ML13317B033
| ML13317B033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1982 |
| From: | Krieger R SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-15-01, TASK-15-02, TASK-15-1, TASK-15-17, TASK-15-2, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8203170158 | |
| Download: ML13317B033 (2) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P.O. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 March 12, 1982 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket Nc. 50-206 Comments on Design Basis Event Reviews, SEP San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1
References:
- 1. Letter,.D. M. Crutchfield.to R. Dietch, dated October 27, 1981, San Onofre 1-SEP Topics XV-1 and XV-2 (Systems)
- 2. Letter,,D. M. Crutchfield to R. Dietch, dated December 7, 1981, SEP Topic XV-17 Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Failure (System Evaluation) -
San Onofre Unit 1 Your referenced letters forwarded completed topic assessments.
The letters requested a timely review of the assessments to verify the validity of the licensing bases and assumptions used relative to the as-built facility, San Onofre Unit 1.
The results of our reviews are enclosed.
If you have any questions regarding the enclosure, please contact me.
Very truly yours,
.fW.Krieger Supervising En eer San Onofre Unit 1 Licensing Enclosure 8203170158 820312
\\
PDR ADOCK 05000206 p
ENCLOSURE COMMENTS ON SEP TOPICS XV Topic XV-1 The review of the safety assessment report on Topic XV-1, Increase of Feedwater Flow, developed the following comments.
The consequences of this transient would be acceptable without credit for operator action as indicated in Reference (3) because protection system setpoints (overpcwer and variable lo pressure trips) are derived to terminate such transients before a DNB ratio of less than 1.30, or the limiting fuel centerline temperature, is reached. Hence, reevaluation of this event assuming a minimum time of 10 minutes for operator action is unnecessary.
This event is bounded by the "rod withdrawal at power" event for which the adequacy of the protection system was verified in Reference (3).
There is a typographical error in paragraph A(3), page 3, third line:
"...system head-flow characteristics."
There is a misconception apparent in paragraph A(7), page 3. Both wide range and narrow range water level monitors on each steam generator sensing the high water level will trip the turbine. If the power is greater than 10% of rated power, the turbine trip will trip the reactor.
Topic XV-2 The review of the safety assessment report on Topic XV-2, Evaluation of Steamline Break Inside/Outside Containment, developed the following comments.
Paragraph 6 on page 3:
the correct reference is 3, instead of 4.
Third line on page 4:
the numerical value should be 34.1 percent of full power.
Topic XV-17 The review of the safety assessment report on Topic XV-17, Consequences of Steamline Break Inside/Outside Containment, verified the validity of licensing bases and assumptions used relative to the as-built facility, San Onofre Unit 1.