ML13343A280

11 Draft Outline Comments

ML13343A280
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/09/2013
From:	Kelly Clayton Operations Branch IV
To:	Arizona Public Service Co
laura hurley
References
Download: ML13343A280 (3)

Text

DRAFT OUTLINE COMMENTS Facility: Palo Verde First Exam Date: Nov. 1, 2013 (Written)

Written Exam Outline (6/13/13)

Comment Resolution 1 No comments - NRC generated outline N/A 2

3 4

5 Administrative JPM Outline (6/13/13)

Comment Resolution 1 No comments N/A 2

3 4

5 Control Room / In-Plant System JPM Outline (6/13/13)

Comment Resolution 1 No comments N/A 2

3 4

5 Simulator Scenario Outline Comments (6/17/13)

Comment Resolution Scenario 1 Event 3: SG tube leak - This For the SG tube leak in this event, it will is listed as a component failure. What require entry into the Excessive RCS are the actions of this failure? Isolation Leakrate AOP. The BOP operator will be 1 of the S/G? Verifiable actions required performing Appendix C, Minimize Release to count as component failure. Also, any to the Environment, and the ATC operator chance the crew will trip based on the will be performing Appendix B, ERFDADS leak rate? If so we should move this Leak Rate Determination. Both OBDI 202 - IOLE Process

event to right before the major so we appendices have verifiable actions dont lose the next two failures. performed by the respective operators.

With a leakrate of this magnitude (~8 gpm), an early reactor trip is highly unlikely as it is not procedurally directed and has not been observed to be directed by past operating crews. Having this event near the beginning of the scenario allows the leakrate determination to be performed making its placement beneficial.

Scenario 1 Event 4: Turbine Cooling For the Turbine Cooling Water (TCW)

Water pump trip - Also any chance of pump trip, it is highly unlikely that the crew tripping the turbine and tripping the crew will perform a turbine trip and/or a plant? reactor trip. However, it is even less likely for the crew to perform a reactor trip for the next event (CH B Steam Generator 2

Level Transmitter failure). Because of this, the order of events will be changed to the SG Level Transmitter failure coming BEFORE the TCW pump trip. This will place the TCW pump trip event just before the reactor trip initiating event.

Scenario 2 Event 2: Pressurizer spray The failure described is very slow acting.

valve fails open - Any chance of crew Only one spray valve fails open which allowing pressure to drop to trip causes a slow and steady pressure drop.

setpoint? It takes minutes before the first alarm (2160 psia) and several minutes after that before reaching an actuation setpoint (1837 psia). Multiple indications will be 3 present for the operator to diagnose the condition (pressurizer heaters, pressurizer spray valve position indication, etc.) prior to receipt of the alarm. Because of these factors, we believe it to be highly improbable for the crew to allow the condition to degrade to an automatic actuation.

Scenario 2 Event 6: ESD outside In Scenario 1, the ESD mentioned is a containment - Scenario 1 also contains steam rupture outside containment an ESD. Lets discuss. Potentially using upstream of the MSIVs. It is also coupled event 9 as the major while coming up with a Steam Generator Tube Leak. This with something else to necessitate the combination requires the crew to perform 4 trip. mitigation strategies in the Functional Recovery Procedure. In Scenario 2, the ESD is on the common header outside containment and is isolated when MSIVs are closed. After discussion, it was verified that these two events require different mitigation strategies and are OBDI 202 - IOLE Process

therefore acceptable to be used.

Scenario 2 Event 3: Inadvertent N/A 5 initiation of AFW - I think this is a great event especially at low power.

6 Scenario 2 Event 9: Loss of Grid - This malfunction has been confirmed as Confirm this is Loss of Offsite Power. being a Loss of Offsite Power.

General Outline Comments (6/13/13)

Comment Resolution What facility document defines the critical Currently the Critical Tasks for initial NRC tasks in the scenarios? license exams are constructed using NUREG-1021 Appendix D. Where applicable, references such as FSAR, Time Critical Action guidelines, Technical 1

Specifications, and condition of license are used to justify these actions. To the extent possible, the Critical Tasks addressed in the scenarios ES-D-1 will reference these documents as applicable.

Need Qualitative Attributes Table added to Revision 1 will contain this table for each 2

D-1 of each scenario. scenario.

Put in expected TS reference(s) into the D- Revision 1 will contain this data for each 3

1 as a quick reference for examiners. scenario.

Scenario 2 is low power scenario (no N/A 4

response required). OBDI 202 - IOLE Process