ML13330B322
| ML13330B322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1988 |
| From: | Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-0800, RTR-NUREG-612, RTR-NUREG-800 NUDOCS 8806150502 | |
| Download: ML13330B322 (27) | |
Text
Southem California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (818) 302-1749 AND LICENSING June 10, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Spent Fuel Transshipment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 In support of the NRC staff's review of the SCE proposed efforts to transship San Onofre Unit 1 spent fuel to the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Fuel Handling Buildings for storage, responses to NRC staff questions are provided in the enclosure. The questions were received as part of telephone discussions with the NRC staff reviewer and the Project Manager for San Onofre Unit 1.
If you have any questions regarding this information, please let me know.
Very truly yours, Enclosures cc: 3. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 8806150502 880610 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P
- 1. Identify which cask will be used for the transshipment.
RESPONSE
A GE IF-300 cask will be used for spent fuel movement. The weight of the cask is 136 kips which includes 7 spent fuel assemblies and water in the event wet shipments are required. The total lifted weight is 141 kips for the cask and rigging.
The cask has a Certificate of Compliance for Radioactive Material (Number 9001) which expires May 30, 1990. It is bounded by the Consolidated Safety Analysis Report NEDO-10084-3. Originally, SCE was planning to use the cask with four deviations from the certificate of compliance.
Currently, SCE will be using the cask with one deviation which has been discussed in the April 25, 1988 submittal.
That is, the cask will be transported between sites with the lifting trunnions installed and the valve cover boxes removed. The remaining deviations have been removed since SCE does not plan to ship fuel wet, will not ship fuel with a burnup greater than 35,000 MWD/MTU and will utilize a certified inspector to perform the helium leak test on the cask.
- 2. In the event wet shipments are done, is the weight of the water included in the cask?
RESPONSE
The weight of water is included in the cask weight for analysis and is estimated to be 4,000 pounds.
- 3. If procedures, standards or NUREGs are referenced for some specific action or content, provide a copy of the procedure or section referenced and reference the specific section of the standard or NUREG.
RESPONSE
Procedures are referenced to indicate that the actions necessary to transship fuel are controlled. The contents of the procedures are generally not relevant to the discussion. In the event the contents are important, a copy of the procedure or the section referenced will be provided. In the case of industry standards and NUREGs, more specific references will be provided when they are discussed.
- 4. With regard to the NUREG-0612 Guidelines evaluation, can more specific detail be provided since a cask has been selected?
RESPONSE
The NUREG-0612 evaluation remains valid for the selected cask. The turbine gantry crane is designed and tested to 150% of the cask weight and, as previously stated, so will the cask lifting device. The other NUREG-0612 issues relate to design issues, inspection, training and other items not related specifically to the cask weight.
-2
- 5. Address, in detail, the cask sitting on the decontamination pad concurrent with a.67g seismic event. Since the floor does not fail, include a discussion on overturning of the cask during the event.
RESPONSE
The decontamination pad is a 9 inch thick reinforced concrete slab with a 9 inch concrete topping.
The reinforced slab is supported by W24x94 steel beams which are attached to the 4 foot thick wall of the spent fuel pool on the north end and a W24x94 on the south end (Figure 1).
The cask will be located on the decontamination pad such that the cask is supported by two modified W24x94 beams. The modified W24x94 were strengthened in 1966 by welding 3/4" cover plates on the top and bottom flanges. The calculated stresses on the structural members of the decontamination pad are shown on Table 1. Administrative controls will be used to restrict the placement of the cask on the pad by marking the floor.
The decontamination pad was verified to withstand the 70 ton cask load during a.67g Modified Housner seismic event. Therefore, the cask will not impact any safety related system or equipment below the pad.
The structural steel members are assumed to only resist vertical loads.
Horizontal forces will be resisted by the floor slab which is connected to the spent fuel pool walls. The concrete slab will be loaded in bearing between the cask bottom and the top flanges of the supporting beams.
The bearing stress is given in Table 1.
Cask overturning will occur during the.67g seismic event and the overturning cases are similar to the cases of cask tipping which are discussed in Item 6. The cask was verified to withstand a Seismic Category B event without overturning.
- 6. Provide a detailed discussion on the lift of the cask utilizing the impact limiter. Sufficient information should be provided which will allow the NRC to draw the conclusion that the cask will not go through the decontamination pad. Also, include a discussion of cask tipping following a drop.
RESPONSE
The utilization of the impact limiter is described on page 10 of Proposed Change No. 181 to the Provisional Operating License submitted to the NRC on April 28, 1988. The impact limiter is shown in Figure 4.
An evaluation of the cask drops on the decontamination pad and the north turbine deck extension included the determination of the load capacities for the concrete decks and structural steel members. The criteria and assumptions are as follows:
-3 A. The crushing strength of the polyurethane foam is 150 psi which was confirmed by testing.
B. A dynamic increase factor of 1.2 is used for impact allowables.
C. The allowables are per AISC, ACI and Standard Review Plan 3.8.4.
D. Williamson & Alvy, "Impact Effect of Fragments Striking Structural Elements" is used to evaluate direct missile impact on concrete by calculating an equivalent static load concentrated at the impact area during a plastic impact.
F. The maximum allowable ductility ratio for the steel members in tension due to flexure is 10 per NUREG 0800, Section 3.5.3 Appendix A.
The impact loads and load capacities of the decks and the supporting members are shown in Table 2 for a 10 foot 6 inch high cask drop.
The postulated cask drop from a 2 foot 8 inch height without the impact limiter was also considered. Based on the equivalent static pressure method by Williamson and Alvy, as recommended by NUREG 0800 Section 3.5.3, each of the modified W24x94 beams will carry approximately 397 kips which is less than their capacity of 428 kips.
Penetration and perforation depths of the decon pad are 0.09 inches and 1.92 inches respectively, which is less than the existing 9 inch thick decontamination pad with a 9 inch concrete topping. The concrete pad will transfer the impact load in bearing to the modified W24x94 beams.
The actual cask lift height will be limited to 2 feet 3 inches.
Cask Tipping Following a Drop Cask tipping can only occur due to failure of one cask trunnion or a yoke arm. Although this event is unlikely, various tipping scenarios are described below:
- 1. Cask tipping following a drop on the 4 foot high section of the impact limiter.
The cask will be located in the 7 foot wide doorway of the Fuel Storage Building. Due to the geometry of the cask and the doorway, cask tipping in the north-south direction is restricted by the sides of the doorway and the drop will be essentially vertical.
The maximum angle of cask tilt from the vertical is 5.88 degrees.
Tipping in the east direction is precluded by the horizontal beam of the turbine gantry crane leg. If the cask tips in the west direction, it will fall on the 2 foot high section of the impact
-4 limiter, damage the cask decon scaffolding and fall on the floor.
The decon pad floor slab will not be damaged as the result of the cask tipping west because the energy of the falling cask will be dissipated by crushing the impact limiter and scaffolding.
- 2. Cask tipping following a drop on the 2 foot high section of the impact limiter.
If the cask tips east, it will strike the horizontal beam of the turbine gantry crane leg. The maximum angle of cask tilt at impact will be 17.7 degrees which is less than the 17.9 degrees for unstable equilibrium. Thus, after impact the cask will tend.to right itself. No significant damage will occur on the horizontal crane beam. The horizontal plate of the cask platform may be locally bent.
If the cask tips west, it will fall on the scaffolding at the west end of the decon room. Since the scaffolding cannot support the cask, the cask will damage it. As the cask falls, it will crush the two foot high section of the impact limiter and hit the west wall of the decon area at approximately 10 feet above the floor. The cask could potentially damage the wall and the damaged portion of the wall will fall into the new fuel area. Since the new fuel racks are 20 feet away from the wall, the 10 foot high falling section of the wall and the cask cannot impact the new fuel racks.
If the cask tips south, it will hit the masonry wall of the decon room and stop because the lateral impact force-is small due to the close proximity of the cask to the wall.
The cask will tend to right itself after impact (cask tilt is 10 degrees). Since the walls do not support the roof of the fuel storage building, local damage to the wall will have no impact on the structural integrity of the building.
If the cask tips north, it will fall on the floor which is the top of the 4 foot wide reinforced concrete wall and stop. Due to the geometry, the cask cannot impact the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel racks. The cask cannot fall into the cask laydown area of the pool because the cask center of gravity will be south of the pool edge.
- 3. Cask tipping following a 2 foot 3 inch drop on the decontamination pad.
The cask tipping scenarios are identical to the scenarios discussed above.
The cask trunnions are located on the north and south sides of the cask. Should a tilted cask drop occur following a trunnion failure, the cask will still impact the two modified W24x94 beams that were verified to sustain the impact load.
-5
- 7. Provide a detailed discussion of the drop of the cask in the spent fuel pool.
It should include the consequences of the drop, effect on the structural integrity of the pool and the stainless steel plate.
Sufficient information should be provided for the NRC to reach a similar conclusion.
RESPONSE
The cask is postulated to drop from plant elevation 42 feet 6 inches (corresponds to 6 inches above the elevation of the decontamination pad) and impact the floor at plant elevation 2 feet 2 1/4 inches. The cask will fall 2 feet 3 inches through the air before hitting water at plant elevation 40 feet 3 inches (corresponds to the lowest water level per Technical Specifications).
A 2-1/4 inch stainless steel protector plate is installed over the existing 11 gauge stainless steel liner plate to protect the liner from perforation. Locally, the required thickness of the concrete basemat to prevent perforation is 11.8 inches. The basemat is 4 feet 9 inches thick.
Verification of the basemat integrity was performed by determining that the maximum deflection of the basemat will be 0.44 inches during the impact. The deflection was conservatively calculated using a model where slab and soil were treated independently. Although the basemat may yield locally, no leaks will occur through the basemat even if a crack is developed because of the "Nob-Lock" waterproof membrane between the concrete and soil.
See Figure 2. This membrane envelopes the bottom of the basemat and extends to grade elevation.
In the event of a tilted drop due to a trunnion failure, the cask could potentially impact the east and west walls. The maximum angle of cask tilt in the west direction is 11 degrees. As such, the drop will be essentially vertical.
The walls will not suffer any structural damage.
If the cask tips while in the pool, the impact on the walls will be negligible because of the pool geometry and the distance between the cask and the walls. The maximum distance between the pool wall and cask is 4 feet 5 inches. The cask will not be able to impact the north wall which is located at the narrow end of the trapezoidal cask laydown area of the pool.
See Figure 3.
- 8. With regards to the ANSI N14.6 load test required to be performed every 5 years on the lifting device, will a 150 ton load test be performed? In addition, are we complying with the standard as part of an NRC requirement or an industry requirement?
RESPONSE
Per the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, periodic testing of the cask lifting device will be performed to verify continuing compliance. It is expected that a 150% load test will be performed, but may be substituted
-6 with the NDE, dimensional test and visual inspection Section 5.3.1 of ANSI N14.6 1978. It is noted that the heavy loads evaluation in the April 25, 1988 submittal indicated a 5-year 150% load test would be performed. It has been determined that it is necessary to perform the load test annually since this lifting device for the cask is used frequently.
- 9. The following information should be provided on the turbine gantry crane:
- a. Analysis of the crane support frame for 70 tons.
- b. Dynamic load factors considered in carrying the cask.
- c. Effect of the tiedown cables on the cask and the crane.
- d. Any differences noted between the cranes for all three units.
- e. Details of the cable supports, cask platform and shear ring.
- f. Description of the counterweight.
- g. Additional details on the cranes safety factors such as the ultimate crane rope capacity and the overturning moment.
RESPONSE
Turbine Gantry Crane Data.
- a. The turbine gantry crane frame was analyzed for a 100 ton load on the horizontal beam of the west A-frame. It was determined that no reinforcement of the frame was required. The maximum combined axial and bending stress ratio is 0.57 which is less than the allowable ratio of 1.0.
- b. Seismic Category B loads were considered when the crane carries the cask (vertical acceleration-0.13g and horizontal acceleration-0.2g).
In addition, vertical impact allowance, lateral load due to acceleration and deceleration, and wind loads were considered per CMAA Specification #70 "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."
- c. The cask tiedown cables will be attached to the cask through two existing holes which are located approximately 13 feet 8 inches from the bottom of the cask (Figure 5).
These holes are used for holddown pins when the cask is transported on the shipping cradle.
The load at each tiedown is 20 kips. The turbine gantry crane was analyzed for the cask load on the horizontal beam of the west A-frame in combination with the 20 kips tiedown load on the legs of the crane. The maximum combined bending and axial stress ratio for the structural elements of the crane is 0.57 which is less than the allowable ratio of 1.0.
If one of the cask tiedown cables breaks, the cask will not fall from the crane cask platform because the cask rests on the platform and is still attached to the crane main hook.
-7
- d. The cranes at Units 2 and 3 were addressed as part of.the Units 2 and 3 licensing amendment review. This portion of the transshipment addresses the turbine gantry crane at Unit 1.
- e. The details of the cable supports, cask platform and shear ring are shown in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9.
- f. The horizontal beam of the east A-frame-of the crane contains 40,000 lbs of miscellaneous steel.
- g. The designed safety factor for the mechanical and structural components of the crane is 5 to 1 based on ultimate strength. The crane as a whole is designed so that for the design conditions of loading, the ratio of righting moment to the overturning moment is no less than 2:1.
The east leg is counter weighted so as to allow a 100-ton lift on the west cantilever and maintain this factor of safety against overturning.
The wire ropes used on the main hoist are extra high strength steel ropes with wire cores. Their designed safety factor based on ultimate strength at their rated load is 5 to 1. The above factors apply at the rated 100-ton load on the main hoist.
- 10.
Provide a description and operation of the sliding roof on the Fuel Storage Building.
RESPONSE
The sliding roof allows the movement of a spent fuel cask inside the Fuel Storage Building with the turbine gantry crane. The sliding roof panel was fabricated with 12 gauge sheet metal and is 13'-3" wide by 28'-9" long. Details of the panel interface with the building are shown in Figure 10. Attached to the underside of the roof panel is the roll up door of the decon pad area and four steel wheels to slide the roof panel.
The wheels travel on two tracks which are attached to the top of the roof. In order to move the roof panel, the roll up door is completely raised into its support housing and the wheels are lowered into position by air cylinders. Lowering of the wheels causes the roof panel to lift off the weather seals installed around the roof opening.
Then the sliding roof panel is operated by a chain drive with access at plant elevation 42 feet. When the chain is pulled, the roof panel slides open to the west. The roof panel travels in reverse (east) to its closed position.
- 11.
Discuss the analysis of key structural elements during the transshipment process.
RESPONSE
The south and north turbine deck extensions (columns and crane rail girders) are qualified for a 70 ton cask load on the crane for a Seismic Category B earthquake. See Table 3.
-8 The turbine gantry crane was analyzed for a 100 ton load on the horizontal beam of the west A-frame for Seismic Category B loading conditions. The maximum combined stress interaction ratio for all structural members is 0.57 which is less than the allowable ratio of 1.0.
- 12. Discuss the turbine deck load bearing test and provide the results of previous tests.
RESPONSE
SCE performs a load bearing test "in order to verify that the turbine deck can withstand the most severe loading associated with the normal, earthquake and postulated impact loadings..., a load bearing test shall be performed every 4 years (concurrent with proof load testing of the turbine gantry crane) on the post-tensioned turbine deck when the plant is shut down. The load will be equivalent to the most severe loading condition considered in the design analysis".
The objective of the testing is to verify that the structural integrity of the post tensioned concrete deck will be maintained during cask handling with the air pallet system. The test line load of 77,000 lbs corresponds to the maximum load that will be transmitted on the deck by the air pallet with a 30 ton cask.
The test procedure requires that the deflections of the deck be measured and the deck be visually inspected for cracks and spalling under the load and in the immediate support locations.
In addition, a visual inspection of all connections of the steel support structures in areas over which the air pallet moves the cask is required. The visual inspection is no longer needed for spent fuel movement with the turbine gantry crane since the load will be transmitted directly on the crane girders and the columns and not through the beam to the girder connections.
The load bearing test was performed three times, in 1976, 1980, and 1984. In all three tests the required acceptance criteria were met. The test results are summarized in Table 4.
- 13.
For all drops postulated, drawings and assumptions should be provided.
Basically, sufficient information should be provided to the NRC such that they agree with the conclusions.
RESPONSE
See response to Item 6.
-9
- 14. Discuss the 42 foot drop in the spent fuel pool relative to a 30 foot drop of the cask on an unyielding surface.
RESPONSE
The cask is postulated to drop in the cask laydown area of the spent fuel pool from plant elevation 42 feet 6 inches and impact the bottom of the pool at plant elevation 2 feet 2 1/4 inches. The falling cask will enter the water at plant elevation 40 feet 3 inches. Due to drag as the cask travels through the water, the striking velocity will be 43.99 ft/sec at the bottom of the pool.
The cask is designed for a 30 foot drop onto an unyielding surface. The striking velocity for a 30 foot drop is 43.93 ft/sec. which is approximately equal to the striking velocity of the cask drop at the bottom of the pool.
- 15.
Provide a discussion for not instituting other testing in place of the turbine deck load bearing test.
RESPONSE
As the 70 ton spent fuel cask is moved with the turbine gantry crane, the load will be transmitted directly to the crane rail girder. The concrete deck will not be loaded, and therefore, load bearing test and visual inspection of the deck are no longer needed. Testing of the concrete deck was performed to ascertain the strength of the slab tendons. Since the material quality of the crane girders and columns of the turbine building are known to be satisfactory, there is no test required to ensure their structural capacity.
- 16.
Provide a description of the walls separating the spent fuel pool from the upender area and the cask handling area and whether spent fuel racks could be impacted.
RESPONSE
The concrete wall that separates the spent fuel pool from the upender area is 3 feet wide and the wall that separates the upender area from the cask laydown area is 2 feet 6 inches. Both walls are designed as two way slabs and are lined with stainless steel.
See Figure 3.
The limitation on the travel of the main hook in the west direction and the geometry of the pool are such that the cask cannot be lifted over the spent fuel racks. Therefore, the spent fuel racks will not be impacted during any postulated cask drop.
- 17.
Provide the following information on the spent fuel pool liner leakage:
- a. How long has the leak existed.
- b. Affect on structural rebar.
- c. Affect on structural integrity of the spent fuel pool.
-10
RESPONSE
The spent fuel pool is provided with a leak chase system that has a monitoring well.
The well is supplied with a threaded cap. The make up capacity for the spent fuel pool consists of the Boric Acid Storage Tank (7,000 gal. and two pumps at 45 gpm each), the Primary Makeup Water Tank (150,000 gallons and two pumps at 100 gpm each), and the Refueling Water Storage Tank (240,000 gallons and one pump at 80 gpm).
a,b. Leakage through the stainless steel spent fuel pool liner was insignificant prior to 1986. In 1986 water was discovered to be leaking through some vertical shrinkage cracks and a horizontal construction joint of the pool walls. Samples of the leaks and pool water were taken for chemical analysis and compared. The chemical analysis results were that the boron to iron ratio was comparable to the existing ratio in the spent fuel pool water. Thus, it was concluded that there was no significant rebar corrosion and the leaking liner does not compromise the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool.
The leaks through the walls were caused by lack of drainage of the monitoring wells.
Drainage of the monitoring wells is performed by operations weekly and logged to prevent recurrence of water leakage through the walls. The average daily discharge from the well is less than 10 gallons per day.
- c. The postulated cask drops in the spent fuel pool will not amplify the leakage and will not cause water leakage into the environment.
Leakage will not occur because a waterproof membrane envelopes the basemat and extends up to grade elevation. In addition, the liner protector plate has been installed in the cask laydown area of the pool to prevent perforation of the liner and thus additional leakage through the liner.
- 18.
Provide sufficient detail that demonstrates a drop of the cask in the areas of the decon pad and the south end of the turbine building will not affect safe shutdown systems.
RESPONSE
Cask drops in the area of the decon pad are discussed in the response to Item 6. Cask drops at the area of the south end of the turbine building will not impact any safe shutdown systems since no such systems or their components are located in the vicinity of the cask lifts.
- 19.
The leak that currently exists in the spent fuel pool liner should be included in the evaluation of the cask drop in the cask handling area (i.e., is the leak amplified).
RESPONSE
See response to Item 17c.
- 20. What is the resultant affect in the event that while the cask is transported on the turbine gantry crane, one of the restraining cables breaks? How are the 'platform, the shear ring and the remaining cable affected? In.the event the cask will fall, what safe shutdown systems will be impacted?
RESPONSE
See response to Item 9.
- 21.
Indicate that the procedure and operator training has been completed.
RESPONSE
The procedure, S0123-X-9.0, "Transshipment of Spent Fuel Using the IF-300 Cask" has been completed. The operator training will be completed with the dry run of the transshipment process at Unit 1 with the cask. This dry run will be performed once the NRC has approved the transshipment process. In addition, some of the previous classroom and hands-on training with the cask may be redone with the operators.
- 22. There is no NRC guidance that will allow the use of NDE in lieu of the 5 year load test. The actual load test must be performed every 5 years.
However, if SCE is proposing that an NDE will be performed instead of the load test, the NRC will review that for acceptability.
RESPONSE
Section 5.3.1(2) of ANSI N14.6-1978, the standard referenced in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612, states that NDE, dimensional testing and visual inspection in.accordance with Section 5.5 may be substituted for periodic (annual) load testing. This is the same as that required in Section 6.3.1 of ANSI N14.6-1986. At the current time, it is not known if these types of inspections will be performed in lieu of the periodic 150% load test, but, if performed, it will be performed in accordance with Section 5.5 of ANSI N14.6-1978.
- 23. In the case where the cask is located on the decon pad during a seismic event, will the cask fall through the floor and damage cable? If so, what assurances are there that the unaffected train of safe shutdown equipment will be operable.
RESPONSE
As stated in response to Item 5, the decon pad will support the cask during a.67g seismic event.
-12
- 24. Specify the minimum decay time for the Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies prior to shipment.
RESPONSE
The last assemblies discharged from the core were removed during the Cycle 9 refueling outage which began in November 1985 and ended in July 1986. Based on the power history for the operation of the core with those assemblies the minimum decay time is 14 months. This decay time ensures that the decay heat for each assembly is below 5725 BTU/hr which is the criteria for shipping dry. It is expected that assemblies discharged in future refueling cycles would have decay times on the order of the 14 months. The exact decay time cannot be estimated without the power history for the assemblies.
- 25.
Provide a discussion that demonstrates spent fuel will not be affected as a result of a seismic event with the cask in the pool or a drop of the cask.
RESPONSE
For discussion of a cask drop in the cask laydown area of the pool, see response to Item 7.
ACL:9621F
TABLE 1 Decontamination Pad Structural Members Item*
Member S(ksi)
D + E'(ksi) 1.6S(ksi)
Remarks A
Modified 24 37.2 38.0 Beam W24 x 94 B
W24 x 94 24 29.48 38.0 Beam C
H8 x 40 14.56 21.76 23.3 Column Decon Concrete Bearing 1785 90 N/A Pad Slab Stress psi psi
- For item locations see Figure 1 S = Allowables per AISC or ACI D = Dead Load E' = Earthquake Load (DBE) 1.6 = Allowable increase factor for D + E' load combinations per SRP Section 3.8.4, paragraph 11.5
TABLE 2 70 Ton Cask Impact Loading Member Concrete Structural Impact Location Slab Steel Load Capacity
-Load Remarks Decon Pad Cantilever 87 psi (shear) 68 psi Between 76.5 psi (bending) 68 psi Beams Modified 428.6 (kips) 362 (kips)
Load Capacity W24 x 94 is based on Beams plastic capacity W8 x 40 344 (kips) 274 (kips)
Column (B7-9)
North West of 176 psi (bending) 68 ksi Turbine Crane Deck Extension 18 x 45 35.2 ksi (bending) 9.1 ksi (bending)
MC18 x 42 35.2 ksi (bending) 11.5 ksi (bending) 22.4 ksi (shear) 4 ksi (shear)
TABLE 3 Turbine Building Structural Members Member Combined Allowable Location Member Stress Ratio Stress Ratio Turbine Girder 0.54 1.0 Building P-R South Extension Column P-8 0.49 1.0 Column R-8 0.31 1.0 Turbine Girder 0.85 1.0 Building A-B-D North Extension Column B-8 0.43 1.0 Column D-8 0.31 1.0
TABLE 4 Load Bearing Test Results Max Deflection Spalling Cracking Date Actual Allowable Actual Allowable Actual Allowable Connections 1976 0.029" 0.25" None None None Yes No damage 1980 0.035" 0.25" None None None Yes No damage 1984 0.0421*
0.25" None None None Yes No damage
- The deck recovered 91% of the imposed deflection 15 minutes after unloading which is better than minimum 80% recovery within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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