ML13309B539

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Reactor Coolant Pump Trip to Complete Review of post-LOCA Status of Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Vs No Trip.Response within 30 Days Requested

ML13309B539
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/29/1985
From:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Baskin K Southern California Edison Co
References
NUDOCS 8506050658
Download: ML13309B539 (6)

Text

APR 2 9 95 Docket Nos.: 50-361 and 50-362 Mr. Kenneth P. Baskin Vice President Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue P. 0. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770

Dear Mr. Baskin:

As you know, the NRC has been reviewing the post-LOCA status of reactor coolant pumps regarding trip versus no trip. This issue has been pursued via the CE Owners Group (CEOG).

As our review nears its conclusion, we find that one area, post-LOCA status of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, has been accorded plant-specific status by the CEOG. Accordingly, we request that you provide your written response to the enclosed questions.

We further request that you provide your response within thirty (30) days so that we may complete our review in a timely manner.

This request for information affects fewer than ten respondents; therefore OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.

Sincerely, George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc:

See next page DISTRIBUTION Docket File 50-361/362 NRC PDR LPDR NSIC PRC System LB#3 Rdg JLee HRood DJaffee Attorney, OELD BGrimes JPartlow EJordan 8506050658 850429 ACRS (16)

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Document Name:

LETTER TO K. P. BASKIN Requestor's ID:

TERESA Author's Name:

Document Comments:

PLEASE KEEP THIS SHEET WITH PACKAGE

1. H. Rood

2.,G. U.Knnon

San Onofre Mr. Kenneth P. Baskin Vice President Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue P. 0. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Mr. James C. Holcombe Vice President - Power Supply San Diego Gas & Electric Company 101 Ash Street Post Office Box 1831 San Diego, California 92112 Charles R. Kocher, Esq.

Mr. Mark Medford James A. Beoletto, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue P. 0. Box 800 P. 0. Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Rosemead, California 91770 Dr. L. Bernath Manager, Nuclear Department Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe San Diego Gas & Electric Company ATTN: David R. Pigott, Esq.

P. 0. Box 1831 600 Montgomery Street San Diego, California 92112 San Francisco, California 94111 Richard J. Wharton, Esq.

University of San Dieqo School of Alan R. Watts, Esq.

Law Rourke & Woodruff Environmental Law Clinic Suite 1020 San Diego, California 92110 1055 North Main Street Santa Ana, California, 92701 Charles E. McClung, Jr., Esq.

Attorney at Law Mr. V. C. Hall 24012 Calle de la Plaza/Suite 330 Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Lacuna Hills, California 92653 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095 Region Administrator-Region V/NRC 1450 Maria Lan/Suite 210 Mr. S. McClusky Walnut Creek, California 92672 Bechtel Power Corporation P. 0. Box 60860, Terminal Annex Los Angeles, California 90060 Resident Inspector, San Onofre NPS c/o U. S. NRC Mr. C. B. Brinkman Post Office Box 4329 Combustion Engineering, Inc.

San Clemente, California 92672 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Dennis F. Kirsh U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CRegion V

1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596

ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP In response to Generic Letter 83-10, CEN-268, "Justification of Trip Two/Leave Two Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy During Transients," was provided by the CE Owners Group. The following paragraph.is taken from CEN-268:

6.5 SERVICE WATER AVAILABILITY RCP cooling water will be isolated at some plants upon a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS). Continuous RCP operation under this condition may lead to potential RCP damage. Low RCP cooling flow alarms are available in the control room, and timely operator action could be employed to restore essential water service. Each utility should review the RCP cooling water service system requirements on a plant specific basis and make changes as necessary.

(page 6-5)

This information was provided in response to a specific issue in Generic Letter 83-10, I.1(e):

"Transients and accidents which produce the same initial symptoms as a LOCA (i.e., depressurization of the reactor and actuation of engineered safety features) and result in containment isolation may result in the o-mi on o s' tems essi5al for coninued ccration f1.; the roactor

coolant pumps (i.e.,component cooling water and/or seal injection water).

It was the intent of TMI Action Plan Item II.E.4.2 to have licensees reevaluate essential and non-essential systems with respect to containment isolation.

In particular, if a facility design terminates water services essential for RCP operation, then it should be assured that these water services can be restored in a timely manner once a non-LOCA situation is confirmed, and prevent seal damage or failure.

It should be confirmed that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure."

1. Does any containment isolation signal result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps?

If so, identify the signals and systems effected.

2. If essential water services are terminated, provide a description of the operatcr guidelines, training, and procedures in place (or to be implemented) which ass.;re -hat these servi'ces are restored in a timely manner 1o prevent seal damage or failure, once a non-LOCA situation has been confirmed.

3. Provide confirmation, included the technical basis, that containment isolation with continued RCP cperation will not lead to seal or punp damage or failure.

4.

Since RCP trip will be required for LOCA events, assurance must be provided that RCP trip, when required, will occur.

To address this concern, provide the following information:

(a)

Identify the components required to trip the RCPs.

Include relays, power supplies and breakers. Address reliability and alternate trip methods.

(b) If necessary, as a result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse containment conditions on RCP trip reliability. Describe the basis for the adverse containment parameters selected.