ML13084A111
| ML13084A111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/2013 |
| From: | Garchow S Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Energy Northwest |
| laura hurley | |
| References | |
| 50-397/13-002 | |
| Download: ML13084A111 (24) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2013 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________
Initial conditions: Columbia is operating at 100% power. TSW-P-1A is tagged out for motor replacement.
TSW-P-1B is protected and selected as the emergency standby TSW pump.
Shift Directions: Perform OSP-MS-M701, the Bypass Valve Test monthly surveillance. The pre job brief and the reactivity brief have been conducted. Proper margin to Pre-Conditioned Status (PCS) exists per PPM 9.3.18. The Dittmer Dispatcher has been notified of the upcoming Bypass Valve Testing. The MT is in Sequential Valve mode.
Event No.
Timeline Event Type*
Event Description 1
T = 0 C (BOP)
R (ATC)
R (CRS)
Perform OSP-MS-M701, Main Turbine Bypass Valves Test. BV2 fails to open, requiring BPVs to be declared inoperable (Tech Spec).
Power reduction by lowering RRC flow to facilitate performance of OSP-MS-M701.
2 T = 20 I (ATC)
I (CRS)
RFW-LI-606A (the selected NR instrument) fails downscale (Tech Spec).
3 T = 35 I (BOP)
Fire in the Turbine Building resulting in degrading Control Air header pressure. Both standby CAS compressors fail to auto start on low header pressure, and must be manually started to restore header pressure.
4 T = 45 M (All)
Loss of CAS-C-1A and CAS-C-1B.
A manual rector scram is required prior to MSIV closure.
5 T = 55 M (All)
A Steam LOCA develops inside containment when the MSIVs close.
6 T = 60 C (BOP)
C (CRS)
When Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig, RHR-P-2A will automatically start with an overcurrent condition. The output breaker will fail to trip and cause a lockout on SM-7. DG-1 must be emergency tripped (Critical Task).
7 T = 65 C (BOP)
C (CRS)
RHR-P-2B fails to auto start. RHR-P-2B has a sheared shaft when manually started. Initiate Drywell sprays with SW-B through RHR-B using PPM 5.5.2 after Drywell temperature reaches 285°F, but before Drywell temperature reaches 330°F (Critical Task).
8 T = 65 C (ATC)
The stop pushbutton fails to stop RRC-P-1A.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2013 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________
Initial Conditions: Reactor power has been lowered to support a Control Rod Set. HPCS-P-1 is tagged out for shaft replacement. The #1 and #2 RFW Heaters have been removed from service per the Reactivity Control Plan. The reactivity brief and the task preview for the shifts scheduled activities have been completed. An SNE is stationed in the Control Room to monitor core conditions.
Turnover: Adjust control rods to the target pattern per the Control Rod Withdrawal Deviation Sheet and then return the plant to 100% power.
Event No.
Timeline Event Type*
Event Description 1
T = 0 R (ATC)
R (CRS)
Pull Control Rods per the Control Rod Withdrawal Deviation Sheet to achieve the target rod pattern.
2 T = 10 C (ATC)
C (CRS)
While moving control rods, a previously adjusted rod (38-23) begins to drift out. Once inserted, releasing the continuous insert pushbutton causes the control rod to drift out again, requiring the control rod to be isolated (Tech Spec).
3 T = 20 I (BOP)
I (CRS)
SGT-A high temperature due to strip heaters failing to de-energize (Tech Spec).
4 T = 45 C (BOP)
DEH-P-1B Fails. DEH-P-1A, the standby pump, does not auto start but can be manually started.
5 T = 50 I (ATC)
I (CRS)
RFW-P-1A Trip.
RRC pumps fail to automatically run back to 30Hz.
6 T = 50 M (All)
A trip of RFW-P-1B results in a loss of Feedwater and a reactor scram.
7 T = 51 C (All)
When the Main Turbine trips, Startup Power will not close in on SM-1, SM-2 or SM-3.
8 T = 70 M (All)
Aftershock results in a rupture in the RHR-A suction line.
Emergency Depressurize the RPV before Suppression Pool level reaches 19 feet 2 inches (Critical Task).
9 T = 70 C (BOP)
C (CRS)
The cross-connect valve between the RHR-A and RCIC pump rooms (FDR-V-607) fails to automatically close due to a failed level switch, and must be manually closed to maintain RCIC operation. Close FDR-V-607 prior to reaching the Maximum Safe Operating Value water level in the RCIC pump room (Critical Task). NOTE: This was determined during the exam not to be a critical task.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2013 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 95% power. RCC-P-1B is tagged out due to excessive vibrations and imminent failure. OSP-HPCS/IST-Q701, HPCS System Operability Test, is in-progress.
Turnover: Return Columbia to 100% power. Continue with the performance of OSP-HPCS/IST-Q701, starting at Step 7.3. The two year VPI and channel calibration are NOT due. The pre-job brief has been completed, and Equipment Operators are on station to support completion of the surveillance. HP has been informed of surveillance performance. The power increase and surveillance are to be performed concurrently.
Event No.
Timeline Event Type*
Event Description 1
T = 0 R (ATC)
R (CRS)
Increase Reactor Power from 95% to 100% with RRC Flow.
2 T = 0 N (BOP)
N (CRS)
Perform the HPCS System Operability Test, OSP-HPCS/IST-Q701.
3 T = 15 I (BOP)
I (CRS)
The HPCS min flow, HPCS-V-12, fuses clear while closing. (Tech Spec).
4 T = 25 C (ATC)
C (CRS)
CRD-P-1B trips on low suction pressure.
5 T = 45 C (CRS)
R (ATC)
A grid disturbance causes a trip of ASD Channel 1B1. (Tech Spec)
Power reduction by lowering RRC-P-1A speed to match loop flows.
6 T = 60 C (ATC)
C (CRS)
Another grid disturbance results in a lockout of SH-5 and SH-6, and a complete loss of RRC flow requiring a manual reactor scram.
7 T = 60 M (All)
Hydraulic ATWS.
Inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation to prevent an uncontrolled depressurization and significant power excursion (Critical Task).
Terminate and prevent injection into the RPV with the exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, to establish an LL (Critical Task).
Perform PPM 5.5.11 to insert control rods. Rods insert. Return RPV level to normal band (Critical Task).
8 T = 65 C (ATC)
Inject Standby Liquid Control (boron) prior to exceeding 110°F Suppression Pool temperature (Critical Task).
RWCU-V-4 fails to automatically close when SLC is initiated.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor