ML13071A142
| ML13071A142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05523694 |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 55-23694-SP | |
| Download: ML13071A142 (73) | |
Text
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Voqtle Scenario No.:
7 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 29% power, BOL, steady state operations, control rods in manual.
(Base IC # 36, snapped to IC # 187 for HL17 NRC Exam)
Equipment OOS: Safety Injection Pump A is tagged out for motor repair.
Turnover: The plant is at 29% power, Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift, raise power at < 8% per hour.
Preloaded Malfunctions:
ES19A Block CVI Actuation Train A ES19B - Block CVI Actuation Train B ES10 - Train A Main Steam Line Isol Auto Actuation Failure ES1 1
- Train B Main Steam line Isol Auto Actuation Failure SIO8A - RWST Sludge Mixing Valve 10957 Failure S1088 - RWST Sludge Mixing Valve 10958 Failure RD17D - (K.14) @ 36 steps RD17H - (D-4) @ 24 steps RD17L - (G-13) @ 30 steps PR12B PORV 456 Block Valve 8000B Auto Closure Failure Overrides HV-81 04 Emergency Borate valve shut.
Note to Simbooth: Place Containment Mini-Purge in service.
Event Malt.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A R-OATC Raises power in accordance with UOP-12004-C.
R-SS N-UO T2 SGO5D C-UO SG # 4 Steam Flow indicator fails high.
@100%
C-SS
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description T3 CVO4 l-OATC Loss of Cooling to Letdown Heat Exchanger (TE-0130 fails low) l-SS T4 new malf TS-SS NSCW Cooling Tower Fan # 1 on Train A trips with ambient wet-bulb (9) temperature > 63°F LCO 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) Condition B T5 PRO2B l-OATC PRZR PT-456 fails high resulting in PORV 456 failing open and block
@100%
l-SS valve HV-8000B failure to auto close.
TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, FU 6 Condition E, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8a Condition M, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8b Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Condition A, FU id Condition 0, LCO 3.3.2 FU 8b Condition L, LCO 3.4.1 Condition A T6 RE C-UO RWST sludge mixing line pipe break with auto closure failure.
TKO2 C-SS 95-88%
TS-SS LCO 3.5.4 Condition B and Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action) 1200 sec TR 13.1.7 Condition D (Immediate TR action) ramp T7 FWO4C C-OATC MFRV # 3 fails shut, requiring reactor trip, 3 stuck rods.
10 Preload C-OATC Emergency borate due to 3 stuck rods with failure of HV-8104 to C-SS open.
TB SGO1C M-ALL Ruptured Faulted SG IRC with failure of CVI to occur.
@45%
T9 FWO6C M-ALL Ruptured Faulted SG IRC with failure of CVI to occur.
@40%
11 Preload C-UO CVI actuation failure requiring manual alignment.
c-SS Critical 12 Preload C-UO Main Steam Line Auto Actuation Failure C-SS Critical (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:
Raise reactor power in accordance with UOP-12004-C.
Verifiable Actions:
OATC Adjust RCS boron concentration and use control rods to raise reactor power.
UO Raises turbine load to raise power.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 2:
Steam Generator # 4 controlling steam flow Fl-542 will fail low resulting in a reduction in FW flow.
Verifiable Actions:
UO Takes manual control of the SG # 4 feed flow valves and MFP(s) speed to control SG NR levels between 60 and 70%.
UO Selects an unaffected channel for control.
UO Returns MFP(s) speed controls to auto.
UO Return SG feed flow valves to auto.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 3:
The temperature instrument TE-0130 will fail low causing TV-0130 temperature control valve to the Letdown Heat Exchanger to close causing temperature to rise. An automatic divert of CVCS Letdown around the CVCS demins on high temperature will occur (TV-0129). Letdown will be diverted straight to the VCT.
Verifiable Actions:
OATC Verifies TV-0130 is open to control cooling water flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
OATC Realigns TV-0129 through the demins. (if high temperature divert occurred)
Technical Specifications:
None 3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:
NSCW Train A Cooling Tower Fan # 1 trips with wet bulb temperature > 63°F Verifiable Actions:
None, Technical Specification call by the SS.
Technical Specifications:
LCO 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) Condition B Event 5:
PRZR pressure channel PT-456 fails high resulting in PORV 456 failing open and lowering RCS pressure with failure of the block valve to automatically close.
Verifiable Actions:
OATC Manually closes PORV 456 per lOAs of18001-C, Primary Instrument Malfunction, energizes PRZR heaters, places spray valves to shut.
OATC Selects controlling channel to 455 / 458 on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT.
OATC Places PRZR heaters and spray in AUTO.
OATC Places PORV in AUTO.
Technical Specifications:
LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8a, Condition M LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FU 8b, Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation FU1d, Condition D LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation FU8b, Condition L LCO 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6:
An RWST leak occurs with failure of RWST sludge mixing pump valves to automatically close.
Verifiable Actions:
UO Manually closes RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves (HV-i 0957 / HV-1 0958) to isolate the RWST leak to preserve RWST inventory.
Technical Specifications:
LCO 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Condition B and Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action)
TR 13.1.7 Borated Water Sources Operating Condition D (Immediate TR action)
Event 7, 10:
Main Feed regulating valve to SG # 3 will fail shut requiring a manual reactor trip by the crew.
Following the trip, 3 control rods will be stuck partially out requiring an emergency boration.
HV-8104 Emergency Boration valve will not open from the QMCB.
Verifiable Actions:
OATC Initiates an emergency boration of the RCS from the RWST through the Normal Charging flow path by opening 1 FV-1 1 OA and 1 FV-i 1 OB and adjusting charging flow to obtain the required boration flow rate of 30 gpm and required charging flow rate of 42 gpm.
Event 8,11,12:
SGTR on SG # 3 post reactor trip. Steam Generator # 3 will develop a DBA SGTR over time after the emergency boration has been completed by the OATC. This will require an SI by the crew.
The diagnosis of the SGTR is complicated by the MFRV # 3 failing closed earlier in the scenario and SG # 3 level will be low relative to the other 3 SGs. The crew will be alerted by the SJAE /
SPE rad monitor (RE-i 2839) and be required to use SG level rise and balancing of AFW flow to diagnose the ruptured SG.
Verifiable Actions:
UO Balances / isolates AFW flows to determine the ruptured SG # 3.
OATC Manually actuates SI due to lowering PRZR level and RCS pressure in order to maintain RCS inventory.
Technical Specifications:
None 5
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9:
Main feed water line break IRC on the ruptured SG # 3.
Verifiable Actions:
UO The UO will manually isolate the main steam lines.
CRITICAL TASKS:
- 1) Manually isolate the Main Steam lines no later than step #3 of 19020-C to limit blow down due to SG # 3 fault to one SG. This limits the Containment pressure rise and challenge to the Containment barrier.
- 2) Manually closes at least one CVI damper in each flow path to prevent a radiation release flow path from the RCS via SG # 3 to the environment. CVI isolation must be performed no later than the Initial Operator Actions of 19000-C.
- 3) Manually isolate SG # 3 to limit blow down to one SG limiting CNMT pressure rise and Challenge to the Containment. This also limits RCS cool down and possible PTS condition by closing the following valves. These will be done no later than the procedurally directed steps of 19020-C.
MSIVs and Bypasses MFIVs BFIVs HV-5134 SG 3 from MDAFW PMP-B HV-5127 SG 3 from TDAFW PMP PV-3020 SG 3 ARV SGBD sample valves SGBD valves 6
ilije(
NUCLEAR SAFETY FOCUS zd!!c TARGET ZERO y v
[
V Protected Train:
EOOS:
Green Alpha LI Yellow D
Bravo El Orange LJRed Plant 29 % power BOL.
Conditions:
Major Activities:
Initiate power ascent UOP 12004-C section 4.1 for Power Ascent at a rate not to exceed 8% per hour. Step 4.1.40 has been performed. Step 4.1.41 is the next procedure plateau.
Active LCOs:__f LI LCO 3.5.2 Condition A is in effect due to SIP A tagged out.
OOS/ Degraded LI None CR Instruments:
Narrative LI Containment mini-purge is in service for a planned Status:
Containment Entry on next shift.
LI SIP A is tagged out for motor repair, expected return to service time is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> left on a shutdown LCO of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
LI MFPT B will be placed in service at 55% power per UOP step 4.1.45.
LI The remnants of Hurricane Maya are passing through, severe weather and thunderstorms will be in the area for the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The Severe Weather Checklist is in effect.
LI Power Range high level trip bistables are set at 90%.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
1 Event
Description:
Reactor Power Ascension from 29% RTP and higher, UOP 12004-C, step 4.1.41 is the next plateau.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Uses 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System Section 4.7 Frequent Dilutions While Controlling Reactor Power, as necessary to maintain Tavg matched with Tref during power ascension.
UO Increases turbine load in increments of 15 Mwe to 30 Mwe using load increase pushbutton at direction of OATC. Monitors Generator Output.
13009-1, Section 4.7:
NOTES This section can be used during power changes when necessary to frequently dilute the RCS for temperature control. The use of this section shall be authorized by the SS.
Frequent dilutions can raise VCT level to the point where VCT pressure reaches 40 psig. 1-LIC-0185 may be adjusted to allow divert to the RHT at a lower level to limit VCT pressure increase.
OATC 4.7 FREQUENT DILUTIONS WHILE CONTROLLING REACTOR POWER 4.7.1 Determine the amount of Reactor Makeup Water necessary to accomplish the power change or accommodate the expected impact of Xenon. (Uses Reactivity Briefing Sheet to Determine # gallons Dilution)
Gals H2O NOTE: EACH OATC WILL USE NUMBER HE/SHE IS COMFORTABLE WITH.
(100 1000 Gallons)
OATC 4.7.2 Verify the Reactor Makeup System is aligned for automatic operation.
OATC 4.7.3 Start one Reactor Makeup Water Pump:
RX MU WTR PMP-1 1-HS-7762 RX MU WTR PMP-2 1-HS-7763 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
1 Event
Description:
Reactor Power Ascension from 29% RTP and higher, UOP 12004-C, step 4.1.41 is the next plateau.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.7.4 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1 -HS-40001 B in STOP.
OATC 4.7.5 As directed by the SS, place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in either the ALT DIL or DIL position.
OATC 4.7.6 As directed by the SS, lower pot setting on 1-LIC-0185, to limit VCT pressure increase.
Initial Pot Setting:_______ New Pot Setting:
OATC 4.7.7 Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1 -FQI-01 11 for the desired amount of Reactor M/U Water.
Gals H2O OATC NOTE If VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A was placed in the DIL position in Step 4.7.5, Step 4.7.8 may be marked N/A.
4.7.8 If required, close 1 -FV-01 1 OB as necessary to raise or maintain RCS hydrogen concentration. (N/A)
Note to examiner: If ALT DIL selected, FV-1 lOB will be closed.
SS / OATC 4.7.9 At SS direction, dilution flow may be adjusted to desired flow using 1-FIC-Ol 11. (record in AUTO LOG).
Initial Pot Setting:
New Pot Setting:
NOTE:
EXPECTED NOT TO CHANGE DESIRED FLOW:
OATC 4.7.10 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and verify flow is indicated on 1 -FI-Ol 1 OB.
2
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
1 Event
Description:
Reactor Power Ascension from 29% RTP and higher, UOP 12004-C, step 4.1.41 is the next plateau.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.7.11 WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 reaches its setpoint, verify dilution stops and the following valves close:
a 1-FV-01 1 1A RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1 -FV-01 11 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT a
1-FV-O11OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.7.12 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cb between the RCS and the Pressurizer.
OATC 4.7.13 Monitor RCS temperature, Control Bank position, or power levels as applicable.
CAUTION If frequent dilutions are to be continued past the end of the shift, step 4.7.14 should be marked N/A and this section completed to include realignment to the normal configuration. The new on coming shift can then initiate the section from the beginning to continue frequent dilution.
OATC 4.7.14 Repeat Steps 4.7.10 through 4.7.13 as necessary to continue power ramp and/or compensate for Xenon.
NOTE:
OA TC WILL LEAVE CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM ALIGNED PER 4.7 FOR FREQUENT DILUTIONS WHILE CONTROLLING REACTOR POWER DURING POWER ASCENSION.
3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
1 Event
Description:
Reactor Power Ascension from 29% RTP and higher, UOP 12004-C, step 4.1.41 is the next plateau.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE:
EVENT 2 Is INITIATED WHILE OATC AND UO ARE PERFORMING ACTIONS IN EVENT 2 FOR POWER ASCENSION AT EXAMINERS DISCRETION.
4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
2 Event
Description:
SG # 4 Steam Flow channel FI-542 fails high.
Time Position {
Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose SG Loop # 4 Flow Fl-542 has failed high.
Symptoms / alarms:
ALB13-D01 STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH Indications:
FI-542 reading off scale high.
Steam flow indication on Fl-542 reading higher than feed flow.
UO IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Gi. Check steam and feed flows MATCHED ON ALL SGs. (NO)
RNO G1. Take manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%.
Affected SG feed flow valves. (UO throttles closed loop 4 MFRV)
MFP(s) speed. (reduces MFPT speed using the Master Controller)
Note to examiners: It is expected the operator will take manual control of MFRV # 4 and the MFPT Master Controller. Steam flow failing high will result in the MFRV # 4 opening and the MFPT Master Controller speeding up the feed pumps. The operator will control SG # 4 levels and MFP speed with these controllers.
SS Enters AOP 18001 -C, SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION, section G for FAILURE OF STEAM GENERATOR FLOW INSTRUMENTATION.
5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
2 Event
Description:
SG # 4 Steam Flow channel FI-542 fails high.
Time ] Position Applicants Action or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS UO G2. Select an unaffected control channel.
Note to examiner: The UO will select F543 on 1 FS-542C selector switch.
UO G3. Return MFP(s) speed controls to AUTO.
Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the MFRV and MFPT speed controllers in auto.
UO G4. Return SG feed flow valves to AUTO.
Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the MFRV and MFPT speed controllers in auto.
UO G5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
OATC UO G6. Check SG level control maintains NR level AT 65%.
SS G7. Notify I & C to initiate repairs.
6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
2 Event
Description:
SG # 4 Steam Flow channel Fl-542 fails high.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS G8. Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE. (NO)
RNO G8. Perform the following:
- a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step 09.
b.
Return to procedure and step in effect.
Note to examiner: There are no Technical Specification actions for this malfunction.
END OF EVENT 2, proceed to EVENT 3.
7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-Cl 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose TE-0130 has failed low.
Symptoms / alarms:
ALBO7-F04 LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT ALBO7-B04 (VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET TEMP HI (delayed, or may not come in)
Indications:
TE-0130 reading down scale low.
TE-Ol 30 red UP arrow LIT. (indicates attempting to raise letdown temperature).
Amber light on 1 HS-129 LETDOWN TO DEMIN / VCT LIT.
OATC ALBO7-F04 response actions:
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:
Letdown flow is diverted away from the Mixed Bed Demineralizers directly to the Reactor Coolant Filter.
OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. Check letdown temperature on 1-TI-0130 on the QMCB. (failed) 2.
IF necessary, initiate 18007-C, Chemical Volume Control System Malfunction. (not necessary, letdown is not lost)
- 3. Check for ACCW normal operation. (TV-Cl 30 not normal) 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTION
- 1. Attempt to balance charging and letdown flow.
- 2. WHEN letdown temperature is restored, return 1 -TV-01 29 to the DEMIN position.
- 3. IF instrument or equipment failure has occurred, initiate maintenance as required.
COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE Note to examiner: The OATC can control cooling flow to the VCT using TV-01 30. For 120 gpm letdown flow, this is normally set to 51% (note dry erase board on SS throne). It is expected the OATC will take manual control of TV-0130 to control cooling flow.
End of 1 7007-F04 actions.
OATC ALBO7-B04 actions (LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT)
PROBABLE CAUSE 1.
Low Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) flow through the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
- 2. Low ACCW flow through the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger or Seal Water Heat Exchanger if aligned to the Volume Control Tank (VCT).
9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-Cl 30 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-Cl 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Check normal operation of ACCW and, if necessary, initiate 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE Seal water injection flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP5) should be maintained less than 130°F.
- 1. Monitor VCT outlet temperature using 1 -TI-Ol 16 on the QMCB.
- 2. Check letdown flow using 1-FI-0132 and temperature using 1-TI-0130 on the QMCB.
- 3. Adjust the charging or letdown flow if necessary to reduce the letdown temperature.
- 4. Return to normal operation as soon as possible per 13006-1, CVCS Startup and Normal Operation.
- 5. IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.
COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE End of 17007-B04 actions.
10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 2-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-Ol 30 failed low, TV-01 30 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position }
Applicants Action or Behavior SS AOP-1 8022-C, LOSS OF AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER symptoms and steps.
Symptoms / alarms:
High temperature on any heat exchanger serviced by ACCW.
Note to examiner: The SS may look at 18022-C due to the reference from ALBO7-B04 if received.
OATC NOTES
. ACCW pumps are removed from the 4.16KV Class 1 E buses following simultaneous loss of offsite power and safety injection.
. ACCW flow to the Seal Water Heat Exchanger is not required if RCS temperature is less than 150°F and Seal Water Heat Exchanger Return Temperature remains less than 135°F.
11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position j Applicants Action or Behavior OATC
- 1. Check ACCW pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)
- 3. Check if ACCW flow exists through the letdown heat exchanger.
(YES)
TV-0130 OPEN.
ALBO7-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP EXTINGUISHED.
OATC
- 4. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
UO OATC
GREATER THAN 20% AND STABLE OR RISING. (YES) 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC
- 6. Check if RCPs should be stopped:
- a. Check the following RCP parameters (using plant computer):
. Motor bearing (upper or lower radial or thrust)
GREATER THAN 195°F.
. Motor stator winding GREATER THAN 31 1°F.
- Seal water inlet GREATER THAN 230°F.
. Loss of ACCW GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES.
Note to examiner: All parameters listed are met, the RCPs do NOT require stopping.
a.
Perform the following.
1)
IF any parameter limit is exceeded, THEN perform step 6.b.
- 2) Go to Step 7.
13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior OATC
- 7. Check RCP thermal barrier outlet valves OPEN. (YES)
HV-1 9051 ACCW RCP-1 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV HV-19053 ACCW RCP-2 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV HV-1 9055 ACCW RCP-3 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV HV-19057 ACCW RCP-4 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV HV-2041 ACCW RCPS THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV Note to examiner: All the above listed valves are open as required.
OATC
LESS THAN 120°F. (YES)
OATC
- 9. Check ACCW containment isolation valves OPEN. (YES)
HV-1979 ACCW SPLY HDR ORC ISO VLV HV-1 978 ACCW SPLY HDR IRC ISOL VLV HV-1 974 ACCW RTN HDR IRC ISO VLV HV-1 975 ACCW RTN HDR ORC ISO VLV Note to examiner: All the above listed valves are open as required.
14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
3 Event
Description:
TE-0130 fails low, this controls ACCW cooling to the Letdown Heat Exchanger. With TE-0130 failed low, TV-0130 will throttle shut raising the actual Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature. The OATC will have to manually control TV-01 30 to control ACCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC
- 10. Check if ACCW is restored to service.
- a. Components cooled by ACCW TERMPERATURES RETURNING TO NORMAL. (YES)
- b. Restore charging and letdown using 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. (N/A)
SS c.
Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF EVENT 3, proceed to EVENT 4.
15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
4 Event
Description:
Trip of NSCW Train A Cooling Tower Fan # 1, wet bulb temperature will be > 63°F requiring a Tech Spec LCO entry.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose trip of NSCW Train A Tower Fan # 1.
Symptoms I alarms:
ALB36-B02 480V SWGR 1AB15 TROUBLE Indications:
Green and amber light on NSCW CT Fan # 1 LIT Note to examiner: The fan green and amber light will be the only indication in the control room the fan has tripped and is not readily in their peripheral vision area.
IF, they dont see the light and dispatch someone to AB15 to investigate, the Simbooth Operator will report back after several minutes that breaker 1AB15-05 is tripped for NSCW FAN-i.
UO ALB36-B02 actions.
PROBABLE CAUSE
- 3. One of the breakers on Switchgear 1AB15 tripped due to a fault.
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
4 Event
Description:
Trip of NSCW Train A Cooling Tower Fan # 1, wet bulb temperature will be > 63°F requiring a Tech Spec LCO entry.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO ALB36-B02 actions continued.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. N/A due to not a loss of bus voltage.
- 2. Dispatch an operator to Switchgear 1AB15 to check for:
a.
Existing relay targets.
- b. Other abnormal conditions.
- c. Transformer winding high temperatures (refer to 13429-1 to check max temperature indication).
Note to examiner. The Simbooth Operator will report back after several minutes that breaker 1 AB1 5-05 is tripped for NSCW FAN-i.
Note to examiner: Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 of ARP are N/A for this event.
UO
- 7. IF alarm is in due to overcurrent trip of Breakers 1AB15-05, 06, 08, OR 13, (NSCW TRAIN A Cooling Tower Fans), THEN the Breaker TRIP/RESET pushbutton must be depressed and the applicable fan QMCB Handswitch must be placed in STOP THEN released to clear the alarm and amber light on associated fan handswitch.
Note to examiner: If requested, the ABC will report the TRIP/RESET pushbutton does NOT appear to be resetting.
17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
4 Event
Description:
Trip of NSCW Train A Cooling Tower Fan # 1, wet bulb temperature will be > 63°F requiring a Tech Spec LCO entry.
TimeJ Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. Initiate maintenance to correct problem (i.e., restore alarm).
- 2. IF after three days the alarm has NOT been restored, intiate a Temporary Modification per 00307-C, Temporary Modifications to clear the bad input(s). Record this action required on Figure 5 of 10018-C, Annunciator Control.
SS Technical Specifications:
3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
LCO 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE. With ambient wet-bulb temperature > 63°F, four fans and four spray cells per train shall be OPERABLE. With ambient wet-bulb temperature 63°F, three fans and four spray cells per train shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One NSCW cooling B.1 Restore fan(s) and spray 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> tower with one or more cell(s) to OPERABLE required fans and/or status.
spray cells inoperable.
D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
AND OR D.2 Be in MODE 5 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
UHS inoperable for reasons other then Conditions A, B, or C 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
4 Event
Description:
Trip of NSCW Train A Cooling Tower Fan # 1, wet bulb temperature will be > 63°F requiring a Tech Spec LCO entry.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Technical Specification 3.7.9 UHS continued.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.5 Verify ambient wet-bulb temperature 63°F In accordance with the when one NSCWE town fan is out-of-service and Surveillance daily high temperature (dry bulb) is forecasted to Frequency Control be > 48°F.
Program I Note to examiner: IF asked to perform the wet bulb surveillance, the Simbooth Operator will report back after several minutes that ambient wet-bulb temperature is 78°F. This will ensure that LCO entry is required.
The SS may request someone to perform OSP-1 41 50-C, Wet Bulb Temperature With Psychrometer. This takes 5 10 minutes, report back the temperature as stated about (78°F).
END OF EVENT 4, proceed to EVENT 5.
19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure of 2185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose the high failure of PRZR Pressure channel PT-456.
Symptoms / alarms:
ALB11-B03 PRZR HI PRESS ALB11-C03 PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK ALB12-EO1 PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP ALB12-F04 PV-0456A OPEN SIGNAL Indications:
PRZR Pressure channel PT-456 offscale high.
PRZR Pressure channels PT-455, 457, and 458 rapidly lowering.
Both PRZR Sprays fully shut.
All PRZR heaters on.
OATC AOP 18001-C, Section C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Cl.
Check RCS pressure
- STABLE OR RISING. (NO)
RNO:
Cl.
Perform the following:
Close spray valves.
Close affected PRZR PORV.
Operate PRZR heaters as necessary.
CREW Enters AOP 18001-C, Section C and verifies immediate operator actions properly completed.
20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure of 2185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior 1
OATC C2.
Check controlling channel OPERATING PROPERLY.
(YES)
OATC C3.
Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
OATC C4.
Control PRZR pressure using heaters gjç sprays
BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG.
OATC C5.
Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller IN AUTO WITH OUTPUT SIGNAL APPROXIMATELY 25%.
(NO)
RNO:
C5.
Place PIC-455A in manual and adjust controller output to approximately 25%.
OATC 06.
Check affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT. (YES) 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure of 2185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C7.
Select unaffected channels on PS-455F:
Failed Channel Select P455 CH457/456 P456 CH455 / 458 P457 CH455/456 P458 CH455 / 456 OATC C8.
Perform the following:
- a. Check PRZR pressure STABLE AT APPROXIMATELY 2235 PSIG.
- b. Place PRZR heaters in AUTO.
c.
Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO.
RNO:
- a. Adjust PRZR pressure to approximately 2235 psig using PRZR heaters and sprays.
OATC C9.
Place PORVs in AUTO and verify proper operation.
OATC Cl 0.
Return PRZR pressure Master Controller to AUTO.
22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure of 2185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
{ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Cli.
Select same channel on PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL as selected on PS-455F.
455 OATC 012.
Check P-li status light on BPLB indicates correctly for plant condition within one hour.
OFF SS 013.
Notify l&C to initiate repairs.
SS will call typically call the SSS to perform the following:
Notify Operations Duty Manager of the AOP entry Write a Condition Report Notify l&C SS Cl 4.
Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.
NOTE: SS is NOT expected to bypass failed channel.
23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure 012185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
rTimejPoSition]
Applicants Action or Behavior SS Cl 5.
Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Ci within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.. (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)
NOTE: SS expected to leave bistables untripped during allowed out of service time to facilitate troubleshooting by l&C.
SS C16.
Initiate the applicable actions of:
TS 3.3.1 Reactor Trip Function Condition 6OTAT E
Ba Low PRZR pressure M
8b High PRZR pressure E
TS3.3.2ESFAS Function Condition id SI low PRZR pressure D
Bb P-i 1 Interlock L (one hour action)
TS 3.4.1.a DNB RCS pressure < 2199 psig B (Momentary)
Note to examiner: The SS may look at Tech Specs for the Block Valve HV-80008 which did not close in automatic. There is no Tech Spec requirement for the Block Valve to work in automatic. Manual operation only is required per Tech Spec Bases of 3.4.1 1.
24
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
5 Event
Description:
PRZR pressure channel P1-456 will fail high with the PORB Block Valve HV-8000B failing to close in automatic on low RCS pressure of 2185 psig. The OATC will be required to manually close PORV 456 or HV-8000B to prevent a Reactor trip.
Time Position j Applicants Action or Behavior SS C17.
Check repairs and surveillances
- COMPLETE.
RNO:
Cl 7.
Perform the following:
a.
WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step Cl8.
b.
Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF EVENT 5, proceed to EVENT 6.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
6 Event
Description:
The RWST will develop a leak resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a OMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close.
The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.
Time1 Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose RWST level is actually lowering on all channels.
Symptoms / alarms:
ALBO6-E04 RWST LO LEVEL Indications:
RWST level lowering on Ll-0990, 0991, 0992, and 0993 to less than 95%..
OATC ALBO6-E04 actions.
PROBABLE CAUSE
- 1. Filling of Accumulators.
- 2. Adding water to the Spent Fuel Pool.
- 3. Safety Injection (SI) actuation.
- 4. System leakage.
UO AUTOMATIC ACTIONS RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves 1-HV-10957 (Train B, 1 -LT-0991) an 1 -HV-1 0958 (Train A, 1 -LT-0990) close.
Note to examiner: These valves are located on the QPCP and will NOT close for this event. The UO will have to manually close the valves to isolate the leak.
26
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
6 Event
Description:
The RWST will develop a leak resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close.
The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC ALBO6-E04 actions continued.
uO INTIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. IF in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, and SI is not in progress, stop any operation that could be removing water from the RWST.
- 2. IF a system leak is indicated, dispatch personnel to locate and isolate the leak.
Note to examiner. The UO closing either HV-1 0957 or HV-1 0958 will isolate the leak for this event.
- 3. Restore RWST level to normal per 13701-1, Boric Acid System.
COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2012-301 Scenario No.:
7 Event No.:
6 Event
Description:
The RWST will develop a leak resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close.
The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.
Time fosition f Applicants Action or Behavior SS 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more sludge 8.1 Restore the valve(s) to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mixing pump isolation OPERABLE status.
valves inoperable.
D.
RWST inoperable for D.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reasons other than OPERABLE status.
Condition A or B.
E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODe 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or D AND not met.
E.2 Be in MODE 5 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Note to examiner: Closing the RWST sludge mixing isolations HV-10957 and HV-10958 satisfies Condition B.
28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event NoV:
6 Event
Description:
The RWST will develop a leak resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close.
The UO will close the valves on the OPCP and the leak will be terminated.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior
]
SS TR 13.1.7 Borated Water Sources Operating.
TR 13.1.7 The following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required byTR-13.1.3:
a.
Boric acid storage tank.
b.
The refueling water storage tank (RWST).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. RWST inoperable.
D.1 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately.
of RWST Technical Specification 3.5.4.
END OF EVENT 6, proceed to EVENT 7, the main event.
29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose MFRV Loop # 3 has failed shut.
Symptoms I alarms:
ALB13-C01 STM GEN 3 FLOW MISMATCH ALB13-C06 STM GEN 3 HI/LO LVL DEVIATION (short delay)
ALB13-C03 STM GEN 3 LO LEVEL (a little longer delay)
ALB13-C05 STM GEN 3 LO-LO LVL ALERT (auto trip set point)
Indications:
Feed flow reading 0 gpm for SG # 3 (1 Fl-530A I 531A).
Level lowering rapidly on SG # 3 (1 LI-538, 539, 537, & 553).
MFRV # 3 green light only lit on ZLB-004.
MFRV # 3 demand at 100% and red up arrow lit on 1 FIC-530.
SS Enters 18016-C CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION section D MAIN FEEDWATER VALVE MALFUNCTION.
30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior UO IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Dl. Check proper operation of BFRVs and MFRVs.
RNO Dl. Perform the following:
- Control SG levels using the following as necessary.
MFRVs BFRVs IF SG levels cannot be maintained greater than 41%.
-OR-Less than 79%,
THEN perform the following:
- 1) Trip the reactor.
- 2) Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Note to examiner: At> 29% power, the BFRV will NOT be able to maintain SG levels and the Reactor will be tripped manually by the OATC or will trip automatically on SG # 3 LO-LO LEVEL.
OATC Dl RNO Manually trips the Reactor due to impending loss of level in SG # 3.
31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position_L Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Transitions to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
SS Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip.
OATC
- 1. Check Reactor Trip: (YES)
Rod Bottom Lights LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN Neutron Flux LOWERING UO
- 2. Check Turbine Trip: (YES)
All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED UO
- 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses. (YES)
- a. AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
4l6OAClEBusses
- b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.
4l6OVAClEBusses 480V AC 1 E Busses 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 4. Check if SI is actuated. (NO)
Any SI annunciators LIT SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT RNO
- 4. Check if SI is required. (NO)
IF one or more of the following conditions has occurred.
PRZR pressure has less than or equal to 1870 psig.
Steam line pressure less than or equal to 585 psig.
Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.8 psig.
Automatic alignment of ECCS equipment to injection phase.
THEN actuate SI and go to Step 6.
UO
- 5. Perform the following to limit RCS cooldown:
- a. Check NR level in at least one SG greater than 10%.
RNO
- a. Maintain AFW flow greater than 570 gpm and go to 19001 -C, ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
- b. Reduce AFW flow.
- c. Goto 19001 -C, ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Transitions to 19001-C, ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
OATC
- 1. Initiate the following:
UO Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-C CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.
CREW 2.
IF SI actuation occurs during this procedure, THEN go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
34
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 3. Limit RCS cooldown:
a.
- b. Trip both MFPs.
c.
Check SGs NR level AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%.
OATC
- 4. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F.
With RCP(s) running RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE.
-OR-Without RCP(s) running RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 5. Check FW status:
- a. Average RCS temperature LESS THAN 564°F. (YES)
- b. Verify FW isolation valves closed. (YES)
MFIVs BFIVs MFRVs BFRVs UO 6.
Check total feed flow capability to SGs GREATER THAN 570 GPM AVAILABLE. (YES)
OATC
- 7. Check all Rods FULLY INSERTED. (NO, 3 are stuck out)
RNO 7.
IF two or more Rods NOT fully inserted, THEN EMERGENCY BORATE 154 ppm for each Rod not fully inserted by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.
Verify adequate shutdown margin as required by Technical Specification SR 3.1.1.1.
Note to examiner: Once OATC initiates emergency boration flow, a DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 3. E. Boration steps are on page
- 39 of this event.
36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time ] Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 8. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)
- 9. Perform the following:
- a. Check 18009-C, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK IN EFFECT.
RNO
- a. GotoStep9.d.
- d. Check other AOPs IN EFFECT. (NO) e.
Initiate actions of AOPs in conjunction with remaining actions of this procedure.
UO
- 10. Check PRZR level control:
a.
Instrument Air AVAILABLE. (YES)
Note to examiner: The DBA SGTR will have initiated by now. The crew will actuate SI and go to E-0 on lowering PRZR level and pressure.
37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9 EMERGENCY BORATION NOTE Table 1 provides a convenient tool for checking Emergency Boration flow path alternatives.
Note to examiner: The path through HV-8104 is the preferred path.
The next preferred path is the next section in the procedure, etc.
OATC 4.9.1 Emergency Boration Through 1-HV-8104.
OATC 4.9.1.1 Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
4.9.1.2 Verify a Charging Pump is running.
4.9.1.3 Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve 1 -HV-81 04.
Note to examiner: 1-HV-8104 will NOT open, the candidate should proceed to section 4.9.2 Emergency Boration Through The Normal Charging Flow Path.
OATC 4.9.2 Emergency Boration Through The Normal Charging Flow Path.
OATC 4.9.2.1 Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
OATC 4.9.2.2 Verify a Charging Pump is running.
38
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.2.3 Open the following valves:
1 -FV-01 1 OA, BA TO BLENDER 1-FV-01 lOB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT NOTE The following step assumes that with 12 gpm of seal return, 30 gpm will be supplied to the RCS.
OATC 4.9.2.4 Place 1-FIC-0121 in MANUAL.
OATC 4.9.2.5 Adjust 1-FIC-0121 to maintain flow greater than 42 gpm.
OATC 4.9.2.6 Verify Emergency Boration flow 1 -FI-Ol 1 OA is greater than 30 gpm.
OATC 4.9.2.7 IF flow is less than 30 gpm, start the second Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
OATC 4.9.2.8 Operate the Pressurizer Backup Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.
39
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
Main Feed Regulating Valve for loop # 3 fails shut requiring a Reactor trip. When the Reactor trips, 3 rods will stick out requiring an Emergency Boration by the OATC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.2.9 Check plant conditions are consistent with RCS boration:
RCS Tavg may be dropping.
NIS may be dropping.
END OF EVENT 7, proceed to EVENT 8, the MAIN EVENT.
40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-31 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Actuates SI due to inability to maintain PRZR level > 9% per Foldout Page of 19001-C, ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
SS Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
OATC
- 1. Check Reactor Trip: (YES)
Rod Bottom Lights LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN Neutron Flux LOWERING UO
- 2. Check Turbine Trip: (YES)
All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED.
UO
- 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses. (YES) a.
AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
4l6OAClEBusses
- b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.
4l6OVAClEBusses 48OVAClEBusses 41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time PositionL Applicants Action or Behavior OATC
- 4. Check if SI is actuated. (YES)
Any SI annunciators LIT SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT SS Go to Step 6.
- 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.
CREW SS
- 7. Perform the following:
OATC OATC Initial Actions Page UO UO Initial Actions Page NOTE: SS initiates step 8 after OATC/UO Initial Actions completed.
42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS
- 1. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE: (YES)
MLB indication QATC
- 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED. (YES)
CIA MLB indication OATC
- a. CCP5 RUNNING. (YES) b.
SI Pumps RUNNING. (YES)
Note to Examiner: SIP A is tagged out.
c.
RHR pumps RUNNING. (YES) d.
NCP TRIPPED. (YES)
OATC
- 4. Verify CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN.
(YES) 43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS
- 5. Verify proper NSCW system operation: (YES) a.
NSCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN.
b.
NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN hand switches -
IN AUTO:
HS-1668A HS-1669A OATC
- 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:
UO a.
ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED. (YES)
MLB indication b.
NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN. (YES)
MLB indication 44
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC
- 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation.
- a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED. (NO)
CVI MLB indication Critical
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) Close Dampers and Valves.
- 2) Start Piping Pen Units.
Note to examiner. CVI dampers on pages 57 and 58.
OATC
- 8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21 PSIG. (YES)
OATC
- 9. Check ECCS flows:
a.
BIT flow. (YES) b.
RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG. (NO)
RNO
- d. GotoSteplO.
45
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time j Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS
- 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs. (YES)
OATC
- 11. Check ACCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)
OATC
- 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 TO 13 GPM.
OATC
- 13. Dispatch Operator to ensure one train of SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING in service per 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.
END OF OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS, return to E-0 Step 8.
46
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3i SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time [ Position Applicants Action or Behavior UC UO INITIAL ACTIONS
- 1. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING. (YES)
MDAFW Pumps TDAFW Pump, if required.
UQ
- 2. Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10%.
(32% ADVERSE)
RNO
- 2. Establish AFW flow greater than 570 gpm by starting pumps and aligning valves as necessary.
47
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO
- 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated: (NO)
- a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:
Any steamline pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.
Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.
Low Steam Pressure Sl/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ONE TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.
RNO
- a. GotoStep4.
UO
- 4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed: (YES)
MFIVs BFIVs MFRV5 BFRV5 48
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO
- 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated. (YES)
Place SG Blowdown isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.
Note to examiner: The UO will place the HS-7603A valves in the hard closed position.
SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED. (YES)
UO
- 6. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING. (YES)
UO
Note to examiner: IF the UO suspects a SGTR into SG # 3, he may request to isolate AFW flow to SG # 3 to assist in determining which SG is ruptured.
UO
- 8. Verify both MFPs TRIPPED. (YES)
UO
- 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)
END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS, return to step 8 of E-0.
49
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 19000-C, E-0 actions beginning with step 8.
UO
- 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
OATC
- 9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F. (NO)
RNO 9.
IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, (it is)
THEN perform the following as necessary:
- a. Stop dumping steam.
b.
Perform the following as appropriate:
IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10% (32%
ADVERSE),
THEN lower total feed flow.
-OR-If all SG NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE),
THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.
c.
If cooldown continues, THEN close MSIV5 and BSIV5.
d.
If temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.
50
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION: A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.
- 10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:
a.
PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO. (YES) b.
Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED. (YES) c.
Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE. (YES) d.
PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)
RNO
- d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.
Note to examiner: PORV B must be manually cycled to control at 2185 psig.
51
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior
]
OATC 1 1. Check if RCPs should be stopped.
a.
ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)
RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (NO)
RNO a.
GotoStepl2.
UO
- 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:
a.
SG Pressures:
Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner. (NO)
-OR Any completely depressurized.
RNO
- a. GotoStepl3.
52
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 13. Check SG Tubes intact:
a.
Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.
- b. Secondary radiation NORMAL. (YES, possible to see on a couple of rad monitor trends but none will be in alert)
MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:
RE-13120(SG1)
RE-13121 (SG2)
RE-13122(SG3)
RE-13119(SG4)
CNDSR AIR EJCTRISTM RAD MONITORS:
RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)
RE-12839E (if on scale)
STEM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:
RE-0019 (Sample)
RE-0021 (Blowdown)
SG sample radiation.
c.
Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES) d.
Go to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
53
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Simbooth: Report back in 20 minutes that SG # 3 shows activity in the samples IF REQUESTED previously.
SS SS transitions to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
NOTE to Simbooth: Once SS has transitioned to E-3, enter the fault on SG # 3.
54
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG # 3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior VALVE #
DESCRIPTION LOCATION HV-12975 CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO IRC QPCP HV-12976 CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO ORC QPCP HV-12977 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO OFIC QPCP HV-12978 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO IRC QPCP HV-2626A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MAIN QHVC (C31)
(Normally de-energized shut)
HV-2626B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MINI QI-iVC ((C32)
HV-2627A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MAIN QHVC (D31)
(Normally de-energized shut)
HV-2627B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC (D32)
HV-2628A CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV-MAIN QHVC (A33)
(Normally de-energized shut)
HV-2628B CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC ((A34)
HV-2629A CTB NORM PURGE EXH ORC ISO VLV-MAIN QHVC (B33)
(Normally de-energized shut)
HV-2629B CTB MINI PURGE EXH ORC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC (B34)
HV-2624A CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV QHVC (A35)
HV-26248 CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXI-1 IRC ISO VLV QHVC (B35) 55
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR on SG #3 followed by a FW Line Break after transition to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Based on the Foldout Page of 19030-C, the crew will transition back to 19020-C to isolate the faulted steam generator, then back to 19030-C and eventually transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR QHVC (C22)
HV-12605 PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPT QHVC (822)
HV-12606 PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPR QHVC (823)
HV-12607 PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR QHVC (C23)
HV-1 2596 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 ISO VENT VLV QHVC (E22)
HV-12597 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 ISO VENT VLV QHVC (E23)
HS-2548 PIPING PEN RM FLTR & EXH FAN 1 QHVC (A22)
HV-2549 PIPING PEN AM FLTR & EXH FAN 2 QHVC (A23)
HV-12604 56
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 1 9030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE to be followed by a Feedline Break IRC.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior j
CREW
- 1. Initiate the following:
Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-C CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCITON STATUS TREE.
- 2. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.
OATC
- 3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.
OATC
- 4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:
a.
ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)
CCP or Sip Pump b.
RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (NO)
RNO b.
IF RCS pressure lowers to less than 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown in Step 17.
THEN stop all RCPs and return to Step in effect.
Go to Step 5.
57
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE to be followed by a Feedline Break IRC.
[_Time Position [
Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 5. Identify ruptured SG(s) by any of the following conditions.
Unexpected rise in any SG NR level.
High radiation from any SG sample.
High radiation from any SG steamline.
High radiation from any SG blowdown line.
Note to examiner: SG # 3 level will be rising with AFW flow throttled.
Note to examiner: Once SG # 3 has been identified, the Simbooth Operator will insert a DBA Feedwater line break on SG # 3 that will require a transition back to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION and then back to 19030-C. IF identified earlier in E-0, the Simbooth operator will initiate the FW line break as soon as E-3 is entered.
UO Recognize rising steam flow on SGs 1, 2, and 4 and lowering RCS OATC pressure.
SS Transitions to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION based on Foldout Page Criteria.
58
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 (E-2 Actions)
Event
Description:
19020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW
- 1. Initiate critical safety function status trees per 1 9200-C, F-O CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.
- 2. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.
Note to examiner: The SS will call the Simbooth to have the Shift Manager implement NMP-EP-110.
OATC CAUTION: At least one SG should be available for RCS cooldown.
UO
- 3. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.
(NO)
Note to examiner: Auto actuation of the Main Steamline and Critical Bypasses is defeated. The UO will have to manually actuate SLI to satisfy the critical step.
UO
- 4. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:\\
a.
Identify intact SG(s): (#1, 2, and 4 are intact)
SG pressures ANY STABLE OR RISING. (YES) b.
Identify faulted SG(s).
ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES, SG #3)
-OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (maybe by now, SG #3) 59
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 (E-2 Actions)
Event
Description:
1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
Close affected MFIVs:
HV-5227 (SG 1)
HV-5228 (SG 2)
HV-5229 (SG 3)
HV-5230 (SG 4)
Close affected BFIVs:
HV-15196 (SG 1)
HV-15197 (SG 2)
HV-15198 (SG 3)
HV-15199 (SG 4)
UO
- 6. Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):
Close affected MDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:
HV-5139 - SG 1 FROM MDAFW PMP-A HV-5132 - SG 2 FROM MDAFW PMP-B Critical HV-5134 SG 3 FROM MDAFW PMP-B HV-5137-SG 3 FROM MDAFW PMP-A Close affected TDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:
HV-5122 - SG 1 FROM TDAFW HV-5125 SG 2 FROM TDAFW Critical HV-5127 SG 3 FROM TDAFW HV-5120 - SG 3 FROM TDAFW Note to examiner: The valves bolded above are critical at this time IF not already previously closed.
60
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 (E-2 Actions)
Event
Description:
1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 7. Check at least one MDAFW Pump RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF FEEDING SG(s) NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN. (YES)
UO
- 8. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve(s): (N/A)
HV-3009 (SG 1) LP-1 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1 HV-3019 (SG-2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1 UO
CLOSED:
PV-3000 (SG 1)
PV-3010 (SG 2)
PV-3020 (SG 3)
PV-3030 (SG 4)
UO
- 10. Align SGBD valves:
Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches in CLOSE position.
Close sample valves.
HV-9451 (SG 1)
HV-9452 (SG 2)
HV-9453 (SG 3)
HV-9454 (SG 4)
UO
- 11. Verify faulted SG(s) remains isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sampling.
UO
- 12. Check CST level GREATER THAN 15%. (YES) 61
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 (E-2 Actions)
Event
Description:
19020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 13. Initiate checking if SG Tubes intact:
a.
Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.
b.
Secondary radiation NORMAL. (NO)
MAIN STM LINE MONITORS RE-13120(SG1)
RE-13121 (SG 2)
RE-13122 (SG 3)
RE-13119(SG4)
CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:
RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)
RE-12839E (if on scale)
STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:
RE-0019 (Sample)
RE-0021 (Blowdown)
SG sample radiation.
c.
Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
(YES)
SS d.
Goto 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
SS Transitions back to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERTOR TUBE RUPTURE.
62
Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE after return from 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION following feed line break.
[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW
- 1. Initiate the following:
Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-C CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCITON STATUS TREE.
- 2. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.
OATC
- 3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.
OATC
- 4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:
a.
ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)
CCP or Sip Pump b.
RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (YES) c.
Stop all RCPs.
63
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE after return from 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION following feed line break.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO
- 5. Identify ruptured SG(s) by any of the following conditions.
Unexpected rise in any SG NR level.
High radiation from any SG sample.
High radiation from any SG steam line.
High radiation from any SG blowdown line.
Note to examiner: SG # 3 will have been previously identified.
CAUTION: At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
UO
- 6. Isolate ruptured SG(s):
CLOSED.
PV-3000 (SG 1)
PV-3010 (SG 2)
PV-3020 (SG 3)
PV-3030 (SG 4) 64
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE after return from 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION following feed line break.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION: If TDAFW Pump is the only available AFW pump, maintain at least one steam supply OPEN.
UO
- 7. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam supply valve(s): (N/A)
HV-3009 (SG 1) LP-1 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1.
HV-301 9 (SG 2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1.
UO
- 8. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSTION.
OATC
- 9. Isolate flow from the ruptured SG(s) by closing its Main Steamline isolation and Bypass Valves.
65
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2012-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.:
8 Event
Description:
DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE after return from 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION following feed line break.
Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS:
This procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure that break flow in the ruptured SG(s) is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.
Any ruptured SG that is also faulted, should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sample.
UO
- 10. Check ruptured SG(s) level:
a.
SG NR level - GREATER THAN 10% (32% ADVERSE).
(NO)
- b. Stop feed flow to ruptured SG(s).
Note to examiner: AFW flow should remain isolated to SG # 3 due to the CAUTIONS above.
UO
(NO)
RNO SS
- 11. Go to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
END OF EVENT 8, END OF THE SCENARIO.
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