ML13155A045

Comment (430) of Vinod Arora Opposing Restart of San Onofre Unit 2 Until NRC Completes Comprehensive Investigation

ML13155A045
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/17/2013
From:	Arora V - No Known Affiliation
To:	Leeds E, Macfarlane A Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch, Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
78FR22576 00430
Download: ML13155A045 (1)

Text

Joosten, Sandy From: Vinod Arora [vinnie48in@gmail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2013 12:20 AM To: CHAIRMAN Resource; Leeds, Eric; Borchardt, Bill; R4ALLEGATION Resource; Lantz, Ryan; Benney, Brian; Hall, Randy; Howell, Art; Dorman, Dan

Subject:

Southern California San Onofre Sad Saga - Continued HAHN Baba April 17. 2013 at 12:10 am Your comment is awaitingmoderation. '-A E 79 Sincere Thanks to NRC Chairman, Mr. Victor Dricks, Mr. Cale Young, Mr. Ryan andy Hall and entire NRC Staff. Thanks to NRC for posting this blog.

San Onofre NRC/SCE/MHI/Public Awareness Series - Please excuse me for any computer or human performance grammatical or spelling errors.

If you cannot see or test a component, then you cannot predict its reliability or safety with significant confidence. Fluid elastic instability, flow-induced vibrations and Mitsubishi Flowering Effect caused tube-to-wear, tube-to-AVB wear, Retainer Bar to tube wear, tube-to-TSP wear, and high-cycle thermal fatigue, axial and circumferential cracks, and incubating cracks. Undetected incubating cracks caused by fluid elastic instability, flow-induced vibrations and Mitsubishi Flowering Effect are of the greatest concern, because they can cause tube leakage or ruptures at 70% power in Unit 2 at any time without notice due to inadvertent component manipulation (opening or closing valves wrong valves), anticipated operational occurrences (loss of offsite power, ATWS) and Design Basis Accidents (Main Steam Line Break, Earthquake) and fire caused by a short circuit or electrical fault in an energized system. Public Safety against radiological accidents cannot be risked in terms of profits or peak electrical demands in summer months. SCE cannot get away with answers to three simple questions, with a quick NRC Review and advertisement in Federal Register. Mitsubishi Fatigue calculations are erroneous and based on hideous data, and do not meet ASME and NRC Regulations. SCE, MHI, Westinghouse, AREVA and Intertek have not addressed the combined synergic effects of tube-to-tube wear and incubating/undetected cracks caused due to adverse effects of fluid elastic instability, flow-induced vibrations and Mitsubishi Flowering Effect. SCE and their consultants cannot answer these questions, So NRC has to prove the safety of Unit 2. Who is going to assure the safety of 8.4 million Southern Californians. NRC cannot sit silent and take no action like a Helpless Police Officer sitting in a Stalled Car with Empty Guns and No radio Communications. Nuclear Wisdom requires safe, time proven and reliable actions. Nuclear regulators cannot be pressured by Billion Dollar Corporations and Powerful Politicians. A nuclear accident in Southern California will have immense and significant adverse consequences beyond the nightmares or dream of a Regulator, Corporation, Citizen or Politician.

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