ML13308A630
| ML13308A630 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13308A629 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911120285 | |
| Download: ML13308A630 (8) | |
Text
FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-206 Date:
July 19, 1979 7 911120
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2.0 FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES......................................
2-1 2.1 General Design Criterion 3 -
"Fire Protection"................
2-1 2.2 Supplementary Guidance.....................................
2-1 3.0
SUMMARY
OF MODIFICATIONS AND INCOMPLETE ITEMS.....................
3-1 3.1 Modifications.............................................
3-1 3.1.1 Fire Detection Systems..............................
3-1 3.1.2 Fire Water Supply...................................
3-3 3.1.3 Yard Hydrants.......................................
3-3 3.1.4 Hose Stations.......................................
3-3 3.1.5 Water Suppression Systems...........................
3-3 3.1.6 Foam Suppression Systems............................
3-4 3.1.7 Gas Suppression Systems.............................
3-4 3.1.8 Portable Extinguishers..............................
3-4 3.1.9 Fire Doors..........................................
3-4 3.1.10 Supervision of Fire Doors.............................
3-4 3.1.11 Fire Barriers.......................................
3-4 3.1.12 Fire Dampers........................................
3-5 3.1.13 Fire Barrier Penetrations...........................
3-5 3.1.14 Water Damage Protection..............................
3-5 3.1.15 Control of Combustibles.............................
3-5 3.1.16 Isolation Devices....................................
3-6 3.1.17 Emergency Lighting..................................
3-6 3.2 Incomplete Items...........................................
3-6 3.2.1 Alternate Shutdown Capability.......................
3-7 3.2.2 Smoke Detection Systems..............................
3-7 3.2.3 Turbine Building Structure..........................
3-7 3.2.4 Cable Spreading Area................................
3-7 3.2.5 Containment........................................
3-7 4.0 EVALUATION OF PLANT ARRANGEMENT..................................
4-1 4.1 Safe Shutdown Systems......................................
4-1 4.2 Fire Detection and Signaling Systems........................
4-1 4.3 Fire Control System..........................................42 4.3.1 Water Systems...............................
......... 4-2 4.3.1.1 Water Supply...............................
4-2 4.3.1.2 Fire Pumps.................
4-2 4.3.1.3 Fire Water Piping Systems..................
4-3 4.3.1.4 Interior Hose Stations.....................
4-4
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) 4.3.1.5 Fixed Water Suppression Systems............
4-4 4.3.1.6 Foam Suppr ession Systems....
4-4 4.3.1.7 Effects of Suppression System on Safety Systems.............-................
4.3.2 Gas Fire Suppression Systems........................
4-5 4.3.3 Portable Fire Extinguishers.........................
4-5 4.4 Ventilation Systems and Breathing Equipment.................
4-5 4.4.1 Ventilation Systems...........................
4-5 4.4.2 Breathing Equipment.................................
4-6 4.5 Floor Drains................................................4-6 4.6 Lighting Systems............................4-6 4.7 Communication Systems.......................4-7 4.8 Electrical Cables...........................4-7 4.9 Fire Barrier Penetrations....................................4-7 4.10 Separation Criteria...........................4-8 4.11 Fire Barriers...............................................4-8 4.12 Access and Egress...................48 4.13 Toxic and Corrosive Combustion Products......................4-9 5.0 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC PLANT AREAS...............................
5-1 5.1 Control Room........................... 5-1 5.2 4160 Volt Switchgear Room...........................
5-2 5.3 480 Volt Switchgear Room...........
4-3 5.4 DC Switchgear Room and Battery Room.........................
5-4 5.5 Auxiliary Building.............................. 5-5 5.6 Turbine Building...............................
5-6 5.7 Diesel Generator Building.................................
5-8 5.8 Containment................................................ 5-9 5.9 Yard Area.................................................... 5-10 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS........................................... 6-1 7.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.....
7-1 5.0 CONCLUSIoNS S.................................................
5...8-1 9.0 CONSULTANTS' REPORT................
9-1 APPENDIX A CHR NOLOGY.............................................
A -1 6.0 DMIN STRA IVE CONT OLS.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Following a fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station in March 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiated an evaluation of the need for improving the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power plants. As part of this continuing evaluation, the NRC, in February 1976, published the report by a special review group entitled, "Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," NUREG-0050. This report recommended that improvements in the areas of fire prevention and fire control be made in most existing facilities and that consideration be given to design features that would increase the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand fires without the loss of important functions. To implement the report's recommendations, the NRC initiated a program for reevaluation of the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power stations and for a comprehensive review of all new licensee applications.
The NRC issued new guidelines for fire protection programs in nuclear power plants which reflect the recommendations in NUREG-0050. These guidelines are contained in the following documents:
"Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-75/087, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection,"
May 1976, which includes "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (BTP APCSB 9.5-1), May 1, 1976.
"Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1), August 23, 1976.
"Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Program Evaluation," September 30, 1976.
"Sample Technical Specifications," May 12, 1977.
"Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administra tive Controls and Quality Assurance," June 14, 1977.
"Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors," June 8, 1978.
All licensees were requested to:
(1) compare their fire protection programs with the new guidelines; and (2) analyze the consequences of a postulated fire in each plant area.
We have reviewed the licensee's analyses and have visited the plant to examine the relationship of safety-related components, systems and structures with both combustibles and the associated fire detection and suppression systems. Our review was based on the licensee's proposed program for fire protection as described in the following docketed information:
(1) "Fire Protection Program Review," dated March 1977;
(2) The fire protection review team's site visit of July 10-13, 19Y8; (3) The licensee's response to staff'positions.
Our review has been limited to the aspects of fire protection related to the protection of the public from the standpoint of radiological health and safety. We have not considered aspects of fire protection associated With life safety of onsite personnel and with property protection, unless they.impact the health and safety of the public due to the release of radioactive material.
This report summarizes the result of our evaluation of the fire protection program at Southern California Edison Company's San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1. The chronology of our evaluation is summarized in Appendix A of this report.
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8.0 CONlCLUSION The licensee has performed a fire hazards analysis and has proposed cert.
modifications to improve the fire protection program. Additional mc have been proposed by the licensee during the course of our review, whice are based upon the fire hazards analysis and our onsite evaluation of the fire protection program.
These proposed modifications are summarized in Section 3.1.
In addition, we have concluded that the licensee should implement certain evaluations or improvements related to the fire protection program. These are summarized irl Section 3.2.
Significant steps are being taken to provide additional assurance that safe shutdown can be accomplished and the plant can be maintained in a safe condition during and following potential fire situations.
Additional evaluation of incomplete items, discussed in the preceding sections, will be necessary before we can conclude that the overall fire protection at the San Onofre 1 facility will satisfy the provisions of BTP 9.5-1 and Appendix A thereto, which the staff has established for satisfactory long-term fire protection.
We find that the licensee's proposed modifications described herein are acceptable both with respect to the improvements in the fire protection program that they provide and with respect to continuedsafe operation of the facility, while the remaining items are completed.
In the report of the Special Review Group on the Browns Ferry Fire (NUREG-0050) dated February 1976, consideration of the safety of operation of all operating nuclear power plants pending the completion of our detailed fire protection evaluation was presented. The following quotations from the report summarize the basis for the Special Review Group's conclusion that the operation of the facility need not be restricted for public safety:
"Fires occur rather frequently; however, fires involving equipment unavailability comparable to the Browns Ferry fire are quite infrequent (see Section 3.3 of [NUREG-0050]). The Review Group believes that steps already taken since March 1975 (see Section 3.3.2) have reduced this frequency significantly."
"Based on its review of the events transpiring before, during and after the Browns Ferry fire, the Review Group concludes that the probability of disruptive fires of the magnitude of the Browns Ferry event is small, and that there is no need to restrict operation of nuclear power plants for public safety. However, it is clear that much can and should be done to reduce even further the likelihood of disabling fires and to improve assurahce of rapid extinguishment of fires that occur. Consideration should be given also to features 8-1
that would*increase further the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand large fires without loss of important functions should such fires occur."
We recognize that the "Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission," NUREG/CR-0400 (The Lewis Committee Report),
states that this Review Group is unconvinced of the correctness of the WASH-1400 conclusion that fires contribute negligibly to the overall risk of nuclear plant operation. In the Commission's Policy Statement dated January 18, 1979, "NRC Statement on Risk-Assessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-1400) in Light of the Risk-Assessment Review Group Report", the Commission indicated on page 3 that it "accepts the Review Group Report's conclusion that absolute values of the risks presented by WASH-1400 should not be used uncritically either in the regulatory process or for public policy purposes and has taken and will continue to take steps to assure that any such use in the past will be corrected as appropriate. In particular, in light of the Review Group conclusions on accident probabilities, the Commission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident."
In summary, it is our conclusion that the operation of the facility, pending resolution of the incomplete items and the implementation of all facility modifications, does not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public based on our concurrence with the Browns Ferry Special Review Group's conclusions identified above,giving due consideration to the Commission Policy Statement, as well as the significant improvements in fire proteciion already made at the facility since the Browns Ferry fire. These include establishment of administrative controls over com bustible materials and use of ignition sources, training and staffing of a fire brigade, and issuance of technical specifications to provide limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for fire protection systems.
We have determined that the license amendment does not authorize achange in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of.environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
We have concluded, based on the considerations-discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probablity cr consequences of accidents previously considered and does not rvove a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does C: inic v& a.5ignificant hazards consideration, (2) there s reasonable ance nt the health and safety of the public will no-be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance 8-2
of this amendment not be inimical to the commor fense and security or to *;e.health and safety of the public.
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