ML13324A696

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Part 21 Rept Re Tdi Emergency Diesel Generators.Table Encl Providing Addl Info,Per Recipient ,Including short- & long-term Corrective Actions Taken
ML13324A696
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 08/14/1985
From: Medford M
Southern California Edison Co
To: Zwolinski J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-85 NUDOCS 8508190315
Download: ML13324A696 (5)


Text

Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M. 0. MED FORD TELEPHONE MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING August 14, 1985 (818) 302-1749 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. J. A. Zwolinski, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-206 Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators Recent 10 CFR 21 Reports from TDI San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1

Reference:

Letter J. A. Zwolinski (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE),

dated June 17, 1985, Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generators-Recent 10 CFR 21 Reports from TDI The referenced letter requested that Southern California Edison (SCE) furnish for NRC staff review information relating to recent 10 CFR 21 reports from TDI regarding the San Onofre Unit 1 emergency diesel generators.

Specifically, this information was to consist of:

1. Identification of 10 CFR 21 reports issued by TDI since April 1984 which concern problems potentially applicable to San Onofre Unit 1, but which are not addressed in the DR/QR Report for San Onofre Unit 1.
2. Actions taken by SCE to assess whether the potential problems exist at San Onofre Unit 1.
3. Causes of any problems that are found to exist at San Onofre Unit 1.
4. Short and long term corrective actions to be taken.
5. Implementation schedules.

8508190315 850814 PDR ADOCK 05000206 S

PDR To-.

Mr. 3.

August 14, 1985 The enclosed Table provides the requested information for all TDI 10 CFR 21 reports issued since April 1984 that are applicable to San Onofre Unit 1. Pending issuance of the NRC's safety evaluation for the San Onofre Unit 1 TDI diesel generators, information similar to the enclosed will be provided for any future 10 CFR 21 notifications from TDI.

If you have any questions, please call me.

Very truly yours, Enclosure I cc: R. Dudley, NRC/NRR San Onofre Unit 1 Project Manager F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3

P. I of 3 TABLE SHOWING SCES ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TOI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Date of SCE's Actions to 10 CFR 21 Assess if Potential Problem Short & Long Term Implementation Report Potential Problem & Causes Exists at San Onofre Corrective Actions Schedules 7/13/1984 A potential problem could exist with As a precautionary measure, the None N/A an engine exhaust or intake valve intake and exhaust valve springs spring due to a surface imperfection were inspected during August and which could result in engine non-September diesel inspections.

availability. On a non-nuclear marine Results Indicated all valve springs engine installation, a valve spring were in satisfactory condition.

failed after 4500 hours0.0521 days <br />1.25 hours <br />0.00744 weeks <br />0.00171 months <br /> of operation.

By letter dated 7/13/1984 to the NRC, TOI indicated no corrective action is required due to only one failure of this type.

7/13/1984 A potential defect exists with the See column (d)

The fuel injection equipment See column (d) high pressure fuel injection pumps.

settings will be reviewed and The fuel injection pumps are inspected on a refueling Interval manufactured by Bendix Corporation, basis in accordance with Sidney, New York.

At Catawba Nuclear Maintenance Procedure S01-I-2.2.

Site, a fuel injection pump failed.

In addition, the fuel injection A review by Bendix indicates the pumps will be sent to a vendor cause of failure to be a material for inspection and calibration defect in the delivery valve on a five-year interval basis.

holder.

TDI recommiends that no corrective action is required.

10/2/1984 A potential problem exists with the An inspection of the fuel control None N/A engine fuel control shaft.

The fuel shaft linkage was performed on control levers are held by friction both engines to ensure that all generated by tightening a cap screw.

fuel lever cap screws are As a safety feature, the levers are properly torqued and all roll also pinned to the control shaft by pins are installed.

Inspection using a 1/4 d

roll pin, which may be results indicated that DG #1 was missing on some levers.

TOI missing roll pins in the control recommendation is to Inspect all cross shaft assembly. On fuel control shafts for properly September 24, 1984 roll pins were torqued fuel lever cap screws and to installed to properly lock the determine if the levers are pinned, positioning of the control levers at both ends of the cross shaft.

Inspection results indicated that rG #2 had all recommended fuel control cross shaft roll pins installed, in accordance with TOI drawing 02-413-11.

P. 2 of 3 TABLE SHOWING SCE'S ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TDI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS (CONTO)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Date of SCE's Actions to 10 CFR 21 Assess if Potential Problem Short & Long Term Implementation Report Potential Problem & Causes Exists at San Onofre Corrective Actions Schedules 1/22/85 A potential problem exists with the On February 5, 1985 an air filter Replacement metal filter See column (d) air filter in the engine local inspection was performed, which bowls were ordered from TOI control panel.

The air filter indicated that both DG #1 and and will be installed at the installed in the engine control panel DG #2 have the subject next plant refueling outage.

has a polycarbonate transparent bowl.

polycarbonate air filters On November 5, 1978, the filter Installed in the engine local purchase specification was changed control panel.

from the polycarbonate transparent bowl to a metal bowl.

The polycarbonate bowl is now rated 150 psig at 115 0F whereas the alternate metal bowl is rated 250 psig at 175 0 F. When the specification was originally issued, the vendor incorrectly rated the polycarbonate bowl at 250 psig. The TOI recommendation is to replace the polycarbonate filter bowl with a metal bowl 3/12/85*

A potential defect exists with a check Upon investigation, the subject For the starting air system, the See column (d) valve in the engine mounted starting valves were found to exist in the potential problem was eliminated air piping. At Grand Gulf Nuclear starting air system of DG #1 and 01 #2 by procuring new Mission Ouo-Chek II Generating Station, during engine (4 valves per engine).

The subject valves from TOI.

The new check operational testing, a starting air valves are also installed In the valves were disassembled, and a check valve failure was experienced, engine lube oil system liquid penetrant test was performed It appears a piece from the bottom (4 valves per engine), the to ensure that no cracks were evident guide of the check valve disc broke engine fuel o1.1 system prior to installation.

The new valves off and was found lying on top of the (2 valves per engine) and the were then installed in both engines piston. Grand Gulf checked the other engine cooling water system on May 15, 1985.

three valves and found one valve was (2 valves per engine).

cracked and the remaining two were For the diesel engine cooling O.K.

These valves were manufactured water system,'a disassembly and by Clow Corporation of Oskaloosa, Iowa inspection of the four subject check and supplied by Williams-Hagar Co. of valves OWN-306, OWS-306, DWN-309 and Pittsburgh, PA.

At Shoreham, when the WS-309, is performed at every refueling same valves were inspected, cracks were outage. These actions were originally found in the valve body. The TDI implemented in response to NRC IE recommendation for corrective action isBulletin 83-03 and preliminary inspection to replace the existing Clow check results were as described in Reference 1 below.

valves in the starting air system with Per Reference 2 below, these valves are now Mission uo-Chek i valves, which are included in the In-Service Testing available from TOI.

program for pumps and valves.

No valve replacement is planned.

rSupplemented by additional TOI notifications dated 3/14/85, 4/4/85 and 4/10/85.

P. 3 of 3 TABLE SHOWING SCE'S ACTIONS RELATIVE TO TDI 10 CFR 21 REPORTS (CONTO)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Date of SCE's Actions to 10 CFR 21 Assess if Potential Problem Short & Long Term Implementation Report Potential Problem & Causes Exists at San Onofre Corrective Actions Schedules For the engine lube oil system and engine fuel oil system, no valve inspection or replacement is presently planned based on satisfactory system performance over a number of years, hourly lube oil/fuel oil temperature/pressure checks per Reference (3) below and relatively less severe valve service conditions.

References:

(1) SCE to NRC letter dated March 7, 1984, NRC IE Bulletin 83-03 (2) SCE to NRC letter dated April 10, 1985, Additional Changes to IST Program for Pumps and Valves.

(3) SCE to NRC [[letter::05000362/LER-1985-002-02, :on 850220,five Snubbers on HPSI Sys Found Inoperable.Caused by Hydraulic Transient & Environ Degradation.Deficient Snubbers Replaced & Engineering Evaluation Performed|letter dated March 8, 1985]], TDI EOG's Revised M&S Program 3/18/85 A potential problem exists with the The 10 CFR 21 report did not As a precautionary measure, at the See column (d) oil plugs in the crankshaft assembly.

list San Onofre Unit 1 as being next refueling outage both diesel At Gulf States Utilities River Bend one of the affected power plants.

engines will be inspected for Site, a failed crankshaft oil plug Upon SCE inquiry, TDI confirmed crankshaft 22 gauge oil plugs.

was discovered during routine that based on their records Any 22 gauge oil plugs will be maintenance. The failed plug was there was very little chance replaced with 16 gauge plugs.

22 gauge material.

On 3/10/80 the that the original 16 gauge oil oil plug material specification had plugs had been replaced with 22 been changed from 16 gauge to 22 gauge gauge plugs.

and then on 6/22/82 the material specification was changed back from 22 gauge to 16 gauge.

The engines manufactured before 3/10/80 and after 6/22/82 should have original 16 gauge oil plugs unless the plugs were replaced.

TOI recommends that all engines be inspected to.determine if any 22 gauge plugs are installed and all 22 gauge plugs be replaced with 16 gauge plugs.

IAA:4690F