering staff acknowledged the inspector's observations.

On January 17,

1985, the inspector was informed by the licensee that

this section of piping had subsequently been insulated; however, the

licensee was making preparations to remove the insulation to clean the

pipe. The inspector informed licensee management that the aforemen

tioned situation was contrary to licensee procedure NDEP-201, revision

No 6, Liquid Penetrant Examination (visible dye, solvent removable)

which states, in part, that penetrant examination materials shall be

removed from the subject surface(s) after completion of the examina

tion.

Licensee management was also informed that the aforementioned

procedural violation is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V,

which states that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by

documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate

to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these

instruction, procedures, or drawings. (Violation 261/85-05-01).

(b) Component Cooling Water System Corrosion Inside Containment

The inspector requested that the lagging be removed from Component

Cooling Water valve 728C for inspection of external surface corrosion.

This valve and associated piping is designed to contain Reactor Coolant

System pressure should a leak develop in a reactor coolant pump thermal

barrier heat exchanger (2503 psi).

Upon inspection of the carbon steel

valve and visible sections of associated piping,

the inspector

expressed concern regarding the apparent deteriorative external condi

tion of the valve and piping.

On January 21, 1985, the inspector was telephonically informed that the

subject valve and piping had been evaluated by a Carolina Power and

Light corporate metallurgist who found that the corrosion was

acceptable in that no pitting or cracking was observed and the

corrosion that was evident is expected for a cold water carbon steel

system which is subject to sweating (condensation).

(c) Cold leg Accumulator Injection Line Corrosion

While inside containment on January 15,

1985,

an inspector observed

corrosion on a 10 inch diameter elbow located in the injection line

associated with Cold Leg Accumulator "B".

This corrosion gave a

freckled appearance to the external surface of this stainless steel

section of pipe.

The inspector expressed concern to licensee manage

ment that this corrosion should be evaluated to determine whether it

was a result of metal or chemical contamination and whether this

corrosion was detrimental to the pipe. The inspector was telephonically

informed by licensee management that a corporate metallurgist had

inspected this area of concern and tentatively identified the subject

corrosion as being resultant from chemical attack. Licensee management

3

further indicated that a chemical analysis was to be performed to

determine the causal agent.

The

inspector was

telephonically informed by the licensee on

January 24, 1985, that the chemical smears of the suspect area and dye

penetrant tests were acceptable.

(d) Corrosion of Seismic Supports

The inspector observed apparent corrosion of a seismic support

associated with the Service Water piping identified in subparagraph 5a

of this report.

This support was identified by the inspector to

licensee management.

The inspector expressed concern regarding

apparent galvanic corrosion of the hanger as a result of metal to metal

contact between the stainless steel Service Water piping and the carbon

steel support (sacrificial anode)

resulting in consumption of the

carbon steel and weakening of the support.

A review of the last in

service inspection of the support in 1982 performed under procedure

ISI-8-Rev. 8 indicated no remarkable corrosion.

A licensee certified visual inspector was sent to inspect the suspect

support.

The licensee inspector indicated that although there was

discoloration of the support, it was apparently due to past evaporation

(possibly of condensation) and that there was small indication of

corrosion on the hanger.

None was observed at the suspect area

identified by the inspector.

Furthermore,

it

was reported by the

licensee that the Service Water pipe did not make contact with the

support. The inspector had no further comments.

(e) The inspector reviewed selected inservice inspection pressure testing

procedures.

The inspector noted that the licensee categorizes leakage

as a deficiency or exception.

Leakage, or evidence of leakage, from

valve and pump packing glands without leakage collection systems, and

component mechanical connections within the area to be inspected are

identified as exceptions.

Deficiencies are flow impairments and

leakage, or evidence of leakage except as previously described as an

exception. The licensee routinely repairs deficiencies; however, the

determination to repair exceptions is left to the engineering judge

ment of the test coordinator. The inspector observed several instances

where mechanical fitting leakage had been categorized as an exception

without apparent corrective maintenance followup. The inspector stated

to licensee management that a good engineering practice would be to

followup all leakage identification with repair. The inspector did not

identify any violations or deviations in this area.

Violations and deviations were not noted in this area.

4

6. Non-Licensed Employee Training

The inspector reviewed the overall training and retraining activities for

non-licensed employees and general training for licensed employees to assure

conformance with the licensee commitments.

The following procedures from

the Training Instruction Manual were reviewed:

(a) "Retraining

and

Replacement Training for Non-licensed Operating

Personnel" Rev. 8 dated November 20, 1984.

The purpose of this procedure is to establish a retraining and replace

ment training program for the following personnel:

1.

Instrumentation and Control Technicians

2. Electricians

3. Mechanics

4.

E&RC Group

5. Auxiliary Operators

6. Stockroom personnel

This procedure met the requirement of ANSI-N18.1-1971.

(b) "Replacement Training for Instrumentation and Control Technicians and

Electricians" Rev. 8 dated August 29, 1984.

The purpose of this procedure is to provide for the qualification and

requalification training of plant I&C personnel and Electricians to

meet the minimum qualification requirements of ANSI-N18.1-1971 and any

additional requirements listed under NUREG-0737 Item II.B.4.

(c) "Replacement Training for Mechanics" Rev. 5 dated November 24, 1981.

The purpose of this procedure is to provide for the qualification and

requalification of the plant mechanics to meet the requirements of ANSI

Standard N18.1-1971.

(d) "Qualification

program for Auxiliary Operators"

Rev. 18 dated

October 5, 1984.

The purpose of this procedure is to provide a qualification program for

plant Auxiliary Operator as described in ANSI Standard N18.1-1971.

(e) "Qualification Program for Shift Engineer" Rev. 3 dated October 24,

1983.

The purpose of this procedure is to ensure the Shift Engineers are

provided with sufficient formal and on-the-job training to meet or

exceed the recommendations of NUREG-0578.

The review of these procedures revealed that an adequate program exists for

non-licensed personnel.

5

The inspector interviewed and reviewed the training records of several I&C,

Mechanics and Auxiliary Operator personnel.

The inspector confirmed that

the formal technical and on-the-job training was provided to the employees

as required by the licensee's committed program.

The inspector reviewed the Nuclear Safety Reviewers training course and

their training records to verify the qualifications of the reviewers.

A

letter from Guy P. Beatty, Jr., to Site Manager (Robinson File No. 13510H)

on January 10, 1985 identified a list of Qualified Nuclear Safety Reviewers.

These reviewers are authorized in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.5.1.1.4 to perform nuclear safety reviews of procedures, tests, experi

ments and modifications.

On the basis of the inspector's review of Modification packages 748 and 655

and a letter written by Guy P. Beatty, Jr. , on January 2, 1985 (Robinson

File No.

13510H)

where the Onsite Nuclear Safety (ONS)

Unit identified

deficiencies with some initial reviews, the ONS group has recommended to the

site management that all qualified safety reviewers be retrained beginning

the first quarter of 1985. The inspector could not determine the manner in

which qualified personnel are selected.

No written criteria was found to

identify the selection process and the required training for the qualified

personnel.

This item will be identified as Inspector Followup Item

(261/85-05-03).

7.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training

An inspection was performed in the area of Licensed Operator Requalification

Training in order to verify that the program is in conformance with NRC

requirements, that the program is properly implemented, and that the program

is technically adequate. With the exception of those specific deficiencies

noted herein, it was determined that in general the program was satisfactory

and that significant improvements had been made in this program over the

past five years. Training Instruction (TI) 200 defines and implements the

Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program which is divided into

four major sections:

preplanned lecture series, simulator retraining,

on-the-job training, and evaluation.

(a) The preplanned lecture series consists of 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> of classroom

lectures which are repeated 4 to 6 times (as circumstances warrant)

annually. The lectures are conducted in accordance with a preplanned

schedule and formal detailed lesson plans and outlines. Provisions are

in place for ensuring that generic weaknesses noted in the previous

year's annual written requalification examination are factored into the

upcoming year's lectures.

The inspector was unable to attend lectures

since none were scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period.

A review of TI-200, a 1984 plant readiness summary which delineated the

1984 operator requalification program, selected lesson plans, exami

nations,

and records,

and interviews with selected operators and

training individuals indicated that the program is adequate and

complies with NRC regulations.

(b) The

simulator retraining consists of each licensed individual

participating in 2 sessions annually; each session being approximately

32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> in length.

This training is conducted at the Harris E&E

6

Center on the Shearon Harris simulator and consequently could not be

observed by the inspector.

A review of TI-200, selected simulator

training evaluation records, and selected simulator control manipula

tion charts indicate that this training is in accordance with 10 CFR 55

Appendix A and the "Qualification of Reactor Operators" letter issued

by Harold R. Denton on March 28,

1980,

and is properly implemented.

One concern was addressed to training department management with

respect to simulator retraining.

This concern was that copies of the

control manipulation charts which specify the control manipulations

performed each year on the simulator by each licensed individuals and

which are maintained as records at the site by the Robinson training

department,

are not signed to certify correctness.

The inspector

considers that certification of these documents would be desirable for

record maintenance purposes.

(c) The on-the-job training consists of (1) a quarterly review of selected

Administrative Procedures,

Abnormal Operating Procedures,

Emergency

Operating Procedures,

Technical Specifications,

Environmental

and

Radiation Control Procedures,

Plant Emergency Procedures,

and Fuel

Maintenance Procedures,

(2) An annual walkthrough of control room

inaccessibility and loss of emergency

buses/station batteries,

(3) Required reading of appropriate design changes, facility license

changes, significant plant modifications,

procedure changes and

significant operating experiences and (4) for licensed staff personnel,

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> watch in the control room each month as an extra man on shift

(75% of which can be satisfied on the simulator).

A review of TI-200 and selected records yielded one concern in this

area regarding a licensed individual standing control room watches

subsequent to not actively performing the functions of an operator or

senior operator for a period in excess of four months.

10 CFR 55.31e

states that if

a licensee has not been actively performing the

functions of an operator or senior operator for a period of 4 months or

longer,

he shall, prior to resuming activities licensed pursuant to

this part,

demonstrate to the commission that his knowledge and

understanding of facility operation and administration are satis

factory.

The Commission may accept as evidence, a certification by an

authorized representative of the facility licensee by which the

licensee has been employed.

The inspector noted one case where a licensed training instructor had

not stood watch as a shift complement member for approximately sixteen

months and then subsequently stood four 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> watches

(November 27 -

30,

1984)

as both the Shift Operator and Senior

Operator. There was no evidence of demonstration to the NRC that the

individual's knowledge and understanding of facility operation and

administration was satisfactory as specified in 10 CFR 55.31e.

The

licensee interprets the phrase actively performing the function of an

operator or senior operator in this application to mean that active

status will be maintained by participating in the annual requalifi

cation program (paragraph 3.1.7, TI-200).

Although for staff

personnel,

this includes an average of four hours per month in the

control room as an extra man on shift (75% of which can be satisfied on

7

the simulator), the inspector does not consider that the licensee's

interpretation of "actively performing functions of an operator or

senior operator" is a valid or adequate interpretation.

Consequently,

it

is considered in this case, that the licensee should

have demonstrated to the NRC that the individual's knowledge and

understanding of facility operation and administration was satisfactory

prior to his standing watch as a shift complement member in order to

meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.31e.

This is classified as an

unresolved item (261/85-05-04)

pending

NRC evaluation and inter

pretation of what constitutes "actively performing the functions of an

operator or senior operator".

(d) The evaluation phase consists of an annual written qualification

examination,

oral examination (once every five years)

and,

where

necessary, accelerated training. In this area the inspector reviewed

annual written requalification examinations and accelerated training.

During the course of this review it

was noted that the four licensed

training staff personnel are routinely exempted from taking the annual

written

requalification examination since they participate in .

preparation and/or review of the annual requalification examination.

Specifically one of these individuals was exempted from the written

examination for the past 6 years, two for the past 3 years, and one for

the last year since becoming licensed as Senior Reactor Operator.

TI-200 requires that an annual written examination shall be admin

istered to all licensed personnel each calendar year and does not

contain any provision for exemptions unless an individual successfully

completes an NRC exam in less than 6 months prior to the requalifica

tion exam.

This condition was not met in the cases cited above.

Additionally, prior to 1983, Administrative Procedure 10.2 required

that a comprehensive written examination be given annually to each

licensed operator without any provisions for exemption.

This is contrary to 10 CFR 55 Appendix A and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

Criterion V and is a violation (261/85-05-02).

A review of selected examinations and answers key reflected that for

those examinations reviewed, the questions were comprehensive.

It was

noted that a minimum of two examinations are made up and used during a

given requalification period.

A review of accelerated training for three individuals who failed the

1984 annual written requalification examination reflected that the

training was self study with a unique individual study plan directing

the study. This was considered adequate for the weaknesses noted in

the 1984 examinations for these individuals.

In all cases reviewed,

the involved individuals were removed from licensed duties, pending

completion of training and reexamination. A review of the new examina

tions indicated that they were adequate.

(e) At the exit interview, a concern was expressed with the fact that the

licensee was unable to demonstrate during the inspection that the NRC

had ever formally approved the Robinson licensed operator

8

requalification program.

Subsequently on January 22,

1985,

the

licensee produced documentation that the program was NRC approved by

letter dated January 30, 1974. This item is satisfactorily resolved.