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MONTHYEARML14085A5332014-05-29029 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident Project stage: Other 2014-05-29
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Similar Documents at Byron |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000454/20230042024-02-0202 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023004 and 05000455/2023004 ML24022A2722024-01-23023 January 2024 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000454/2024011 ML24018A0362024-01-17017 January 2024 Paragon Energy Solutions, Defect with Detroit Diesel/Mtu Fuel Injectors P/N R5229660 Cat Id 0001390618 ML23320A1762023-12-13013 December 2023 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0027 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML23277A0032023-12-11011 December 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of TSTF-370 ML23318A5102023-12-0101 December 2023 Relief from the Requirements of the ASME Code IR 05000454/20233012023-11-27027 November 2023 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000454/2023301 and 05000455/2023301 BYRON 2023-0065, Unit 2 - Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline2023-11-17017 November 2023 Unit 2 - Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline BYRON 2023-0063, Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B2R24)2023-11-16016 November 2023 Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B2R24) IR 05000454/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023003 and 05000455/2023003 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion RS-23-117, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums ML23313A0852023-11-0909 November 2023 Submittal of 2023-301 Byron Initial License Examination Post-Examination Comments RS-23-114, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds2023-11-0101 November 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds ML23297A2352023-10-26026 October 2023 Information Request for the Cyber Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection RS-23-100, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-13013 October 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-23-108, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles2023-10-11011 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles RS-23-105, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2023-10-10010 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections ML23278A0272023-10-0505 October 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval - Byron Station, October 2023 RS-23-093, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel.2023-09-29029 September 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel. ML23251A1622023-09-29029 September 2023 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements RS-23-094, Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 752023-09-29029 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 75 RS-23-091, Relief Request I4R-25, Alternative Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals2023-09-26026 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-25, Alternative Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals ML23226A0062023-09-19019 September 2023 Review of License Renewal Commitment Number 10 Submittal ML23180A1692023-09-11011 September 2023 Calvert Cliff Units 1 & 2, and R.E. Ginna Plant - Withdrawal of Proposed Alternatives to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Requirements (Epids L-2022-LRR-0074, 0076, 0079, 0091, 0092, 0093 and 0094) ML23242A3282023-09-0101 September 2023 Amendment No. 233 Correction IR 05000454/20235012023-08-31031 August 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000454/2023501 and 05000455/2023501 IR 05000454/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Byron Station (Report 05000454/2023005 and 05000455/2023005) IR 05000454/20230022023-08-0303 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000454/2023002 and 05000455/2023002 ML23209A7242023-07-31031 July 2023 Request for Information on the NRC Quadrennial Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection: Inspection Report 05000454/2024010 and 05000455/2024010 ML23192A0362023-07-25025 July 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23122A3022023-07-20020 July 2023 Issuance of Amendments Technical Specifications 2.1.1 and 4.2.1 to Allow a Previously Irradiated Accident Tolerant Fuel Lead Test Assembly to Be Further Irradiated in Unit No. 2 IR 05000454/20234022023-07-18018 July 2023 Baseline Security Inspection Document; 05000454/2023402; 05000455/2023402 ML23198A0372023-07-17017 July 2023 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution (PIR) Inspection at Byron Nuclear Plant ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III RS-23-083, Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators2023-06-27027 June 2023 Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators ML23172A1172023-06-22022 June 2023 Notification of NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection Request for Information RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23159A1302023-06-0808 June 2023 Day Inservice Inspection Report for Interval 4, Period 3, (B1R25) ML23159A1542023-06-0808 June 2023 2022 Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report RS-23-075, Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2023-06-0707 June 2023 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML23157A2832023-06-0606 June 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information BYRON 2023-0029, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements2023-06-0101 June 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements ML23138A1342023-05-18018 May 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Braidwood Station and Byron Station ML23003A7882023-05-11011 May 2023 Report for December 12-16, 2022, Regulatory Audit Regarding Reinsertion of a High Burnup Accident Tolerant Fuel Lead Test Assembly 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood BW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form RS-23-094, Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 752023-09-29029 September 2023 Relief Request I4R-24, Alternative for Post-Peening Reexamination Frequency for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Number 75 RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 BYRON 2022-0071, Materials Reliability Program: Topical Report for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Mitigation by Surface Stress Improvement (MRP-335, Revision 3-A) Final Causal Report and Description of Corrective Action Assignment2022-10-13013 October 2022 Materials Reliability Program: Topical Report for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Mitigation by Surface Stress Improvement (MRP-335, Revision 3-A) Final Causal Report and Description of Corrective Action Assignment NMP1L3469, Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits2022-06-30030 June 2022 Constellation Energy Company, LLC, Request for Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-093, R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2021-09-0101 September 2021 R. E. Ginna, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections RS-21-056, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld2021-05-12012 May 2021 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld RS-21-001, Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping2021-01-0404 January 2021 Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping BYRON 2020-0085, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report2020-12-10010 December 2020 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report BYRON 2020-0084, 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary Report2020-12-10010 December 2020 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary Report ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML20195B1592020-07-10010 July 2020 Attachment 1 - Description and Assessment ML20195B1622020-06-30030 June 2020 Attachment 11 - SG-SGMP-17-25-NP, Revision 1, Foreign Object Limits Analysis for the Byron and Braidwood Unit 2 Steam Generators June 2020 ML20195B1612020-06-25025 June 2020 Attachment 6 - Intertek Report No. Aim 200510800-2Q-1(NP), Byron Unit 2 Operational Assessment Addressing Deferment of B2R22 Steam Generator Tube Examinations to B2R23, April 2022 ML19228A0232019-08-15015 August 2019 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-879 ML18192C1522018-07-18018 July 2018 Review of Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML17355A5612017-12-21021 December 2017 Ltr. 12/21/17 Response to Disputed Non-Cited Violation Documented in Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000454/2017009; 05000455/2017009 (DRS-N.Feliz-Adorno) ML17234A4782017-08-22022 August 2017 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Information - NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 2, H.4.4 Path 4: GMRS ≪ 2xSSE RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 ML16344A0062016-12-0909 December 2016 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary of Biennial Report of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, Performed RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17360A1742016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6: Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations (Non-Proprietary) ML16356A0202016-10-0707 October 2016 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. RS-16-122, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-31031 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-088, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-07-15015 July 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-16-057, Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds2016-03-15015 March 2016 Supplement to Response to Requests for Additional Information for Relief for Alternate Requirements for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations with Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration J-Groove Welds RS-15-267, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2015-11-30030 November 2015 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-15-072, Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 542015-02-12012 February 2015 Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 54 RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application RS-14-277, Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 12014-09-24024 September 2014 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1 ML14128A5562014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14178B2222014-06-24024 June 2014 Technical Review of TIA 2013-02, Single Spurious Assumptions for Braidwood and Byron Stations Safe-Shutdown Methodology ML14085A5332014-05-29029 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses BYRON 2014-0040, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Revised for Negative Pressure Application During Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Fill2014-03-27027 March 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Revised for Negative Pressure Application During Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Fill ML14079A4232014-03-12012 March 2014 Enclosure 1, Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Revision 0 ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event RS-14-082, ECCS Evaluation Model Error - 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report2014-02-27027 February 2014 ECCS Evaluation Model Error - 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report BYRON 2014-0003, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (Mur) Power Uprate2014-02-13013 February 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) for Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (Mur) Power Uprate ML13225A5952013-12-17017 December 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Related to Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049(Mitigation Strategies) 2023-09-29
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARBW230054, Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form2023-11-17017 November 2023 Attachment 2: MDMP Deviation Form ML23321A0452023-11-17017 November 2023 EC 639996 (Byron), Revision 1 and 640160 (Braidwood), Revision 0, Technical Evaluation for NEI 03-08 Deviation of Baffle-Former Bolts Volumetric Examinations for Byron and Braidwood RS-22-071, License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds2022-06-0707 June 2022 License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 - Evaluation of Possible PWSCC Crack Initiation and Propagation in the Steam Generator Channel Head Assembly and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds RS-22-047, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-04-0808 April 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-21-112, Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2021-10-22022 October 2021 Updated 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML18192C1522018-07-18018 July 2018 Review of Fall 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML17355A5612017-12-21021 December 2017 Ltr. 12/21/17 Response to Disputed Non-Cited Violation Documented in Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000454/2017009; 05000455/2017009 (DRS-N.Feliz-Adorno) RS-17-048, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2017-04-0707 April 2017 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 ML16344A0062016-12-0909 December 2016 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summary of Biennial Report of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, Performed RS-17-039, Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations.2016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17170A1472016-10-0707 October 2016 Areva, 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. ML17095A2692016-10-0707 October 2016 Attachment 6, Areva Document 51-9263014-000, PWSCC Evaluation of Uhp Cavitation Peening for Byron and Braidwood Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations. RS-16-122, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-31031 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16236A2082016-08-23023 August 2016 Report of Backfit Appeal Review Panel ML16214A1992016-08-11011 August 2016 an Assessment of Core Damage Frequency for Byron/Braidwood Backit Appeal Review RS-16-088, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-07-15015 July 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) RS-16-073, Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2016-04-0707 April 2016 Submittal of Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-15-072, Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 542015-02-12012 February 2015 Comments on the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 54 RS-14-348, Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application2014-12-15015 December 2014 Comments on the Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, Related to the License Renewal Application ML14128A5562014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14085A5332014-05-29029 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14120A0392014-04-24024 April 2014 Units 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request to Install New Low Degraded Voltage Relays & Timers on the 4.16 Kv Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Buses ML14066A4792014-03-0404 March 2014 Clarification of Licensing Basis Assumptions for a Natural Circulation Cooldown Event ML13225A5952013-12-17017 December 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Related to Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049(Mitigation Strategies) ML13182A0312013-07-0303 July 2013 Transmittal of Final Byron Station, Unit 2, Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee RS-12-162, Company, LLCs 180-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 Company, LLCs 180-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12341A1622012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 2 RS-12-161, Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 22012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generation Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-002 Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 2 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 3 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 3 RS-12-161, Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 32012-11-0707 November 2012 Byron Generating Station, Unit 1, 12Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 3 RS-12-161, Q0108.20-R-002, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 22012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-002, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 1 of 2 ML12341A1662012-11-0707 November 2012 Enclosure 2, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Byron Station, Unit 2, Report No: 12Q0108.20-R-002, Revision 1 ML12341A1652012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 3 of 3 ML12341A1642012-11-0707 November 2012 Q0108.20-R-001, Rev. 1, Appendix C, Seismic Walkdown Checklist (Swc). Part 2 of 3 ML12341A1612012-11-0707 November 2012 Enclosure 1, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Byron Station, Unit 1, Report No. 12Q0108.20-R-001, Revision 1 2023-11-17
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 29, 2014 Mr. Michael J. Pacilio Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Office (CNO)
Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
BYRON GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 -STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0101)
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54-(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.
'J .....
By letter dated November 27, 2012, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the Byron Station, Unit No. 1. By letter dated November 27, 2013, Exelon provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments. By letter dated December 13, 2013, Exelon provided Annex A to the Byron Station, Unit No. 1, walkdown report documenting the results of additional seismic walkdowns performed for items that were inaccessible during the.
initial walkdowns.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
M. Pacilio (
If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-6606 or by e-mail at Joei.Wiebe@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, oel S. Wiebe, Senior Project Manager lant Licensing 111-2 and and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-454
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC BYRON STATION. UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-454
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2012, 1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," 2 to the*
50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP),
verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC. of the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following:
- a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a descriptio.n of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.
- b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process. /
- c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (I PEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them.
- d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded,
. nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.
- e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.
- f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.
In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the, seismic
(
1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340.
2 ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A049 Enclosure
walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012, 3 the Nuclear Energy Institute staff submitted Electric Power Research Institute document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for -
Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," (walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012, 4 the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.
By letter dated November 27, 2012, 5 Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for Byron Station, Unit No. 1 (Byron 1). The NRC staff reviewed the initial walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the staff in completing its review. By letter dated November 1, 2013, 6 the NRC staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys. The licensee responded to the NRC staff request by letter dated November 27, 2013. 7 By letter dated December 13, 2013, 8 the licensee provided Annex A to the walkdown report. The purpose of the Annex A was to provide the results of the completed internal inspection of cabinets that were not opened and inspected during the initial walkdowns.
The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;"
and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an SSC of a facility must perform, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design.
The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.
The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's d<?cketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, 3
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121640872.
4 ADAMS Accession No. ML12145A529.
5 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML12341A160 6
ADAMS Accession No. ML133048418 7
ADAMS Accession No. ML133318501.
8 ADAMS Accession No. ML14030A242.
applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including ail modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for Byron 1 in Section 1.0 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes, standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
- The NRC staff reviewed Section 1.0 of the walkdown repor t, focusing on the summary of the SSE and the design codes used in the design.
Based on the NRC staff's review, the staff concludes that the licensee provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Sectio*n 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance.
3.2
- Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic walkdown methodology. By letter dated July 10, 2012, 9 the licensee confirmed that it would utilize the walkdown guidance in the performance of the seismic walkdowns at Byron 1.
The walkdown report dated November 27, 2012, and supplemental walkdown report submitted on December 13, 2013, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance.
The NRC, staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report:
- Development ofthe Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)
- Implementation of the Walkdown Process *
- Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications*
Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic w.alkdowns and area walk-bys. .
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 2, and Appendix A of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications.
Specifically, the staff reviewed the summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the following personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: equipment selection personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team, and operations staff.
The NRC staff noted that the walkdown report did not provide specific information about the involvement of the operations staff beyond the development of the SWEL and selection of items to be walked down. However, the licensee stated in its response to request for additional information (RAI) 1 that operations staff were involved in the resolution of items placed into the CAP for resolution.
Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the. NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate seismic background, knowledge and experience, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, Selection of SSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.
The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the Byron 1 base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool (SFP)- related equipment).
The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance. Based on Appendix B of the walkdown report, Byron 1 SWEL 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection: ,
- A variety of systems, equipment and environments
- Major new or replacement equipment
- Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., sorhe plants generate direct current power using inverters
- and, therefore, do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process as described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance.
The NRC staff also noted that a rapid drain-down list was not included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance. In Section 4.2.2.4 of the walkdown report, the licensee stated there are no components that could, upon failure, result in rapid drain-down of the
SFP water level to below 10 feet above the top of the fuel. After reviewing the information provided in this section, the staff concludes that the licensee provided adequate justification for not including rapid drain-down items as part of the SWEL 2:
After reviewing the SWELs 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby, meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. In addition, the NRC staff notes that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as described in the walkdown guidance.
3.2.3 . Implementation of the Walkdown Process
- Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 5 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that teams, which consisted of at least two qualified seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs) conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. According to the signed seismic walkdown .checklists (SWCs) and area walk-by checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted during the weeks of August 6 and August 20, 2012, and on September 19 and 22, 2012. In addition, a subsequent set of walkdowns were performed during the fourth quarter of 2012, and first quarter of 2013, as stated in the December 13, 2013, letter, from the licensee. The purpose of the last activity was to complete the internal inspection of cabinets that were not opened and inspected during the initial walkdowns. The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns. Additionally, the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review.
Appendices C and D of the walkdown report provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on the SWEL (SWEL 1 and 2) and each area containing SWEL equipment. Appendix AC of Annex A to the walkdown report provides the SWCs and AWCs for the subsequent walkdowns and walk-bys. The licensee used the checklists provided in Appendix C of the walkdown guidance report without modification.
The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the initial walkdown report list the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. The licensee did not identify any conditions to enter into the CAP during the subsequent walkdowns and did not perform any additional area walk-bys. Table A5-2 of Annex A summarizes the conditions identified during the initial walkdowns and provides the updated conditions and status of the items in Table 5-2 of the initial walkdown report. Table A5-3 of Annex A provides the updated condition and status of the items in Table 5-3 of the initial walkdown report. These tables describe how the condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP), the resolution and the current status.
Based on the initial review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. As such, by letter dated
November 1, 2013, the staff issued two questions in an RAI in order to obtain clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys.
- Specifically, in RAI 1, the staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation was determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that all conditions identified during the walkdowns and walk-bys were documented as issue reports in the Byron 1 CAP. The licensee referred to Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the walkdown report which include all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for Byron 1. The licensee stated that in addition to addressing the PASCs through the CAP, other nonseismic potentially adverse conditions, such as housekeeping and material conditions items, were identified by SWEs and addressed through the CAP.
After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the walkdown report and Tables A5-2 and A5-3 of Annex A, the staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1, the PASCs were properly identified and documented, and summary Tables 5-2, 5-3, A5-2, and A5-3, are considered complete.
In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50 percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance.
Section A5.4 of Annex A provides the results of the walkdowns of the cabinets that were not opened during the initial walkdowns to ensure that visibly accessible internal components mountings are adequate. No adverse conditions were identified.
Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 6 of the Byron 1 walkdown report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The licensee stated that it performed licensing basis evaluations and resolved PASCs using the plant's CAP. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 of the walkdown report list the key licensee findings, and provide a complete list of the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Tables A5-2 and A5-3 of Annex A update this information with the most recent status of items in Tables 5-2 and 5-3. These tables also describe the actions taken or planned to address these conditions, including the current status of each of the items the licensee entered into the CAP.
The the staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken or planned to address potential deficiencies. The staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified
degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the *cAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown 'guidance.
3.2.5 Conclusion J Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations.
3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns. Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:
- Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs.
- Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.
- Review the licensing basis evaluations.
- Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP.
- Review the walkdown report.
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 8 and Appendix F of the Byron 1 walkdown report which describe the conduct of the peer review for the initial walkdowns. Section A8 and Appendix AF of Annex A describes the peer review of the subsequent walkdowns.. In addition, the staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically, the staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report.
The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a pee~ reviewer for that same activity. In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 8 and the full peer review report in Appendix F of the walkdown report.
- The licensee confirmed that there were no cases where any peer reviewer reviewed their own workr- for Byron. 1.
The staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of .these activities, which included a discussion of the peer review team members' qualifications and level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review cor:nments. After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results ()f the peer review
- activities and hoW these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report.
Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance.
3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," licensees previously had performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.
The licensee provided background information regarding their IPEEE program and referenced several submittals to the NRC in which the IPEEE outliers were identified along with their status at that time. The licensee stated that although it did not identify any vulnerabilities, additional improvements were made to enhance safety after the IPEEE was completed. These actions are summarized in Appendix G and Table G-1 of the walkdown report. Table G-1 also provides the IPEEE proposed resolution, the actual resolution, and resolution date. The licensee stated that aiiiPEEE plant improvements and associated actions are complete .
. Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 7 and Appendix G of the walkdown report, the staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers, and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance.
3.5 Planned Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report.
3.6 NRC Oversight 3.6.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On July 6, 2012, 10 the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that the Byron 1 licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated February 5, 2013, 11 documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were identified.
10 ADAMS Accession No. ML12156A052.
11 ADAMS Accession No. ML13036A035.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, the licensee verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed seismic conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
M. Pacilio If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-6606 or by e-mail at Joei.Wiebe@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, IRA/
Joel S. Wiebe, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and and Planning and Analysis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-454
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
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