ML13310B691

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Requests Delay in Issuance of Proposed Change 126 Due to Util Intention to Implement Confirmatory Insps & Preoperational Tests on Tdi Diesel Generators Along W/Any Consequential Repairs on Generator
ML13310B691
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 09/07/1984
From: Medford M
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To: Paulson W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8409120079
Download: ML13310B691 (5)


Text

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

BOX Soo 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD. CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O. MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING September 7, 1984 (213) 572-1749 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. W. A. Paulson, Acting Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-206 Use of Temporary Emergency Diesel Generator Sets San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1

References:

(A) Letter M. 0. Medford (SCE) to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC),

April 16, 1984, Return to Service Requirements (B) Letter M. 0. Medford (SCE) to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC),

May 25, 1984, Pre-Startup Hot Functional Testing (C) Letter D. M. Crutchfield (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE),

July 26, 1984, Transamerica Delaval Diesel Inspection Requirements for Restart of San Onofre Unit 1 (D) Letter M. 0. Medford (SCE) to W. A. Paulson (NRC), August 28, 1984, Return to Service Requirements Regarding TDI Diesel Generators Reference A provided you with our plan for San Onofre Unit 1 return to service, including the performance of a hot functional test (HFT).

Reference B provided further details regarding the objectives, duration and proposed method for conducting the HFT and discussed the safety aspects of replacing DC Battery Bank No. 1 coincidentally with HFT performance.

Reference B also pointed out that the existing Technical Specifications do not address the emergency power source requirements for Modes 3 and 4, but that Proposed Change No. 126 (which is presently being reviewed by the NRC) will specifically require two sources of emergency power in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Reference B further requested that issuance of Proposed Change No. 126 be delayed so that it becomes effective after the conclusion of the HFT.

8409120079 840907-PDR ADOCK 05000206 G):PDR

Mr. W.

September 7, 1984 As part of the NRC's evaluation of the reliability of Transamerica Delaval emergency diesel generators, Reference C recommended certain confirmatory inspections and pre-operational tests to be performed on the San Onofre Unit 1 diesel generators prior to plant restart.

By Reference D, Southern California Edison Company agreed to these recommendations. It is our intention to implement these diesel related tests and inspections and any consequential repairs on one diesel generator at a time. This may require that one diesel generator is taken out of service during the HFT. As explained in the first paragraph, this is consistent with the existing Technical Specification requirements, but not with Proposed Change No. 126.

Therefore, it is requested that issuance of Proposed Change No. 126 be delayed so that it does not become effective prior to the end of the HFT. The basis for this request is the low probability of an emergency power demand during the HFT and the fact that temporary backup emergency power will be provided, as explained below.

If during the HFT, either of the two permanent diesel generators is taken out of service, a temporary diesel generator capability will be provided. This will consist of two diesel generator sets capable of parallel operation. Based on the safe shutdown loads listed in Enclosure 1, the two temporary diesel generator sets will be of > 1800 kW combined rating.

The temporary diesel generator sets will be self-contained and designed for standby operation. The generator outputs will be connected through an existing 4 kV station breaker. The diesel generator sets will be load tested to verify ability to carry full load (> 1800 kW), response tested to verify ability to maintain voltage and frequency when the single largest load is applied to the generators, and operationally tested to verify the adequacy of the operating procedures.

After testing, the temporary diesel generator sets will be maintained in standby status with fuel oil day tanks > 90% full, a backup fuel supply truck onsite and the capability to utilize the onsite fuel oil storage tanks for extended operation. The operability of the temporary diesel generator sets will be demonstrated by test once every seven (7) days during the time they are required to be operable by verifying the diesel generators start from ambient conditions and achieve rated speed and voltage. Personnel trained in the operation of the temporary diesel generators will be onsite throughout the time they are in standby service. Station operators will be trained in the performance of station operating procedures for aligning designated loads to the generator sets.

The temporary diesel generator sets will not be required to start automatically. The estimated starting and loading time for each temporary diesel generator set is approximately thirty minutes.

The temporary diesel generators will be located within the plant protected area and installed in such a manner that they do not impact safety related equipment during a seismic event. For the purpose of security, a Vital Area will be established around the temporary diesel generators.

Mr. W.

September 7, 1984 The portable diesel generators will be located away from the diesel generator building and will have no shared cabling with the permanent diesel generator. Additionally, measures will be implemented to assure that a fire originating in the portable diesel generator equipment does not impact other safety related equipment.

If you have any questions regarding the above information, please call me.

Very truly yours, cc:

USNRC Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3)

ENCLOSURE 1 ELECTRICALLY POWERED SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO TEMPORARY PORTABLE DIESEL GENERATOR SETS SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT POWER SUPPLY Pressurizer Heater Groups A or B 480V-No. 1 or 2 Battery ChargerslA or B 480V-No. 1 or 2 Battery Chargers 2C or D 480V-No. 1 or 2 (via MCC lB or 2B)

Air Compressors 3A and B 480V-No. 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump G105 4 480V-No. 1 Saltwater Cooling Pumps G13 A or B 480V-No. 1 or 2 Component Cooling Water Pumps G15A or B 48V-No. 1 or 2 RHR Pumps G14A or B 48V-No. 1 or 2 CVCS Test Pump G42 480V-No. 2 (via MCC2A)

Control Room HVAC (Switch 8-IIIO)*

480V-No. 1 (via MCCl)

HVAC Panel (Switch 8-1130)*

480V-No. 1 (via MCCl)

Security UPS*

480V-No. 1 (via MCCl)

Spent Fuel Pit Pump*

480V-No. 2 (via MCC2)

Vital Bus No. 4 and Utility Bus 5 480V-No. 1 or 2 (via MCC1 or 2)

Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans A9 or A9S*

480V-No. 1 or 2 (via MCC1 or 2)

MOV813, 814, 833 and 834 (1 at a time) 480V-No. 1 or 2 (via MCC1 or 2)

(optional) 6 Charging Pumps G8 A or B 4160V-No. 2C or C Not required for safe shutdown but included to facilitate shutdown efforts.

ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

NOTES

1. Battery Chargers A and B provide power to DC Bus No. 1 which supplies Vital Bus Nos. 1, 2, 3, 3A (and Regulated Buses) for control and instrumentation systems.
2. Battery Chargers C and 0 provide power to DC Bus No. 2 which supplies Vital Bus Nos. 5 and 6 for control and instrumentation systems.
3. Two air compressors are usually in.

operation.

4. The Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is not listed but could be used initially. The DC control power is provided via DC Bus No. 2.
5. Normally powered through a 480/120V, 37.5 kVA transformer from MCC2.

Provides power for fire detection, radiation monitors and pressurizer pressure below 1600 psig.

6. These MOV's inside containment are listed as optional since provisions for power to the motors will minimize required containment access. Other MOV's may require local manual operation.

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