ML13330B424
| ML13330B424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1988 |
| From: | Baskin K Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | Martin J NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-V |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13330B423 | List: |
| References | |
| IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8811140006 | |
| Download: ML13330B424 (2) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company
- 0.
BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 KENNETH P. BASKIN TELEPHONE VICE PRESIDENT 818-302-1401 October 4, 1988 Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator NRC Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206, 50-361, 50-362 Criteria for Protection Action Recommendations for General Emergencies
Dear Mr. Martin:
As we continue to review and refine our procedures to handle emergency situations, I continue to have some concerns with the strict interpretation of the guidance regarding protective action recommendations for general emergencies which are contained in IE Information Notice 83-28 of May 4, 1983. At recent meetings with the Region, the guidance discussed indicated that it was expected that the evacuation of the two mile radius and five miles downwind as a protective action recommendation at every general.
emergency declaration was expected in all cases. We have included a site specific protective action recommendation flow chart in our procedures for use by the Shift Superintendent who is the initial Emergency Coordinator; however, once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated and a dialogue is established with offsite decision makers, then the evacuation of a two mile radius and five miles downwind should be based on offsite conditions.
There are certain situations at a general emergency declaration which would not lend themselves to the "automatic" evacuation.
One would be an earthquake situation where the roads might be impassable and buildings damaged. Another would be a serious onsite terrorist/hostage situation where the offsite agencies would be unaffected and the general public should not be on the roads.
'AD-1PC02 F
D 5i 0:206 FDic
Mr. John October 4, 1988 A second concern with the "automatic" evacuation would be a situation where SCE would follow the IE 83-28 guidance and recommend an evacuation, and the offsite decision makers decide to not evacuate. We have experienced this in past drills.
This presents a potential conflicting situation that would be reported by the media.
The SCE position, once the EOF is activated, is that a very careful evaluation will be conducted on protective action recommendations, and a dialogue established with the offsite jurisdictions to share with them the basis for the SCE recommendation. The SCE recommendation will be based upon plant conditions with full recognition of the offsite situation at the time.
The above discussion summarizes our concerns regarding a strict interpretation of an evacuation of a two-mile radius and five miles downwind.
I believe that our procedure, that incorporates input from the offsite agencies as well as consideration of the particular emergency situation at the plant is preferred over a strict interpretation of NRC guidance that would require evacuation as discussed above.
Please advise me if you have any different thoughts on this matter.
Sincerely, cc:
F. R. Huey, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, SONGS 1, 2 & 3