ML13302A331

Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants

ML13302A331
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	09/30/1979
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML13302A329	List: ML13302A331 NUREG-0610, Forwards NUREG-0610, Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants. Requests Comment
References
NUREG-0610, NUREG-0610-DRFT, NUREG-610, NUREG-610-DRFT, NUDOCS 7911140230
Download: ML13302A331 (18)

Text

NUREG-0610 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS September 1979 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 79111 40

For interim use and comment - 9/14/79 BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES This document is provided for interim use during the initial phases of the NRC effort to promptly improve emergency preparedness at operating nuclear power plants. Changes to the document can be expected as experience is gained in its use and public comments are received. Further, the Commission has initiated a rulemaking procedure, now scheduled for completion in January 1980 in the area of Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Additional requirements are to be expected when rulemaking is completed and some modifications to this document may be necessary.

Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are established which replace the classes in Regulatory Guide 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions.

The classes are:

Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Emergency General Emergency The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site emergency class reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information. In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and associated communications. The general emergency class involves actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.

The immediate action for this class is sheltering (staying inside) rather than evacuation until an assessment can be made that (1) an evacuation is indicated and (2) an evacuation, if indicated, can be completed prior to significant release and transport of radioactive material to the affected areas.

The example initiating conditions listed after the immediate actions for each class are to form the basis for establishment by each licensee of the specific plant instrumentation readings which, if exceeded, will initiate the emergency class.

Some background information on release potential and expected frequencies for the various classes is provided in this material.

Note that there is a wide band of uncertainty associated with the frequency estimates. The release potential given reflects the amount that could be released over a long time period or under favorable meteorological conditions without exceeding the exposure criteria of a more severe class. Release of these amounts in a short time period under unfavorable meteorological dispersion conditions might trigger the criteria of a more severe class.

State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Notification of unusual event

1. Promptly inform State and/or local

1. Provide fire or security offsite authorities of nature of assistance if requested Class Description unusual condition as soon as discovered

2. Standby until verbal Unusual events are in process or have

2. Augment on-shift resources closeout occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety

3. Assess and respond or of the plant.

othpln.4.

Close out with verbal summnary to

3. Escalate to a more severe Purpose offsite authorities; followed by class written summiary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Purpose of offsite notification is to (1) assure that the first step in any or response later found to be necessary has been carried out, (2) provide

5. Escalate to a more severe class current information on unusual events, and (3) provide a periodic unscheduled test of the offsite communication link.

Release Potential No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring aresexpected unless further degradation of safetya systems occurs.

Expected Frequency Once or twice per year per unit.

EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

1. ECCS initiated

2. Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded

3. Fuel damage indication. Examples:

a. High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 pci/sec; corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; or an increase of 100,000 pci/sec within a 30 minute time period)

b. High coolant activity sample (e.g., exceeding coolant technical speci fications for iodine spike)

c. Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes.

4. Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abnormal fuel temperatures

5. Exceeding either primary/secondary leak rate technical specification or primary system leak rate technical specification

6. Failure of a safety or relief valve to close

7. Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability

8. Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown by technical specifications

9. Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function requiring shutdown by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy)

10. Fire lasting more than 10 minutes

11.

Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g., plant computer, all meteorological instrumentation)

12.

Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage

13.

Natural phenomenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels

a. Any earthquake

b. 50 year flood or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche

c. Any tornado near site

d. Any hurricane

14. Other hazards being experienced or projected

a. Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility

b. Train derailment on-site

c. Near or onsite explosion

d. Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release

e. Turbine failure

15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g., cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits, pipe cracking found during operation)

16. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital

17. Rapid depressurization of PWR secondary side.

State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions AuthorityActions Alert

1. Promptly inform State and/or local

1. Provide fire or security authorities of alert status and reason assistance if requested Class Description for alert as soon as discovered

2. Augment resources by activating Events are in process'or have

2. Augment resources by activating on-site near-site EOC and any other occurred which involve an actual technical support center, on-site primary response centers or potential substantial operations center and near-site degradation of the level emergency operations center (EOC)

3. Alert to standby status key of safety of the plant.

emergency personnel including

3. Assess and respond monitoring teams and Purpose associated communications

4. Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and Purpose of offsite alert is associated communications

4. Provide confirmatory offsite to (1) assure that emergency radiation monitoring and personnel are readily available

5. Provide periodic plant status updates ingestion pathway dose to respond if situation to offsite authorities (at least every projections if actual releases becomes more serious or to 15 minutes) substantially exceed technical perform confirmatory radiation specification limits monitoring if required, (2)

6. Provide periodic meteorological assess provide offsite authorities ments to offsite authorities and, if

5. Maintain alert status until current status information, any releases are occurring, dose estimates verbal closeout and (3) provide possible for actual releases unscheduled tests of response or center activation.

7. Close out by verbal summary to offslte authorities followed by written summary

6. Escalate to a more severe class Release Potential within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Limited releases of up to 10 or curies of 1-131 equivalent or up to 104 curies of Xe-133

8. Escalate to a more severe class equinvalent.

ExpectedoFrequency Once in 10 to 100 years per unit.

EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT

1. Severe loss of fuel cladding

a. High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/5ec; corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes)

b. Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 300 pci/cc equivalent of 1-131)

c. Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 1% fuel failures within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failures.

2. Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite power

3. Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes (e.g., several hundred gpm primary to secondary leak rate)

4. Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm) primary to secondary leak rate or MSIV malfunction

5. Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm

6. High radiation levels or high airborne contamination which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings)

7. Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power

8. Loss of all onsite DC power

9. Coolant pump seizure leading to fuel failure

10.

Loss of functions needed for plant cold shutdown

11.

Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical

12.

Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling building

13.

Fire potentially affecting safety systems

14. All alarms (annunciators) lost

15.

Radiological effluents greater than 10 times technical specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, would result in about 1 mr at the site boundary under average meteorological conditions)

16.

Ongoing security compromise

.7-

17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected

a. Earthquake greater than OBE levels

b. Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels

c.

Any tornado striking facility

d. Hurricane winds near design basis level

18. Other hazards being experienced or projected

a. Aircraft crash on facility

b. Missile impacts from whatever source on facility

c. Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation

d. Entry into facility environs of toxic or flammable gases

e. Turbine failure causing casing penetration

19. Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of technical support center and near-site emergency operations center

20. Evacuation of control room anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from local stations Clas Licnse ActonsState and/or Local Offsitn Class Licensee ActionsActions Site Emergency

1. Promptly inform State and/or local off-

1. Provide any assistance site authorities of site emergency status requested Class Description and reason for emergency as soon as dis covered.

2. Activate immediate public, Events are in process or have

2. Augment resources by activating statan oviempublic occurred which involve actual technical support center, on-site or likely major failures of emergency operations center and near-periodic updates plant functiond needed for site emergency operations center (EOC)

3. Augment resources by activating protection of the public.

near-site EOC and any other

3. Assess and respond primary response centers Purpose 4.Dsac nst n fst oioig

4. Dispatch key emergency personnel Purpose of the site emergency teams and associated communications ascie onictin s warning is to (1) assure that response centers are manned,

5. Provide a dedicated individual for plant

5. Alert to standby status other (2) assure that monitoring teams status updates to offsite authorities emergency personnel (e.g.,

are dispatched, (3) assure that and periodic press briefings (perhaps those needed for evacuation) personnel required for evacuation joint with offsite authorities and dispatch personnel to near of near-site areas are at duty site duty stations stations if situation becomes

6. Make senior technical and management

6. Provide offsite monitoring more serious, (4) provide staff onsite available for consultation results to licensee and others current information for and with NRC and State on a periodic basis and jointly assess them consultation with offsite authorities and public, and

7.

Provide meteorological and dose estimates

7. Continuously assess information (5) provide possible unscheduled to offsite authorities for actual from licensee and offsite test of response capabilities releases via a dedicated individual monitoring with regard to in U. S.

or automated data transmission changes to protective actions already initiated for public and Release Potential

8. Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources based on available plant condition

8. Recommend placing milk animals Releases of p to 1000 ci of information and foreseeable contingencies within 2 miles on stored feed 1-131 equivalent or up toanasesedtoxed 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.

9.

Close out or recommend reduction in dansessne oetn emergency class by briefing of offsite Expected Frequency authorities at EOC and by phone followed

9. Provide press briefings, perhaps by written sunmnary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with licensee Oncin 000ersndpe unit

10. Maintain site emergency status suntil closeout or reduction of

10.

Escalate to emergency class emergency class or

11.

Escalate to general emergency class

EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE EMERGENCY

1. Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity

2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry (indicators should include instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity and/or containment radioactivity levels)

3. Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes with loss of offsite power

4. BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation

5. PWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage

6. Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes

7. Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes

8. Loss of functions needed for plant hot shutdown

9. Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,

large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level)

10.

Fire affecting safety systems

11.

All alarms (annunciators) lost for more than 15 minutes and plant is not in cold shutdown or plant transient initiated while all alarms lost

12. a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs

13.

Imminent loss of physical control of the plant

14.

Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown

a. Earthquake greater than SSE levels

b. Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels

c. Winds in excess of design levels 10 -

15. Other hazards being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown

a. Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire

b. Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion

c. Entry of toxic or flammable gases into vital areas

16. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams and a precautionary public notification

17. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes

State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions General Emergency

1. Promptly inform State and local offsite

1. Provide any assistance requested Classauthorities of general emergency status

2. Activate iediate public Clas Dsciptonand reason for emergency as soon as notification of emergency status discovered (Parallel notification of and provide public periodic Events are in process or have State/local) updates occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core

2. Augment resources by activating on-site

3. Recommend sheltering for 2 mile degradation or melting with technical support center, on-site radius and 5 miles downwind potential for loss of contain-emergency operations center and near-and assess need to extend ment integrity.

site emergency operations center (EOC) distances Purpose

3. Assess and respond

4. Augment resources by activating neAr-site EOC and any other Purposeepns cntr Purpose of the general emergency

4. Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring warning is to (1) initiate pre-teams and associated communications

5. Dispatch key emergency personnel determined protective actions including monitoring teams and for public, (2) provide

5. Provide a dedicated individual for associated communications continuous assessment of informa-plant status updates to offsite tion from licensee and offsite authorities and periodic press psnl oty statins t

measurements, (3) initiate briefings (perhaps joint with additional measures as indicated offsite authorities) 5 mile radius and alert all by event releases or potential releases, and (4) provide

6. Make senior technical and management staff

7. Provide offsite monitoring current information for and onsite available for consultation with results to licensee and others consultation with offsite NRC and State on a periodic basis.

and jointly assess these authorities and public.

autortie ad pblc.7.

Provide meteorological and dose estimates

8. Continuously assess information Release Potential to offsite authorities for actual toin ard t

ch n releases via a dedicated individual or toronttiegaacto cared Releases of more than 1000 ci of automated data transmission initiated f cuic ad 1-131 equivalent or more than 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.

8. Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources based on available plant condi tion

9. Recommend placing milk animals Expected Frequency information and foreseeable contingencie4 within 10 miles on stored feed and assess need to extend Less than once in about 5000

9. Close out or recommend reduction of distance years per unit. Life threatening emergency class by briefing of offsite

10.

Provide press briefings, perhaps doses offsite (within 10 miles) authorities at EOC and by phone followed once in about 100,000 years by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per unit.

11.

Consider relocation to alternate EOC if actual dose accumulation in near-site EOC exceeds lower bound of EPA PAGs

12. Maintain general emergency status until closeout or reduction of emergency class

EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem/hr W.B. or 5 rem/hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions

b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,

radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are masured in the environs.

Note:

Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />

2. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of core geometry and primary coolant boundary and high potential for loss of containment).

Note:

Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. If more than gap activity released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.

3. Loss of physical control of the facility.

Note:

Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.

4. Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation. See the specific PWR and BWR sequences.

Notes: a. For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.

Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector) if large amounts of fission products are in the containment atmosphere. Recommend sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circumstance.

b. For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not imminent and large amounts of fission products in addition to noble gases are in the containment atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector).

c. For sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere and containment failure is judged imminent, recommend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot be completed before transport of activity to that location.

13 -

d. As release information becomes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time available to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current conditions.

14 -

EXAMPLE PWR SEQUENCES

1. Small and large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to severe core degradation or melt.. Ultimate failure of containment likely for melt sequences.

(Several hours available for response)

2. Transient initiated by loss of feedwater and condensate systems (principal heat removal system) followed by failure of emergency feedwater system for extended period. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate failure of containment likely if core melts.

3. Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram.

Core damage for some designs. Additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems would lead to core melt.

4. Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of emergency feedwater makeup capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of containment.

5. Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment heat removal systems over several hours could lead to core melt and likely failure of containment.

NOTE:

Most likely containment failure mode is meltthrough with release of gases only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases likely for ice condenser containments for melt sequences or for failure of containment isolation system for any PWR.

15 -

EXAMPLE BWR SEQUENCES

1. Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core shut down systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system).

Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.

2. Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to core melt degradation or melt. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent.

3. Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.

4. Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.

5. Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.

NRC FORM 335

1. REPORT NUMBER (Assignedby DOC)

(777)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NUREG-610 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE (AddVolumeNo., if appropriare)

2. (Leave blank)

DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

7. AUTHOR(S)

5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED MONTH YEAR September 1979

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)

DATE REPORT ISSUED Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation MONTH YEAR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 1979 Washington, DC 20555

6. (Leave blank)

8. (Leave blank)

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)

10. PROJECTiTASK/WORK UNIT NO.

Same as 9. above.

11. CONTRACT NO.

13. TYPE OF REPORT PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive daes)

Draft guidelines

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. (Leave blank)

16. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

The USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has developed draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines to improve the emergency preparedness capabilities around opera ting nuclear power plants. The included draft guidelines are for interim use and establish four classes of Emergency Action Levels replacing the classes in Regu latory Guide 1.101, The new classes are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, and General Emergency.

17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a. DESCRIPTORS 17b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN-ENDED TERMS

18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

19. SECURITY CLASS (This report)

21. NO. OF PAGES Unlimited availability.

20. SECURITY CLASS (Thispagel

22. PRICE Unclassified S

NRC FORM 335 (7-77)